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c t :
This dissertation seeks to explain how civil society organizations can positively affect 
peace consolidation based on cases of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
community based (CBOs) organizations from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan. It aims 
to determine how and why civil society organizations behave as they do in post-conflict, 
post-communist, contexts, and assess their contribution to peace. The link between civil 
society and peace has been assumed in research literature, but little comparative empirical 
research has been carried out to explain its nature. This dissertation is an attempt to fill this 
gap.
I describe how liberal and communal definitions o f civil society are applicable to the Tajik 
and Bosnian cases based on a brief historical analysis. NGOs are found to be the most 
significant organizational representation of liberal civil society, and CBOs, especially 
mahallas (neighborhoods) and mjesne zajednice (local communities), o f communal civil 
society in the postwar period. I outline key post conflict challenges, classifying them as 
institutional, behavioral, political-economic and rights based. I develop a series of 
preliminary hypotheses on civil society organizations’ possible contributions based on civil 
society and peace literature. These assumptions are tested through case studies o f two 
NGOs and two CBOs.
I determine how the post-conflict, post-communist, environments influenced organizations’ 
choices of missions, programs, linkages, structures and funding sources. I conclude that 
experienced and charismatic leadership, clear missions, ability to build trust, understanding 
of donor relations, and well-developed linkages, were essential for success. I confirm many 
of the assumptions regarding civil society’s potential to positively affect peace, but find 
some critical differences. One important conclusion is that not only inter-communal but 
also intra-communal organizations can support peace.
2
T a b le  o f  C o n t e n t s :
Abstract 2
Table of contents 3
Acknowledgements 6
Acronyms 8
Introduction 10
The country case studies 12
The literature deficit 14
The thesis outline 16
Chapter 1. Civil society in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina: Between Liberal 
and Communal Conceptualizations.
Introduction 18
I. Rival concepts of civil society 19
II. Civil society in Tajikistan: historical evolution of a concept 28
III. Historical definition of civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina 39
IV. General features of civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan 49
Conclusions 52
Chapter 2. Making Peace: Four Approaches to Peace Consolidation
Introduction 55
I. The institution-building approach to peace consolidation 57
II. Peace consolidation as conflict resolution and behavioral change 61
III. Political economy interpretations of war and peace 66
III. Rights based approach to war and peace 71
IV. Peace consolidation in practice in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan 76
Conclusions 90
Chapter 3: Challenges of studying civil society organizations comparatively in post­
war contexts.
Introduction 92
I. Research design and conceptual framework 93
II. Organizational case study selection 98
III. Research methodology: data collection and analysis 101
IV. Opportunities and limitations of field work in post-conflict settings 108
Conclusions 172
Chapter 4. NGOs as a Form of Liberal Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Tajikistan.
Introduction 114
I Origins, missions and values of the case study NGOs 115
II. NGO programs and tactics 130
III. NGO linkages 149
IV. NGO structures and funding 159
Conclusions 172
Chapter 5. Village Organizations and Mjesne Zajednice: The Post-War Re-Emergence 
of Communal Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan.
Introduction 175
I. Origins and history of local self governance and community development in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan. 176
II. Missions and values of the case study CBOs. 182
III. Activities, tasks and tactics of the case study CBOs. 195
IV. Linkages of the case study CBOs 206
V. Structures and funding of the case study CBOs 214
Conclusions 232
Chapter 6. Civil Society Organizations’ affect on Peace Consolidation in Tajikistan 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Introduction 235
I. Civil society organizations’ affect on institution building 235
II. Civil society organizations’ affect on conflict resolution 245
III. Civil society organizations’ affect on greed and grievance 253
IV. Civil society effect on the rights-based peace project 
Conclusion
260
265
Conclusion 266
Introduction 266
Civil society in post-communist, post-war contexts 267
Policy issues 272
Conclusion 274
Bibliography 276
Interviews Referenced 297
Annex 1: Sample Interview Questionnaire 300
Annex 2: Glossary 304
Map of Bosnia-Herzegovina 306
Map of Tajikistan 307
5
A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s :
I am grateful to a large number of persons who assisted me in the preparation and 
completion of this dissertation. I am very fortunate to have had the guidance of professors 
who are not only remarkable for their outstanding scholarship but also for their activism in 
civil society. My supervisors Prof. Mary Kaldor and Dr. David Lewis provided tremendous 
intellectual stimulus and support. It was an honor to be one of their students. Dr. Helmut 
Anheier offered me a Lord Dahrendorf Scholarship, a unique opportunity to join the LSE 
Center for Civil Society, and valuable direction during my first 18 months as a PhD 
candidate. I would also like to acknowledge Prof. Gene Lyons and Prof. Anne Sa’adah at 
Dartmouth College who first helped me develop my research skills, taught me the value of 
internationalism, and encouraged me to continue with academic study.
This thesis is based on case studies and thus on the vision and beliefs of the individuals 
who committed themselves to the organizations that I examined. I would like to 
acknowledge as a group those persons from Zene Zenama, Ghamkhori, the Sevarlije Board 
for Return/  MZ, and the Karategin Valley VOs who spent long hours with me to explain 
their personal stories and engagement in civil society. In addition I thank the young people 
of the hCa Youth Network and the Youth EcoCenter o f Tajikistan who I interviewed, and 
who inspired me greatly, but whose organizations I did not include in this PhD.
I benefited from much support, advice and friendship in Bosnia-Herzegovina since I began 
conducting research there in 1993. Nuna Zvizdic showed me the power of non-violent 
conflict resolution and of women committed to affecting change. Damir Hadzic shared war 
and post-war experiences, offered knowledge and advice, and opened the doors of Sevarlije 
to me. Lejla Hrasnica was a supportive friend and host. Eco and Beba helped me know 
what it means to be part of a Bosnian community.
Prof. Kamol Abdullaev introduced me to the history and courage of the Tajik people. Prof. 
Alla Kuvatova and Prof. Margarita Khegai first shared with me the accomplishments of
6
women in Tajikistan. I was inspired by Bahodur, Mikhail, Mavjuda, Dilorom, Malika and 
all the rest of the Ghamkhori staff. Mahmadali Saidov and Jodgor Faizov from MSDSP 
believed in the value of my research and gave me unique access to the village 
organizations. Olga Grigoreva, Manuchehr Kholov and Bokhtar Bakozade were tireless 
research partners and friends. In Uzbekistan on my trips in and out of Tajikistan, Lola 
Maksudova and her husband Timur shared warmth and hospitality.
In Tajikistan I was hosted as a colleague by the staff of UNTOP. Ambassador Ivo Petrov 
provided me full access to the resources of the UN mission, and Lilia Zaharieva facilitated 
all my first steps, Gisella Nauk and Mr. Bian Vitunic were always there for long debates. 
Political advisors Rahid Abdullaev and Mukhibullo Zubaidulloev walked me through the 
history of the Tajik conflict and provided invaluable insights into the country’s political 
scene. The staff of the OSCE, my former employer in Central Asia, treated me like one of 
their own, assisting with the organization of meetings, sharing experiences and friendship. I 
especially want to thank Jamila Sharipova in Garm, Sameddin Loikov in Shartuz, Harald 
Jepsen and Nigina Alieva in Khojand. Many other people in Tajikistan offered my insights 
and assessments, including Christopher Buckley, Mark Whitton, and Sara Robinson.
The unwavering support of my parents, brother Eric, and aunt Nicole encouraged me at 
every stage of the dissertation. I spent many long months away from my partner Ercan but 
his love and belief in me provided the motivation to complete this PhD. Friends Paola 
Grenier and Babken Babajanian in London offered me generous hospitality and hours full 
of discussion and debate. My colleagues at the Center for Civil Society always made it a 
pleasure to be in London. Daniel Stevens painstakingly edited and commented on my final 
draft.
This dissertation is based on the inputs, support, and advice of a very large number of 
individuals who assisted me. I cannot name you all. However I hope that this work will in 
some way reward your trust and confidence.
7
A c r o n y m s :
ADB Asian Development Bank
ADDC Association of District Development Committees
AKF Aga Khan Foundation
ASTI Association of Scientific and Technical Intelligentsia (ASTI)
CAIP Community Action Investment Program
CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CBO Community based organization
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CNR Commission on National Reconciliation
CPT Communist Party of Tajikistan
DFID Department for International Development
DM German mark
DP Displaced person
DRA Dutch Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
ECCP European Center for Conflict Prevention
ECHO European Community Humanitarian Organization
ESI European Stability Initiative
EU European Union
GBAO Gomo-Badakshon Autonomous Oblast
GFAP General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNP Gross National Product
GONGO Government Organized NGO
GTZ Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit
HCA Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly
HDZ Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska stranka)
HRCC Human Rights Coordination Center
HRW Human Rights Watch
IBHI International Bureau for Humanitarian Issues
IC International Community
ICG International Crisis Group
ICNL International Center for Not-for-profit Law
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
ICVA International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IDPM Institute for Development Policy and Management (Manchester University)
IEBL Inter-Entity Border Line
IFOR (Nato) Implementation Force
IFRC International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IMF International Monetary Fund
10 International organization
IPTF International Police Task Force
IRP Islamic Republican Party
8
JDC Jamoat Development Committee
KM Convertible Mark
KWHP Khatlon Women’s Health Program
LNGO Local non-governmental organization
MONGO Mafia organized NGO
MSDSP Mountain Societies Development Support Program
MZ Neighborhood community (Mjesna zajednica)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-governmental organization
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OHCHR (UN) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OHR Office of the High Representative
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSI Open Society Institute
P/CRO Peace/Conflict Resolution Organization
PIC Peace Implementation Council
PONGO Party Organized NGO
PRO V AW Project for the Reduction of Violence Against Women
RS Serb Republic (Republika Srpska)
RRDP Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Development Program
RRTF Return and Reconstruction Task Force
SCOT Swiss Cooperation Office Tajikistan
SDA Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratske akcije)
SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SDP Social Democratic Party (Socijaldemokratska Partija)
SDS Serb Democratic Party (Srpska demokratske stranka)
SKOJ Yugoslav League of Communist Youth
SFOR (NATO) Stability Force
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency
SU Soviet Union
Tacis Technical Assistance to the CIS
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMiBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina
UNMOT United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNTOP United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace Building
US United States
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USCR United States Commission for Refugees
USIP United States Institute of Peace
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UTO United Tajik Opposition
VO Village Organization
WB World Bank
WHO World Health Organization
Introduction
I n t r o d u c t i o n :
WHAT CIVIL SOCIETY AFTER CIVIL WAR?
Introduction:
After civil wars have ended, how can civil society positively affect peace consolidation? 
This dissertation seeks to answer this question through the study of local civil society 
organizations in two countries - Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina -  five years after the 
end of armed hostilities. With fanfare Tajikistan celebrated the fifth anniversary of the 
General Agreement on the Establishment o f Peace and National Accord in 2002, as did 
Bosnia-Herzegovina the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), in 2000. In 
both cases five years after the signing of peace agreements armed violence had ended, 
refugees and displaced persons had started to return home, a central government had been 
elected, economic production had restarted, and society had begun to shift its thoughts from 
traumatic war experiences to hopes for a better future. Amidst these significant 
transformations what positive role did Tajik and Bosnian civil society organizations play?
The aim of this dissertation is to explain how civil society organizations can positively 
affect peace consolidation in post-communist post-war contexts based on cases of non­
governmental organizations (NGOs) and community based organizations (CBOs) from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan. The connection between civil society and peace has 
been assumed for the past decade but little comparative empirical research has been carried 
out to explain it further. The link was first made in the early 1990s when two of the loudest 
buzzwords in the academic and policy-making worlds were peace building and civil 
society. At the end of the Cold War there were rising expectations of a new world order in 
which the international community had the capacity to secure peace and stability in a host 
of trouble spots. The twin United Nations (UN) documents An Agenda for Peace (1992) 
and Building Peace and Development (1994) clearly reflected the international 
community’s early optimism. The 1989 revolutions in Central Europe meanwhile came to 
represent the victory of civil society -  of groups such as Charter 77, Solidarity, and the
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Danube Circle -  over authoritarianism. In policy documents from the UN to the World 
Bank (WB), from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to 
Oxfam, civil society was glorified as an essential component of peace building, 
democratization, and development. Civil society organizations were credited with the 
ability to fill democratic deficits in governmental institutions and decision-making; to 
support transition from state-controlled to capitalist market economies; to address the 
breakdown of social cohesion and trust by facilitating reconciliation; to transform popular 
emotions of greed and grievances; and to strengthen the rule of law and human rights 
protection in post-war contexts.
Ten years later, the optimism that the international community could secure peace and 
stability, and that civil society organizations could play an important role in peace 
consolidation, had begun to fade. Academics, policy-makers and development workers had 
all become more self-critical and wary about their capacities, and those of civil society, to 
build peace. Debate and ambivalence confronted the practical and conceptual usefulness of 
the terms “peace building” and “civil society.” The discourse on civil society, and more 
particularly on NGOs, was criticized by activists and academics alike as a fig leaf 
concealing international and mainly Western inaction or indifference to human suffering, 
both in humanitarian operations and development (Pearce, 2000: 20).
This study seeks to approach the question of the affect of civil society organizations on 
peace from a fresh perspective - neither bogged down in the current theoretical and 
practical malaise, nor duped by the earlier magic. Though there has been substantial debate 
on civil society’s affect on peace, few attempts have been made to study actual experiences 
in post-war contexts comparatively to explain the nature and strength of the link. When 
work on this dissertation began in 2000 the challenge to reconcile the literatures on civil 
society and peace consolidation remained largely unfulfilled. As Varshney noted in Ethnic 
Conflict and Civic Life (2002: 5), “thus far scholars have either worked on civil society or 
on ethnic conflict, but no systematic attempt has been made to connect the two.”
This dissertation is an attempt to contribute to this bridging process. Its novelty is to 
propose an in-depth analysis of a handful of local civil society organizations, in two
11
Introduction
countries at peace for five years, to explain not only how these groups behaved, but also 
why they behaved as they did. The organizations chosen for analyses were popularly 
perceived to be strong groups with the organizational capacity to effect change. As these 
groups are those most likely to be able to influence peace consolidation, this study aimed to 
explain the nature of their missions, activities, funding, leadership and ultimately their 
contribution to peace, in the post-war and post-communist contexts of Tajikistan and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Examples of NGOs and CBOs were considered. In the literature on 
civil society the former are generally described as being representatives of liberal civil 
society, and the later forms of communal civil society. Civil society scholarship has 
established a liberal/communal dichotomy based on the assignment of ideal types based on 
the missions, organizational structures and political aims of different groups. Ultimately 
this thesis also seeks to assess the appropriateness of this dichotomy in post war settings.
The country case studies:
Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina were selected as country case studies because they 
share distinct attributes as post-communist states -  bom out of the disintegration of larger 
federations -  with important Muslim populations. In choosing one country from the 
Balkans, and one from Central Asia, I hoped to advance theoretical and policy-orientated 
findings that are applicable throughout both regions -  and potentially could also be of use 
to studies of peace processes in the Caucasus.
Before comparing the two countries, it is important to note the existence of some 
significant differences in historical socio-political developments in Tajikistan and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. The nature of communism in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was not the 
same.1 In Yugoslavia greater emphasis was given to popular participation and self­
management, through a wide range of committees in the workplace and the community, 
than in the Soviet Union. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia while strong, did not 
hold a monopoly on decision-making to the same degree as the Communist Party did in the 
USSR. Small farms were never nationalized and citizens had the right to profits made from 
their production. Yugoslavs could travel outside their state borders and individual freedoms
11 employ the term “communism” out o f convention, though in the Yugoslav case it may be more appropriate 
to speak of “socialism.”
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were generally more widely respected than in the Soviet Union. The nature of Sunni Islam 
in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina -  and particularly popular Islam’s influence on 
society -  was not comparable. In Tajikistan before 1991 Islam was the religion of the vast 
majority of the population. In Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991 43.8% of the population 
declared themselves to be “Muslim,” while according to a 1985 survey only 17% of the 
total Bosnian population described themselves as religiously observant (Ramet, 1996: 155, 
187). Although religion was more harshly repressed under the Soviet Union than in 
Yugoslavia; in Tajikistan, Muslim traditions, values and rituals were more faithfully 
maintained among the population. A third fundamental difference between the two 
countries relates to their geopolitical and cultural location. Bosnia-Herzegovina exists on 
the edge of Europe, and it can only questionably be considered as “non-Western.” 
Lockwood’s 1975 book titled “European Moslems” aptly reflected the dual -  
complementary and contradictory -  identity of Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslims. Tajikistan’s 
position bordering China, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, amongst others, clearly puts it in 
the non-Westem sphere.
Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina share the painful experience of having gone through 
violent wars following the breakup of the Federations to which they belonged. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 2, various theories have been developed to explain the causes of war 
in both countries. While in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina the conflict is generally 
defined as internal, theorists have also explored the influence of external actors. As fighting 
developed in the two countries, it pitted groups from different regions against one another. 
Consequently certain regions suffered more than others. Internal displacement caused by 
attempts to flee armed confrontations and “ethnic cleansing” changed the population 
distribution. In particular there was a large-scale movement of rural groups to urban areas. 
The conflicts in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina shared some characteristics, yet they 
were also very different in nature, as were the processes of conflict termination. As Gidron, 
Katz and Hasenfeld do in the introduction to their study on “Peace/Conflict-Resolution 
Organizations in Northern Ireland, South Africa and Israel/Palestine”, I would like to stress 
that the comparisons presented in this work focus on civil society, and not on the conflicts 
or peace consolidation processes the two countries underwent (2002: 23). I am assuming
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that civil society organizations in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina are comparable based 
on the fact that they share specific features and address certain similar post-war challenges.
Furthermore, in comparing civil society in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, I am 
purposely studying organizations operating in two countries whose peace processes were 
differently affected by two significant variables -  the strength of international involvement 
and the centralization of the state. In both conflicts international mediation and intervention 
helped secure peace. Yet in the first five years after the signing of the peace agreements, 
the level of international political and financial involvement in the peace process was much 
greater in Bosnia-Herzegovina than in Tajikistan.2 While both Tajikistan and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina were challenged by the task of (re)-establishing effective state institutions in 
the post-war period, the state defined in the Tajik peace settlement was a centralized one, 
while the Bosnian state was de-centralized and divided. Due to these differences, with 
Bosnia-Herzegovina an international protectorate benefiting from large-scale foreign 
support and possessing a weak state, the expectation would be that civil society would play 
a much larger role in peace consolidation there than in Tajikistan. In Chapter 6 these 
significant differences between Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina will provide useful 
basis for comparisons to draw hypotheses on the key interconnections between civil 
society, international intervention, and the state.
The literature deficit:
Few extensive empirical and theoretical studies have analyzed the affect of local civil 
society organizations on peace from a comparative perspective. Three that have are: a 
comparative research project entitled Peace/Conflict-Resolution Organizations in Northern 
Ireland, South Africa and Israel/Palestine by Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002); a large- 
scale analysis of Peace Building and Complex Political Emergencies which looked at the
2 The population in Bosnia-Herzegovina is less than 4 million inhabitants and the population o f Tajikistan is 
estimated at more than 6 million. The Priority Reconstruction Program for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
involved 48 donors, committed $4.37 billion between 1996 and 2000 (USAID, Fiscal Year 2000 
Congressional Presentation Bosnia-Herzegovina, http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000 retrieved 04.2001). In 
comparison the lead relief donor in Tajikistan, USAID provided approximately $36 million in 1998-2000 
(USAID, Fiscal Year 2000 Congressional Presentation Tajikistan, http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000 
retrieved 04.2001) and the UN’s Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Tajikistan 2000 amounted to $34.8 
million UN Office for the Coordination o f Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “United Nations Consolidated
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role of NGOs in peace building in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Liberia by Hulme and 
Goodhand (1997-2000); and a World Bank-sponsored study on Violent Conflict and the 
Transformation o f Social Capital; Lessons jrom Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala and 
Somalia by Colletta and Cullen (2000). Together with these works I have found Varshney’s 
2002 book Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India particularly 
relevant to my study.
While the first two studies focus on NGOs’ affect on peace, Varshney and Colletta and 
Cullen consider not only NGOs but also the influence of CBOs. Varshney argues that in 
many country contexts outside Western Europe and Northern America, formal associations 
that fit a liberal definition of civil society do not exist. Thus he (2002: 44) underlines the 
necessity of looking at other representations of civic engagement where people “connect, 
talk, share views, formulate strategies.” As will be described in Chapter 1, I am terming 
this type of civil society “communal.” CBOs fit within this definition. One of my aims in 
this dissertation is to assess whether making the distinction between communal and liberal 
forms of civil society organizations is empirically useful when examining the groups’ 
likelihood to contribute to peace consolidation.
Another debate found in the literature concerns the role of intra-communal or inter- 
communal civil society, or bonding and bridging social capital, in facilitating peace 
processes. Studying inter-community zones of peace between Hindus and Muslims 
Varshney concludes that wtercommunal and not m/racommunity engagement was key. 
“The key determinant of peace is wtercommunal civic life, not civic life per se” (2002: 
282).3 Colletta and Cullen’s (2000) findings in a study of peace processes in four countries 
were similar. However in addition to m/ercommunal associations which they relate to 
bridging social capital, they concluded that w/racommunal linkages, which are based on 
bonding social capital, can serve as a basis for consolidating peace.4 They state (2000: 122)
Inter-Agency Appeal for Tajikistan 2001”, 2 November, 2000. http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf. retrieved 
04.2001).
3 However in a footnote (2002: 368) he added “this finding and the logic underlying it, does raise a question: 
are there any conditions under which intraethnic, intra-communal associations can play a peaceful role? [...] 
This is a tremendously important question, but it as yet [sic] not empirically explored.”
4 Social capital can be defined as “the features of social organizations, such as trust, norms and networks, that 
can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam, 1993: 36).
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that in post-war contexts, “resilient communities rely on all forms of responsibility and 
social capital: bonding primary ties for protection and survival in times of crisis; bridging 
links for action and development in times of hope.” Bonding social capital refers to kinship 
and other intra-group networks or associations; while bridging social capital relates to those 
networks or associations that link individuals and groups beyond major social categories or 
cleavages (WB, 2002: iv). This dissertation in part seeks to determine whether Varshney 
and Colletta and Cullen’s findings are verified in the Tajik and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
contexts.
Previous case studies have examined the processes of peace consolidation in Tajikistan and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nevertheless the vast majority of these works were concerned with 
the interaction between international peace efforts and the domestic peace process. They 
were much less focused on how domestic and indigenous factors influence peace. Except in 
a few cases -  in accounts on Mostar for example -  the national level has been the main 
frame of analysis. How peace evolved at the community level in specific towns and 
villages in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina has rarely been written about outside policy 
papers prepared by groups such as the International Crisis Group (ICG) and the European 
Stability Initiative (ESI).
This study thus seeks to contribute to the existing literature by providing a detailed 
description of what kind of civil society organizations have positively affected peace 
consolidation in two post-Communist and mainly Muslim countries.
The thesis outline:
Two levels of analysis, the national level and community level, are employed in this thesis. 
I seek first to understand what definition of civil society best applies in Tajikistan and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Based on the existing civil society literature, and a brief historical 
analysis of civil society’s evolution in the two countries in Chapter 1, I find that 
organizational representations fitting the liberal and communal civil society ideal type 
existed in both post-war contexts. I subsequently try to determine what civil society’s 
positive impact could be -  in other words to distinguish the main components of peace 
consolidation. In Chapter 2 I thus outline key post-conflict challenges classifying them as
16
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institutional, behavioral, political-economic and rights based. Based on these two macro­
level studies I develop preliminary hypotheses on possible positive contributions that civil
»
society organizations could make to peace consolidation. Secondly I seek to test these 
hypotheses and deepen my findings by analyzing a small number of civil society groups. I 
refer to positive cases of organizationally sound groups that seemingly had an impact to 
better understand why this was so. In Chapter 3 I describe the methodology employed and 
some of the challenges of conducting research on civil society in post-conflict 
environments. I explain how I selected my case study organizations. Chapters 4 and 5 
present materials on the specific organizational case studies. In Chapter 4 the values, 
programs, linkages and structures of the NGOs Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori are 
analyzed in detail. In Chapter 5 the CBOs Mjesna Zajednica Sevarlije and Karategin Valley 
Village Organizations are similarly studied. Chapter 6 looks more closely at how the case 
studies affected peace consolidation, and considers whether the communal/liberal civil 
society dichotomy is useful to assess this affect. I conclude with several theoretical 
conclusions and policy recommendations on civil society and peace consolidation.
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IChapter one
C h a p t e r  O n e
C iv il  so c ie t y  in  Ta jik ist a n  a n d  B o sn ia -H e r z e g o v in a : b e t w e e n  l ib e r a l  a n d
COMMUNAL CONCEPTUALIZATIONS
Introduction:
Since the end of the Cold War practitioners and scholars have contended that civil society 
can positively affect peace consolidation. In the immediate post-war period, leading 
international organizations engaged in peace efforts in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
identified civil society as a key actor in the peace process. In the Bosnian case, the Peace 
Implementation Council (Final Document) stated in December 1998 that the development 
of civil society is “essential to democratic society” and vital to “promote the healing of the 
wounds of war, to protect the peace.” In its 2001 Action Plan, the Human Rights 
Coordination Center (HRCC, 2001a: 9) - a forum led by the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR) including all other major international agencies - affirmed that 
“NGOs and Associations are to play a crucial role in the transition phase, taking over most 
of the tasks currently fulfilled by the IC (international community).” Similarly, in 
Tajikistan, international donor and policy making agencies considered that civil society 
could significantly affect peace consolidation. In its 2002-2004 Strategy Paper for Central 
Asia, the European Commission (2002: 19) stated that “to eliminate sources of political and 
social tension” in the region it will support reforms “aimed at establishing good 
governance, the rule of law, functioning civil societies, respect for fundamental freedoms 
and other OSCE values.” UNDP (2002) was committed to “support government and civil 
society partnership to address the persistent threat of poverty and to strengthen local 
governance institutions.” While influential policy makers appeared convinced that civil 
society could positively affect peace consolidation, they were rarely in agreement on what 
elements of the peace project civil society could influence. They also did not always share a 
common understanding of what they meant by “civil society.”
What civil society is most likely to positively affect peace? Civil society is a highly debated
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term. It has alternatively been conceived as an idea, a political goal and an organizational 
form. Several authors (Kaldor, 2003: 22-27; Stevens, 2004: 24; Van Rooy, 1998: 30) have 
identified the existence of a tension between normative and descriptive understandings of 
civil society. Yet Kaldor (2003: 16-31) also argues that all versions of civil society are both 
normative and descriptive. They describe a political project as a goal, and at the same time 
an actual existing reality. In the following chapter I will thus consider civil society as a 
social reality and a socio-political project. I will first propose two main definitions of civil 
society, that are both normative and descriptive ideal types, terming them liberal and 
communal. Thereafter I will apply these theoretical definitions to the study of the historical 
evolution of Tajik and Bosnian civil society in the expectation that they can help us 
understand the nature of post-war civil society in the two countries.
I. Rival concepts of civil society:
Debates on civil society have traditionally shadowed great historical processes of change; 
and the various definitions of civil society have been significantly affected by the social- 
political developments that surrounded their emergence (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999; 
Howell and Pearce, 2001: 16-38; Kaldor, 2001, 2003; Keane, 1988, 1998). The most recent 
discussion on civil society is generally considered to have commenced during the late 
1980s - early 1990s with the massive social and political upheaval that transformed the 
nature of the state in East and Central Europe. Since then civil society’s meaning, form and 
nature has been the subject of much polemic among scholars and practitioners. One way in 
which this contention has been addressed is through the creation of ideal types (Glasius, 
Lewis, Seckinelgin, 2004), which suggest ways that civil society has developed as system 
of values, political project, and organisational form. Most frequently in the literature these 
ideal types operate in opposition rather then in symbiosis. In the following section two 
ideal types - the liberal and communal form of civil society -  are described.1
La Liberal definitions o f civil society:
The increase in interest in civil society that started in the mid-1980s was directly linked to 
changes in East and Central Europe and the empowerment of dissident opposition
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movements. At that time, Havel (1985) and Michnik (1985) wrote about civil society’s 
ability to serve as an essential form of anti-politics. As described by Michnik (1999) the 
“first institutions of civil society” were created in Poland in 1976. These “enclaves of 
independence” aimed “to allow people to defend themselves against the Communist State.” 
According to Havel (1985: 78-79) it is at this stage that the dissident movements began to 
support the development of parallel political structures -  “initial attempts at social self­
organization.” Shortly thereafter Western theorists (Arato and Cohen, 1992; Gellner, 1994; 
Keane, 1988, 1998; Seligman, 1992) started to speak openly about civil society’s ability to 
undermine the tyranny of the state. They pondered the practical and theoretical challenges 
behind using the civil society concept in East and Central European countries where 
decades of communism had put them on radically different trajectories from that of 
Western Europe.
These theorists drew inspiration from the classical concept of civil society in which civil 
society was normatively grounded. As a source of civic responsibility and public virtue it 
contributed to the public good (Lewis, 2001: 45). “.Societas civilis” should be distinguished 
from the state of nature, an environment according to Hobbes (in Arato and Cohen, 1992: 
22-23) “of continual fear, and danger of violent death,” in which “the life of man is 
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” Civil society was “synonymous with polite society, 
a society in which strangers act in a civilized way towards each other, treating each other 
with mutual respect, tolerance and confidence (Kaldor, 2003: 17).” “Civil” was the 
operative word and according this definition “a civil society means a good society (Van 
Rooy, 1998:12).
This theoretical conceptualization of civil society closely linked the development of civil
thsociety to “modernity.” It understood civil society as having first appeared in 18 Century 
Western Europe, the period of the creation of nation-states. According to this understanding 
“to be a member of a civil society was to be a citizen -  a member of the state” (Keane, 
1988: 36). Members of such a society (men at least) would therefore have the right to vote 
and serve in public office; participation in public affairs was institutionalized. In Global
1 Other ideal types have been proposed elsewhere. For example in the Latin American context, Avritzer 
(2004) identifies the existence o f liberal, participatory and ‘uncivil’ forms o f civil society, while Pearce
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Civil Society: An Answer to War, Kaldor (2003: 31) persuasively argues that “the 
emergence of the [civil society] concept was linked to the formation of states and the 
centralization of political power in a given territory.” Incidentally it was also associated 
with urbanization and industrialization: men who migrated to cities in search of 
employment joined groups to defend their interests and fill a sense of encroaching malaise 
caused by their uprooting from their traditional social networks based on kinship and 
proximity. A civil society was characterized by the rule of law, based on individual rights 
and reinforced by a state with a monopoly on violence.
Liberal civil society was thus also conceived as a political project, which aimed to promote 
public participation in decision-making, good governance and democratization. In 17th and
th18 century Europe, civil society provided a means for members of mainly urban classes to 
question decisions taken by their rulers and advocate for their interests. In the 1990s civil 
society was again given this function when it was praised for its ability to contribute to 
democratic consolidation by “stabilizing expectation and social bargaining, generating a 
more civic normative environment, bringing actors closer to the political process, reducing 
the burdens of governance and checking potential abuses of power (Diamond, Plattner, Chu 
and Tien 1997: xxxi).” It was defined as being closely linked to the state and political 
parties that contest elections, while nevertheless maintaining an autonomous identity. This 
civil society was about “the need for self-organized groups and institutions outside the state 
and for political parties to be able to act and speak honestly without concern for the capture 
of political power (Kaldor, 1999a).” According to Gellner’s (1994:5) oft cited definition,
“Civil society is that set o f diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to 
counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role o f keeper of  
the peace and arbitrator of major interests, can nevertheless prevent if  from dominating or 
atomizing the rest o f society.”
Having gained strength in numbers, citizens in independent organizations were empowered 
to open a dialogue with government to protect their interests. Liberal civil society was thus 
understood as having the ability to encourage popular participation in policy-formulation
(2004) distinguishes between a radical and liberal view of civil society.
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and implementation, as well as political decision-making. Civil society and liberal 
democracy were believed to be mutually reinforcing, the stability and efficacy of the 
democratic systems dependent on the existence of a vibrant civil society that held elected 
officials accountable.
Liberal civil society was also conceived as having a role in the economic sphere. As the 
state-controlled economy crumbled in post-socialist East and Central Europe, civil society 
was deemed as having the potential to make a significant contribution to social service 
provision encouraging the privatization of welfare assistance. Billis and Glennerster argued 
in 1998 that “Distinct from the state and the market, and as a provider of social services” 
civil society “has a special role in the economies of liberal democratic developed regimes.” 
As a provider of services “nonprofits will have an advantage when societal is combined 
with financial disadvantage (Billis and Glennerster, 1998: 22).” Civil society was 
considered able to support “structural reform” and the strengthening of private property 
(Hyden 1997:25). Civil society was also perceived as having the ability to serve as a 
positive economic actor in parts of Africa and South Africa where state-led development 
projects were largely deemed to have failed by the 1980s (Lewis 1999:1).
Civil society that fits within the liberal definition may take up modes of action that fit 
within a “neo-liberal” or an “activist” ideology. The neo-liberal project is more concerned 
with improving relations between state-market-citizen, and the conditions of the 
communities it operates in, through service provision. It considers that civil society can 
serve as a substitute for the state. It is the definition most favored by international donors 
and policy makers, who see it as a way of smoothing the path towards democratization and 
market reform, and providing a safety net for economic and political disenfranchised 
individuals. The activist project on the other hand recognizes civil society as a potential 
opposition to the centers of political and economic power. It is involved in a clear struggle 
to change society and the relations between the centers of power and citizens, to make the 
state more accountable, through public and political action. The “activist” interpretation is 
critical of the market, and neo-liberal driven globalization, which has tended to deepen 
economic inequalities (Kaldor, 2003: 8; Howell and Peace, 2001: 31-37).
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According to the liberal definition, civil society can be conceived as an organizational form 
where civil society is “the realm of autonomous voluntary organizations, acting in the 
public sphere as an intermediary between the state and private life” (Diamond and Plattner, 
1996: xxii). NGOs, unions, and public interest groups who operate in a democratic 
environment best exemplified this form of civil society. Liberal civil society associations 
tended to be defined as only those groups that are explicitly political or “civic” (Hyden, 
1997: 30). They were seen as independent of the state, family and local community bonds 
(Gellner, 1994). Civil society organizations were also related to the voluntary sector made 
up of organizations that are private, non-profit distributing, self-governing and voluntary 
(Salamon and Anheier 1996). Based on this understanding, NGOs became the most 
common and distinct embodiment of liberal civil society, in Eastern and Central Europe in 
the 1990s.
The liberal conceptualization of civil society provided the theoretical foundations for a 
large scale Western political project to assist civil society’s development throughout East 
and Central Europe. It was grounded in the belief that indigenous nascent civil society 
groups could be strengthened through external funding and capacity building. It was a 
specific policy objective that in practice most often translated into support for domestic 
NGOs (USAID: 1999:3). NGOs -  particularly those engaged in advocacy -  were assumed 
to be a critical segment of civil society that could promote democratization (Ottaway and 
Carothers, 2000: 295). Western civil society aid involved not only direct funding but also 
supporting the creation of an environment more conducive to NGO development. The 
environment promoted freedom of association, individualization, a non-autocratic state, 
social stability and economic development (McCarthy et al in Anheier and Seibel, 1998: 
178).
Processes of globalization have broadened the definition of liberal civil society to extend 
beyond the nation-state to fit within a global perspective. As such, global liberal civil 
society is considered to be a space and an organizational form. It has been described as 
being made up of forums or “institutions where citizens of the planet may discuss the 
problems and take the decisions that shape their destiny” (Archibugi, 1995:157). Included 
are parallel summits and meetings of non-governmental groups in inter-governmental
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forums. At the global level, through the promotion of transnational socio-political causes 
(such as women’s rights, environmental protection), liberal agents of civil society have 
been considered capable of providing a voice to citizens and a means to hold international 
multilateral institutions accountable (Clark, 2003: 165; Colas, 2002: 144-145; Kaldor, 
2003). In this form liberal civil society is best represented by international NGOs, including 
development organizations that seek to attenuate liberalization and privatization strategies 
which are part of most international financial institutions’ structural adjustment programs, 
and humanitarian groups that provide emergency aid in times of war.
I. b Communal definitions o f civil society:
A second definition of civil society, which we shall term “communal,” began to gain 
currency in the mid-late 1990s and questioned many of the assumptions and arguments 
made by liberal theorists. The communal definition primarily became influential among 
scholars and activists studying parts of the world considered “non-Western.” For as Keene 
(1998: 23-31) described, “the footprint of the term has spread well beyond the boundaries 
of Europe” during the 1990s from Africa, to East Asia and into the Muslim world. While 
liberal civil society theorists tended to be political scientists and economists, western 
scholars attempting to redefine civil society in non-Western contexts (Hann, Lewis) were 
initially most often social anthropologists. Scholars from the Islamic world (al-Sayyid, 
1995; Filali-Ansary, 2002; Hanafi, 2002; Kamali, 1998; Khatami, 2000; Sajoo, 2002) were 
frequently at the forefront of the re-conceptualization of civil society outside Europe. 
According to this “non-Western” approach a great deal of the “acquis” of civil society 
discourse could be questioned starting from civil society’s normative basis to its 
organisational representation.2
Like the liberal definition, the communal definition was a product of a significant historical 
process of change: not the end of communism but the rapid spread of globalization. 
Globalization propelled the civil society argument to parts of the world that may previously 
have been excluded from the debate, and incited a re-consideration of the term to fit new
2 One group o f civil society theorists, o f which Ernest Gellner (1981, 1994) is the most prominent, firmly 
rejects this approach, preferring to deny the existence of civil society in non-Westem contexts. However, 
several critical theorists in the Muslim world agree with Gellner. According to Serif Mardin (1995: 278-279)
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contexts. This definition includes concepts of “religious civil society,” “traditional civil 
society,” and “clan based civil society.”
Proponents of the communal definition such as Varshney (2002: 46) argued that it was 
necessary to shift debates on civil society from formal structures and organizations towards 
an investigation of the host of informal group activities and meeting places that connect 
individuals, build trust, encourage reciprocity, and facilitate exchange of views on matters 
of public concern. Communal civil society could be thus defined as a sphere of social 
interaction where people come together on a voluntary basis, along interest lines, to 
exchange information, deliberate about collective action, and define public opinion. It is a 
space of public and collective activity, made up of organizations as well as highly informal 
modes of interaction. Communal civil society could be located in “families, communities, 
friendship networks, solidaristic workplace ties, voluntarism, spontaneous groups and 
movements” (Wolfe in Dekker and van den Broek, 1998: 13).” It was most often bound by 
a set territory, and focused in the local community, the site of face-to-face encounters.
The use of the communal concept of civil society “argues for a more inclusive usage of 
civil society, in which it is not defined negatively, in opposition to the state, but positively 
in the context of the ideas and practices through which cooperation and trust are established 
(Hann and Dunn, 1996: 22).” One of the distinctive characteristics of this definition is that 
it is less about state-society relations, and the ability of citizens to resist amoral and power 
hungry political elites, and more concerned with relations within society, with community 
solidarity, self-help and trust. Rather than directly opposing the state employing political 
tools, communal civil society may work in symbiosis with the state or ignore it altogether. 
This does not mean that civil society/state relations are unimportant. For as Roy (2002: 
124) noted, this form of civil society would often “involve traditional networks of 
solidarity, based on primordial communities of kinship and patronage, that allow the 
population to resist the encroachments of a strong authoritarian state, or to compensate for 
the weakness or corruption of the state.”
in the Muslim world “civil society is a Western dream [....] A characteristic of the history o f the 
transformation o f the Western dream into a reality is that this metamorphosis is limited to the West.”
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Based on the communal definition, civil society was mainly understood as being concerned 
with insuring that all members of the group had the necessary means for survival. Thus 
civil society organized to offer services, community infrastructure, and other essentials. In 
this context civility signified providing the basic material and economic conditions to 
people to insure that they could function in the group. It was about inspiring “cohesion and 
trust in local communities (Hann and Dunn, 1996: 22).” Those who had more were 
encouraged to share with others. When mutual aid was shared, the moment was also often 
“marked by extensive festive socializing” which deepens social integration and trust (Hall, 
1995: 171). Assistance was provided through informal coping mechanisms based on family 
ties, friendship or good neighborliness.
The values that this form of civil society espouses aim first and foremost to maintain 
community stability and security; they tend to be conservative and patriarchic. Men are the 
dominant actors. Community meetings generally seek consensus and thus shared ideas and 
values tend to be more appreciated than diverse and innovative ones. The ensuing 
environment may be oppressive to those who do not wish to conform to the majority or to 
the generally conservative moral codes promoted (Waite, 1997: 227-228). It cannot be 
unconditionally assumed that all elements of civil society will be multi-ethnic and 
supportive of democratic decision-making. When referring to communal civil society, 
White’s (2000: 142-155) question about participation and civil society - participation by 
whom? -  is particularly relevant. More often than not, in communal civil society women’s 
public engagement in decision-making was restricted. Communal civil society was liable to 
organize along ethnic and national lines, rejecting difference and multi-culturalism. It did 
not “necessarily promote democracy [...] may be places for egotistical pursuits [...] in 
which authoritarian values are nurtured [...] its associations [may] pursue values that go 
against tolerance and respect for others (Hyden, 1997: 31).” Communal civil society was 
therefore not normatively grounded. As Robinson and White described, this civil society 
“contains repression as well as democracy, conflict as well as cooperation, vice as well as 
virtue” (cited in Glasius, Kaldor and Anheier, 2002; Hyden, 1997; Van Rooy, 1998).
Commitment to civil society was therefore not necessarily based on the assertion of the will 
of individual citizens, but often on group and community expressions of solidarity. Gellner
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(1995: 33) argued virulently against considering this “civil society” because it is a system 
that maintains “cohesion, internal discipline and solidarity by a heavy ritual underscoring 
of social roles and obligations.” He considered that this can easily transform itself into a 
“tyranny of the cousins” (1995: 33) for in communal civil society community members 
have little opportunity to leave the group. Participation may be “imposed either by birth or 
awesome ritual (Gellner, 1995: 42).” Those with divergent values are doomed to suffer 
hostility or rejection. However, these social relations which facilitated the process of 
institutional development may also restrain individualism and egotistical greed -  people 
may be motivated by helping each other as much as by the promise of individual gain 
(Howell and Pearce, 2001: 32). Seligman (2002: 19) argued that the thinkers of the 
Enlightenment considered civil society to be a form of community solidarity because 
within this society “the need for respect and approval, man’s very amour de soi, rested on 
the praise of others.” Solidarity networks and community level associations built on family, 
clan and neighborhood ties help build social cohesion and collective identity. However, 
while conferring privileges on some, they could also severely constrain the rights of others 
(Eade, 1997: 112).
Communal civil society is an inclusive term with a wide global applicability. It is based on 
a range of institutions and practices, which are particular to the environment in which they 
function. The idea behind the term is that shared values and ideals bind individuals into 
groups or common activities. The aim of civil society is not necessarily to promote 
democracy or liberal economic exchange but rather to guarantee stability, unity and trust 
within local communities. Transposing the concept of communal civil society, as can be 
done for liberal civil society as described above, beyond the nation to the global level is 
somewhat challenging. As communal civil society is mainly identified with the community, 
when it expands cultural clashes are likely to occur (Clark, 2003: 167). Nevertheless the 
ability of communal civil society actors to maintain stability and security at the local level 
may be strengthened by their links to global networks. According to Kaldor (1999a: 209), 
“those who are trying to exert a constructive influence over local life in a globalized world 
can only succeed if they have outside support and access to those international 
organizations that can influence governments and global regulatory processes.” The 
Zapatista movement, which defends the rights of indigenous people of Chiapas, is one
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organizational representation of communal civil society that has been successful in this 
regard (Howell and Pearce, 2001: 35). Religion has also been identified as a potentially 
unifying mechanism between geographically based communities, which may provide a 
basis for global understanding and solidarity.
II. Civil society in Tajikistan: historical evolution of a concept.
As Glasius, Lewis and Seckinelgin argue in a forthcoming book, “The power of the concept 
of civil society depends less on abstract definitions, than on the extent to which it is 
grounded in actual experiences from around the world and embedded in local realities 
(2004: introduction).” Current representations of civil society in all countries are the 
product of complex historical and social developments (Howell and Pearce, 2001; Lewis, 
2001; Van Rooy, 1998). For this reason it is important to briefly analyze the historical 
evolution of civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan before we can determine 
whether the civil society ideal types described above are relevant in the post-war period. 
We find that one set of scholars that studies the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 
considers that civil society has a long history in the two regions, while the other tends to 
argue that civil society development began with the end of communism. The former are 
most likely to conceptualize civil society as including both communal and liberal ideal 
types, while the later generally understands civil society to be a liberal construct. The 
context and the theoretical definition of civil society applied affects any value judgement 
on civil society’s nature, as well as on its potential contribution to broader socio-political 
and economic change in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
ILa Communal civil society’s early development:
If civil society is considered to fit within a communal ideal type then it has deep roots in 
Tajikistan. For centuries, trust and solidarity networks were built around kinship ties. 
Kinship served as an important mobilising factor through which individuals were able to 
express and defend their common interests. Abduallaev (2002) argues that in Tajik society 
“the dominant institution of power was the avlod - an ascent patriarchal extended family 
[...] For generations, this avlod system provided survival, autonomy, and adaptability to its 
members, serving traditionalism and sustainability of the society.” Avlods “fostered 
communal identity and solidarity; they also reinforced social values and ‘civilized’ norms
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of behavior, acting as both moral mentor and moral censor” (Akiner, 2002a: 170). Through 
marriage the avlod extended its membership. Though the avlod is often considered to be a 
pre-Soviet social institution, Abdullaev (04.03.02) states that in 2002 it continued to play 
an important role in society, providing protection and assistance to obtain housing, 
employment, marriage partners and, in certain instances, political power.
Forms of communal civil society based on kinship were strengthened by links based on 
proximity. In the pre-Soviet era amongst the sedentary Tajiks the place of residence served 
as the basis of well-developed civic networks, particularly in urban areas where mahallas 
formed as relatively independent associations of citizens.3 Mahallas brought people living 
on the same territory together mainly on a voluntary basis, along interest lines based on 
profession, ethnic origin, or good neighbourliness. Mahalla members gathered regularly to 
exchange information, resolve community problems, and define public opinion in 
neighborhood tea-houses (Chaihanaj. Mahallas were self-governing and served as a forum 
where local values, rules of behavior, and common needs were defined. To regulate 
personal and family problems, inhabitants turned to councils of elders (aksakals). They 
helped organize traditional feasts and gatherings (maraka) to celebrate births, marriages, 
and funerals. The traditions of community voluntary action (hashar) and community giving 
to help those in need (sadaqa) were perpetuated through the mahalla. Mahallas focused on 
protecting local interests; they sought to improve the provision of services, rather than 
large-scale policy change. They were capable of taking collective action in defense of the 
neighborhood or trade they represented, though they rarely openly opposed the ruling 
khans or emirs.
Historically, religion also provided a normative framework and focal point for social 
mobilization. The reformist Jadid movement was an example of a religiously defined 
representation of communal civil society that developed in Central Asia in the early 
twentieth century.4 With its origins in the Crimea, it was significant because it expanded 
beyond the borders of the local community. Jadidism called for more progressive forms of
3 This was particularly the case in the historical cities of Bukhara, Samarkand and Khojand.
4 Central Asia and Tajikistan has served as a cross-roads for various religions including Zoroastrianism, 
Buddhism, Christianity, Manichaeism, and Islam (Foltz, 1999). The Jadid movement was only one o f the 
Islamic movements that expanded through Central Asia (Rashid, 2002; Vinatier, 2002).
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teaching Islam and for the development of a clear Muslim identity that could find its place 
in a largely Europeanized Christian Russia (Foumiau, 1994: 99-102). Members of the 
Central Asian educated middle class, comprising scholars, writers and merchants, rallied 
around Jadidism and supported its calls for establishing Western notions of political 
accountability (Abdullaev and Akbarzadeh, 2002: 102-103; Abduvakhitov, 1994; Kangas, 
1995: 274; Khalid, 1998). Jadidism spurred on the formation of smaller groups such as in 
Bukhara, where supporters formed the “Young Bukharians”, a secret society advocating for 
political and social change (Foumiau, 1994: 110). While Jadidism was a successful 
example of the geographic broadening of communal civil society, due to its narrow focus 
on the urban upper middle class, it had an almost complete lack of interest in rural 
concerns, which did not go beyond encouraging the rural population to become educated 
(Khalid, 1998). Its embeddedness in rural communities appears to have been weak. After 
the 1917 Russian revolution, and the failed attempt to establish territorial autonomy for 
Turkestan, Jadidist political activists lost their political influence, integrated into 
communist institutions and were repressed by Soviet forces (Khalid, 1998: 281-301).
ILb The Soviet era and the resilience o f communal forms o f civil society'.
Scholars of the Soviet Union are sharply divided on the subject of the existence of civil 
society during the Soviet era. The vast majority of specialists from Western Europe and the 
United States (Atabaki, 1998: 41; Carley, 1995; Fish, 1996: 264-267; Hall, 1995: 22; 
Howell and Pearce, 2001; Kangas, 1995: 274; Keane, 1998: 21; Rau, 1991; Rose, 1996: 
253-255; Ruffin and Waugh, 1999: 7; Shlapentokh, 1989; Wedel cited in Hann, 1996: 1) 
argue that the development of civil society was impeded during the Soviet era because it 
was controlled from above and not allowed to express any form of opposition to 
governmental structures and policies.5 According to this analysis the totalitarian Soviet 
state -  and particularly the dominant Communist Party -  so thoroughly controlled society 
that all associative spheres lost their identity and independent functions. However, a 
minority of experts provide an alternative view. They describe how during the Soviet era
5 According to Shlapentokh (1989: 10), “On the one hand the Soviet elite wants to describe Soviet society as 
democratic, ruled by the people through the elected state bodies (Soviets, i.e., councils), and therefore based 
on civil society. But on the other hand, the same elite wants to legalize its political monopoly, using the 
‘leading role o f the Communist Party,’ as a label for it. By putting the party over the state, and promising 
increased participation o f the masses in government, the elite actually demonstrates the absence of a legal 
civil society through which the democratic process can more or less control the state apparatus”.
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many traditional means of organizing, informal institutions and solidarity groups -  based 
on kinship, proximity and religion - were either transformed or strengthened in Soviet 
Central Asia. In many ways this debate about the existence of civil society in Central Asia 
under communism is an extension of the debate on the conceptualization of civil society as 
Kandiyoti (2004) and Roy (1999) have also noted.6
Though few civil society forms that expressed opposition to the government functioned in 
Soviet Tajikistan, organizations that provided a range of public services flourished. A range 
of large-scale organizations were created to defend the interests of and provide activities 
for workers, youth, women, intellectuals, artists... The state employed the groups to 
propagate Communist ideology. Yet the organizations also provided benefits, representing 
their beneficiaries to the state; mobilizing volunteers; organizing services at minimal costs; 
and informing the public or their target group about matters of public benefit (Waite, 1997). 
For example the Women’s Committee (Zhensoyuz) advocated for the protection of 
women’s rights, lobbied for collective women’s interests, and provided a forum to gather 
women’s personal or professional complaints (Kandiyoti, 2004: 6). In Tajikistan the 
population generally trusted social organizations, and most educated professionals were 
involved in their work. Some of the associations successfully incorporated traditional 
practices - the initiation of mass social campaigns like Subotnik in part replicating the 
traditional Tajik self-help practice of hashar for example. Soviet era social organizations 
harnessed a degree of volunteerism, provided people with organizing and leadership skills, 
offered services, information, and contacts outside their narrow community. However, as 
critics (Shlapentokh, 1989; Mullojanov, 2000; Howell and Pearce, 2001: 191; Atabaki, 
1998: 41) have pointed out, this type of civil society may also have had a role in inhibiting 
the development of independent or critical social institutions and networks.
From the 1920s until the 1980s there was a significant weakening of the mahalla institution 
in Tajikistan, and most significantly, the mahalla transformed from an urban to a rural 
institution. This was arguably more attributable to border changes and rapid urbanization 
than to the controlling nature of the state and Communist Party. The mahalla institution
6 Roy (1999: 110) made this argument himself, stating that if  we consider that two different definitions of  
civil society similar to the communal and the liberal exist in Central Asia “in the former sense there is already
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had traditionally been strong in urban centers, which were incorporated into Uzbekistan by 
Stalin in 1929. After 1929, Tajikistan’s cities -  especially Dushanbe -  grew rapidly leaving 
little time for the development of an urban culture similar to the one that had existed in 
Samarkand or Bukhara for centuries. The mahallas’ raison d ’etre was diminished in urban 
areas where large populations lived sharing few contacts and common interests. Instead the 
Soviet system set up the concept of Housing Committees (.Dom-Kom), partly based on the 
mahalla notion, to be responsible for the maintenance of local infrastructure. Yet the Dom- 
Koms never played the same social or public opinion-forming functions as the mahalla. 
The term mahalla remained in the Tajik lexicon, and legislation was passed in November 
1985 defining official functions of mahalla committees. With the 1985 law the state sought 
to delegate to mahalla committees its information dissemination, social and organizational 
work at the local level. Yet as the Soviet Union was in a process of disintegration, the 
mahalla never successfully fell under the state’s control. Somewhat ironically during the 
Soviet period, it was rural inhabitants who more readily adopted the mahalla term to 
designate their local civil society structures.
Analysts of the communist influence on Central Asia have found that in rural areas, unlike 
in urban centers, pre-Soviet forms of communal civil society, such as the mahalla, were 
maintained and strengthened through their reincarnation in collective farms (kolkhozes and 
sovkhozes).7 Traditional mahallas and avlods may not have openly countered the state, but 
some scholars have argued that they successfully co-opted official institutions. Humphrey 
(1998, 2002), Roy (2000, 2002), and Rubin (1998) have shown how soviet institutions at 
the local level, such as the administration of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz and agriculture work
o
units {brigades), merged successfully with traditional forms of community organizing. 
Roy (2002: 127-128) considers that the kolkhoz system is “the expression of the recasting
a kind o f civil society in Central Asia; in the former it has to be built from scratch.”
7 Herewith lies one o f the fundamental differences between communism as it was applied in the Soviet Union 
(SU) and in Yugoslavia. Collectivization was not implemented in Yugoslavia, and collective farms were 
never established. Thus in the SU, state bureaucratic structures were formed at all levels o f society all the way 
down to the kolkhoz. In Yugoslavia at this level o f society the state apparatus did not exist. Therefore mjesna 
zajednica, self-managing communities of citizens that operated more independently from state structures.
8 “One of the paradoxes of the Soviet system was the project o f destroying traditional society and the 
implementation o f ‘social engineering’ with a view to creating a new society translated, at least in the Muslim 
republics, into a recomposition o f solidarity groups within the framework imposed by this system, and also 
into the creation o f a two level culture: on the one hand an appearance o f conformity with the social project
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of former solidarity groups into a socialist system [...] Indeed the internal administration 
structure of the kolkhoz have reshaped and strengthened many traditional identity groups.” 
He goes on to specify that mahalla structures were often duplicated at the brigade level of 
the kolkhoz (2002: 128, 2000: 87-88).9 Once integrated into the Soviet kolkhoz system, the 
recomposed mahalla “benefited from an administrative, economic, social, and even 
political institutionalization [...] The kolkhoz was relatively autonomous (2000: 88).” The 
Tajik kolkhoz, and to an ever greater degree the brigade, maintained a degree of 
independence from the state -  the president was elected, decision making concerning 
service provision and public works was carried out locally, and people continued to meet to 
discuss issues of local concern. In effect the kolkhoz gave traditional solidarity groups 
organizational, economic and decision-making capacity, while maintaining their sense of 
common identity and loyalty to traditional leaders.
In his argument Roy emphasizes the inability of the kolkhoz to establish a group identity 
that overpowered allegiance to the mahalla and avlod.
“Collectivisation [...] in all cases involved a systematic territorialisation of solidarity groupings within 
the framework o f the kolkhoz. The awlad (avlod), the mahalla and (in the tribal zones) lineage segments 
were reincarnated in the sub-divisions of the kolkhoz. [...] It is the logic o f the solidarity group, whether 
pre-existent or reconstituted, which creates the kolkhozian identity. [...] The Soviets several times took 
steps to break these solidarities [...]” Nevertheless “the kolkhoz itself turned into a solidarity group, and 
the mahallas did not disappear. The communities had a reality which survived bureaucratic 
manipulation” (Roy, 2000: 87-88).
Due to Tajikistan’s mass forced displacement of populations from the 1930s-1960s this 
could lead to antagonisms in kolkhozes in which groups from different areas were brought 
together, or where neighboring kolkhoz were dominated by groups originating from 
different regions (Roy 1999: 112-113). As Akhmedov (1998: 173) notes, this was 
particularly a problem in the Vaksh Valley, around Kurgan Tuppe, where the sense of
imposed by the authorities; on the other, a subversion of that project by practices o f factionalism and 
clientism.” (Roy, 2000: 85)
9 An irony o f history is that even though mahallas were traditionally urban institutions, they survived more 
effectively in practice in rural areas.
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allegiance to the mahalla amongst the displaced from Garm/Karategin Valley was 
particularly strong.
Based on the avlod and mahalla, communal civil society in Tajikistan was extremely 
resilient to external influences. Distrust reigned supreme outside networks linked to family, 
proximity and religion. Relations that did not follow these lines were held suspect. It could 
thus be argued that Tajik communal civil society was mainly inward looking, formed out of 
mutual support networks based on region of origin, constructed along horizontal 
personalized relations. Its value base was inherently conservative and its interests local. 
Groups within communal civil society were disconnected from national level politics and 
tended towards communalism and traditionalism.
II. c Perestroika: the awakening o f liberal civil society in Tajikistan though the
development o f advocacy based politically orientated groups.
The new political openness that began in the 1980s with Perestroika and Glasnost offered 
the public space for the creation of new civil society organizations in Tajikistan that more 
closely fit the liberal definition. For the first time they carved out their own political 
positions and initiated a real public political debate to challenge the existing order (Akiner 
2002a: 158, 184). Like in many countries of Central Europe and the Soviet Union, in 
Central Asia and Tajikistan, some of the first moves towards genuinely popular 
participation were made by movements protesting environmental degradation (Carley, 
1995; Howell and Pearce, 2001: 196-197). These groups attracted mainly scientists, 
professors, teachers and students. Environmental organizations that developed in Tajikistan 
were influenced and strengthened by the global environmental movement (Ryazanova, 
13.06.2002). The ideas and activism of the Perestroika era civil society organizations 
attracted mainly the upper and middle classes living in urban areas and appeared to bypass 
many rural communities. Some of the first groups formed as an extension of the urban 
mahalla structure by focusing on community needs. An example was Ehyoi Khojand 
founded in Khojand in 1989 by city intellectuals, journalists, and artists, which first formed 
to organize socio-cultural activities for the benefit of its own community. It subsequently 
moved into the political domain, successfully holding a referendum to return the original 
name of Khojand to what was then called the city of Leninabad (Sughd region).
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Glasnost provided intellectuals and urban-based elites with a unique opportunity to 
confront national level problems and promote solutions that rivaled those offered by the 
state. In Tajikistan Rastokhez (Renaissance), formed in September 1989, was the first large- 
scale civil society organization to draft an extensive Republican level program. For the first 
time in the Soviet period, Rastokhez employed nationalism to mobilize society (Vinatier, 
2002: 213-114). Created by entrepreneurial elites and intellectuals, it was partly based on 
the model of Baltic People’s Fronts, which had been operating since 1986. There was much 
experience sharing, communication and support exchanged between Rastokhez activists 
and their Baltic counterparts (Abdushukurova, 17.05.02). Rastokhez's programs gave great 
weight to ecological problems, education, language, national cultural renaissance and the 
national interests of the republic as a whole (Niyazi, 1993). Rastokhez eventually tried to 
influence policy and politics through the electoral process, several of its leaders setting up 
the Democratic Party of Tajikistan for the 1991 elections (Atkin, 1997).
Rural populations were not initially heavily engaged in the political activism of the late 
1980s, yet at the time Islam was increasingly being employed as a mobilizing tool in rural 
communities (Atkin, 1994; Makhamov, 1994). Little has been written about how Islamic 
groups extended their presence in rural Tajikistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In a 
period of mounting political and economic instability it appears that these elites acted 
through traditional solidarity structures of communal civil society, appealing to citizens’ 
local level grievances and search for identity. As of 1990 the Islamic Republican Party 
(IRP) in Tajikistan began successfully mobilizing traditional groups using kin- and 
territory-based networks, especially in the Vaksh and Karategin valleys (Roy, 1999: 112- 
113; Roy, 2000).10 While agreeing with this analysis, Abduallaev (Abdullaev, 10.02; 
Abdullaev, 2004) also contends that in the 1990s a phenomenon of the 1920s was 
replicated when Ishans (or pirs) -  religious leaders following a form of Sufism implanted in 
parts of Tajikistan - became an ideological inspiration and were able to rally large numbers 
of their followers (murids). In addition, according to Abdullaev (2002) the avlod served as
10 Roy describes how a kolkhoz president “in the event of conflict will mobilize his supporters in his district of 
origin, and it is to that district that he will retire in the event o f setbacks. This was a familiar scene during the 
1992 civil war in Tajikistan: the supporters o f the two camps in question (‘Islamists’ and ‘communists’)
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a basis of a “community-oriented identity and clan network [that] determined political 
loyalty during the civil war in 1992-1993 and later.” Islamists effectively employed 
traditional solidarity networks and institutions to inform and mobilize adherents. They were 
not the only ones, as supporters of the former communist regime under President Nabiev, 
and later of President Rakhmonov, did the same but focused on populations originating 
from other regions, especially Kulob (Barnes and Abdullaev, 2001). This provided the 
foundation for an explosive environment in mixed kolkhozes and amongst neighboring 
kolkhozes where different traditional groups, based on the locations of their original 
mahallas, allied with different political groups (Akhmedov, 1998: 173-174; Roy, 2000).
II.d Weakening o f communal and liberal civil society during the war:
Civil society in Tajikistan was unable to play a significant conflict prevention role in large 
part because in 1990-1992 groups that fit within either communal and liberal civil society 
ideal types were deeply divided, rather than cooperating to maintain peace they tended to 
rival one another to gain influence. As Soviet rule disintegrated, the urban populations’ 
main form of organization -  social organizations linked to the Communist Party -  
dissolved, leaving few structures through which city dwellers could rapidly mobilize. The 
Perestroika era liberal type organizations had just begun to function, lacked unifying 
national level political agendas, were urban-based and generally bypassed rural 
communities. In rural areas, however, populations were more easily rallied through a 
system of community-based organizations that had never been eradicated during Soviet 
times. Religious leaders, elders, and informal village leaders had the authority and trust 
necessary to encourage a broader representation of citizens to attend public rallies, or 
otherwise become more politically active. In urban areas, such traditional leaders had been 
largely eliminated and thus could not similarly organize the upper and middle classes. 
Many urban workers on the other hand were new arrivals to the city and had maintained 
strong ties to their village level organizations. In this pre-war environment there were few 
opportunities for liberal and communal forms of civil society to initiate the dialogue 
necessary to prevent war.
descended on the capital in trucks from their respective kolkhoz with their apparatchiks and and their mullahs 
in tow.” (2000: 92)
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The one organization that may have had the capacity to facilitate greater integration 
between communal and liberal forms of civil society was Rastokhez. Yet after creating the 
Democratic Party of Tajikistan, Rastokhez activists joined forces with the Islamic 
Renaissance Party (IRP)11 in what would eventually became known as the United Tajik 
Opposition (UTO). The UTO, as one of the main parties in the Tajik conflict, openly 
sought to obtain control of state structures. Thus at the start of the war, the leaders of 
Rastokhez, and many of the other liberal groups of the Perestroika era, either joined the 
UTO, chose exile, were killed, or limited their public activity. Rastokhez as an independent 
organization virtually disappeared, as did the vast majority of Tajikistan’s pre-war liberal 
civil society groups. Even in comparison with Bosnia-Herzegovina, as will be described in 
the following section, the absence of any liberal type “peace now” or human rights 
organizations in Tajikistan during the war was striking.
On the other hand, during the Tajik conflict communal civil society, as represented by the 
mahalla, played a significant yet ambiguous role. The war caused a general breakdown in 
local governance and the inability of central government to control or provide resources to 
all areas of the country created an opening for traditional communal civil organizations to 
fill. Mahallas obtained resources from international organizations to distribute as 
humanitarian assistance. According to Mamadazimov (20.03.02) Director of the National 
Association o f Political Scientists, “during the Tajik civil war the status of mahallas 
increased because international humanitarian agencies preferred to distribute aid through 
them, rather than through the hukumats (district government).” As chair of his mahalla 
until 1996, the secretary of the Nosiri Khisrav jamoat in 2002 (4.06.02), described 
(04.07.02) how he cooperated directly with a range of international organizations (UNDP, 
Caritas, Save the Children) on reconstruction and rehabilitation projects in his community.
On the other hand during the war and in the immediate post-war period the position of the 
mahalla and other traditional forms of civic organizing was undermined by warlords, field 
commanders, and other militarized groups. Individuals asked for assistance and protection 
from them, rather than from the local government, courts, police, kolkhoz leadership,
11 The Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) held its founding meeting in October 1990 and officially registered as 
a political party in October 1991 (Abdullaev and Akbarzadeh, 2002: 97-99; Akiner 2000b; Olimova and
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aksakals, or mahalla members. For centuries aksakals had been the most respected leaders 
of the community, but during the war and its immediate aftermath they came to “represent 
authority but not power.” Incidentally in order to build trust and allegiance within the 
community, gunmen carried out many of the same functions as the mahalla and aksakals. 
They organized banquets, community celebrations, and provided financial support to the 
needy (Abdullaev, 04.03.02). At the same time the kolkhozes, which had provided 
significant state-based financial and material support to the traditional solidarity groups 
based around the mahallas, began to lose their resource base, thus undermining much of the 
mahallas ’ ability to carry out independent activities.
II. e Post war Tajikistan: an opportunity for liberal civil society?
The post-war period was characterized by the rapid growth of the Tajik non-governmental 
sector. The International Centre for Not-for-profit Law (ICNL) estimated that in 2002 a 
total of 1,241 NGOs were registered, compared with 33 groups in 1993 (ICNL, 2002). 
NGOs were generally started by members of the urban elite -  very often women 
(Abdushukurova, 17.05.02; Khegai 23.03.02; Kuvatova, 21.10.02, Ryazanova, 13.06.02) - 
and based in cities (Dushanbe, Khojand and Kurgan Tuppe). The intellectuals who set up 
the first NGOs initiated activities in the fields they knew best: teaching, education, and 
research. (Rahmonderdiev, 18.09.02). They organized out of a narrow spirit of self-help 
and self-interest. When in 1995 the Association o f Scientific and Technical Intelligentsia 
(ASTI) in Khojand was created, according to its founder Farrukh Tyurryaev (27.06.02) “we 
simply wanted to help ourselves.” Like their preceding communist social organizations, 
rather than being advocacy based, the new NGOs were heavily engaged in service delivery. 
When they did engage in lobbying, NGOs rarely sought to address clearly identified local 
grievances, or to protect community interests, instead they focused on universal issues: 
women’s rights, civic education, media, health care, language and computer skills 
development.
The international organizations that worked in Tajikistan after the war cooperated primarily 
with those new NGOs that fit a liberal definition of civil society, rather than with groups 
that evidently belonged to communal civil society. International NGOs carrying out
Olimov, 2001)
38
Chapter one
humanitarian activities sought partners to help deliver assistance. Well-connected, skilled 
and innovative Tajiks (Akiner 2002a: 173; Roy 2002: 142-143) set up more sophisticated 
NGOs to meet this need. They diversified their activities to include assistance to displaced 
persons, income generation activities, health and sanitation projects, media training, legal 
protection for women, etc. NGOs expanded to rural and distant regions by 2002 creating 
rural-based indigenous NGOs -  as had never existed before. Nevertheless large swathes of 
territory -  in the Karategin Valley, the mountainous regions of Sughd around Aini, parts of 
Khatlon -  remained virtually untouched by NGOs and international organizations five 
years after the end of the civil war.
The new NGOs in Tajikistan were weary of engaging in lobbying and advocacy, or directly 
holding the government accountable for its decision-making. NGOs tended to prefer to 
adopt the language of social partnership. Tajik NGOs cooperated with Ministries, such as 
the Ministry of Social Affairs for the preparation of the country’s Poverty Reduction 
Strategy; sat on state commissions, such as the National Commission to Protect the Rights 
and Interests of Children; and in June 2002 took part in a National Conference hosted by 
Tajikistan’s President. Though initially suspected of being ^wri-governmental, more and 
more NGOs won the respect of government authorities for their experience, specialized 
skills, and ability to secure international funds. In addition, several governmental officials 
created their own NGOs such the Association o f Women Lawyers in Dushanbe and 
Chashma Hayot in Khojand. These officials benefited from both positions or as one Tajik 
activist (05.02) described it: “Working in Government they have their chairs, and working 
in NGOs they have the investments.”
IQ. Historical definition of civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina
III. a The pre-Titoist period: the development o f communal civil society.
As in Tajikistan, the place of residence served as a key source of identity and cohesion and 
the basis for the development of communal civil society in Bosnian urban centers during 
the Ottoman Empire. Especially amongst the Muslim population living in Bosnian cities 
and towns, Mahallas functioned in many of the same ways as they did among Tajiks.12 On
12 In Mostar thirty-two mahallas reportedly existed (Pasic, 2003). In late 16th Century Sarajevo there were 
ninety-three mahallas o f which only two were predominantly inhabited by Christians (Malcolm, 1994: 68).
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the one hand mahallas formed a territorial unit -  a neighborhood with one or several 
religious structures, shops, schools, and other public facilities -  on the other they served as 
an institution for community level decision-making and mutual aid. In each mahalla one or 
several esnaf (guild, corporation) may have functioned. Muslim-charitable foundations 
known as vakuf collected donations from the wealthy and provided income for religious 
institutions, as well as public baths, market inns, marriages, etc. (Malcolm, 1994: 68). 
Many mahallas were made up predominantly of persons belonging to the same ethnic or 
religious group, and tended to function mainly amongst the country’s Muslim population. 
However, a notion of civil good neighborliness that Bougarel defined, using the Bosnian 
word komsiluk, helped span religious and ethnic differences when they existed within and 
between mahallas. He argues (1996b: 81) that the komsiluk concept:
“Designated in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the daily system of coexistence between different communities.
It expressed itself essentially through mutual help in work or daily life, invitations to religious 
ceremonies, and involvement in family events. In all three cases it obeyed the strict rules o f respect 
and reciprocity.”
This value system helped regulate divisions and provided “daily reassurances on the stable 
and peaceful nature of relations between communities” (Bougarel, 1996a: 84).
Towards the end of the Ottoman Empire, and increasingly during Austro-Hungarian rule, 
communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina organized along national-religious lines, becoming 
ever more politicized, and gradually moving from service provision to activism. The trend
7 ?began with the organization of the Christian population into millets during the Ottoman 
Empire. Decision-making was no longer carried out on a territorial basis but on a religious 
one, religious identity became formalized into a political identity which superseded most 
others. With the establishment of the millet system the churches came to play key social, 
cultural, and political roles (Bougarel, 1996b: 88). Thereafter under the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire a more diverse number of religiously based associations developed in cities to 
provide services, through cultural and educational programs (Donia, 1981).14 In the late
13 Religious communities that provided a large measure o f internal autonomy to non-Muslim population 
living under the Khalifate in the Ottoman Empire.
14 At the turn o f the century 1,256 societies existed in 258 locations -  mainly in Sarajevo and other large 
cities. Very few (391) were ethnically mixed or inter-religious (Hadzibegovic and Kamberovic, 1998: 3-6).
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th  •19 Century as Croatian and Serbian nationalism developed in Bosnia and in neighboring 
regions, political entrepreneurs and nationalist elites found these religious networks and 
structures to be useful propaganda and political mobilizing tools.15 “Nationalism spread 
among the Catholic and Orthodox Bosnians through the very network of priest, school 
teachers and educated newspaper readers which Austro-Hungarian policy had helped to 
bring about” (Malcolm, 1994: 149). In 1905 when political parties were authorized to form 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, several were created on the basis of the pre-existing religiously 
based representations of civil society (Malcolm, 1994: 151; Hadzibegovic and Kamberovic, 
1998: 4). Increasingly religious and nationalist ideologies converged around a strong 
rejection of the Austro-Hungarian regime. The new nationalist movements did not shy 
away from public activism (Malcolm, 1994: 153). Some adopted violent means - as most 
famously Gavrilo Princip, an alleged member of the organization Mlada Bosna (‘Young 
Bosnia’), did in 1914 with his crime that launched the start of World War I.
IILb The Tito era: the development o f civil society through the Yugoslav political 
project.
Just as in the case of Tajikistan, the majority of scholars, and policy makers, who first 
commented on the status of civil society in Yugoslavia under communism in the 1980s and 
1990s considered it to be weak or non-existent. More recently authors (Belloni 2001: 176; 
Hann and Dunn, 1996: 7; Smillie 1998; Stubbs, 1997; Pugh 1998) have criticized this 
approach, arguing that it was erroneous to compare Titoist Yugoslavia with some kind of 
“totalitarian deep freeze” (Gagnon, 2002: 209) that put on hold the development of all 
forms of civil society.
During the Titoist period the League of Communists banned the traditional national-based 
civic associations, but allowed other forms of organizations to develop. Bougarel (1996b: 
92) contends that the Communist Party dissolved national/religious based organizations 
such as the Muslim association Preporod in 1946, “less to liquidate the communitarian 
structure than to put it under exclusive communist control.” Correspondingly it can be
15 Bougarel (1996a: 89-90) explains the development o f nationalism in Bosnia as a consequence of the 
Bosnian state building project. He argues that the gradual transformation o f communitarian identities and 
relationships inherited from the Ottoman period, into nationalism, must be understood in the context o f the
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argued that while the state disallowed the existence of any kind of oppositional civil 
society, it acquiesced to other forms of public organizing. Ignatieff (1997: 40-41) argues 
that “Yugoslavia enjoyed one of the freest civil societies in Eastern Europe [...] In 
retrospect it seems clear that the relative freedom of this civil society was in fact the source 
of its weakness.” It was a diverse civil society but not a political one. According to the 
study by the International Bureau for Humanitarian Issues (IBHI, 1998: 25):
“During the socialist period, the work of civil organizations, in all fields o f public, social and political 
life, was quite prevalent These organizations included, inter alia, associations o f citizens and youth, 
syndicate organizations and sports associations. They became an important feature of social life, and 
developed, to a certain extent connections with international associations. A number of organizations 
dealt with matters of a purely humanitarian nature.”
In Yugoslavia citizens joined a myriad of mass based social organizations (ex: Socialist 
Alliance, trade unions, League of Socialist Youth) and smaller citizens’ associations 
(udruzenja gradjana) (Ferdinand 1991; Seroka and Smiljkovic, 1986). These social 
organizations had a degree of autonomy. They were often able to determine their own 
activities and select their leaders, and they relied extensively on funds raised by members, 
the local population and local enterprises. They were part of a voluntary effort that 
complemented state action through self-management.
Socialism as applied in Yugoslavia was founded on the notion of workers’ self­
management and social self-government (Ferdinand, 1991: 37-39). Some observers of the 
system (Djordjevic in Ferdinand, 1991: 41-42; Zukin, 1975: 67) have gone so far as to state 
that the guiding values of the Yugoslav system included the primacy of civil society over 
the state and political society, the spirit of volunteerism, and direct participation in 
decision-making. A host of institutions in Titoist Yugoslavia thus aimed to serve as an 
intermediary between the state, the enterprise and the family.
One such organization established under the 1963 Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
the 1974 Federal Constitution of Yugoslavia, was the mjesna zajednica (local community)
political, economic and cultural modernization occurring at the time. “The introduction of parliamentarianism 
in Bosnia went hand in hand with the institutionalisation of communitarianism.”
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(MZ).16 It was created as a territorially based self-government institution, set up at the 
most basic level of the organized neighborhood in rural and urban areas. Mjesne zajednice 
often followed the territorial lines of the older mahallas and as such adopted part of their 
value systems. They could be considered as an extension of pre-Titoist communal civil 
society. Mjesne zajednice appear to have enjoyed a large degree of autonomy, and had 
important competencies in social, economic, security and justice affairs (WB, 2002a).17 
They were a:
“Self-managing community o f citizens, from the territory o f villages and cities, in which citizens 
achieved self-management to carry out those activities which directly satisfy their needs and the 
needs o f their families. [...] MZ in this period made special efforts to resolve the communal needs of  
citizens, especially in villages, like [engaging in efforts to provide] electrification, water supply, 
roads, bridges, schools, cultural centers, sports and other facilities, tree planting, cleaning and 
garbage collection. All these activities were achieved mainly by self-contributions and by the 
voluntary action o f citizens.” (Milicevic, Pasic, Zlokapa, Stitic, 1999: 110)
The experience of mjesne zajednice in the pre-war period has generally been analyzed 
positively (Milicevic, Pasic, Zlokapa, Stitic, 1999; World Bank, 2002a). Arguably mjesne 
zajednice were administrative units below the municipal level that were part of the state 
control system. Yet in their seminal book on political organizations in Yugoslavia, Seroka 
and Smiljkovic (1986: 252-253) argued that an active political life existed within the 
mjesne zajednice, and because of their strength at the community level, autonomous 
political organizations played an important role in the policy making process. Where there 
were active mjesne zajednice, the Titoist system was successful in incorporating communal 
and rural civil society into decision-making and its broader political project.
III.c. The pre-war period: the victory o f nationalist civil society over civic and tolerant 
ideologies.
As federal Yugoslavia underwent significant political transformations in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, new and different forms of civil society started to develop. Divisions between 
exclusionary and tolerant forms of civil society began to emerge - though much less in
16 Another important institution at the time was the samoupravna interesna zajednica (Self-Management 
Interest Community).
17 By 1980 there were over 11,000 MZs in Yugoslavia, and they were engaged in a range o f construction, 
civic improvement, social welfare and policy making activities (Seroka and Smiljkovic, 1986: 17).
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Bosnia-Herzegovina than in other parts of Yugoslavia. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina tended to be less politically engaged than in Slovenia, 
Croatia or Serbia. A network of women’s activists, with a pole in Zagreb and another in 
Belgrade, for example, began to question women’s role in Yugoslav socialist thought. Few 
Bosnian women participated (Cockbum, 1998: 159-160; Large, 1998; Ramet, 1999).18 The 
groups that began to appear in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that could be considered as early 
representations of liberal civil society, tended to be less explicit in their criticism of the 
state or the ruling ideology. In September 1987, thousands of students marched through 
Sarajevo to demand improved conditions on campus, but they did not outwardly question 
governmental decision-making. Urban intellectuals set up human rights committees such as 
the Committee for the Protection o f Rights and Liberties o f Individuals and Groups. In 
Tuzla and Zenica in 1989 there were small demonstrations protesting against the polluting 
effects of the towns’ massive industrial complexes (Andjelic, 1995). As in other Eastern 
and Central European countries where communist regimes were faltering, civil initiatives 
developed mainly around youth, the environment and the protection of human rights. 
However, somewhat like their counterparts in perestroika era Tajikistan, these activists was 
unable to develop a clear unifying Republic-wide platform, and more importantly perhaps 
to reach out to rural groups. Rural populations were not significantly involved in the civic 
initiatives of the 1970s and the 1980s
Nationalist entrepreneurs in the 1980s and early 1990s were highly successful in 
radicalizing urban and rural groups through various civil society networks. Bougarel 
(1996a, 1996b) and Ignatieff (1997) have persuasively described how nationalist politicians 
and activists exploited popular sentiments of economic and political insecurity -  
transforming traditional civil society structures into exclusionary ones before the war. The 
most marginalized communities were those most likely to turn towards nationalist political 
entrepreneurs and accept their rhetoric. Analyses of the 1990 election results demonstrate 
how nationalist parties gained most of their votes in economically disenfranchised and rural 
areas. Support for non-nationalist or “civic” political parties came from city-based
18 The modem feminist movement in former Yugoslavia dates from the mid-1970s. In 1976 the first women’s 
studies course was organized in Dubrovnik; in 1978 an international women conference on feminism was 
held at the Student’s Cultural Center in Belgrade; in 1979 the independent organization Women and Society
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intellectual elites and the working class -  those who benefited most from Titoist era 
economic development (Bougarel, 1996a: 96-97).19 In just a few years nationalist political 
parties -  including the SDA, HDZ, and SDS -  were able to build complex Bosnia-wide 
party structures on the basis of church and mosque networks.20 At the same time they 
worked through elite urban-based cultural institutions such as Matica Hrvatska, the 
Croatian cultural center, and the Serbian Academy o f Sciences, to mobilize nationalist 
sentiment. As nationalist political elites strengthened their grip on all spheres of power, they 
also gained control over the provision of services and humanitarian assistance that was 
previously offered by the pre-Titoist forms of civil society - including Merhamet, Caritas, 
and Dobrotvor - which had been revived in 1989-1990 21
It was only as nationalist politics hardened in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the months leading up 
to the war, that tolerant forms of civil society also became more politically active and 
unified in a common Republic-wide attempt to stop the outbreak of violence.22 According 
to Bougarel (1996a: 101) in Bosnia-Herzegovina “more than the civic parties, courted as 
they were by the SDA, it was the media, the trade unions, and the students and pacifist 
movement that opposed the progressive intrusion of the nationalist parties into economic, 
social and cultural life.” Pacifist demonstrations, organized by groups that often had links 
to anti-war groups in Belgrade and Zagreb, were held in Sarajevo, Mostar, Tuzla, Banja 
Luka and other towns and villages in 1991-1992 (Kaldor, 1999b: 43). On 6 April, 1992 
when the European Union (EU) recognized Bosnia as an independent state, between 50,000 
and 100,000 people took to Sarajevo’s streets calling for peace (Bougarel, 1996a: 102;
was formed in Zagreb to be followed by the creation o f similar groups in urban centers in subsequent years 
(Cockbum, 1998: 159-160).
19 Ignatieff argues (1997: 41) that in 1991 the “heroes o f the hour were those who had suffered under 
communism which in Yugoslavia’s case were the nationalists.” The leaders o f the Tito era social 
organizations or the urban middle classes -  who later attempted to lead the anti-nationalist opposition in 1991 
-  were not trusted amongst the majority because they were perceived as having been co-opted by the state.
20 For example the SDA used networks o f the Islamska Zajednica (Islamic Community, present in each 
town/village where a mosque was located) to mobilize voters for the November 1990 elections and in 1991- 
1992 to amass and distribute weapons in preparation for war (personal interviews in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Posavina region, 1993-1996). Bougarel (1996a: 96) describes the role o f the Islamic Community in creating 
the SDA.
21 Religiously defined humanitarian and cultural associations were not always exclusionary -  the Jewish 
based La Benevolencija was for example famous in Sarajevo for providing humanitarian assistance to all.
22 In fall 1991 several Bosnian groups joined a Shadow Parliament bringing together 36 non-nationalistic 
political parties and civic initiatives from all Yugoslav Republics. They also put their signature to an Anti- 
War Campaign charter with 76 Yugoslav groups (Large, 1998: 28).
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Kaldor, 1999b: 43; Malcolm, 1994: 235). For the first time, a large scale, democratically 
orientated, anti-nationalist representation of liberal civil society had surfaced. Nevertheless, 
as the outbreak of fighting demonstrated, it was mostly powerless vis-a-vis the nationalist 
political forces that had earlier taken control of key elements of liberal and communal civil 
society, especially through mobilization in rural areas.
As in Tajikistan, the urban/rural divide and the split between liberal and communal civil 
society, which existed in pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina had significant repercussions on 
political life. The tradition of independent community organizing, for advocacy purposes, 
among educated urban dwellers was similarly weak. A unifying Republic level association 
with a clear mission for the country’s future had no time to develop. Instead, following a 
pattern from the end of the Austro-Hungarian rule, religious and cultural associations 
successfully served as the basis for exclusionary and nationalist political parties and groups 
to disseminate their ideology and mobilize supporters.23
IILd War and post-war civil society: the strengthening o f liberal forms.
Civil society was clearly divided along national lines during the 1992-1995 war. Most of 
the remaining Tito era citizens’ associations split according to nationality. Several new 
mono-national groups were created to represent the interests of internally displaced person 
(IDPs), veterans, the families of fallen soldiers, the mothers of missing persons... Many 
ethnically mixed mjesne zajednice became the site of intensive power conflicts between 
members -  leading to their break up and the creation of self-proclaimed mono-national 
mjesne zajednice and mjesne zajednice-'m-Qxi\Q (for displaced persons). During the war 
national humanitarian organizations -  such as Merhamet, Caritas and Dobrotvor -  
according to Kuslugic (20.03.01) became “a pure extension of the activity of nationalistic 
parties that only fulfill the vision of nationalist parties.” As nationalists controlled these 
forms of civil society they also shaped their activity, most significantly determining how 
they carried out humanitarian aid distribution (Bojicic and Kaldor 1999; Duffield, 1999). 
Meanwhile state resources and voluntary contributions to support the activities of mjesne
23 Analyzing the overall situation in Central Europe in 1990, Rau (1991: 140-141) argued that:
“It was nationalism that managed to preserve pre-communist values and then mobilize masses o f the 
population [...] The result o f this process is that now civil society is relatively strong in terms o f the number
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zajednice and other social organizations declined significantly, weakening their ability to 
engage in any form of independent work.
Only a handful of the pre-war representations of liberal civil society that associated youth, 
women, environmental or human rights activists continued to function during and after the 
war -  most notably the Helsinki Citizens Assembly and the Forum o f Tuzla Citizens. Much 
of their survival was due to their engagement in transnational networks from which they 
gained information, the ability to maintain contacts throughout Yugoslavia, moral and 
financial support. Thus during the conflict years, women activists from different parts of 
former Yugoslavia succeeded in maintaining links, meeting in Hungary or Italy, 
exchanging information via the Zamir (for Peace) computer link, and initiating common 
projects such as the Balkan Women’s Parliament in 1995. Displaced persons (DPs) and 
refugees also benefited from transnational forms of civil society. In 1997 the Koalicija za 
Povratak!Coalition for Return was created to bring together a growing number of DP 
associations from all parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to define common interests, lobby 
international organizations and local authorities, and disseminate information (through the 
bulletin Putokaz and its Information Centers). The Coalition for Return in turn was linked 
to Ziveti Zajedno/Let’s Live Together, which starting in 1997 assembled NGOs working on 
the return of refugees and displaced persons in all ex-Republics of Yugoslavia. In 1998 it 
began publishing a magazine called Povratak/Return with contributions from journalists 
from throughout the former Yugoslavia
During the war new NGOs began to form. Some were established by international 
organizations which sought implementing partners to assist them in the delivery of 
assistance or with the goal of “leaving something behind” (Stubbs, 1997; Smillie, 1998). 
International donors tended to focus their support on new urban NGOs, modeled on 
Western groups, rather than on traditional rural based community groups, socialist era 
social organizations or pre-war civic initiatives whose organisational structure, skills and 
experiences did not meet their criteria (Duffield, 1996; Pugh, 1998; Sali-Terzic 2001). 
International organizations generally turned to NGOs to provide services -  first
of its institutions and the extent o f their activity, but relatively weak in terms of constructive values [...] In 
the region as a whole nationalism simply blocks the development o f a liberally orientated civil society.”
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humanitarian assistance, subsequently in the fields of health, education, and aid provision-  
in an effort to bypass what they perceived to be heavily bureaucratized and inflexible 
governmental agencies. However, governmental and party representatives also sought a 
share of the international funding by creating their own NGOs (hCa, 1998: 26). In 1996- 
2001 a mass of GONGOs (government organized NGOs), PONGOs (party organized 
NGOs), and MONGOs (mafia organized NGOs) started operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly, 1997: 9-11). According to the USAID NGO Sustainability 
Index 2001 for Bosnia and Herzegovina, more than 1,300 NGOs were registered in 2001, 
though “only an estimated 300 to 500 are active and able to provide adequate services for 
their beneficiaries or membership.” 24
Although after the signing of the GFAP NGOs generally became the most prominent 
representation of civil society, they were virtually non-existent in numerous parts of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, where especially Serb and Croat nationalist politicians maintained a 
strong hold on power. International experts tended to call these large swaths of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina ominously “black holes” or “neglected areas” by (Belloni, 2001: 174). Asked 
to identify the region that was the most difficult for NGOs to operate in, Svetlana Deraj ic 
(22.03.2001) easily responded in 2001, “It is Western Herzegovina [...]. That region is not 
accessible for NGOs, for people from multi-ethnic political parties, to freely speak with 
people and know their honest will.” Furthermore only a few towns in Republika Srpska 
such as Banja Luka and Bjeljina had become strong centers of civic activity. In rural 
Herzegovina and Republika Srpska personal and private relations were paramount; and the 
population appeared to be resistant to NGO activity.
International donors funded local NGOs to take up service related activities, but with 
virtually no cooperation or coordination with governmental structures. The govemment- 
NGO disconnect led by 2001 to the formation of a parallel system of service provision with 
little integration or functional relationship with public bodies. At the same time “The 
government saw [the development of NGOs] as a threat because first they thought that 
NGOs were working against government. Secondly because they were getting money from
24 http://www.usaid.gov/regions/europe eurasia/dem gov/ngoindex/2001/bosnia.pdf
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international donors (Gordana Suvalija, 23.03.2001).” As there was little dialogue between 
NGOs and government there was also little opportunity for NGOs to lobby and advocate 
with government, or to hold it publicly accountable.
IV. General features of civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan
IV. a Communal civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan:
This discussion of the evolution of civil society in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
reveals some important similarities in the nature of civil society in both countries. For 
centuries a strong communal civil society existed in which kinship and proximity served as 
the building blocks of civic networks. People assembled in organizations as well as in 
informal settings, such as weddings and funerals. Commitment to groups and practices was 
less a reflection of individual will than an expression of community solidarity. Communal 
civil society’s most well developed organizational representation (in Muslim dominated 
urban areas) appears to have been the mahalla. In Tajik and Bosnian mahallas people came 
together to exchange information, to resolve community problems and affect public opinion 
but they rarely confronted state authority openly. They worked together in solidarity to 
provide mutual aid rather than to oppose the state. Under communism -  of the Yugoslav 
and Soviet type -  traditional group practices and ways of organizing were often replicated 
either in the kolkhoz or the mjesna zajednica where people engaged in community efforts 
through voluntary work.
Yet between Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina there was a key difference based on the 
fact that one country had a uniformly Muslim population and the other was mixed. Thus in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, where mahallas based on proximity were largely uni-ethnic, civil 
society organizations could divide rather than unify communities. The existence of a 
bridging influence between local civil society groups was essential to diminish 
opportunities for rivalries or conflict. The komsiluk concept thus offered an opportunity for 
inter-action and confidence building through mutual aid and common action -  while no
In the 2002 edition o f the International Council o f Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) Directory o f Humanitarian 
and Development Agencies in BiH 196 local NGOs were listed.
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such bridging notion existed in the largely mono-ethnic territories that became Tajikistan.25 
To respect the values of komsiluk signified in a highly mixed environment being able to cut 
across religious and nationality divides to work together on small issues (Whaites 2000: 
136-137). In the more homogeneously Muslim Tajikistan, Islam successfully bonded 
communities and not such bridging mechanism was needed to maintain peace and stability. 
Rather than dividing society, as would have been the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
religiously based intra-communal organizations, such as those that developed around 
Jadidism, helped Tajik scholars expand their links with others in the Muslim world, as well 
as in Russia. Only in the early 1990s were religiously based communal groups based in the 
kolkhoz used in Tajikistan to exacerbate tensions between the Islamists and “ex- 
communists” -  or Garmis and Kulyabis -  as will be described in more detail in Chapter 2.
Though the nature of the communist system in Yugoslavia and in the USSR was different, 
communal civil society evolved similarly in both contexts. In both countries we find that 
the state or Communist Party was unsuccessful in eradicating communal forms of civil 
society. The Mahallas* reincarnation in state sponsored kolkhoz brigade and mjesna 
zajednica structures illustrates how communal civil society was able to survive under 
communism. However here it is important to note some differences between Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Tajikistan. Communal civil society appears in many parts of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina to have been more effectively co-opted in state structures than in Tajikistan. 
Kinship linkages for example maintained greater influence in Tajikistan. In Bosnia the 
mjesna zajednica was explicitly integrated into the system of government as an institution 
of local self- government with a legal personality, while in Tajikistan the mahalla within 
the kolkhoz never was. When the communist system fell apart in the early 1990s the mjesna 
zajednica in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the mahalla in Tajikistan were significantly 
weakened. They could no longer rely on governmental subsidies or support. The voluntary 
contributions that community members previously made became increasingly scarce as the 
economic situation worsened.
25 Whether something similar existed in the multi-national and religiously mixed cities of Samarkand and 
Bukhara (present day Uzbekistan) would be extremely interesting to determine, but I have found no studies 
on this subject.
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Due to its non-normative character, the communal definition implies the highly sensitive 
finding that many of the nationalist groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina that were at the forefront 
of wartime atrocities disseminated their ideas and mobilized supporters through communal 
civil society. Similarly in Tajikistan warlords easily co-opted traditional organizations and 
solidarity mechanisms in the most extreme cases to perpetuate ethnic cleansing against 
people with different historical regional backgrounds. This seems to support the argument 
that communal civil society, based on bonding social capital, may “be readily perverted to 
undermine social cohesion and fragment society for individual and group gain, and this 
manipulation has the potential to lead to violent conflict” (Coletta and Cullen, 2000: 15). 
Or as Varshney (2002: 9) describes where inter-communal associations are weak, and intra- 
communal groups dominant, communal identities can cause “endemic and ghastly 
violence.”
IV  b Liberal civil society in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina
In both contexts, though to a greater extent in Bosnia-Herzegovina, religious and nationalist 
ideologies provided a basis for the development of the first liberal civil society 
organizations in the second part of the 19th Century. The first liberal organizations in both 
countries were heavily dependent on external ideologies and guidance for their 
transformation into political actors. Unlike in other contexts (Lewis, 2004: 113) Tajik and 
Bosnian representations of liberal civil society were not deeply rooted in traditional forms 
of community organization and voluntary action.
In the late 1980s a revival of liberal civil society was apparent in Tajikistan and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. At that time in both countries democratic civic movements emerged mainly 
advocating for greater attention to be paid to mainly environmental, youth and human 
rights concerns. They were focused in urban areas and attracted mainly intellectuals. In 
both countries pre-war liberal forms of civil society proved fragile. In Tajikistan groups 
that had originally formed to protect community interests became ever more embroiled in 
party politics -  several eventually joining one of the armed factions in the Tajik war. In 
Bosnia-Herzegovina a handful of civic initiatives attempted to provide an alternative to the
26 Yet to some extent Tajikistan’s distance from Moscow and its social context attenuated much o f the 
center’s control on community life as Roy (1999; 2002) argues comprehensively.
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increasingly dominant and violent discourse of nationalist political leaders. But they were 
few, divided, lacked an overarching agenda/ideology, and possessed weak links with rural 
populations. During the civil war in Tajikistan (Akiner 2002a: 158-159, 183-184), as well 
as in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bougarel, 1996a: 102; Gagnon 2002: 211; Kaldor, 1999a: 197) 
much of the pre-war forms of liberal civil society were devastated.
When a new post-war liberal civil society emerged, there were few foundations of a pre­
war liberal civil society to build upon (Abdushukurova, 17.05.02). Arguably as a result, the 
new NGOs that formed in the post-war period more readily engaged in service delivery 
than advocacy or the promotion of public participation in decision-making. The NGOs thus 
did not fulfill all the functions of a liberal civil society -  as defined earlier in this chapter -  
and due to this were frequently criticized for being ineffectual (Belloni, 2001: 170-174; 
Pugh, 1998: 19-2; Smillie, 1996: 3).
Though it has been argued (Akiner, 2002: 158-169; hCa, 1997: 6; Kaldor, 1999a: 197) that 
war impedes the development of civil society, our reading of Tajik and Bosnian history 
suggests that civil society is transformed during times of conflict -  co-opted in certain cases 
- but does not necessarily collapse. Civil society organizations emerge or get recreated 
during civil war. Most dramatically, the war years were accompanied by an increase in the 
number of Tajik and Bosnian NGOs. According to one Bosnian activist (hCa, 1997: 7) it is 
precisely the breakdown in civilized relations between people and the absence of a state, 
that incited him to set up an organization. These NGOs in both countries tended to provide 
emergency assistance when government social service provision had significantly 
weakened -  inherently contributing to a privatization of welfare delivery.
Conclusion:
The existing literature on civil society defines two main ideal types -  communal and liberal 
forms of civil society -  and suggests that it is possible to classify organizations into two 
groups based on their values, political aims, and organizational characteristics. As we 
found in this chapter, this typology can help us understand the different manifestations of 
civil society in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have found that over time in both 
countries civil society has taken on different organizational forms, in defense of different
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goals and values. Traditions in civil society keep being reinvented and transmitted to each 
new political era. Consequently a single universal definition of civil society cannot 
adequately describe the complex reality of civil society’s development. Liberal and 
communal forms of civil society evolved in the two states, occasionally as clearly distinct 
entities, but also often overlapping and sharing functions. At times civil society 
organizations operated in harmony and at times in conflict. Most significantly, when war 
commenced in 1992 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan, there was a sharp divide 
between liberal and communal forms of civil society. In both countries there were rivalries 
among individuals and families of urban and rural origin, and divisions between inter and 
intra-communal modes of organizing. Tensions between the “enlightened” urban elite’s 
understandings of civil society and popular rural ones were clearly evident before the 
outbreak of war. This distance may help explain why in both countries civil society was 
unable to play a significant conflict prevention role.
At the beginning of this chapter I noted that after the Bosnian and Tajik wars international 
policy makers were convinced that civil society could positively affect peace. I posed the 
question: what civil society is most likely to have this affect? As this chapter demonstrated, 
two different conceptualizations of civil society exist in the literature and are of relevance 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan. This typology begins to suggest what kind of roles 
civil society may play in post conflict contexts. Thus my initial question may be refined 
and re-stated as: Is communal or liberal civil society most likely to positively affect peace? 
In subsequent chapters an attempt will be made to respond to this query through the study 
of organizational representations of liberal and communal civil society. Specifically two 
NGOs and two CBOs will be analyzed. As we saw in this Chapter, in post-war Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Tajikistan newly created NGOs, carrying out service delivery activities 
but with little engagement in advocacy, were the most prominent organizational 
representation of liberal civil society. Communal civil society, with its long history in the 
two countries, could be identified with the CBOs that developed out of the Tajik mahalla 
and the Bosnian mjesna zajednica.
Before approaching the case studies it is necessary to consider the meaning of peace 
consolidation. In the following chapter I will thus present four approaches to the study of
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war and peace. Each of these approaches assigns different priorities to peace consolidation 
based on a different understanding of the causes of war. In Chapter 2 we will describe these 
approaches as they relate to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan and consider what 
assumptions they make concerning civil society’s potential to positively affect the peace 
process. Based on this review we will conclude the chapter with a series of hypotheses on 
how communal and liberal civil society may influence peace consolidation. The validity of 
these hypotheses will be investigated in more detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6; where I will 
analyze how four civil society organizations affected peace and why they behaved as they 
did in challenging post-war post communist contexts.
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C h a p t e r  t w o :
M a k in g  p e a c e : f o u r  a p pr o a c h e s  to  pea c e  c o n so l id a t io n
Introduction:
To determine how civil society can positively affect peace consolidation it is necessary to 
understand how peace is made. From the end of the Cold War until the start of the US led 
“War on Terror” in 2001, debates on war and peace generally shifted to investigations of 
intra-state processes, and of possible external intervention strategies to help build peace. 
There was a recognition (Holsti, 1996: 205-207; Rasmussen, 2003: 1-4) that the analytical 
tools developed over the past two hundred years in international relations and political 
science to examine the sources of war and the conditions for peace were no longer 
adequate. Therefore “international actors were on a steep learning curve on peace 
implementation throughout the 1990s” (Malone, 2002: ix). Soon after research for this 
dissertation began, Downs and Stedman (2002: 43) noted that “compared to the formidable 
scholarly literature dealing with the problem of negotiating peace agreements in civil wars, 
the literature devoted to the problem of implementing peace agreements, is modest.” 
Though theorists have been scrutinizing war and peace since time immemorial, the 
question “what constitutes peace? ” retained much of its pertinence.
The United Nations (UN) took the lead in defining forms of intervention that could 
promote peace. Post-conflict peace building was designated as one of the four mechanisms 
at the UN’s disposal to prevent and resolve conflicts.1 Based on this rational approach, 
peace building was described (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 45-46) as a technical response 
mechanism to be implemented after preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. 
The Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 61) provided a list of post-conflict activities 
in lieu of a conceptual definition of the term:
1 Herewith the term “peace consolidation” is being used rather than “peace building” to reflect how our 
definition of peace includes the UN’s but is not limited by it.
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Post conflict peace-building “through agreements ending civil strife, may include disarming the 
previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of 
weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring 
elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental 
institutions and promoting formal and informal processes o f political participation.”
The 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 11) added more tasks, 
including: “the design and implementation of de-mining programmes, the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, the establishment of new police forces; the design and supervision 
of constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms, the coordination of support for economic 
rehabilitation...”
Peace consolidation thus tended to be described as the sum of activities undertaken by a 
range of external international actors in post conflict contexts. Scholars attempted to 
identify a list of peace consolidation priorities (Ball, 1996: 3), proposing specific peace 
consolidation mechanisms, tasks and projects (Ball, 1996: 52-54; Kumar, 1997: 4-32; Last, 
2000: 86; Ramsbotham, 2000: 182). The first analysis of peace building operations (Ball, 
1996; Doyle 1995, 1997; Hampson, 1996; Heininger, 1994) which focused on Cambodia 
and Latin America were clear examples of this approach.
To adequately respond to my research question -  how can civil society positively affect 
peace? -  I will introduce four conceptualizations of peace consolidation. These approaches 
can be classified as institutional, behavioral, political-economic and rights-based. As will 
be described, each devises a distinct concept of peace, assigns different causes for war, and 
interprets the evolution, goals, and instruments of peace consolidation differently. The four 
make assumptions about the positive contribution that civil society can make to peace. 
Some apply a liberal definition of civil society, while others favor a communal one. Based 
on these conceptualizations of peace, we will then turn to the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Tajikistan to consider the causes of conflict and the condition of peace consolidation 
five years after the end of civil war. The chapter will conclude with the presentation of a 
series of theory-based hypotheses on how civil society can contribute to peace as an 
institution building, conflict resolution, political-economic, and rights-based project to be 
investigated further in subsequent chapters.
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I. The institution-building approach to peace consolidation:
La Institution building as a solution to failed states:
Since the end of the Cold War, armed conflict as in intra-state affair was often explained 
by the “failed state” phenomenon, referring to nation-states in Africa and Asia, but also 
the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in which economic hardships threatened to lead 
to governmental collapse (Helman and Ratner, 1992: 4-5). Failed states were considered to 
have a short-lived statehood, weak civic institutions, limited economic prospects, and 
close to non-existent judicial systems and rule of law. In failed states problems were 
understood as being mainly structural. Centralized government authority was unsuccessful 
in monopolizing the means of coercion; states had lost their monopolies over armed 
violence; and “terrorists, guerillas, bandits and robbers” were in a position to rival them 
(van Creveld, 1991: 197). Processes of transition, the entrenchment of authoritarianism 
and the rise of ethno-nationalism further undermined what institutions of governance 
existed. Wars in these contexts were usually fought between a weak government authority 
and various rebel groups. The sides struggled for control over territory and state power.
Failed states were considered worthy of international intervention because the conflicts 
they engendered posed threats that extended beyond their borders. In the mid-1990s, and 
especially during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Western European countries were 
reminded of how wars could launch large-scale refugee flows. Failed states’ role in 
facilitating trafficking of drugs and people, disseminating radical ideas and terrorism, and 
buying/selling the components of weapons of mass-destruction also emerged as large-scale 
threats to Western and global security.
As post-war societies were considered to be “cursed by institutional breakdown” (Newman 
and Schnabel, 2002:1), institution building was assigned as one of the main components of 
peace consolidation. The international community had an important role to play. For after 
the signing of a peace agreement, the former warring parties’ capacities to meet the 
demands of institution building were “constrained by institutional weaknesses, limited 
human and financial resources, and economic fragility (Ball with Halevy, 1996: 30). Thus 
there arose opportunities for a range of actors, including international organizations and 
financial institutions, international and domestic NGOs, and private corporations, to
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become engaged. Their tasks were varied but the project was dependent on the presence of 
a liberalized economy, democratic institutions of government, and a secure environment 
where the state has the monopoly on violence. In Making Peace Work, Ball with Halevy 
(1996: 30-46) categorized peace consolidation as: building political institutions, 
consolidating internal and external security, and promoting economic and social 
revitalization. According to Duffield (2002: 11) this “liberal peace” was a political project 
whose “aim is to transform the dysfunctional and war-affected societies that it encounters 
on its borders into cooperative, representative and especially stable entities.”
The institutional-building approach was also closely related to the “democratic peace” 
argument, which is based on the proposition that democracies seldom go to war with one 
another. According to the democratic peace literature (Brown, Michael, Sean Lynn-Jones 
and Steven Miller, 1997; Gleditsch, 2003) constitutional, representative, democratic 
governments based on consent and rational policy making (Hoffman, 1995: 161) are less 
prone to engage in war than other systems of government. Thus the aim of the peace 
consolidation project is the establishment of democratic institutions. In practice, the 
holding of multi-party elections was often considered to be a clear indication of successful 
peace consolidation.
Lb The contribution o f civil society to institution building'.
Those who adopt an institution building approach to peace consolidation generally consider 
that civil society can play an essential role in contributing to the strengthening of 
democratic governmental structures and the establishment of free-markets. Institution 
building proponents thus mainly favor a liberal definition of civil society. As described in 
the previous chapter liberal civil society has been conceived of as a political project, which 
aims to promote democratic decision-making and a roll back of the state in economic 
affairs. Thus based on her analysis of the Cambodian peace building efforts, Heininger 
(1994: 118-119) argued that “Peace-building entails the rebuilding of a civil society. It can 
help reconstruct a failed state by strengthening institutions shattered by conflict.” In post­
conflict environments civil society is seen as having a crucial part to play as “true 
democratization cannot occur without a strong, established, well-functioning and broadly 
supported civil society -  which produces potential leaders and socializes and mobilizes
58
Chapter two
citizens around democratic and civic duties and responsibilities.” (Newman and Schnabel, 
2002: 1-2). Civil society can support institution building as well as increased public 
participation.
“During the transition phase, the parties to the conflict are often consumed by the political infighting that 
accompanies the dissolution o f wartime coalitions and are consequently unable to represent adequately 
the interests o f ordinary citizens [...] Supporting the empowerment o f civil society can help to mitigate 
the detrimental effects of this behavior by offering citizens the means to make their voices heard, 
especially at the local level.” (Ball 1996: 65).
These assumptions are informed by conclusions made in the much broader literature on 
democratization and on not-for-profit management. Lastly civil society can play an active 
role as an advocate for peace, engaging in policy debates. In the post conflict phase “In 
civil society, the objectives should be to enhance the capacities of organizations to evaluate 
policy and to develop and implement programs in their sphere of activity.” (Ball with 
Halevy, 1996: 9)
Institution-building proponents also argue that the development of civil society is closely 
linked with economic development and the establishment of a liberal market system. In the 
Executive Summary of the 1997 Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (30) 
civil society is assigned a pivotal role right next to the private sector. “Many elements of 
civil society,” the report states, “can work to reduce hatred and violence and to encourage 
attitudes of concern, social responsibility and mutual aid within and between groups. In 
difficult economic and political transitions, the organizations of civil society are of crucial 
importance in alleviating the dangers of mass violence.” In a Framework for World Bank 
Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, the World Bank advises that assistance must 
concentrate “on re-creating the conditions that will allow the private sector and institutions 
of civil society to resume.” (World Bank quoted in Pugh, 1998: 3) While the process of 
economic liberalization and the reduction of the state’s involvement in the local economy 
progresses, civil society organizations have an important role to play in the provision of 
social services, contributing to the shifting of goods and service provision from the public 
to the private sector.
2 Within this literature see for example: Bastian and Luckham, 2003; Burnell, 2000; Dahl, 1997; Diamond 
and Plattner, 1996; Ottaway and Carothers, 2000.
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Since civil society can play such a role, international funds and policies are called upon to 
support it. Ball states that, because of the institutional weaknesses of post-conflict societies, 
“donors need to give top priority to building capacity in [...] civil society as early as 
possible” (Ball, 1996: 9). Capacity building is carried out through international civil society 
development programs.
When policy makers argue that civil society can make a positive contribution to institution 
building, they are generally employing a liberal definition of civil society, and are mainly 
concerned with the impact of NGOs. According to the USAID’s Bureau for Europe and 
Eurasia (E&E), “We decided early on that vigorous USAID support for local non 
governmental organizations would be a critical element of strengthening civil society” 
(USAID, 1999: 3). In post-conflict environments “strengthening NGOs can help to build 
civil society, enhance opportunities for participation, and foster political reconciliation 
(Ball 1996: 93).” NGOs are the preferred channel because they are considered to be 
familiar with local needs, cost-effective, and to have effective community-level networks 
(Aall 2000a: 134-135; Ball with Halevy, 1996: 90; Goodhand with Chamberlain, 2000: 99; 
Minear and Weiss, 1995: 195; Prendergast and Plumb, 2002).
Nevertheless in practice it has been recognized that NGOs in many post-war environments 
face a host of organizational challenges. They are often new structures going through the 
early stages of organizational development. They may lack familiarity with outside 
resources, with accountability procedures, and have working “customs that from an 
international perspective may be questionable.” (Minear and Weiss, 1995: 195) Few will be 
skilled in Western modes of financial management (Ball and Halevy, 1996: 92, Eade, 1997: 
179). Problems with corruption in the absence of an effective legal framework to regulate 
NGO activity are endemic.
Scholars and practitioners who consider the causes of war to be mainly the existence of 
failed states, and the task of peace consolidation to be focused on institution-building,
3 Of special relevance in the literature is: Billis and Harris, 1996; Powell and Clemens, 1998; Lewis, 1999.
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argue that civil society can positively affect the peace process by supporting the twin 
processes of democratization and economic liberalization. Civil society organizations can 
help provide essential economic and social services, as well as serve as a conduit for 
popular participation. Those who favor an institution-building approach hypothesize that 
NGOs are the civil society organizations most likely to positively affect peace.
Peace consolidation approach: Institution building
Causes of war:
Goals o f warring sides:
Tasks of peace consolidation 
that civil society may affect:
Transition 
Failed states 
Institutional breakdown 
Control o f state 
Control o f territory 
Defeat of enemy
Build democratic participatory government
Establish liberal market economy
Support the privatization o f social service provision
Civil society likely to contribute: Liberal civil society/NGOs
II. Peace consolidation as conflict resolution and behavioral change:
II. a Reconciliation as a solution to ancient hatreds:
Conflict resolution provides a second approach to the understanding of war and peace, that 
has also shifted since the end of the Cold War to emphasize peace consolidation as 
primarily a “local” process (Rupesinghe, 1995: 72-81). Where the institution-building 
approach described above argued for a sectorial and institutional response to peace 
consolidation, conflict resolution calls for a comprehensive strategic approach which 
focuses on the transformation of behaviors and beliefs. As Saunders (1999: 4) succinctly 
points out, “Building peace is also a human -  not just an institutional -  task.” Thus conflict 
resolution theorists seek ways to address what they deem to be inadequacies in the 
traditional diplomatic process - of negotiation and coercion -  and use of armed force to 
make and support peace consolidation. Theorists such as Lederach (1999: 35) conceived of 
peace consolidation as the transformation of a “war system” into a “peace system.” It is a 
long-term process difficulty measured through the attainment of empirical sub-goals. 
(Rothstein, 1999: 224)
Rather than emphasizing the impact of “failed states,” conflict resolution scholars 
considered the problem of “protracted social conflict, which typically involves non-state
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actors whose autonomy is not guaranteed in the state system (Azar, 2002:1s).”4 While 
conflict could be partly caused by the absence of effective institutions of government, the 
state could also exacerbate tensions. This was most likely to occur in multi ethnic/national 
settings, where one dominant group that sought to maximize its interests monopolized state 
authority at the expense of others. War broke out as a result of perceptions of mutually 
incompatible goals among communities, often complemented by a strong sense of 
collective victimization. During these “protracted social conflicts,” fighting rarely 
descended into chaos. Rather it followed well-defined lines as populations were clearly 
demarcated by their identity (national, ethnic, religious, gender) and as such were drawn 
into the fighting as victims or perpetuators. Such conflicts were defined by their 
viciousness, as fighting became a question of basic survival and the aim of warring sides 
was total defeat of the other.
With its talk of “deep rooted human conflict” (Saunders 1999) conflict resolution analysis 
of the causes of war has some commonalties with what has been termed the “new 
barbarism” narrative (Richards cited in Duffield, 2002: 109). For proponents of “new 
barbarism” conflicts between ethnic or national groups are inevitable due to the destructive 
power of traditional feelings and attachments to identity. The unleashing of primordial 
nationalism, after the breakup of the Yugoslav and Soviet socialist/communist regimes, is 
considered to be an important cause of contemporary conflict. Supporters of “new 
barbarism” interpretations find little utility for intervention in other peoples’ conflict. “We 
are not in control” thus writes Kaplan (1997: 436-437) from a Western perspective, and 
“people will either solve their problems at the local level [...] or they won’t”, succumbing 
instead to history’s wrath.
Conflict resolution theorists generally differ sharply from Kaplan in their conviction that 
outside intervention can play a crucial role in peace. They do not believe in the 
irreversibility of the coming anarchy, and argue that differences based on identity can be 
transformed and relationships re-imagined to secure peace. Feuding parties can benefit
4 This is not to say that conflict resolution theorists only focus on domestic actors when explaining the 
sources o f post-Cold war conflict. Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse speak about “international social 
conflicts,” which consider the complex relationships between international, state and social sources of conflict 
(1999: 77).
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from third party or external intervention to initiate, facilitate, or sustain contacts and 
dialogue between antagonistic sides. Multi-track diplomacy (Diamond and McDonald, 
1996; McDonald, 2002), problem solving workshops (Azar, 2002; Kelman, 2002), 
sustained dialogue (Saunders, 1999) are but three of the many tools conceived of as a 
means to consolidate peace. They share the aims of changing behaviors: strengthening 
contacts and trust between former warring sides; transforming understanding of the 
conflict, values and modes of dialogue; and establishing a sense of group cohesion and 
initiating common action.
Reconciliation between former warring sides is hampered by hatred, images of death and 
destruction, feelings of victimization and dreams of revenge often promoted by political 
elites. Information tends to be tightly controlled in conflict settings; citizens are limited to 
one vision of the conflict and of the “other side.” Conflict resolution thus entails the 
transformation of popular conceptualizations of the conflict and the “enemy.” Conflict 
resolution activities seek to “develop a new language of dialogue to replace the language of 
conflict and sectarianism. In doing so they may help ‘deconstruct’ and reconceptualize the 
inherited history of myth and symbol that fuels confrontation (Ryan, 1995a: 151).” On one 
hand the actual means of communication may be transformed -  from passive to active 
listening for example -and on the other the beliefs about oneself and the other may be 
changed. Firstly it is necessary for former conflicting parties to meet each other. It 
necessitates a place where not only “voices that seek moderation and engagement can be 
heard and in which moderate constituencies can be mobilized (Kumar, 2001:183),” but also 
“where the diverse but connected energies and concerns driving the conflict can meet 
(Lederach, 1997:35).” Meetings are rarely one-time events (Azar, 2002: 25), but tend to 
involve a systematic prolonged dialogue (Saunders, 1999:12) to gradually build trust and 
confidence, and enable the identification of common concerns. The process is most likely 
to have an impact at the community level where conflicting groups live in close proximity 
(Assefa, 1999: 40-41; Lederach, 1997: 23).
Peace as conceptualized by conflict resolution theorists necessitates a “systematic 
transformation of relationships in the affected society,” to help fill the “interdependence 
gap” that was a cause of the conflict, and deepened during the fighting (Lederach, 1999:
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29-31). On one hand there is a “need [for] good relationships at community level to manage 
conflict without violence” (Last, 2000: 80). On the other sustainable peace consolidation 
“requires both horizontal and vertical relationship building” -  between people at different 
levels in the socio-political structure of society, and across the line of division (Lederach 
1999: 30). Thus for peace to be secured, all levels of society should recognize their 
interdependencies, the common opportunities and responsibilities they have to improve 
their plight and promote change. Peace consolidation is successful when formerly hostile 
groups -  as well as relatively non-engaged groups such as citizens’ initiatives and local 
government - have increased capacity and willingness to act together in joint problem 
solving and to implement solutions. Ultimately this cooperation may lead to the 
establishment of new bridging networks and institutions.
II. b Civil society’s affect on conflict resolution:
Conflict resolution theorists emphasize the importance in peace consolidation of 
encouraging grassroots level, bottom up processes in parallel with state-level, top down 
ones. They underscore how “a multi-sectorial approach to conflict transformation is needed 
which emphasizes the significance of local actors and the non-governmental sector in 
developing effective and sustainable citizens-based peace building initiatives (Rupesinghe, 
1995: 65, 80).” As Saunders (2001: 249) contends “important as governments and formal 
mediation and negotiation will remain, lasting peaceful relationships will not be built until 
citizens outside government are deeply engaged and until the civil societies in which they 
work provide public space in which they can span the divisions in those societies.” Those 
who favor a conflict resolution approach to peace consolidation thus regard civil society as 
a key actor. They tend to recognize liberal and communal civil society as important.
Civil society may play an extensive role in conflict resolution, providing a space in which 
former antagonistic sides can meet and contacts and trust can be built; reconciliation 
facilitated by transforming modes of dialogue; and joint problem solving and the initiation 
of common action supported. Thus Aall (2000: 153) describes how in post-war contexts 
civil society organizations may effectively:
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■ Act as channels o f communication between parties in conflict
■ Work at the grassroots to affect reconciliation at the local level
■ Provide training for post-conflict administrators in the intricacies o f civil society
In a community environment poisoned with violence and hatred, civil society is a forum in 
which local peacemakers can operate with greater freedom. By creating a space in which 
educated middle class people can take responsibility and learn new skills, NGOs may “be 
producing an important resource: a cadre of ‘organic intellectuals’ with community- 
mobilization skills.” (Goodhand with Chamberlain, 2000: 100) With the advantage of 
strength in numbers, “NGOs can provide support to independently minded individuals who 
feel silenced by political pressures but are nonetheless ready to take a stand” (Rotberg, 
1996: 7). Those who form local civil society groups may do so in defense of the principle 
of inclusiveness and to create an inter-personal connection when conflict has caused 
divisions. Shaped by this mission, they will include individuals from different tribal or 
ethnic groups. In maintaining a commitment to openness in conflict and post-conflict 
zones, civil society groups contribute to “demilitarizing people’s minds” (Goodhand and 
Chamberlain, 2000: 102).
Conflict resolution theorists argue that “external interventions that build local peace 
capacities and/or processes stand the best chance of creating a self-enforcing peace” 
(Prendergast and Plumb, 2002: 346). Thus aid to local civil society actors should be a 
priority of external intervention.
Conflict resolution theorists are careful not to limit their definition of civil society 
organizations to NGOs but to include other groups that may be indigenous to non-Western 
contexts. They argue that traditional groups, at least as much as NGOs, are able to employ 
local mechanisms of conflict management and reconciliation that build on domestic 
concepts of social justice. Cases in Africa describe how traditional civil society groups 
have provided avenues for inter and intra-group reconciliation. Rather than NGOs, 
traditional civil society groups -  clans, committees of elders, and religious gatherings -  
play the greatest role. For them to succeed, any external support should be discreet and
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minimal -  attentive to the danger of undermining local leadership and decision-making 
(Prendergast and Plumb, 2002: 342-344).5
Conflict resolution theorists thus suppose that civil society can positively impact peace by 
strengthening contacts and trust between former warring sides; transforming modes of 
dialogue; and developing group cohesion through the implementation of common 
activities. Civil society is important as an organizational form and as a “space” of action. 
Arguably in post-war setting “citizens working in a wide array of associations in the civil 
society pursue actions designed to reconnect elements of the civil society that have been 
alienated and fragmented by the conflict (Saunders, 1999: 27).” Theorists do not claim that 
civil society organizations can force warring parties to accept peace, yet once a peace 
agreement has been signed, they can play a key role in encouraging transformative peace 
consolidation. Within civil society, NGOs are described as one of the actors capable of 
affecting peace consolidation, though traditional groups such as clans and committees of 
elders may also play a decisive role. In the conflict resolution literature it is thus 
hypothesized that both communal and liberal forms of civil society may affect peace.
Source o f theory: Conflict resolution
Causes o f war:
Goal o f warring sides:
Tasks o f peace consolidation 
that civil society may affect:
Ancient hatreds 
Nationalism
Control o f national identity 
Redress past grievances
Build contacts and trust between former warring sides
Transform values and modes o f dialogue
Increase group cohesion and initiation o f common action
Civil society likely to contribute: Communal and liberal civil society/CBOs and NGOs
m . Political-economy interpretations of war and peace:
IILa. Equitable economic development as a response to conflict:
While war can be seen as caused by breakdowns in institutional arrangements or in 
relations between different groups, political economists tend to understand war as “not 
simply a breakdown in a particular system, but a way of creating an alternative system of
5 Prendergast and Plumb’s findings are based on a study of the Akobo Peace Conference (Southern Sudan) 
carried out by Wal Duany, William O. Lowrey, and Julia Duany, “The Indigenous Peace Process: A Case 
Study of the Jikany-Lou Nuer Conflict and its Resolution,” workshop on Political Theory and Policy 
Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, June, 1997.
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profit, power and even protection (Keen, 1998: 11).” Armed conflicts benefit elites and the 
disenfranchised through the creation of war economies. Thus Keen (1998) distinguishes 
between two sources of violence: “top down”, which is mobilized by political and 
economic entrepreneurs, and “bottom up”, which develops among dissatisfied citizenry 
seeking to improve their plight. Elites looking to improve their economic and political 
position may foment violence out of greed. At the same time, amongst marginalized 
sections of the population in which there is high unemployment, low sense of self-worth, 
and resentment towards those who have done well, war can be a means to address 
grievances (Keen 1998: 23-54). Particularly in the UK based literature on the political 
economic causes of war, conflict is considered to be based on politically and economically 
motivated greed and grievance. Rather than being an expression of intra-state rivalries, 
these wars primarily reflect “the contested integration of stratified markets and populations 
into the global economy (Duffield 2002: 14).” According to this interpretation wars are 
fought mainly over control of economic resources and rarely in defense of an ideology or 
political program.
The political economic approach also interprets the outbreak of war as a failure of 
sustainable and equitable economic development. According to this analysis “the unequal 
distribution of resources or other benefits between social groups, and, especially, the 
absence of formal political mechanisms to peaceful reconcile such differences (Duffield 
2002: 38)” can breed conflict. After peace agreements are signed, even if there is no return 
to an open war, “growing economic inequalities and hardship can fuel increased violence 
(Woodward, 2002: 184).”
The source of the new wars are linked with globalization because, together with the 
solidification of regional trade (and political) blocks, the privatization of economic 
relations, and the decline of the welfare state, globalization has weakened the prestige of 
political authority and citizens’ sense of national identity. In a rapidly changing world, 
where globalization brings opportunities as well as frustrations, and traditional values are 
challenged by imported slogans, whatever feelings of exclusion and grievance that already 
exist in society risk being exacerbated. Disenfranchised citizens with no strong government 
to turn to or no clear role models in formal positions of authority may feel a sentiment of
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low worth and direction. For the elites and average citizens alike participation in the 
parallel war economy, while proclaiming to be fighting for a nation or region, can thus 
provide a powerful new “strong man” identity. Globalization also brings greater 
opportunity for economic gain. As Duffield (2002: 14) describes, the liberalization of trade 
relations and market deregulation “has deepened all forms of parallel and transborder trade 
and allowed warring parties to forge local-global networks and shadow economies as a 
means of asset realization.”
The political economy approach advocates for a linking of international relief and 
development activities in an attempt to help build up local economic capacities in war and 
post-war contexts. Yet it also considers that the economic liberalization policies 
implemented by international agencies in peace building operations have frequently been 
counterproductive for long-term stability and conflict reduction. Macro economic 
stabilization programs advocated for by the World Bank, relying on strict fiscal and 
monetary polities, are criticized for not addressing the deeper structural imbalances that are 
part of the causes of conflict (Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2000: 104-109; 2002: 96; Woodward: 
2002: 192-193). International financial institutions’ calls for privatization, tax cuts and 
reduction in state expenditures are likely to contribute to a greater loss of state revenue and 
legitimacy when it is crucial to strengthen confidence in government (Woodward, 2002: 
185, 193). Instead political economists reason that economic programs should prioritize 
rebuilding the formal and legal economy, reducing corruption, and reversing discriminatory 
economic relationships that emerged out of war economies (Kaldor, 1999b: 131-137). To 
break the political entrepreneurs’ ability to mobilize people along exclusionary identity 
projects, economic reconstruction should focus on job creation and providing the means for 
individual economic development (Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2000: 117; Woodward: 2002: 201- 
203).
Political economists consider that peace will be consolidated when opportunities to satisfy 
greed and address grievances through violence are diminished. Keen notes that the “art of 
a successful transition from war to peace may lie in insuring that at least some of those 
benefiting from war will benefit more from peace (Keen, 1998: 66).” This also means 
addressing the needs of the “spoiler” (Stedman, 1997) or “warlord” with his urge to
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survive, his network of vested interests and his imperative to resist a peace process at all 
costs” (Mackinlay, 1997: 60). It signifies establishing an equitable peace -  lessening some 
of the social, political and economic inequalities that helped cause war.
III. b Civil society’s affect on political economic causes o f war:
Political economists tend to be skeptical about civil society organizations’ capacities to 
positively affect peace. As war is considered to be the product of a powerful juxtaposition 
of greed and grievance, successful peace consolidation requires the taming of both 
passions. Civil society is poorly placed to affect field commanders’ greed. The problems 
that Alex de Waal describes in the cases of Africa are just as likely to develop in the former 
Yugoslavia and Central Asia. He writes:
“The power relations that exist in any society, and particularly so during wartime, present a huge 
obstacle to any sort o f civic mobilisation for peace. It is widely noted that some political leaders and 
military commanders gain political and material advantages from armed conflict. Unfortunately, 
these same individuals who benefit from war are usually those who take the lead in negotiating for 
peace. By contrast, the people who lose most from war, that is ordinary citizens and especially those 
who are most disadvantaged in any political system, are voiceless when it comes to pressing for an 
end to war and setting the terms of a peaceful settlement.” (2000: 1)
Most forms of civil society emerge from years of war either weakened or co-opted by the 
leaders who benefited from the fighting.
In particular the close relationship between communal civil society groups and the 
communities in which they operate may prove detrimental to the peace efforts, as the 
former become implicated in processes of complicity and accommodation. In post-conflict 
environments there is a greater risk that community linkages will challenge organizations’ 
efforts to remain neutral and avoid being co-opted by political elites (Eade, 1997: 179). 
NGOs may choose to “dance to the tune of the prince,” in which case they become an 
extension of the patron-client relationship between commanders and communities 
(Goodhand and Chamberlain, 2000: 91, 98). Civil society groups may be created as 
primordial homogenous groups, whose initial intentions seem benign, but ultimately they 
often seek ways to strengthen the primordial group’s comparative position within a wider 
context of clientalism (Whaites, 2000: 128). Keen thus argues that during wartime violence 
is often privatized. Then “elites are likely to try to harness economic agendas within civil
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society in order to fight civil wars on the cheap: violent private accumulation at the local 
level can serve as a substitute for supplies form the center (Keen 2000: 28).”
Political economists are wary of expecting too much from civil society in the immediate 
aftermath of war, and are often highly critical of international policy makers’ focus on 
NGOs as the main civil society form capable of contributing to institution-building. They 
contend that western led attempts to support NGOs as service providers or political 
advocates are misguided. They find this liberal civil society to be weak and ineffective; 
with few or no capacities to affect peace consolidation (Duffield 1999: 136-143; Stubbs 
1997). International donor policies to support NGOs may provide such groups with public 
legitimacy and power, while bypassing local authorities in the distribution of goods and 
services. This may further undermine weak government capacity and legitimacy 
(Woodward, 2002: 208; Eade, 1997: 169). Political economists further argue that the means 
that international organizations employ to support civil society are inappropriate: financial 
assistance should be redirected to political support and facilitating local civil society 
organizations’ attempts to define their voice in international arenas in order to advocate for 
their interests. Bojicic-Dzelilovic’s argument (2002:94-95) on the potential negative impact 
of external assistance based on experience from Bosnia-Herzegovina comprehensively 
explains the concerns that:
“Numerous programmes to strengthen local civil society -  and NGOs as one o f its constituent parts -  are 
pursued within the reconstruction framework, but the results have, by and large, been disappointing. In 
most conflict affected countries, institutions of civil society tend to be underdeveloped. Indeed, the 
opposite is often true in that ‘uncivil,’ exclusionary forms tend to prevail. The approach that a civil 
society can be created from outside against a blueprint originating in a different cultural context is in 
itself problematic. It gives rise to organizations that are under pressure to conform to Western models 
[...] There is also a larger issue o f the effectiveness o f NGO-supported projects with respect to macro­
level policy making, in the sense that the latter can undermine or even annul the results accomplished by 
small, community-based projects.”
Rather than focusing on NGOs, “The challenge is to find legitimate, established sources of 
authority. These may include local authorities, traditional elders, clans structures and self- 
defense groups. In states close to collapse, these sources of authority will usually be local, 
rather than central.” (Keen, 1998: 64)
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The political economy literature contains ambiguities about the civil society’s potential 
affect on peace. It concurs with conflict resolution arguments about the necessity of 
supporting local peace capacities. It considers that civil society groups can work with this 
population of dissatisfied in order to show them the benefits of peace, and ensure that they 
are not alternatively mobilized by political elites who seek a return to the battlefield. Yet 
the understanding of the limits, possibilities, and diverse definitions of civil society is 
subtler in the political economy literature than in the two described above. While civil 
society groups’ close ties to local communities are often interpreted as one of their greatest 
assets, political economists are careful to note that linkages make local groups more 
susceptible to the pressures of patronage networks. In literature on greed and grievance the 
discussion on civil society is extended to include both communal and liberal forms, but 
CBOs rather than NGOs are generally considered to be most likely to positively affect 
peace.
Source o f theory: Political economy
Causes o f war:
Goal of warring sides:
Tasks o f peace consolidation 
that civil society may affect:
Greed for political and economic power 
Political, economic and social grievances 
Inequality 
Control state
Control economic resources
Diminish opportunities to satisfy greed through violence 
Reduce economic inequalities and unemployment 
Decrease attractiveness o f violence for aggrieved
Civil society likely to contribute: Communal civil society/CBOs
IV. Rights based approach to war and peace:
When considering the causes of conflict, the rights based approach to peace consolidation 
is influenced by discussions on the origins of “new wars” (Duffield, 2001: 13-15; Kaldor, 
1999b: 2, 69-90; 2000: 3-4; 2003: 119-123). According to Kaldor’s terminology, “new 
wars” are to be distinguished from traditional inter-state conflicts; their political character 
emphasized; and the increased blurring of distinctions between war, organized crime, and 
large-scale transgressions of human rights underlined. This approach shares the institution- 
building interpretation of war as generally starting in failed states (Kaldor, 2003: 120). 
Most often these states appear strong, but they lack popular legitimacy and rely on both 
legalized and illegal use of violence to remain in power. Autocratic governments, in close
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cooperation with an array of military and paramilitary forces, warlords, and black 
marketers, conspire in carrying out massive human rights violations for personal political 
and economic gain.
These wars are less about the capture of territory by military means than the capture of 
civilians’ thought processes, the dissemination of an exclusionary political project, and the 
establishment of homogenous “pure” regions. Populations are kept in a state of intense fear 
of the “other”, or those with dissenting opinions, as authorities use the “strategy of tension” 
and the media as mechanisms of control. Consequently there is a top-down undermining of 
community, trust, and values of tolerance and mutual aid. Massive human rights violations, 
which are a fundamental tool of the new wars, are perpetuated against all those who refuse 
to follow the war project, be they members of the enemy group or internal dissenters. As 
Kaldor (1999b: 9) notes, “the first civilians to be targeted are those who espouse a different 
politics, who try to maintain inclusive social relations and some sense of public morality.” 
Archibugi (2003: 13) argues that these civilians should be considered like “hostages in a 
kidnapping.”
Closely related to the political economists’ argument - that war provides a means for elites 
and the disenfranchised to gain a new strong man identity - the new wars are understood as 
being about identity politics. Kaldor (1999b: 78-79) thus considers that in a world where 
politicians and traditional elites are losing their influence and power, they turn to various 
forms of identity politics as a means to maintain popular interest in their actions. They 
claim power and legitimacy on the basis of a particular identity -  national, regional, 
religious, linguistic or other -  and their ability to protect this identity from external threats. 
Primordial identities are “reinvented in the context of the failure or the corrosion of other 
sources of political legitimacy” (Kaldor, 1999b: 7) by elites aspiring to secure their power- 
base. Observance of universal human rights standards and cosmopolitanism, which has 
been defined by Brennan (2003: 41) as an “enthusiasm for customary differences [...] as 
well as a theory of world government and corresponding citizenship”, have been proposed 
as alternative sources of identity and political consciousness (Archibugi, 2003: 10-11; 
Kaldor, 1999b: 86-89).
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The rights-based analysis of war is concerned with all forms of non-legitimized acts of 
violence, not only the violence undertaken by military forces, but also the wide range of 
actions that violate international and domestic law. Domestic violence, intra-community 
violence, and the violation of political and civil, as well as social and economic, rights are 
thus included.
For peace to be consolidated, proponents of a rights-based approach consider that 
international humanitarian law, human rights law, and domestic legislation should be 
applied and respected. In post-war countries they advocate the rebuilding of trust between 
citizens and in public authorities and the re-establishment of a rule of law. It is a political 
and legal project. The pursuit of justice, accountability, and the re-establishment of 
governmental institutions’ legitimacy are key. A rights-based approach calls for the holding 
to account of individuals who have committed atrocities during the war, through the 
conduct of criminal trials or the formation of truth commissions. This serves to underscore 
that individuals, and not entire identity groups, are responsible for human rights abuses, and 
to ensure that grievances are not left un-addressed to re-emerge in the future (Kritz, 1996: 
594-598). Justice should be served according to international laws, norms, and institutions 
(Newman, 2002: 41). The rights based approach also emphasizes the necessity of re­
establishing a rule of law to protect all members of society, ensure that all parties are held 
accountable for their actions, and establish non-violent means for people to resolve disputes 
(Kritz, 1996: 588). This signifies setting up an independent judiciary, a non-political law 
enforcement system, and a non-corrupt public administration (Kritz, 1996: 591-594; 
Putnam, 2002: 238).
The international community can contribute in the immediate post-war years in helping to 
establish public security until local capacities are strong enough to undertake these tasks 
alone. This can be defined as “international law enforcement” (Kaldor, 2000: 93). In this 
context international forces, with UN approved mandates, may undertake tasks such as 
protecting civilians, arresting war criminals, implementing cease-fires, overseeing 
demilitarization, and engaging in policing or border monitoring.
73
Chapter two
IV  b Civil society’s contribution to rights promotion and ideological change.
Those who adopt a rights-based approach tend to conceive of civil society as a society that 
respects international human rights norms, and is guided by values of tolerance and justice. 
Generally these forms of civil society emerge from years of war weakened. During the war 
years, and often before, freedoms of assembly, speech and expression are limited, with 
civic activists imprisoned or killed. In a society dominated by fear there remains little room 
for dialogue, self-initiative and trust. Authorities are attuned to the value of civil society 
organizations in shaping and mobilizing adherents. They are thus likely to co-opt them in 
their own exclusionary projects or terminate their activities.
Nevertheless, even in countries where massive human rights have occurred, Kaldor (1999b: 
111) maintains that “islands of civility” remain which need to be deepened and widened. 
The new nature of warfare, its geographic fragmentation, and non-linear trajectory, 
signifies that even in wartime, regions and groups can successfully resist violence (Kaldor, 
1999b: 111; Varshney, 2002: 283). The representations of civil society that Kaldor and 
Varshney consider as having this influence are intra-communal ones, committed to notions 
of tolerance and with a non-exclusive political agenda. They most often fit the liberal 
definition of civil society but are guided by an “activist” ideology rather than neo-liberal 
one. “To the extent that they are capable of mobilizing support, they weaken the power of 
the warring parties” (Kaldor 1999b: 121) and the zones in which they are active provide a 
base from which it is possible to reach out to civilians living in more repressive 
environments. Ultimately, once a peace agreement has been signed, “the groups who 
defend humanistic values and refuse the politics of particularism” can play a key role by re­
launching political debate, providing alternatives to exclusionary politics, and supporting 
the establishment of the rule of law (Kaldor 199b, 133-137).
Proponents of a rights-based approach also consider that civil society organizations can 
play an important human rights promotion and protection role, educating individuals about 
their rights and developing mechanisms for the protection of those rights (Putnam, 2002: 
256-257). Civil society activists can train police and judiciary personal in international 
human rights standards. They can serve as mediators between citizens and law enforcement
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bodies, for example providing legal aid and representation, and help rebuild trust in these 
institutions to resolve conflicts without violence.
Civil society organizations may furthermore contribute as partners in the international law 
enforcement project in countries emerging from war. Based on their knowledge of the local 
situation, and community level contacts, they can advise and guide external actors (Kaldor, 
1999b: 121, 124, 136). Amongst indigenous populations, the involvement of civil society 
can provide legitimacy to outsiders. A similar outcome can be obtained at the global level 
when the peace-building mission is supported by international civil society or international 
legal bodies (Archibulgi, 2003: 12). All too often, however, international actors are 
reluctant to engage in serious dialogue with civil society representatives, or to support their 
efforts as a conscious part of their peace consolidation strategy, preferring to focus their 
attention on leaders of the warring parties (Kaldor, 1999b: 122).
The development of an international human rights regime, where a range of national and 
international human rights organizations are highly active, has initiated the enlargement of 
the discussion on civil society’s impact on peace to include the role of global networks 
(Kaldor, 2003: 128-136). Global civil society may reduce tensions between people and 
states as the common norms and values of a normative civil society bind those participating 
in it. This is a distant scheme, but as Keane (1998: 33) suggests: “The global talk of civil 
society may even signal the first step in the long term emergence of a common framework 
of meaning underneath and across state boundaries.” Civil society working together across 
borders has begun to find its common voice, for example in the defense of human rights or 
environmental issues (Falk, 1995: 164-165). In Civil Society an Answer to War, Kaldor 
(2003: 159) argues that it is “the job of civil groups to promote international norms and 
values to show that the notion of human consciousness can be actively practiced.” Global 
civil society may come together to affect change at the global level, but it can also play this 
role locally. In post-war contexts, civil society organizations operating at the national level 
need the assistance, and occasionally protection (Putnam 2002: 258), of partners across 
borders to affect change. Thus “an effective response to the new wars has to be based on a 
alliance between international organizations and local advocates for cosmopolitanism
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(Kaldor, 1999b: 123)” which builds a political alternative to exclusion based on a 
commitment to human rights standards and values.
The rights-based analysis considers that civil society can positively affect peace and 
concurs with the conflict resolution and political economy arguments about the importance 
of supporting local representations of civil society in war and post-war contexts. It deems 
communal, as well as liberal, definitions of civil society to be valid but identifies liberal 
civil society as the most likely to positively affect peace. This is mainly because communal 
civil society, made up of non-voluntary groups based on set identities, is generally intra- 
communal, exclusionary, and not open to all.
Peace consolidation approach: Rights based
Causes of war:
Goals o f warring sides:
Tasks of peace consolidation 
affected by civil society:
Weak states and the decline o f state legitimacy 
Erosion o f rule o f law and legitimate use of force 
Globalization
Control o f political and economic resources 
Elimination of all alternative identities 
Provide alternatives to exclusionary politics 
Assist in human rights protection and enforcement 
Support establishment of the rule o f law and trust injustice
Civil society likely to contribute: Liberal civil society/NGOs
V. Peace consolidation in practice in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan:
V.a War and peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina:
All four approaches to war and peace described above are useful to help explain the origins 
of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.6 Most closely related to the behavioral approach of 
conflict resolution, a primordial view of nationalism has been used to explain the conflict’s 
origins. According to this argument it was the reemergence of 14th century “ethnic hatreds” 
between Croats, Serbs and Bosnian Muslims which caused the outbreak of fighting in 1991
6 There have been numerous accounts o f the breakup o f Yugoslavia. Recommended texts include: Mark 
Thompson, A Paper House: the Ending of Yugoslavia, New York: Pantheon Books, 1992; Morton Halperin, 
and David Scheffer with Patricia Small, Self Determination in the New World Order. Washington, DC: the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992; Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking 
the Breakup 1990-1992, London: Verson, 1993; Samantha Power, Breakdown in the Balkans: A Chronicle of 
Events, January 1989-May 1993, Washington DC: the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993; 
Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, Chapters 2-6, Washington 
DC: Brookings Institute, 1995; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, London: 
Penguin Books, 1995; J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in 
Transition, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995 (2nd edition).
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(Kaplan, 1993). Views that correspond more closely with the instrumental conception of 
nationalism link war to the breakup of the Yugoslav federation -  a highly decentralized 
system in which the center could not adapt quickly enough to exogenous economic shifts 
(Hechter, 2000: 150-151). When the transition to a market economy began, “there were no 
effective institutional mechanisms to arbitrate and settle differences (Denitch, 1994: 10- 
11).” This understanding is close to an institutional line of argument that notes that 
Yugoslavia’s communists, and the institutions they set up, failed to “solve” the national 
question (Ramet, 1992: 278-279). Once Croatia and Slovenia began to call for their 
independence, their new governments did little to alleviate the concerns of minorities or to 
assure them their rights would be protected. In this particular context, the people of the 
Balkans were led into warfare by “purposeful actions of political actors who actively 
create(d) violent conflict [...] by selectively drawing on history in order to portray it as 
historically inevitable (Glenny in Jentleson, 1998: 299).” Thus ethnicity was a “social 
construct” used by leaders seeking to gain political power and economic privilege. 
Woodward (1995: 225-236) provides lengthy arguments supporting this thesis, describing 
how nationalist politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina cooperated in “psychological 
warfare” to create divisions along nationalist lines. In line with a rights-based analysis, the 
Bosnian conflict has also been described as a “war of exclusivist nationalists against a 
secular multicultural pluralistic society (Kaldor, 1999b: 44).”
Why the populations of the former Yugoslavia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular, 
answered the nationalist call can arguably best be explained by political-economic factors 
linked to greed and grievance. In Bosnia-Herzegovina independence came ten years into a 
period of deepening economic crisis, public spending cuts, rising unemployment, and 
international financial institutions’ increasing pressure for debt repayment (Hechter, 2000: 
150-151; Woodward 1995: 15-17). Ramet (1992: 278-279) argues that citizens’ political 
grievances mounted in the 1980s, and that their readiness to adopt nationalism increased 
because democracy was not allowed to take hold. As Ignatieff (1997: 40-41) explains, civic 
leaders who could have led a burgeoning democratic movement in the early 1990s were 
publicly distrusted by the majority, who considered that they had been co-opted by the 
regime a decade earlier. Greedy for political and economic influence, an elite, who until 
Tito’s death had pledged allegiance to socialism and Yugoslavism, needed “a new language
77
Chapter two
of popular appeal” to remain in power. As democracy and multi-national ideals were 
largely discredited, they turned to nationalism. Nationalist sentiment appealed to citizens’ 
economic and political grievances and to the sense of fear of the unknown that they 
harbored after Tito’s passing (Bojicic and Kaldor 1999: 93; Ignatieff, 1997: 41-46). Once 
the war began ethnic cleansing and savage plunder became a means for aggrieved groups to 
“revenge their nation” and make economic gains, but also for the greedy to benefit -  often 
with little concern for national interests (Bojicic and Kaldor, 1999; Bougarel, 1996a: 104- 
103). Amongst the youth that joined irregular armed militias, fighting provided a sense of 
belonging and purpose (Denitch, 1994: 75).
After three and a half years of intense fighting and failed international mediation, the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina ended with the signing of the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace (GFAP), more frequently termed the Dayton Agreement, on 14 December, 1995.7 
Approximately 200,000 persons had been killed (out of a population of some 4.3 million), 
two million persons displaced, and $100 billion lost (UNDP, 1998: 19). Some 845,000 
people were registered as internally displaced (HRCC, 2001b). Two thousand kilometers of 
roads, 70 bridges, half the electricity network and more than half of the housing units were 
destroyed (Cox, 2001: 11). A large-scale humanitarian operation was underway. Sixty 
thousand NATO troops formed the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR); the Peace 
Implementation Council (PIC) was established to supervise civilian peace building efforts 
together with the OHR. Nationalist political parties controlled all levels of government; the 
media propagated hate messages; freedom of movement was nonexistent; social services 
were provided on the basis of nationality or by international humanitarian agencies; the 
formal economy functioned meekly while the black market and organized crime flourished; 
and internal security and judicial bodies upheld a nationalist rule of law. Though the war 
had officially ended, violence perpetuated by majority ethnic/national groups against 
minority ones continued, as did the destruction and looting of homes. Elites saw their best 
chance of remaining in power to be maximum control over people’s loyalties and
7 For an account o f the Dayton peace process see Richard Holbrooke (1998), To End a War. New York: 
Random House and Roger Cohen (1998), Chapter 32, Sagas of Sarajevo: Hearts Grown Brutal. New York: 
Random House. For accounts o f previous international negotiation efforts: Warren Zimmerman (1996), 
Origins of a Catastrophe, New York: Times Books and David Owen (1995), Balkan Odyssey, London: Victor 
Gollancz.
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livelihoods. They considered that fear, a sense of vulnerability, and intense distrust would 
insure the great majority of people’s continued allegiance to nationalist parties. The GFAP 
preserved the sovereignty of a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina but legalized the existence of 
two separate entities -  the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska 
(Serb Republic) with unclear powers.
Five years after the end of the war conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina had notably 
normalized; in no small part due to the High Representative’s use of new powers conferred 
to him at the 1997 Bonn PIC. The introduction of common license plates and the 
dismantling of roadblocks contributed to freedom of movement in 1997-1998. A common 
currency facilitated economic transactions and trade. New media laws and regulations 
silenced the most virulently nationalist stations, and provided space for independent media 
outlets to grow and to be heard on either side of the former front lines. By 2001 five sets of 
countrywide elections had been organized with the support of the international 
community. The 2000 general elections were the first in which nationalists did not win, as 
the Alliance for Change, a coalition of non-nationalist parties led by the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) won a majority in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Parliamentary Assembly and the 
Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as in several canton level and 
municipal races.9 Human rights institutions, including the Property Commission, the 
Human Rights Chamber, and a series of Human Rights Ombudspersons, had been set up 
and provided mechanisms for citizens to address violations of their human and civil rights.
8 The OSCE organized three general elections, held in 1996, 1998, 2000; and two municipal elections in 1997 
and 2000. In addition, elections were held in Mostar in 1996 and 1997. A special election for the RS National 
Assembly occurred in 1997. The 2000 general elections included new municipal elections for the 
municipality o f Srebrenica.
9 The 1996-2000 elections were considered as having reinforced rather than reduced nationalist parties hold 
on power (Cousens and Cater, 2001; ICG, 1999a; Pugh and Cobble, 2001; Woodward, 1999:7). In 2000 at the 
lower levels, in three Federation cantons the SDP tallied the highest number o f votes, in the other nine 
cantons it came in second. At the municipal level the SDP won relative or absolute majorities in 15 
municipalities, in the RS the Party of Independent Democrats (SNSD) gained the control o f four 
municipalities (OSCE, 2000a, 2000b).
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In the first four years after the end of the war minority returns (guaranteed by GFAP Annex 
7) were low,10 yet in 2000 they suddenly began to increase. Before 2000 security threats, 
fear, the destruction of minority owned property and the strident nationalist rhetoric of 
many political authorities, in addition to legal, social and economic challenges, created 
obstacles that appeared insurmountable to many potential minority returnees (Cousens 
2001, 2002; ICG 1997; ICG 1999b; USCR 2000; USIP 1999). Yet during 2000 more than 
52,000 displaced persons, and 16,000 refugees, regained their homes -  a nearly four-fold 
increase since 1999 (HRCC, 2001b; ICG, 2000). More than 23,000 were registered as 
minority returns (UNHCR, 2001). The surge in returns could be explained by “refugee 
impatience; new international community effectiveness; and a change in the psychology of 
both majority and minority populations (ICG, 2000: 5).” As explained in more detail this 
could be seen as part of a “home grown strategy:”
“In this strategy, refugees return to remote, unoccupied, burned out villages deep within ‘enemy’ 
territory, where there is little or no presence o f the majority group. Because the returns are low 
visibility and do not displace members o f the majority ethnic group from their housing, ethnic 
tensions are usually manageable, and the local majority is able to slowly adjust to the presence o f a 
significant minority group nearby. Success in one village is then duplicated in another nearby village 
(ICG, 2000:3)”
While five years of peace brought many improvements towards the normalization of daily 
existence in Bosnia-Herzogovina, the Bosnian state still had no functioning “unified” 
governmental institutions (Cousens, 2002: 552-553; Cox, 2001). The country continued to 
be de facto governed by four entities -  the Bosniak part of the Federation of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, Republika Srpska (RS), Herzeg-Bosna (H-B) and the OHR internationally 
sponsored protectorate. The state was fragmented and largely ineffective.11 The complexity 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s governance structures created a heavy bureaucracy, obstacles to 
effective decision-making, limited efficient revenue collection, and unclear responsibilities
10 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) some 19,498 Bosniak and 
Croat displaced persons returned to the RS, and 20,858 Serb DPs to the Federation, from 1996 to 1999 
inclusive (UNHCR 2001).
11 In his inaugural speech, High Representative Paddy Ashdown (OHR, 2002) stated to his Bosnian audience: 
“You have 1,200 judges and prosecutors, 760 legislators, 180 Ministers, four separate levels o f government 
and three armies -  for a country of less than four million people! You have 13 Prime Ministers! That’s a 
Prime Minister for every 300,000 citizens! The cost o f government in BiH is a staggering KM1.8bn -  and 
that’s just for the government machine itself, it doesn’t include the cost o f services such as health, education 
and pensions. That means that just paying for politicians and bureaucrats costs every citizen o f working age in 
BiH KM900 every year -  that’s almost 3 months’ wages for the average worker!”
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concerning the level of government in charge of providing basic services. Nationalist forces 
in Herzegovina, and to a lesser extent in RS, had no incentive to strengthen higher levels of 
governance. Rather they sought to keep as many powers divulged to the local levels as 
possible (ESI, 1999: 2). After 2000 this posed substantive challenges to non-nationalists 
elected to work in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Parliamentary Assembly, and in the Parliament 
of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For the first time since 1991 non-nationalists 
were governing, and especially at the municipal and canton levels, expectations that they 
would improve basic social and economic conditions were high.
In the first years after the end of the war massive inflows of foreign assistance had fueled 
economic growth. According to the World Bank, GDP growth in 1996 was 62% in the 
Federation and 25% in the Republika Srpska. (USAID B-H, 2000). Basic social services 
that had ceased during the war resumed. Five years after the end of the war, however, the 
economic situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was no longer progressing at the same pace with 
official unemployment above 40%, poor revenue collection and a substantial trade deficit 
(Cox, 2001: 9). Nineteen percent of the population was assessed as living in absolute 
poverty, GDP was 65% lower in 2000 than in 1990, and the average trade deficit was 50% 
of GDP (UNDP 2002b: 9-10).12 In 2001 the UNDP concluded that Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
social policy and welfare system was in urgent need of reform as “the economically weak 
state is in no condition to satisfy the needs of all the people who [...] find themselves in a 
situation of social need (UNDP 2001: 35). The official level of unemployment in 2001 was 
close to 40% and opinion surveys revealed that unemployment, followed by corruption, 
were the two greatest popular concerns (UNDP 2001: 35).
Five years after the end of the war peace was progressing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Positive 
change seemed most evident in the domains of reconciliation and rights-protection. While 
the 2000 elections suggested that the nationalist parties’ legitimacy was decreasing, the 
institutional set-up and structures of government remained deeply divided. The macro- 
economic situation was stagnant, leaving large discrepancies between rich and poor, and 
maintaining a large population of unemployed and dissatisfied youth.
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V.b War and peace in Tajikistan
On 9 September 1991 Tajikistan declared its independence from the Soviet Union and less 
then a year later it was embroiled in a war. As in the Bosnian case, primordial and 
instrumental theories of nationalism can start to explain the causes of the Tajik conflict. 
“Regionalism” or “localism” was identified as a main cause for the fighting, a line of 
cleavage between a modernized industrial North and more traditional agricultural South of 
the country that deepened in the 1980s (Niyazi, 1998: 155).13 Several theorists have argued 
that among the majority of Tajik citizens a deeply ingrained conception of the Tajik nation­
state did not exist, as the country was only formed as a cohesive territorial unit in 1929 
when it became a Soviet Socialist Republic.14 Instead the country was made up of groups 
bound by strong allegiances to local identity or “regionalism” (Rubin, 1998: 135). Rural- 
based and geographically divided, Tajik society retained strong traditional networks of 
solidarity built on family and community ties. Soviet power-sharing relied on the regional 
groupings, giving them political validity and seeding inter-regional antagonisms (Roy, 
2001: 23). When the Soviet Union broke down competition between the regions broke out 
as there was no longer an external referee to moderate power-sharing. To demonstrate how 
the war in Tajikistan was mainly a war of regions, theorists describe how, during the early 
days of the conflict in 1992, participants at two large-scale demonstrations that stretched 
from April into May in Dushanbe were split by regional affiliation (Niyazi, 1998: 159).
Several authors (Atkin, 1997: 291-295, Chatterjee, 2002; Niyazi, 1998: 146-154) have 
provided descriptions of Tajik regions, which were divided by geography and topography 
but have come to be characterized by their different economic development, level of 
religiosity, and links to central government. In the North, Leninabad/Khojent was arguably 
where industry and agriculture were most well developed and from where the Tajikistan
12 In their report the authors underline the lack o f “trustworthy” national statistics in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
note that GDP may be underestimated by as much as 20%, and unemployment overestimated by 20%. No 
nation wide census was held in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1991-2003.
13 The dichotomy between the North and South is also frequently interpreted as one between plain-dwellers 
who were part o f the ancient Transoxiana civilization and “mountain Tajiks” who were largely cut off from 
external influences (Akiner, 2002a: 152; Akiner and Barnes, 2001: 18).
14 Tajiks have been present in Central Asia for several thousand years. Yet when Stalin demarcated 
Uzbekistan from Tajikistan the two ancient cities of Bukhara and Samarkand, that had majority Tajik 
populations, were left inside Uzbekistan’s territorial borders.
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Soviet political elite originated. In the South the Kuliab region (Khatlon) was mainly 
agricultural, reliant on cotton growing. The mountainous Garm/Karategin Valley in the 
center specialized in vegetable and fruit growing and inhabitants were considered 
particularly pious and traditional. Further to the West, sparsely populated Gorno- 
Badakhshan had the highest level of unemployment but also the highest population of 
educated persons and was populated by Ismailis. Around the city of Kurgan Tuppe 
(Khatlon), in the Vaksh Valley, up to 90% of the population were newcomers settled from 
other parts of Tajikistan in the 1930-1950s to complement a mixed indigenous population, 
and to develop a growing cotton-processing and chemical industrial sector (Akiner, 2002a: 
155; Rubin 1998: 151-152). It is in this region that the first conflicts developed as a pattern 
emerged of people originally from the Garm/Karategin region and from Kuliab fighting 
over resources, land, water and administrative and managerial posts. During the war a 
rough, uneasy alliance posed Leninabadis and Kuliabis against Garmis and Pamiris (people 
from Gorno-Badakhshan). However, unlike the parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina, no regional 
group sought to establish its own secessionist state (Akiner and Barnes, 2001: 17) They did 
not question the legitimacy of Tajikistan’s statehood and their fight was for control of the 
state and its institutions (Abdullo, 2001: 49).
Regionalism in itself was not enough to create the armed conflict that broke out “when 
ancient regional contradictions became intertwined with those of a newer ideological and 
political kind (Niyazi, 1998: 146).” Regionalism was superimposed on an ideological 
conflict between former communists on one hand (who tended to originate from Kuliab), 
and Islamists (often Garmis) and Democrats on the other. The dominant parties in the 
conflict were the government -  under the leadership of President Emomali Rakhmonov -  
and a group of opposition parties that coalesced around the Islamic Renaissance Party 
(IRP) and took the name of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). The IRP, formed in 1990 
and registered in 1991, advocated greater freedom to practice Islam and the incorporation 
of Muslim values in government. In 1991-1992 the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, and 
some of the first liberal civil society groups including Rastokhez and La 7/ Badakhshan, 
joined the IRP, and eventually the UTO, in its political and military struggle against the 
Tajik government. The latter was identified as neo-communist due to its composition -  of 
former apparatchiks -  and close ties to Moscow. Other divisions based on ideology, urban
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vs. rural cleavages, economic disparities, social conditions, and external pressures were 
also sources of tensions (Akiner and Barnes, 2001: 16-21; Atkin, 1997: 279; Rubin, 1998: 
131-146). Political-economic and rights-based interpretations of the origins of the conflict 
thus consider that the civil war “originated primarily in the dynamics of a power struggle 
between a new class of ‘political entrepreneurs,’ rather than in deep social divisions” 
(Barnes and Abdullaev, 2001: 8).
An institutional analysis can further contribute to understanding the origins of the war. In 
the early 1990s the lack of mechanisms or means to moderate regional and ideological 
differences was decisive in the outbreak of armed fighting. Newly independent, Tajikistan 
“lacked well-developed mechanisms to manage political conflict and competition. [...] 
There were few counterbalances capable of arresting the escalation to war (Akiner and 
Barnes, 2001: 18).” Rapidly “the inability of [Tajikistan’s] state apparatus to integrate the 
population of the republic’s arbitrarily demarcated territory into a common society with 
reciprocal rights and responsibilities” proved decisive (Rubin, 1998: 128). As Atkin (1997: 
285-290) describes, attempts to mobilize public support for multi-party politics and civic 
activism in 1990-1992 failed when individuals in power sought to assert their monopoly by 
political maneuvering and the use of force. Concepts of power-sharing, consensus-building 
and accommodation were even farther away from Tajiks than they were from Bosnians at 
that time. For as the Inter-Tajik Dialogue, made up of representatives of Tajik civil society, 
explained in 1996, “the primary obstacle to peace in Tajikistan is the absence of an 
adequate understanding on sharing power among the regions, political parties, and 
movements and nationalities (quoted in Slim and Saunders, 2001: 47).”
Political economy factors can also help explain why ordinary people remained committed 
to their regional grouping and the war continued for over five years. Tajikistan was highly 
dependent on Russia and other external influences for its economic and political 
development. Starting in the 1980s externally induced economic growth began to decline 
and unemployment started to rise. Young people were especially affected and drawn into 
criminal networks (Akiner and Barnes, 2001: 19). Independence resulted in a sharp 
reduction in subsidies from Moscow, which had previously funded 80% of the country’s 
budget (ICG 2003: 1). Grievances increased along with mounting poverty. Authors have
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pointed to the role that religion played in the conflict, in particular to the affect that non- 
traditional Islamic thinking imported into Tajikistan had on both “aggrieved” populations 
and “greedy” entrepreneurs (Akhmedov 1998: 175-182). In addition it has been alleged that 
Tajikistan became embroiled in larger geo-political conflicts in which Russia, Uzbekistan, 
and Afghanistan played a role (Akhmedov 1998: 183-184).
Regardless of what caused the war, by 1993, as Atkin (1997: 300) points out, the fighting 
was no longer “about ideology but about who would benefit from controlling the levers of 
power” (also ICG 2003: 1). By then the country was “plagued by warlordism” as leaders of 
armed bands used force to fulfill their personal ambitions in southern and western 
Tajikistan. In 1996-1997 much of the fighting in the country was commanded by leaders 
who once supported the government side and President Rakhmonov (Atkin, 1997: 302- 
303).
Population displacement was characteristic of the Tajik war, but was not generally 
employed as a tool of “ethnic cleansing” as it was in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Only in parts of 
Tajikistan’s Kurgan Tuppe region were people murdered, raped and expelled according to 
their regional identity. In these cases “the regionalist group became community based and 
almost turned into an ethnic group. [...] The fact of belonging to a regional group 
automatically implied a political solidarity which, even if rejected by the individual 
concerned, was assumed by others (Roy, 2000: 98). Displacement of populations occurred 
due to fighting, fear, lack of food and shelter. The first wave of displaced persons moved in 
1992 and traveled to Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Dushanbe. By 1995, 57,558 out 
of 60,786 refugees from Garm, Tavildara, Jirgital and Tadjikobod had regained their pre­
war residences (UNDP, 1995: 51). However, in May 1996 a second wave of displacements 
occurred as fighting restarted.15 By the end of 1997 most of these persons had also 
returned. In the post-war period the main challenge for the majority of Tajiks was not 
return - as it was for many Bosnians described above - but re-establishing physical and 
material security, basic services, and community cohesion.
15 The ICRC estimated that 23,000 persons had fled from May-December, 1996 (ICRC, 1.12.96)
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On 27 June 1997, President Rakhmonov and head of the UTO, Nuri, signed the General 
Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and Accord after three years of negotiated talks 
overseen by the UN, OSCE and several observer nations. The number killed during the 
war, out of a population of some 5.2 million (in 1990), was somewhere between 50,000 and 
100,000; more than 650,000 were displaced (as refugees and internally displaced persons); 
and war damages were estimated at $7 billion (Abdullaev and Freizer, 2003: 16). Some 
35,000 houses, 55 bridges, 61 medical centers, large segments of the electrical network and 
of the road infrastructure were destroyed (UNDP 1995). It is estimated that the country’s 
GDP fell by 65% from 1991-1997 (ADB 2002: 2). International humanitarian agencies 
were active in the country though their resources were extremely limited compared with 
funds disbursed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.16 The United Nations Mission of Observers in 
Tajikistan (UNMOT), which started its work in early 1993, and the CIS peacekeeping 
forces (composed mainly of Russian units) maintained their presence to assist in the 
peacebuilding effort (Goryayev, 2001). A Commission on National Reconciliation (CNR) 
including representatives of both the government and the UTO was created to oversee 
implementation of the peace accord and to design reforms of the state structure.
Five years after the end of the war, Tajikistan “won deserved praise” (ICG, 2003: i) as the 
country had made “significant achievements [...] in the process of restoration of peace and 
national reconciliation” (UN, 2001: 5). Implementation of a power sharing agreement 
between the former opposition (UTO) and the government had insured the establishment of 
a legitimate central government. The President had further succeeded in centralizing most 
state powers in the Executive and asserting his control over the entire country. In 
November 1999 the first post-war presidential elections were held, followed in spring 2000 
by a parliamentary election. Nevertheless, while Bosnia-Herzegovina was challenged by a 
highly fractured state, Tajikistan in 2002 was becoming increasingly autocratic as the 
former opposition was either co-opted into state structures or discredited. The Parliament 
was extremely weak (ICG, 2003: 10). The President was making ever more frequent 
statements linking political Islam with regional instability and terrorism. In 2002 there was
16 The Priority Recovery and Reconstruction Program from Bosnia-Herzegovina which involved 48 donors 
committed $4.37 billion in 1996-2000 (http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp200Q retrieved March 2001). In 
comparison the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Tajikistan in 2000 amounted to $34.8 million 
(http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf retrieved March 2001).
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a general perception amongst Tajiks that the region of Kuliob, from which the President 
originated, was receiving priority funding, and Kuliobis were obtaining advantages in the 
distribution of political and administrative posts. Throughout government institutions 
widespread corruption and rigidly hierarchical and weak structures continued to hamper 
good governance (Abdullaev and Freizer, 2003: 7; 24, 26).
Five years after the end of the war the economic situation in Tajikistan continued to foster 
popular grievances. By 2000 the Government of Tajikistan considered that the country’s 
main needs were not linked to post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction but to poverty
i nreduction. Poverty, unemployment and corruption were often considered by policy 
analysts to be the main potential sources of future armed conflict in the country (EU 
Strategy Paper 2002-2006, ICG 2003, Abdullaev and Freizer 2003). In her study of poverty 
in Tajikistan in 2000, Falkingham (2000b: iv) found that “over 95% of the population are 
living below the minimum consumption basket, four out of five are ‘poor,’ a third are ‘very 
poor’.” The UN warned in 2000 that, “economic decline and infrastructure collapse 
threatens to undermine further consolidation of the peace process (OCHA, 2000a: 1-2).” In 
2002 it stated in its Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal that in Tajikistan “extreme poverty 
is the central development issue. [...] 83% of the population lives under the national 
poverty line, the average monthly income is less than $7, and the Gross National Income 
per capita is $170” (UN, 2002: 4). The state budget in 2003 was estimated to be a tenth of 
what it was in 1990 (ICG 2003: 2). Though a large percentage of the country was destitute 
and in dire need of governmental assistance, in 2003 a referendum, which was widely 
criticized as being fraudulent by Tajik and international observers, was passed putting an 
end to free and universal provision of medical and educational services (ICG, 2004: 4-5).
Opportunities to satisfy greed continued to proliferate in 2002. Globalization and the 
opening of trade routes has tended to create new opportunities for Tajik war commanders to 
pursue their economic agendas through various forms of trafficking. Tajikistan was 
considered to be the main transit route for narcotics from Afghanistan in the early 2000s -  
with an estimated 100 tons of heroin transiting through the country annually (UN Office on
17 The Government o f Tajikistan completed its Poverty Reduction Strategy in 2002, a comprehensive process 
supported by, amongst others, the World Bank and UNDP.
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Drugs and Crime 2003/ In 2001-2002 poppy growing in Afghanistan continued to 
increase, providing an ever-growing demand for secure trade routes. Thus drug money and 
discord over lucrative trafficking routes contributed to a continued atmosphere of tension 
after the war (Abdullaev and Freizer 2003: 21; ICG 2003).
By 2002 the security situation was starting to improve in the Karategin Valley, where 
violence and insecurity continued beyond the official 1997 end of the civil war until 2000. 
The region was considered to be the UTO’s base and holdout. Fighting between 
government forces and the UTO had been particularly violent in 1996-1997, when the 
Valley’s towns frequently changed hands and the warring parties violently competed for 
control of roads.18 Along these routes there were frequent hostage-taking incidents.19 
Conditions for the civilian population were dire, with inadequate provision of food, 
medicine and shelter. Especially during the winter months, the region was often 
inaccessible as a result of military activity and weather/road conditions. The civilian 
population was regularly harassed, threatened and beaten by government, opposition and 
independent groups (HRW, 1998).20 In addition the growth of the UTO commander’s 
influence in the region tended to be accompanied by the imposition of stricter Islamic rules 
and the forceful internment of women in their homes.21 During 1997-2000, when the 
central government maintained uneasy control of the Valley, former opposition field 
commanders, carved out small “fiefdoms” (ICG 2001: 16) from where they exerted
18 Tavildara for example changed hands five times in 1996. (ICRC, 12.12.96)
19 UN military observers were taken hostage in December 1996 (interview with former UNMOT staff, 07.02); 
in Feb 1997 17 expatriates were abducted by the “Sodirov group” together with the Tajik Minister of Security 
(ICRC, 5.03.97; HRW 1998); in July and August 1997 the “Sodirov group” kidnapped another nine people 
(HRW 1998). In July 1998 four officers working with the UN Mission o f Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) 
were killed in an attack on their convoy driving in the Tavildara district. In late June 2001 fifteen workers 
from the German Agro Action were taken hostage, and later released unharmed, in the same area. All o f these 
incidents occurred in the Karategin Valley.
20 Human Rights Watch World Report 1998, Tajikistan, retrieved on 05.09.2003 at: http:// www.hrw.org/ 
worldreport/ Helsinki-22.htm. Generally the population were in the standard “no win” situation o f civilian 
groups in civil wars: when the government controlled their area, they punished civilians for assisting the 
opposition, and when the opposition controlled the area the opposite occurred.
21 The Karategin Valley has also played a broader geopolitical role as the base o f the Islamic Movement of  
Uzbekistan. Uzbek citizens reportedly left Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Valley after the murder o f four policemen 
in 1997 triggered harsh government repression. After a series o f six bombs went off in Tashkent in February 
1999 more are said to have migrated to the Karategin Valley. By the summer of 1999 between 1500-2000 
Uzbek citizens may have taken refuge in the Karategin Valley, especially in the hamlet of Hoit (Tadjikobod 
district). They are blamed for having carried out armed incursions from Tajikistan into the Ferghana Valley in 
1999 and 2000. In 2000 the Uzbeks were encouraged by a former UTO commander and Minister o f
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pressure on the local population and authorities, collected “road fees” at checkpoints and in 
some cases facilitated drug trafficking.22 However by 2002 the security situation in the 
region had improved significantly with the roads open to traffic and local government 
institutions carrying out their regular administrative duties.
Weaknesses in the rule of law permeated through large segments of the judiciary and law 
enforcement even five years after the war. The majority of the population did not trust the 
courts or police to be un-biased or effective. Accused often considered it easier to pay 
prosecutors and judges bribes rather than go through court hearings. Though Tajikistan was 
a signatory to six major international human rights instruments, in 2002 human rights 
observers alleged increasing recourse to the death penalty, frequent incidents of torture, 
arbitrary arrest and detention, and denial of fair trials (Abdullaev and Freizer, 2003: 35-36; 
ICG, 2003: 11-12).
Five years after the signing of the agreement that brought peace to Tajikistan no resumption 
of armed conflict between the government and the UTO had occurred. Peace consolidation 
had progressed most significantly at the institutional level where elections were held and a 
government was established that included former opposition figures. The degree to which 
reconciliation had been achieved was much more difficult to measure. In the public 
discourse there were no calls for revenge or appeals to a sense of victimization among the 
population. Yet conflict resolution experts remained divided on the strength and 
significance of whatever unresolved and silent grievances remained (Abdullaev and 
Freizer, 2003: 24). Identity remained largely localized, helping patronage networks 
influence politics and economics (ICG, 2003: 13-14). Amongst all forms of peace, 
political-economic peace seemed the most elusive, as feelings of greed and grievance -  
linked to increased wealth disparities and opportunities to benefit from illicit international 
trade - continued to shape political decision making and promote criminal activities. 
Overall security was improving but human rights protection and the establishment of the 
rule of law remained weak.
Emergency Situations, Mirzo Ziyoev, to leave for Afghanistan (Rashid, 2002). Tajik inhabitants o f the region 
claim that the Uzbeks have not returned since (Hoit, 25.10.02).
22 Interview with Program Coordinator o f the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Regional 
Office for Central Asia, Tashkent on 11.11.2002.
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Conclusion: Peace, war and civil society:
This chapter outlined the difference between four main approaches to peace consolidation 
and introduced the assumptions that they make concerning the positive role that civil 
society organizations can have. All four approaches assign different causes for war, and 
interpret the evolution, goals, and instruments of peace consolidation differently. They 
provide different hypotheses concerning civil society’s potential to positively affect peace 
consolidation. In this chapter we have seen how institutional approaches to peace building 
tend to favor cooperation with liberal civil society in the form of NGOs, to support 
institution building, increased public participation and the privatization of social service 
delivery. Conflict resolution proponents assume that not only NGOs but also more 
communal forms of civil society based in local communities can advance the peace project 
by strengthening contacts and trust between former warring sides; modifying values and 
modes of dialogue; increasing group cohesion and the initiation of collective action. 
Political economists are more skeptical about the impact that civil society organizations can 
have on reducing the greed or grievances that led to conflict. They accept both a communal 
and liberal definition of civil society, considering that civil society can be made up of 
groups that are inclusive and exclusionary, independent and co-opted, progressive and 
traditional. They tend to consider that CBOs are nevertheless more likely to positively 
affect peace, especially in reducing grievances. Finally those who adopt a rights-based 
approach hypothesize that liberal civil society organizations -  committed to an “activist” 
ideology, the protection of universal human rights and the strengthening of global civil 
society -  are most able to contribute to peace.
This chapter has also served as an introduction to my two country case studies. The wars in 
Tajikistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina are both examples of post-Cold War conflicts that 
broke out after the disintegration of federations. They were caused in part by the challenges 
of statehood -  or rather the difficult process of creating a new state where institutions and 
national identity were not firmly formed. In both countries, the period leading up to war 
was characterized by struggles between different factions seeking to take control of the 
state. In Bosnia-Herzegovina political leaders used nationalism to gain popular legitimacy 
and exacerbate cleavages, and in Tajikistan religion and regionalism served similar
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functions. The fight for power led to the same outcome, and the first shots were fired in 
Sarajevo and Dushanbe in Spring, 1992. As predicted by political economists, during the 
conflict greed and grievance, as well as external forces, also played important roles. Five 
years after the end of the war, peace consolidation in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
was progressing to different degrees with regard to institution-building, reconciliation, 
alleviating greed and grievance, and human rights promotion. By the end of this study I 
hope to gain a better understanding of how civil society organizations contributed to this 
process.
In the following chapters the hypotheses introduced in Chapters 1 and 2, based on the civil 
society and war and peace literature, will be tested through case studies of Tajik and 
Bosnian civil society organizations. Our aim in Chapters 4 and 5 is to analyze in detail how 
civil society organizations behave and why they behave as they do in the post-conflict 
period. In the following chapter the methodology employed to carry out this task and the 
challenges encountered when doing will be explained.
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C h a p t e r  t h r e e :
C h a l l e n g e s  o f  s t u d y i n g  c i v i l  s o c i e t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n s
COMPARATIVELY IN POST-WAR CONTEXTS
Introduction:
How can civil society and its affect on peace consolidation in post war countries like 
Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina be best scrutinized? As outlined in the first two 
chapters of this work civil society scholarship, as well as war and peace literature makes 
assumptions concerning civil society’s ability to positively impact peace. This chapter 
describes how these propositions may be verified. Based on a historical study of civil 
society development, we found that civil society evolved over time in Tajikistan and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and can be considered as fitting within communal and liberal ideal 
types. In both countries’ post war contexts, NGOs were the most prominent form of 
liberal civil society, and CBOs, associated with mahallas and mjesne zajednice, the 
main form of communal civil society. In the next three chapters, I will thus concentrate 
on analyzing the affect of NGOs and CBOs on peace consolidation. In this chapter I 
describe the methodology employed: the conceptual framework applied; the choice of 
case studies; the data collection and analysis tools; and some of the challenges and 
opportunities that developed during field work in post-conflict contexts. This chapter is 
meant to serve as an introduction to the opportunities and limitations of employing 
qualitative research methodology and empirical data collection to the analysis of civil 
society organizations and their contribution to peace.
Civil society’s potential to positively affect peace consolidation has been acknowledged 
in earlier literature, but there have been few comprehensive comparative attempts to 
explain what type of civil society affects peace and how it does so. Gidron, Katz and 
Hasenfeld (2002), together with Cockbum (1998), Coletta and Cullen (2000), Varshney 
(2002) and Goodhand and Hulme (1998, 2000) are amongst the few who have 
published scholarly research with this aim. In the preface to their book, Gidron, Katz 
and Hasenfeld (2002: vii-viii) explain the methodological and conceptual challenges 
they faced, which due to the relevance to this dissertation, will be quoted in detail:
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“We have intersected two traditionally separate fields o f study -  namely, the third sector, and 
peace processes and conflict resolution -  leading us to explore new and uncharted paths. [...]
We had to formulate a comparative framework that would guide our data collection and enable 
us to analyze the similarities and differences among the organizations. [...] We were faced with 
the challenge o f  finding creative solutions to complex substantive and methodological problems 
without the benefit o f prior studies dealing with similar projects. In particular, we needed, on the 
one hand to spell out a conceptual model and set o f variables that could be used to compare and 
explain the organizational attributes and behavior o f these peace and conflict-resolution 
organizations. On the other hand we wanted to make sure that this conceptual model would not 
mute the distinct narratives o f these organizations within the unique national contexts in which 
they existed.”
Similarly in this study we are interested in defining appropriate mechanisms to gain a 
better understanding of the characteristics of different civil society representations in 
post-war environments, their effect on peace consolidation, and how the context in 
which they operate influences their structures and effectiveness. Our main research 
question is not only how does civil society affect peace but also ‘why’. The main unit of 
analysis is the individual organization. Four organizations were studied -  two in 
Tajikistan and two in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were each treated as separate “cases” 
using qualitative data collection methodology and semi-structured interviews. Before 
elaborating upon the case study selection and research methodology, I will first provide 
a description of the research design and conceptual model applied.
I. Research design and conceptual framework:
La Introduction to the existing literature:
Within the NGO development field, a vast body of literature addresses international 
NGOs’ role in conflict. The growth of this literature occurred as NGOs became 
increasingly engaged in conflict zones since the 1968 Biaffra war (Kouchner and 
Bettati, 1987; Minear, 1991; Minear, Weiss, and Campbell, 1991; Minear and Weiss, 
1993; Rufin, 1994; Minear and Weiss, 1995; Rotberg, 1996; Anderson, 1999; 
Goodhand and Hulme, 1997, 1998, 2000). Mary Anderson’s book (1999) Do No Harm: 
How Aid Can Support Peace or War, was one of the most influential studies to have 
analyzed the impact of aid on conflict. The 1994 Code of Conduct produced by the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement; the Sphere project; and the 
Humanitarian Ombudsman were practical attempts to reduce the negative affects of aid 
on conflict. The majority of these studies focused on the impact of international NGOs. 
Though there has been substantial work on the interaction between NGOs and conflict
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in times of war, there is much less conceptual understanding of their affect on peace 
(Rupesinghe, 1995: 89).
NGO development literature has tended to cement a division between “local” and 
“international” organizations, focusing more on the latter than the former. 
“International” or “northern” NGOs are considered to be international agencies with 
headquarters in Western states; while “national,” “local,” or “southern” NGOs are 
indigenous community organizations with local leadership and staff (Smith, 1998; 
Sandberg, 1994: 28). Most of the NGO literature speaks of “Northern” and “Southern” 
NGOs (Hulme and Edward, 1997: 11-20; Bebbington and Riddell, 1997; 108-125; 
Hudock, 1999: 1). This dichotomy in the literature is limiting in practice. Firstly, it 
bypasses “Eastern” groups or those that emerged out of post-communist or Muslim 
majority contexts. Secondly, it fixes a boundary between local and international, 
Northern and Southern groups, which by the mid-1990s was increasingly becoming 
muddled (Carroll, 1992: 11).
In 1999 Lewis spoke about the continual existence of “two parallel research universes,” 
separating theorists and researchers between those focusing on NGOs in developed and 
developing countries (Lewis, 1999: 1-2). This division was counterproductive because 
organizations operating in developing and developed countries may be “struggling in 
different ways with essentially the same issues.” (Lewis, 1999: 3) Those studying NGO 
development tend to concentrate on groups concerned with relief and development 
outside Western settings. Those more familiar with not-for-profit management are 
generally interested in private organizations that provide services in developed contexts.
The comparative literature on “local” communal civil society and community based 
organizations is even smaller. In 1997 Kaufman and Alfonso supervised a research 
project studying grassroots organizations in five different countries, claiming in their 
introduction (1997: 2) that it was the first comparative examination of the process of 
community-based mobilization. They noted that there is a “need to develop broader, 
more inclusive theoretical paradigms for understanding and advancing community 
based forms of popular power.” (1997: 22) In 2002, in a study on community driven 
development in Central Asia, the World Bank (2002b: 2) admitted that, “we still know 
very little about social organization in communities -  rural or urban -  and the best ways
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to stimulate local development. Although the Bank and other agencies have learned a 
great deal about centralized post-Soviet governments, and are still learning, we have 
given little attention to how local communities actually function and respond to the 
needs of the poor.”
II. b Civil society organizations as NGOs and CBOs:
NGO management and not-for-profit literature generally agrees on dividing society 
groups according to their size, activities, linkages, missions, and resources. Though 
various classifications of organizational forms exist, I choose to follow one that most 
closely mirrored my civil society taxonomy and divides groups into:1
Community based organization (CBO): They are membership organizations, 
which may formally represent a sectional interest. Many combine representation 
with some form of development, service delivery, charitable or self help activity. 
Their functions are both representational and operational (Bebbington and Riddell, 
1997: 109) They may also be called “primary grassroots organizations,” “the 
smallest aggregation of individuals or households that regularly engage in some 
joint development activity as an expression of collective interest.” (Carroll, 1992:
11)
• Non government organization (NGO): Also termed “intermediary organizations” 
they sometimes carry out projects, but most frequently act as brokers between local 
groups at the grass roots (Smith, 1998: 217) They are primarily “facilitator 
organizations, whose management is made up of professional middle or upper class 
individuals.” They are not “controlled or accountable to the beneficiaries” with 
whom they work. (Carroll, 1992: 12)
The distinction between NGOs and CBOs is frequently found in the literature. Analyzing 
civil society in Sri Lanka for example, Wickramasinghe (2001: 81) explained that a 
“significant distinction is between grassroots organizations, which are membership 
organizations, found at the village level and NGOs that are grassroots support 
organizations that seek to create and strengthen membership organizations.” This 
distinction also seems appropriate in post-war Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 
Bosnia-Herzegovina CBOs functioned mainly as mjesne zajednice, and in Tajikistan as 
mahallas within the disintegrating kolkhoz structure. NGOs were the urban centered 
groups that have been created on the basis of a weak pre-war liberal civil society, with
1 The division between community based organizations and intermediary organizations is one advanced 
by Thomas Carroll in Intermediary NGOs: The Supporting Link in Grassroots Development. He 
describes how it has been discovered that national intermediary organizations “could energize local
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close ties to international organizations, and a tendency to focus on service provision 
activities rather than advocacy.
/. c. The definition o f  a practical conceptual framework:
Recent attempts to bridge the NGO development and not-for-profit management 
literatures offer us conceptual models and sets of variables that can help us compare and 
explain civil society organizations’ characteristics and behaviours. In the Management 
o f  Non-Governmental Development Organizations (2001:6) David Lewis argues that,
“Despite their diversity, all NGOs need to manage in three main areas: the organizational domain of  
their internal structures and processes; their development activities, which may be in the form of 
projects or programmes, campaigns or services; and finally their management of relationships 
with other institutional actors -  the state, the private sector, other NGOs and organized components 
o f the communities in which NGOs operate. In the center o f the triangle is the crucial variable of  
‘context’ against which an analysis o f any NGO must be placed, and which has political, historical 
and cultural dimensions.” (emphasis added)
Similarly Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme (1997, 1998, 2000) in a large-scale 
project entitled “Peace Building and Complex Political Emergencies” developed a 
“peace auditing” methodology based on case studies from Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and 
Liberia. The “peace audit” aimed to assess the “peace-ability” of NGOs. It sought to 
identify “generic organisational capacities in NGOs that may not necessarily bring 
peace but raise the probability of peace” (1998:20). More specifically the “peace audit” 
looked at questions around:
■ NGO identity and values
■ NGO relationships and linkages
■ NGO programs
Applying the “peace audit” methodology the authors were able to assess the 
contribution of NGOs to peace building, and to make suggestions concerning the ways 
in which NGOs, and the donors who support them, might strengthen that contribution.
To better understand the characteristics and organizational attributes of communal and 
liberal civil society organizations in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina five years after 
the war, I selected to employ the peace audit as a framework but adding to it an analysis
of group structures and financing. As noted above, (Lewis: 2001) all NGOs must
groups and provide vertical mediating links between them and the higher reaches o f [...] power [...]
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manage these areas. We are arguing that it is not only NGOs but all civil society 
organizations that must define and shape their missions and values; programs; linkages; 
structures and financing. Data on these key variables was thus collected to make 
comparisons between civil society organizations of the same type in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Tajikistan in Chapters four and five, and cross-nationally between 
different types in Chapter six.
I.d The research questions:
The main aim of this research was to determine how organizationally sound civil 
society organizations can positively affect peace consolidation -  in Tajikistan and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. We posed this question because the literature on war and peace, 
and on civil society, along with practitioners in post-conflict settings argued that civil 
society could have this affect but with little analysis of how and why. Thus this study 
has several sub-goals:
1. To gain a fuller understanding of what forms of civil society can positively 
influence what type of peace.
2. To determine the characteristics and organizational attributes of organizationally 
sound civil society organizations -  NGOs and CBOs -  in post conflict, post­
communist contexts like Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan.
2.a To examine how missions and values guide organizations;
2.b To assess their projects and programs;
2.c To study their linkages and relationships;
2.d To determine how organizational structures and funding can support or 
impede organizations in their efforts.
3. To understand in what way our case studies affected peace consolidation in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan five years after the end of war.
Through a series of case studies I wanted to describe how strong civil society 
organizations with a proven degree of organizational capacity operate in post-war
Intermediary are one or two steps removed from primary grass-roots groups.” (p.2-3)
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contexts such as Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to understand why they act as 
they do.
II. Organizational case study selection:
A qualitative multiple case study approach was adopted to analyze the cases in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Tajikistan, and to make comparisons between them. Two local civil 
society organizations in each country were selected for in-depth analysis: one CBO and 
one NGO. “Purposive sampling” (Denscombe, 1998: 15) was applied. A conscious 
effort was made to select structurally sound organizations reported to be performing 
well - “best case scenarios” - as our focus was on civil society organizations’ potential 
positive contributions to peace. Cases representing “extreme instances” are considered 
valid when the aim is to “highlight” an effect (Denscombe, 1998: 33). In this 
dissertation the goal was to better understand the nature of civil society’s positive affect 
on peace -  not to determine if there is or is not a positive affect. The aim was not to 
obtain findings from these cases that can be applied to all civil society organizations in 
post conflict settings, but only to those who already are considered to be strong and to 
have organizational capacity to effect change.
Amongst the large number of civil society organizations operating in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Tajikistan, I employed the following selection criteria to select four 
groups to study in-depth:
1. A popular perception that the group was “highly successful,” organizational 
sound and had the capacity to effect change.
2. The group’s organizational form (CBO or NGO).
3. The organization’s mission and target groups
4. The organization’s geographical location.
I decided not to choose cases based on their project focus. Civil society organizations can 
be involved in a myriad of activities. According to the International Council on Voluntary 
Agencies’ (ICVA) Directory of Humanitarian and Development Agencies in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (ICVA, 2000: 475-534), groups were involved in fifteen sectors in 2000. A 
UNFPA 1998 survey of Tajik NGOs identified eleven fields in which the organizations 
were active (UNDP, 1999: chapter 2). Thus rather than select organization by specific
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activity, or service delivery vs. advocacy orientation, I chose organizations based on their 
target group - women, youth and displaced persons/local communities. These are groups, 
which the literatures on peace building and conflict resolution identify as being significant 
to peace (Rupesinghe, 1995; Lederach 1997, 1999; Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2000; 
Anderson, 1999).
I studied two organizations that worked primarily with women, yet did not carry out a 
gender analysis of peace consolidation, or rely to any significant extent on women 
studies’ literature. In accounts of war and post-war developments women are often 
depicted as victims of “gender violence” (Allen, 1996; Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2000; 
Richter, 2001: 139-159). Yet as others have found in the Tajikistan and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina cases (Cockbum with Domuz and Hubic, 2001: 40) women may emerge 
from war with new strengths, and skills that make them efficient in reconciliation 
efforts (Anderson, 1999: 230-231; Woodhouse, 2000: 21). Their contribution to peace 
in NGOs has been described (Cockbum with Domuz and Hubic, 2001; Cockbum, 1998, 
2000; Falkingham, 2000: 28-35; Kasic, 1997; Kuvatova, 2001: 131-134; Richter, 2001: 
159-163; Zajovic, 2001) while much less has been written about women in CBOs 
(Centlivres-Demont, 2001: 180-181). In this dissertation I was thus also interested in 
determining how liberal and communal civil society organizations’ way of addressing 
gender relations, women’s participation in political life, and male/ female equality, 
affected their ability to contribute to peace.
The geographical location was another key selection criterion due to the history of the 
development of civil society organizations in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina -  
characterized by a strong rural/urban split and shaped by wars that left both countries 
regionally divided. For this reason attempts were made to select cases on the basis of 
their location, with groups from urban areas (Sarajevo and Kurgan Tuppe) and from 
rural ones (Karategin Valley and Sevarlije in Doboj municipality). I felt that the impact 
of an organization could also differ according to the localities’ war experience and the 
political forces that controlled them. Therefore I was interested in targeting regions in 
Tajikistan that were a priori supportive of governmental forces (Kurgan Tuppe) and of 
the opposition (Karategin Valley) during the 1992-1997 civil war. In Bosnia- 
Herzegovina I chose an organization based in the Federation (Sarajevo) as well as one 
from the Republika Srpska (Sevarlije). To be able to observe the greatest change
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possible from war to peace, I looked for regions that had been significantly war affected 
as Kurgan Tuppe, the Karategin Valley, Sarajevo and Sevarlije were. By selecting cases 
from different “types” of locations, I thus hoped that my overall findings could be 
generalized to other examples regardless of whether they functioned in government 
controlled or opposition held regions.
Identifying CBOs to research proved to be more difficult than NGOs. I initially hoped 
to research a mjesna zajednica in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a mahalla in Tajikistan. In 
Bosnia-Herzegovina I succeeded in this effort largely due to my extensive previous 
experience in the country and my significant level of access (more below). However, in 
Tajikistan I was unfortunately unable to identify one specific mahalla to employ as a 
case study. This is partly due to the difference in the nature of Bosnian mjesne zajednice 
and Tajik mahallas. As explained in the previous chapter, mjesne zajednice were 
considered to be local self-government official structures in Yugoslavia -  mahallas 
were much more informal and traditionally based. It also had to do with the different 
level of knowledge, contacts, and trust I had in the two countries.
Therefore, rather than focussing on one Tajik community group, I studied six villages 
that were part of the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) Mountain Societies Development 
and Support Program (MSDSP) village organization (VO) network in the Karategin 
Valley. The village organizations were partly mahallas in the traditional sense of the 
term, but also beneficiaries of an internationally supported project. Based on guidelines 
I defined, the specific villages were selected by MSDSP staff. I requested to visit village 
organizations that had effective leadership and community participation, some that 
were new to the MSDSP program and some that were older, and villages that were 
significantly affected by the war (population displacement and return, internal conflict, 
property destruction). I also traveled to one village which was not part of the MSDSP 
program, to have a baseline for comparison.
Based on this case study selection process, I carried out research on the following 
groups:
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IDPs an d  re tu rnees W o m en  and  
youth
Location
C o m m u n i ty  Based 
O rgan iza t ion  (CBO)
-Karategin Valley Village 
Organizations 
- Sevarlije Mjesna 
Zajednica
R u ra l
Fo rm er ly  not u nder  central  
g o vernm en t  contro l  d u r in g  w a r
Non governm enta l  
o rgan izat ion  (NGO)
- Ghamkhori
- Zhene 
Zhenama
U rb a n
U n d e r  g o v e r n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  
d u r i n g  w a r
III. Research methodology: data collection and analysis
Ilia. Employing qualitative research methods:
The goal o f this project was to deepen theoretical and empirical understanding o f how 
strong civil society organizations affect peace consolidation, rather than measure the 
impact that civil society has had on peace. Impact assessment according to Roche 
(1999: 21) is “the systematic analysis o f the lasting or significant changes -  positive or 
negative, intended or not -  in people’s lives brought about by a given action or series of 
actions.” Several authors (Large, 1997; Goodhand and Hulme, 2000; Burnell, 2000) 
who have looked at civil society organizations’ role in conflict and post-conflict settings 
have demonstrated the difficulty o f drawing any conclusions about their “impact” or to 
establish scientific tools to measure their affect due to challenges o f attribution and 
causality. Thus I subscribe to Goodhand and Hulme’s approach (2000: 8) -  if  extended 
to include not only NGOs but also CBOs -which postulates that:
“The problems o f  attribution, time frames and the lack o f  the counterfactual mean that it is 
difficult to talk with precision about the contribution o f  NGO programmes on peace building or 
conflict fuelling processes. At best, we are talking about the general direction o f change and the 
probabilities  that NGO interventions had an impact on peace and conflict dynamics. The 
evaluative stance o f  those examining the role o f NGOs in peace-building might best focus on 
‘improving’ performance rather than ‘proving’ impact.”
Rather than focusing on the nature o f the impact that civil society organizations made, 
and developing indicators o f the causal relationship between CSOs and peace 
consolidation processes, I wanted to understand how, through their values, programs,
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organizational structure and linkages, two ideal types of organizations could positively 
effect peace.
The question asked helps define the research methodologies employed. As Yin states 
(1984: 18) “’how’ and ‘why’ questions are more explanatory and likely to lead to the 
use of case studies, histories and experiments as preferred research strategies. This is 
because such questions deal with operational links needing to be traced over time.” He 
defined a case study (1984: 23) as an “empirical inquiry that:
■ investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context; when
■ the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in 
which
■ multiple sources of evidence are used.
Yin adds that when multiple case studies are employed it is necessary to develop a rich 
theoretical framework that will become a vehicle for generalization to new cases (1984: 
49). The theoretical framework was defined in chapters 1 and 2 based on literatures that 
address problems of civil society, and war and peace. Thus in the first two chapters we 
provided some preliminary hypotheses concerning civil society’s affect on peace 
consolidation. These hypotheses served as the basis of the inquiry and helped establish a 
framework that guided the case study selection and fieldwork.
In this study the researcher had no control over the events being observed and the focus 
was on real-life current, ongoing, developments. Therefore the case study method 
seemed to be the most appropriate. In addition case studies have been used for 
examining linkages between civil society organizations and peace previously (Gidron, 
Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002; Cockbum, 1998; Goodhand and Hulme, 1997, 1998, 2000; 
Coletta and Cullen, 2000).
It was decided to use qualitative data collection methods, based on case studies, though 
aware that qualitative methodology has been regarded as “unscientific, or only 
exploratory, or entirely personal and full of bias” (Denzin and Lincoln 1994). As 
Creswell explains (1994:2), quantitative methods, the opposite of qualitative ones, are 
“based on testing a theory composed of variables, measured with numbers, and 
analyzed with statistical procedures.” But in the post-war contexts of Tajikistan and
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Bosnia-Herzegovina numbers and statistics were notoriously unreliable. A handful of 
researchers have made attempts to conduct quantitative research in the two countries. 
Yet even relatively successful efforts such as Falkingham’s (2000: 6), who studied 
poverty in Tajikistan, note that “the particular circumstances of transition in Central 
Asia have given rise to a host of methodological issues in the measurement of 
household welfare.” Falkingham argues for a mix of “objective” and “subjective” 
approaches in a context where numbers, quantities and official statistics never tell the 
whole story.
In his discussion of the criteria to be applied when choosing between quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies, Creswell (1994: 10) justifies the use of qualitative 
methodology when:
•  “The research problem needs to be explored because little information exists on the topic;”
•  “The researcher wants to focus on the context that may shape the understanding o f the phenomenon 
being studied;”
• “Theories available in the field are often ‘inadequate, incomplete, or simply missing.”
This study matched the description provided above. The literature review demonstrated 
that little information on the affect of civil society on peace consolidation existed. As 
described in Chapter 1 and 2, theories on peace consolidation and civil society begin to 
provide hypotheses concerning the linkages between the two concepts, but they are 
largely inadequate, normatively based, and poorly supported with empirical evidence. 
The context evidently shaped the understanding of the phenomenon being studied, as I 
was interested in particular post conflict, post-communist, Muslim majority settings.
I ll  b Pre-field work preparations: preliminary visits.
Devereux and Hoddinott (1992: 10) point out that “a preliminary visit to the intended 
country has many practical and methodological advantages.” Most significantly a 
preliminary visit can feed back into the theoretical preparation at a time when the 
literature review is comirfg to an end and initial hypotheses are being formed.
Before selecting case studies and completing my field work preparation, I undertook 
background data collection in Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 2001 and in Tajikistan in 
March 2002. During 2-3 week initial field trips I interviewed governmental authorities,
2 A state wide census has not been organized in Bosnia-Herzegovina for example since 1991.
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representatives of international organizations, and civil society activists to gather 
general information on the post-war context and civil society development. In Bosnia- 
Herzegovina I carried out thirty-nine interviews in eight locations.3 Many of the 
stakeholders I spoke with I knew in my previous capacity as the Community 
Development Coordinator at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996-1998.4 In Tajikistan I did not have 
the same in-depth experience of the country and contacts. However, in March 2002 I 
was hired as a consultant for the UN Office of the High Commission on Human Rights 
(OHCHR), to conduct an assessment of human rights protection and existing human 
rights programs. This entry point enabled me to identify and arrange meetings with key 
informants. I held twenty-nine interviews of relevance to my research on civil society, 
and two roundtables -  one with civil society organizations dealing with education and 
another with groups addressing human rights issues. The interviews I conducted during 
the background data collection phase in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan helped me 
start to prepare the Chapter 1 historical overview of civil society development, to 
identify a group of possible case study organizations, and to elucidate issues to include 
in my interview questionnaires.
III.c Data collection in the field.
Due to the relative lack of analytical material and literature on my research topic, it was 
necessary for me to rely predominantly on other data collection forms, especially 
interviews and direct observation. Personal history collection also proved to be an 
effective means to obtain responses to questions about developments before or during 
the conflict.
During fieldwork in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan I employed mainly semi­
structured interviews to gather information for the macro-analysis of civil society 
development, as well as case study microanalysis. Semi-structured interviews involve 
using a list of questions, but recognize “that departures will occur if interesting themes 
emerge from what respondents say and in order to get their version of things” (Bryman 
1989). My questionnaire aimed to be flexible enough to allow respondents to digress
3 Sarajevo, Tuzla, Brcko, Bjeljina, Banja Luka, Livno, Capljina, and Mostar.
4 1 have been traveling to Bosnia-Herzegovina since early 1993 when I was working with a Hungarian 
NGO Hungarian Interchurch Aid. Subsequently I was employed by the Lutheran World Federation in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1994-1995).
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towards issues that they deemed to be important. To facilitate the drawing of 
comparisons I raised similar questions with all my case study interviewees in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Tajikistan. The types of questions that I asked reflected my conceptual 
framework, and could be divided into the following six topic areas (sample interview 
questionnaire in appendix):
1. History of involvement in the organization: why did you first come to this 
organization? What did you think the goal of the organization was? Why are you 
still involved? Is this your only employment?
2. Personal background information: what is your place of birth? What is your 
education? What was your previous employment? Were you previously involved in 
any organizations? Where were you during the war? What did you do?
3. Description of involvement in organizational activities: what is your 
responsibility here? What program are you part of? How many beneficiaries do you 
have? Why is this program needed? What has this program accomplished? Where 
do the finances for this program come from?
4. Opinion about organizational structure: how has the organization evolved since 
you started cooperating with it? How are decisions made? What role do you play in 
that process?
5. Contacts and linkages with other institutions: Do you personally have any 
contacts with: local government? religious authorities? political parties? media? 
international organizations,? other local groups? etc.? If yes how often? More or less 
than before?
6. Views on peace consolidation: What do you consider to be the most critical issue 
that has been resolved since the end of the war? Who resolved it/them? What are the 
most critical issues for the near future?
While I undertook field research in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, I continued to 
expand my knowledge on the general development of civil society through interviews 
with local authorities and civil society activists. In Tajikistan interviews were carried 
out in Dushanbe, Khojand, Kurgan Tuppe, Shartuz, Khorog, Garm, Tavildara, and 
Kulob. Many of these interviews were organized with the assistance of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to Tajikistan and the UN 
Tajikistan Office of Peace building (UNTOP). In Bosnia-Herzegovina local activists
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and authorities spoke with me in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Banja Luka, Brcko, Bjeljina, and 
Doboj.
I also engaged in direct observation. Studying NGOs I observed many of their events, 
office meetings, regular activities and interactions within, and to some extent outside, 
the organization. In the villages I observed several CBO meetings and activities. I 
visited their community meeting places, schools, medical clinics, small infrastructure 
projects. At a minimum once a week I wrote up “field notes” to record the impressions I 
felt, and what I saw, during this observation.
The other major source of evidence was documentation. From the NGOs I gathered a 
large amount of evidence including:
■ Annual reports.
Project proposals.
■ Project reports (monthly, bi-annual and yearly).
■ Internal documents: registration documents, statutes, job descriptions, contracts, 
newsletters, personal memos, strategic plans....
■ External evaluation reports (from donors, international organizations and other 
researchers).
IILd Data analysis:
This stage of the process proved to be the most difficult and painstaking.5 The large 
number of taped interviews I accumulated required much transcribing. I did all the 
transcribing of the tapes from my Bosnian case studies (which took three months) and 
hired a university student to transcribe my tapes from Tajikistan. I completed the 
transcription of the Bosnian tapes before leaving for Tajikistan, allowing me to conduct 
preliminary data analysis and revise my interview questionnaire. Based on the variables 
that were part of my conceptual framework, and more detailed ones that arose during 
my analysis, I hand coded the interviews. Based on the results of this coding I revised 
my project outline and began writing chapter drafts.
5 1 should have heeded Denscombe’s (1998: 128) warning that “transcribing o f the tapes is generally far 
more time consuming than the actual collection o f data.”
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ffl.e Findings on how “organizational form ” affects data collection effectiveness: 
Through practice I found that whether I was collecting information on a CBO or an 
NGO affected the challenges that I faced in the process. Collecting information on 
NGOs proved to be the most methodologically straightforward assignment. With an 
office, staff, filed reports and projects, I was able to spend approximately one month in 
the premises of Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama. From there I interviewed the founders 
and leadership of the organization and staff. I spoke with all twelve staff members of 
Zhene Zhenama. As Ghamkhori has a staff of some 45 persons, I interviewed a quarter 
of the employees (also 12). Each interview lasted between 50-90 minutes and was 
taped. With the leadership of each organization (Bahodur and Mikhail at Ghamkhori, 
Nuna and Jadranka at Zhene Zhenama) I carried out multiple interviews totaling 
between 7-8 hours. Interviews were generally conducted in Serbo-Croatian at Zhene 
Zhenama and in Russian at Ghamkhori.
The CBO case studies proved to be a greater methodological challenge because of their 
weaker organizational structures and broader community base. In Bosnia-Herzegovina 
the organization that I studied had transformed during the peace process from an 
unregistered community organization to an institution of local self-governance. It had a 
small office in 2001 and one salaried staff member. As a membership base organization, 
Sevarlije’s MZ members, of which I interviewed twelve, provided me with most of the 
data on the evolution of the group. As members, rather than staff, their engagement in 
the group was informal and it was mainly through “life stories” that I learned how the 
MZ functioned and affected people’s livelihoods. I also obtained information on the 
group’s linkages by speaking with staff of four international organizations that had 
cooperated with the group in the past, and one municipal (Doboj) governmental official.
As explained above, in Tajikistan I did not study one community based organizations 
but six that were part of the MSDP village organization program. I also visited one 
village in the region that was not part of the project. Half of the village organizations 
had small offices, but I met the staff in the leaders’ home in all but one case. As 
described below I was not entirely free to organize interviews with village organization 
staff and members randomly. I formally interviewed fifteen village organization staff 
members. In addition I obtained a great deal of information on the village organizations
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from MSDSP project documents, and from the thirteen interviews that I held with 
MSDSP employees (at the country, regional, and district office level).
The organizational type also affected my ability to review project documents. In the 
cases of Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama, I was provided with a wealth of documents, 
which are generally useful in revealing how the organization wants to portray 
themselves to outsiders. As they are often drafted for donors they are tinted by a 
positive bias. Again the review of project documents proved to be more challenging 
with the CBOs. I learned that the former head of the Sevarlije MZ had meticulously 
collected documents on the group’s development, meetings, communications and 
general activities from before the Bosnian war until 1998. Unfortunately, after he died 
in 2000, all the papers were burned.6 In Tajikistan I was also unable to obtain 
documentation on the villages’ activities before they joined the MSDSP. However, 
since the village groups I studied were part of a formal structure run by MSDSP, I 
obtained copies of documents which village organizations (VOs) had submitted to 
MSDSP, as well as general statistics that MSDSP has compiled on VOs, their activities, 
funding, level of participation, etc. Similarly I received some data from international 
organizations that cooperated with the Sevarlije MZ  (UNHCR, USAID, Mercy Corps).
I taped all my NGO interviews, not the ones carried out with Sevarlije mjesna zajednica 
and Karategin Valley village organizations’ members. In highly informal village 
settings interviewing seemed overly formal and obtrusive, so I took detailed notes.
IV. Practical opportunities and limitations of field work in post-conflict 
settings:
Post-conflict environments tend to deepen the host of theoretical, methodological, 
practical and ethical challenges that researchers engaged in qualitative data collection 
face.7 Some theories on social science methodology argue that researchers can and 
should approach their subject of investigation entirely neutrally and objectively. This 
has been termed a “positivist” approach where the researcher is considered to have
6 Because according to the person who destroyed the documents “nobody asked for them.” Interview in 
Sevarlije, Hadzic, 4.08.03.
7 Downs and Stedman (2002: 43) also point out that: “A large part o f  the explanation for why literature on 
the implementation o f peace agreements in civil wars is not more well developed is that it is difficult to 
think o f an environment that is less conducive to the conduct o f evaluation research. The number o f cases 
is small and the measurements o f potentially important variables [...] are often unreliable.”
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access to superior knowledge by virtue of scientific methodology. However 
ethnographers maintain that the researcher is never dissociated from the subject he/she 
is studying or entirely neutral. Hammersley and Atkinson (1989: 234) thus argue for an 
“explicit recognition of the fact that the social researcher, and the research act itself, are 
part and parcel of the social world under investigation.” Thus scholars have to take into 
consideration existing power relationships between the ethnographer and the research 
subjects, such as: those resulting from the backgrounds of the researcher and the 
researched; those that develop during field work; and those that derive from writing 
about and representing others (Wolf, 1996 in Harris, 2000: 14). I am not an 
ethnographer, yet my experience while working on this dissertation was that ethical 
questions concerning the relation between the researcher and those being researched are 
difficult to avoid. I have thus outlined some of those that I addressed below.
IV  a Addressing issues o f trust and access
Post-conflict peace consolidation is deeply dependent on rebuilding trust -  trust 
between neighbors, between former warring parties, between citizens and the state, 
between the state and external powers... Much of the success of fieldwork in post 
conflict contexts is also contingent on trust. In the course of the fieldwork it became 
clear to me that trust is more likely to develop between people who resemble each other 
-  or share certain interests. It was, for instance, much easier for me to gain the 
confidence of young westernized educated youth active in Ghamkhori and Zhene 
Zhenama than of rural and traditional former combatants in the Karategin Valley or 
Doboj. As others have found (Devereux and Hoddinott, 1992: 18, Harris, 2000: 11) for 
me (as a female) discussions with women -  especially in rural settings -  tended to be 
more informative than those undertaken with men. Trust was more likely to develop 
when I was able to reveal to my interlocutor that we had shared a common experience. 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina this was easier for me because I had lived there for extended 
periods during the war, while I first traveled to Tajikistan in 2000.
The general distrust that permeates most post-conflict environments also affects who is 
“allowed” to speak with the researcher and who is not: the issue of access (Devereux 
and Hoddinott, 1992: 4-18). My extensive past experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina made 
it much easier for me to gain access than in Tajikistan. A greater number of people 
knew and trusted me in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I was able to mobilize my own social
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networks and carried out most of my data collection alone, without any preliminary 
introductions from intermediaries. In Tajikistan I often relied on international 
organizations -  the UNTOP, the OSCE and AKF -  to help make initial contact.8
The access issue proved to be a greater obstacle when I was studying community based 
organizations. Due to my previous close relations with a Bosnian family and their 
community, I was able to gather information on a community-based organization in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in a way I could not in Tajikistan. Part of this was due to the 
different organizations’ structures, but it was also because of my dissimilar position in 
the two countries. In Bosnia-Herzegovina I spent three weeks in the village collecting 
data, was introduced by a community member as an “old friend”, and had the freedom 
to walk around the village unhindered, knock on doors, sit in the village store and speak 
with customers.
When undertaking research on the Karategin Valley village organizations in Tajikistan, 
I did so as an outsider who temporarily obtained access with the assistance of MSDSP 
staff members. I was introduced in each village first to the head of the village 
organization, and started by completing an extensive interview with him. Then I spoke 
with the deputy of the organization, the head of the women’s group and when possible 
random villagers - who felt confident that their participation would not be negatively 
interpreted by local leadership. This formal approach limited access to dissenting 
opinions. As Hammersley and Atkinson (1998: 63-73) describe, when there are 
“gatekeepers” and “sponsors” facilitating research, it is difficult to avoid their attempts 
to exercise a degree of surveillance and control. Only in one case in the Karategin 
Valley did I speak directly with excluded segments of the community -  poor, women 
and dissenters -  without prior approval of the village leadership.9
The importance of taking responsibility to avoid negative outcomes, influenced how 
interviews were conducted and what questions were asked. As Roche (1999: 35-36) 
warns, carrying out research in conflict settings may “well lead to the emergence of 
conflicting views, which precipitates more conflict and generated risks for local
8 Neither in Bosnia-Herzegovina nor in Tajikistan did I obtain official clearance to conduct research by a 
national state or academic authority which Devereux and Hoddinott (1992: 6-17) recommend as essential.
9 And this happened when I conducted research in a village that was not part o f the MSDSP program, 
with a Tajik unaffiliated with MSDSP but associated with another international organization (OSCE).
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populations, agency staff and others.” Generally I employed few group interviews since 
they do not ensure confidentiality. Where conflicts existed I took note but tried not to 
provoke them by prodding the interviewee to provide details on the discord. The raising 
of political questions concerning the use of power and authority in the local community 
can have negative repercussions on the interviewee. “Research, like any other form of 
intervention, occurs within an intensely political environment and is unlikely to be 
viewed by local actors as neutral or altruistic” (Goodhand, 2001). Thus responses to 
political questions risk putting interlocutors in positions of unnecessary insecurity. To 
avoid such negative consequences I found that the more sensitive questions were better 
reserved for persons with the highest political authority -  a question on former field 
commanders’ influence in the community would be posed to either a former 
commander or a governmental official, not a farmer. This requires an understanding of 
who wields power, and which issues may endanger research subjects.
IV. b Literature, language and names:
Fluency in the local language has been identified as providing significant benefits to the 
researcher. In this study, which relied heavily on interviews, knowledge of the local 
language was particularly important. Language was a sensitive issue in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Tajikistan due to the post-war context. On one hand though much has 
been said about the differences between Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian, I speak a 
“foreigner’s” version of the language that I still prefer to call Serbo-Croatian. In 
Tajikistan, though I had the ability to conduct interviews in Russian, I found that 
outside urban centers most interlocutors preferred to speak in Tajik.101 was thus obliged 
to work with an interpreter for my interviews with Tajik CBO staff and members. No 
interpreter can provide the same ease of communication as can be obtained discussing 
directly. Yet a positive characteristic of working with an interpreter is that he/she can 
serve as a bridge with the interviewees -  and gain trust more rapidly than an outsider.
Researchers often question the appropriateness of naming their sources. In her study 
Harris (2000) decided to conceal all identities of the subjects of her book (except one). 
Cockbum (1998) found that individuals were generally content to appear in their own 
names in her text. During the interview process I asked my interlocutors whether I
10 Increasingly young researchers are learning the local languages o f Central Asia -  Tajik, Uzbek, Kazak 
-  though the older generation tends to be more versatile in Russian. The breakup o f the USSR is 
definitely a cause o f this shift.
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could individually quote them, using their own words, and use their names for 
identification. Virtually all agreed. Thus I generally use (real) first names when 
referring to Zhene Zhenama, Ghamkhori, and Sevarlije MZJ Board for Return staff and 
last names with reference to Karategin Valley VO informants. After the person’s name I 
indicate the date of the interview (day.month.year). Details of the persons being referred 
to are available in the “interviews referenced” appendix.
IV. c Reducing expectations andfield work responsibilities:
As has been noted elsewhere (Hammerley and Atkinson, 1998: 75), case study 
informants are likely to have a variety of expectations concerning the researchers they 
are assisting. I thus felt that it was of importance to avoid giving organizations and 
communities false expectations concerning the research’s impact, and the level of 
support that I could offer in return for assistance. In my relationship with NGO staff it 
was easier for me to offer immediate and direct assistance such as contacts with 
international donors, and guidance on project proposals. However in the villages the 
needs and expectations of persons being interviewed were more direct and practical, 
such as food, seeds, housing, and infrastructure. Especially in Tajikistan, as a foreigner I 
was immediately considered to be an international aid worker, and in some instances 
when collecting data on MSDSP village organizations I was perceived as an MSDSP 
decision-maker. Undoubtedly this affected the responses that I obtained.
If quantitative research “is purely interested in extracting information and does not 
allow all participants to gain insights, to reflect on their observations, and to look to the 
future, then the cost to some of those involved will far outweigh the benefits (Roche 
1999: 35).” Finding the balance between taking and giving back - to the community, 
organization or individual - is a personal and challenging process (Harris 2000: 2-3, 15). 
While some researchers have chosen to support the initiation of a development project 
in the topic of their interest (Harris, 2000: 2-3) others have assisted with the 
organization of workshops (Cockbum, 1998: 4-5). Admittedly I adopted a minimalist 
approach. In the weeks after conducting fieldwork I provided technical reports to Zhene 
Zhenama, Ghamkhori and MSDSP with recommendations for their future work. These 
reports gave staff the opportunity to criticize, comment and make suggestions on my 
initial findings. In November 2002 I presented my research to a group of Ph.D. students 
and academic staff at the Tajik National University in Dushanbe, and an article on my
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research methodology was published through the Soros Gender Studies Center (Tajik 
National University). Ultimately I hope to transform this work into a book -  to be 
translated into Russian and Serbo-Croatian -  so that it can be more easily shared with 
those who gave so many insights and knowledge.
Conclusions:
"This study was constrained by a relative lack of methodological and conceptual tools to 
measure the successes of peace consolidation. Previous writings on peace building have 
shown that “defining successes and failures in complex peace operations is far from an 
exact science.” (Doyle, Johnstone, Orr: 1997: 369) Furthermore, authors who have 
looked at the role of NGOs in conflict settings have concluded that it is very difficult to 
make any conclusions on the “impact” of NGOs on peace building. The following is 
therefore not an impact assessment but an effort to understand how and why groups 
function as they do in post-conflict environments. The research questions that we posed 
aim to broaden our knowledge about what forms of civil society can positively affect 
what type of peace. Do the assumptions made in the civil society and war and peace 
literatures play out in practice in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina?
To answer this question I have established analytical categories and associated different 
civil society ideal types (communal and liberal) with different forms of organizations 
(CBOs and NGOs). My historical analysis of the development of civil society in 
Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina revealed the deep embeddedness of communal civil 
society, represented by mjesne zajednice in Bosnia-Herzegovina and mahallas in 
Tajikistan; and the new emergence of local NGOs. As explained, I chose to focus on 
four case studies: two from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and two from Tajikistan. In the 
following two chapters I will first study two NGOs, then two CBOs, with the aim of 
understanding their characteristics and organizational attributes, especially their 
missions and values; programs; linkages; organizational and funding structures. 
Thereafter in chapter 6 I will consider how my four cases studies positively impacted 
peace consolidation.
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C h a p t e r  f o u r :
NGOs AS A FORM OF LIBERAL CIVIL SOCIETY IN BO SN IA- HER ZEG OVI NA AND
T a j i k i s t a n
Introduction:
With the aim of understanding what forms of civil society can positively affect peace, in 
the following chapter I consider two representations of liberal civil society: the NGOs 
Zhene Zhenama (Women to Women) and Ghamkhori (Assistance). In this chapter I reflect 
on some of the general assumptions about liberal civil society introduced in Chapter 1, to 
assess how relevant they are in practice to the study of the characteristics and 
organizational attributes of organizationally sound groups operating in post-communist, 
post-conflict, contexts. As indicated previously, the NGO form in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Tajikistan is new; these groups began to appear in the immediate pre-war period, grew in 
numbers during the conflict, and increased dramatically after the war. During the post war 
period, international donors tended to adopt a liberal definition of civil society, equating 
NGOs with civil society as a whole and targeting funding to them.
In this chapter I depict how these two groups operated in their respective post-war contexts, 
and attempt to determine why they acted as they did. As explained in the previous chapter, 
relating to methodology, a recent merging of development and not-for-profit management 
theories offers us conceptual models and sets of variables that can help us understand the 
characteristics and organizational attributes of NGOs both as single cases and 
comparatively. Through the application of these modes of analysis the missions/origins, 
programs, linkages, organizational structures and funding relations of the two case studies 
will be assessed individually and then compared.
Though the context in which Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori developed shares similarities 
and differences, this chapter focuses solely on the two organizations, not the conflicts or 
post-war peace consolidation processes they influenced. We are making “the assumption
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that the P/CROs were comparable across countries and cultures based on the mere fact that 
as organizations they shared specific features and had to address certain imperatives” as 
Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002: 23) did in their study of NGOs in Northern Ireland, 
Israel/Palestine and South Africa.1 However, as will become more evident below, the 
environment in which the groups developed affected them substantially.
I. Origins, missions and values of the case study NGOs:
I. a The origins o f Zhene Zhenama
Zhene Zhenama was founded in Sarajevo in 1996 by three charismatic women who shared 
common values, ideals and wartime experiences. In establishing an organization after the 
signing of the GFAP, the founders sought to take advantage of the opportunity to set up a 
multi-national women’s center in the capital which had, until recently, been divided and the 
focus of intensive fighting.
I.a. 1 Characteristics and motivations of the organization’s founders:
Rather than impeding them from becoming active in civil society the war in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina galvanized the founders of Zhene Zhenama. The women shared few personal 
characteristics in the pre-war period but were united by their war time experiences. Zhene 
Zhenama’s founders -  Nuna, Jadrenka and Selma -  were urban middle-class professionals. 
Though Nuna and Jadranka were married and had children, Selma was a twenty one-year- 
old university student in 1996. During the Yugoslav era, Nuna and Jadrenka were not part 
of the Communist elite but lived a comfortable lifestyle. All three of the organizations’ 
founders would have called themselves Bosnian or Yugoslav, though Nuna was a 
practicing Muslim bom in Montenegro, Jadranka an atheist of Serbian nationality, and 
Selma non-religious and from a mixed background. None of the founders of Zhene 
Zhenama were women rights’ activists before 1993, though Nuna was active in her 
company’s trade union. The outbreak of violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina served as a key 
stimulus for their subsequent public engagement.
During the 1992-1995 war global civil society provided Zhene Zhenama's founders with 
personal and professional connections which became critical to the formation, funding, and
1 These authors use the term P/CRO to indicate Peace/Conflict Resolution Organizations.
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growth of their organization. Displaced to Belgrade from 1993-1995, Jadranka joined two 
of the most influential women’s groups in Serbia, Women in Black and the Center for 
Women War Victims}  Nuna and Selma worked in Zenica’s (Bosnia-Herzegovina) women’s 
association Medica. These three groups were part of a strong anti-war, anti-nationalist 
women’s network bridging Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina that was 
supported by women’s groups in Western Europe and the United States.3 Zhene Zhenama’s 
founders were first introduced to each other through this network. Nuna (14.11.01) and 
Jadranka (14.11.01) recalled how it was at women’s conference in Cologne in 1994 that 
they promised each other to return to Sarajevo after the war to work together. Through their 
engagement, Nuna, Jadranka and Selma sharpened their own political identities and 
positions vis-a-vis nationalism and feminist thinking. Even in the war time context, Nuna, 
Jadranka and Selma had the skills to give “social meaning to infrequent, culturally 
diversified, professional relations,” which, as Hilhorst notes in her NGO study (2003: 185), 
is crucial to successful international work and interactions.
In 1996 Zhene Zhenama’s founders were motivated by common ideals, a sense of guilt for 
having left wartime Sarajevo, and the desire to help others which had crystallized during 
the war. They felt the emotional and intellectual need to continue with their activism, to 
maintain their contacts with women in other parts of former Yugoslavia, and to employ 
their skills. They recognized that they had been able to overcome their own war traumas 
while being engaged in women’s groups, and sought to provide a similar space for other 
women. Setting up an NGO gave them the necessary organizational structure to satisfy 
these ambitions.
I.a.2 Characteristics and motivations of the organization’s staff:
The founders of Zhene Zhenama tended to draw organizational staff from their own 
personal networks, recruiting persons who shared many of their ideas and characteristics.
2 Women in Black defines itself as a “feminist, pacifist group founded on October 9, 1991 in Belgrade. 
Dressed in black, in silence, [...] we are a women’s activist group against war -  against militarism, 
nationalism, ethnic cleaning, rape of women in war, sexism and fascism.” (Zajovic, 2001: 345)
3 From early 1991 there was a strong symbiosis between the women and peace movements both in Serbia and 
Croatia. The feminists Vesna Terselic (Anti-War Campaign Zagreb) and Vesna Pesic (Center for Antiwar 
Actions, Belgrade) exemplified this and were nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997. For an account 
see Terselic (1997).
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From 1998-2002 the organization had 13 paid staff members. Most belonged to Bosnia- 
Herzegovina’s urban middle class and were not previously politically active. Like the 
founders of Zhene Zhenama, several of the organization’s employees worked with women 
victims of violence in 1992-1996. They appreciated the more independent and non- 
hierarchical working environments of women’s organizations. They professed commitment 
to tolerance and multiculturalism. All ten staff members interviewed found the question, 
“what is your nationality?" distasteful. Their preferred response was that they were 
“Bosnian and Herzegovinian.” Of those interviewed all except one claimed to have voted 
for the non-nationalist Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 2000.
Zhene Zhenama’s staffs motivations to join the organization were similar: they first came 
because friends brought them and thereafter continued to be engaged in order to help 
themselves. Initially they did not necessarily know what the NGO’s activities or values 
were. Thus the staff of Zhene Zhenama was largely connected by friendship ties. In 1996- 
1997 the line between staff, members and beneficiaries was vague, as programs were rarely 
formalized. Women who would become staff members were initially attracted to the 
organization because it provided them with a means to gain confidence. As Zilha
(15.11.01) one of the Psycho-Social Team members explained, “I found what I was looking 
for here, and the space to work on myself... Every day I am somehow stronger and more 
secure.” In interviews, staff members metaphorically called Zhene Zhenama their “family,” 
“home” and “friend.” For Radmilla, a member of the Women Studies Project Team, the 
refuge was not only symbolic. Originally from Mostar, Radmilla became a refugee in 
Belgrade in 1993 and joined the anti-war movement. She left Serbia in 2000, and unable to 
return to her hometown, relied on Zhene Zhenama to obtain housing, short-term 
employment and emotional support in Sarajevo. Only much later when Zhene Zhenama 
established a funding base did the possibility of obtaining a salary attract staff.
Though Zhene Zhenama’s staff did not outwardly join because of a shared sense of 
mission, the organization’s commitment to tolerance provided Serb and Croat women with 
a unique opportunity to mix with women of other nationalities and become publicly 
engaged. In 1996, according to Milica (13.11.01), a Serb heading the Women Studies 
Project Team, “there were just a few of us [Serbs in Sarajevo], and it was very hard for us
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to survive the peace. We survived the war, but we had to survive the peace.” When Miriana 
Music of the Psycho-Social team (21.11.01), from an Orthodox family and bom in Croatia, 
joined Zhene Zhenama she did so because she believed that “this center will not divide us. 
But together we will agree on things, construct our space and start to fight for our rights.”
Zhene Zhenama also encouraged staff to develop their sense of identity and political 
engagement. Through educational seminars they could further their understanding of 
women’s issues and commitment to public engagement. Sefika (20.11.01), the 
organization’s accountant, explained how through this process she “for the first time saw 
how to organize work for women, how to strengthen them.” At Zhene Zhenama it was also 
acceptable to be critical, which in a hierarchical, post-communist, and patriarchal society 
such as Bosnia-Herzegovina’s, was rare. Danijela (14.11.01) described how at Zhene 
Zhenama, “I decided that my role would be to say something whenever I felt that 
something was wrong.”
I. b Zhene Zhenama’s mission and values
Zhene Zhenama -  as its name indicates -  was created explicitly as an organization of 
women for women. The organization’s aim was to be a “grass-roots self-organized 
women’s association, that gathers women of different generations, social and education 
backgrounds, ethnic and religious orientation (Zhene Zhenama 2001a).” Zhene Zhenama 
filled an important niche in Sarajevo’s women’s movement due to the lack in 1996 of any 
truly multi-national organizations of pre-war residents and displaced persons. Significantly 
Zhene Zhenamadefmed itself primarily as a women’s organization, rather than a peace, 
conflict resolution, or human rights group.
Zhene Zhenama nevertheless pursued peace-related issues because the founders felt that 
women had a particular role to play in the peace process. Queried on why she had decided 
to organize a women’s association rather than a conflict resolution one, Nuna (14.11.01) 
responded: “Maybe it was because of the experience that I brought from Medica. I was 
crazy about women and wanted to be useful to women... Women took on the hardest 
burden amongst all that happened [during the war].” On one level her response was an
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emotional one, on the other it expressed a feminist argument that war influences men and 
women differently Slobodanka Konstantinovic-Vilic (2000: 187) explains this view:
“Some new situations created by war (the loss of family members, their recruitment into armed forces, 
separation and the necessity of refuge) demand that women adopt new, more active roles and engage in 
independent decision making. Life in war demands more o f women and consequently they become 
stronger and more decisive. However suffering in war produces feelings o f helplessness, hopelessness and 
depression.”
Zhene Zhenama's mission was to help women overcome these challenges so that they 
would be in a stronger position to influence peace. In a promotional document (1997c), 
Zhene Zhenama’s founders explained that they had decided to create an organization for 
women, because:
“During the war women were the most active population, in the defense of the country from aggression, 
in supporting peace initiatives, participating in peace processes, working on humanitarian issues or 
simply, trying to survive and struggle for their families.”
In the immediate post-war period, it was important to assist women so that they did not lose 
these subtle “gains.” The founders of Zhene Zhenama also targeted women because they 
initially saw it as an easier way to promote change. “Working with the converted,” with 
women, who had expressed a commitment to peace and reconciliation, would be less 
difficult than approaching men.
The setting up of a multi-national women’s center in Sarajevo was Zhene Zhenama's first 
goal: to create a space in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s capital in which people belonging to 
different national groups could meet, discuss and cooperate. Subsequently the mission 
broadened. In a 2001 promotional leaflet (Zhene Zhenama, 2001a) the organization’s 
objectives included facilitating:
■ Exchange between theoretical and practical perspectives on conflict resolution
■ Awareness raising about non-violence and peace education
■ Peace and trust building in multiethnic communities
■ The identification o f social and political problems in times of transition
■ Non governmental organizational development
■ The establishment o f an active NGO and activist network
Though not explicitly stated, Zhene Zhenama’s goal was to support the strengthening of a 
multi-national Bosnia-Herzegovina. “I did not want to accept that we were divided in
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Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Nuna (14.11.01) explained, “if I wanted my children and other 
children to have a country that would not put them into question because of their religion 
and nationality [...] then I had to give myself the goal of building that state. But I needed 
people [to do it with], I could not do it alone.” Zhene Zhenama provided Nuna and the rest 
of the staff and membership with an organizational form to promote tolerance and 
cooperation across ethnic lines.
To reach its long-term objectives of increasing respect for women’s rights and tolerance, 
Zhene Zhenama's mission included strengthening grassroots civil society development. At 
the community level Zhene Zhenama (2001a) strived to “promote a violence free culture,” 
by “changing the existing culture with its traditional characteristics” and helping 
community members see the “source of creativity as being in the diversity of relationships 
among human beings.” The NGO management argued that change had to occur at all levels 
of society, and that its greatest contribution could be at the grass roots.
I.c The origins o f Ghamkhori
Ghamkhori was created in 1997 in Khatlon, a region south of Dushanbe which since 1992 
was the scene of intensive wartime fighting, as well as the displacement of some 653,388 
persons. It was one of the first three local NGOs to form in the region, when the Tajik NGO 
sector was made up of a mere 83 registered groups (ICNL 2002). In 1997, as Tajikistan 
moved from war to peace, Ghamkhori's innovative approach was to teach self-reliance 
rather than provide emergency aid. Based in Kurgan Tuppe, Ghamkhori started its activities 
in the heavily destroyed villages of the Bokhtar district of the Khatlon Region.4 
Ghamkhori's founders targeted rural areas to meet the needs of returning refugees and 
displaced persons, as well as those of the population that had remained. According to the 
organization’s statute, Ghamkhori's (1999a) goal was to improve the socio-economic 
existence of the population by increasing levels of popular knowledge in the fields of health 
and the protection of women and children’s rights.
4 According to the UNDP (1995: 50) Human Development Report, Bokhtar was where “the most damage 
during the war was inflicted.” “Of 132 villages, 45 are leveled to the ground completely. Over 6,400 houses 
were burned and 2,994 partially ruined. More than 5,700 families are without shelter. Covering these losses 
will cost approximately US $11.4 million.” [...] “Commercial and community structures were eliminated. 
These include 2 clubs, 67 shops, 13 kindergartens, 10 common-service salons, several obstetrician consulting 
stations, 34 schools and 2 libraries.”
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I.e. 1 Characteristics and motivations of the organization’s founders and staff:
Unlike Zhene Zhenama, the initiative to establish Ghamkhori did not come from a group of 
Tajiks but from an international consultant and researcher who was completing a Ph.D. on 
gender, Islam and socialism in Tajikistan (Harris, 2000). When she carried out fieldwork 
in rural Khatlon in 1996, Colette found that women considered the provision of free 
contraception to be a pressing need.5 She thus devised the Health of Bokhtar Women 
project together with a group of five Khatlon based professionals who would form the 
initiative group for the creation of Ghamkhori (Colette, 28.06.03). A specific need thus 
motivated the drafting of the project, which inspired the creation of the organization. 
Though “Health of Bokhtar Women” project was funded in 1997 by the international donor 
Christian Aid, it was not until 1999 that the group felt the need to officially register as an 
organization.
Unlike Zhene Zhenama’s founders, the five Tajik members of the initiative group that 
became Ghamkhori were not driven by a clear mission that had developed through war 
time activism -  though they did share certain personal characteristics with the Bosnian 
NGO’s leaders. In 2002 two of the original founders -  Bahodur and Mikhail - remained 
involved with Ghamkhori, while the others had joined international organizations or 
migrated out of Tajikistan. Like in Zhene Zhenama’s case, Ghamkhori’s core staff and 
leadership was composed of middle class professionals, with a limited history of pre-war 
activism, and eclectic national backgrounds. Bahodur was a teacher and Mikhail a doctor. 
They had not been activists within the Communist Party (Mikhail joined the CPT during 
Perestroika) though they were active in other social organizations including labor unions 
and the Komsomol. Bahodur was an Uzbek national and Mikhail, bom in the Ukraine, came 
to Tajikistan as a young professional. Before Tajikistan’s independence they considered 
themselves to be citizens of the Soviet Union. During the war Mikhail served as the 
medical director in the Vaksh district and took risks to provide medicine to both sides in the 
conflict. However neither Bahodur nor Mikhail felt a strong drive to become publicly 
engaged before joining Ghamkhori'. they had no earlier contacts with local NGOs or
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Perestroika era civic organizations. They were initially drawn to Ghamkhori because it 
offered them an opportunity to further develop their professional skills.
The founders of Ghamkhori set out to establish an organization that was reliant on paid 
staff. Purposely they did not depend on friendship ties to recruit personnel. The 
organization had a strict rule against the hiring of relatives, a practice commonplace in 
Tajikistan. From 1997-1999 the organization had 12 staff, by 2000 it had 40. New 
employees were selected based on an extensive interview process, for their professional 
skills and perceived ability to be communicative, innovative and critical. Out of twelve 
Ghamkhori staff members interviewed in the context of this research in 2002 only two 
stated that they knew what the aims of Ghamkhori were before they were hired. Several 
persons interviewed acknowledged that they were content in their previous jobs, but that 
they left them for the higher salary that Ghamkhori offered. Ghamkhori developed around a 
core group of professionals, rather than activists, who were not necessarily bound by 
common values, interests, or ideology.
Though the staff of Ghamkhori did not profess to be motivated by any broad sense of 
mission when joining the organization, many of them shared a common value base due to 
their background and experiences. The majority of the staff interviewed were educated, 
middle aged, and married with children. Several proudly described their activism in Soviet 
era social organizations -  mainly the Komsomol, Zhensoyuz, and professional unions 
(Boymahmad, 08.06.02, Dilorom, 30.05.02, Kalongul, 08.06.02, Malika, 09.05.02). Staff 
included Tajik, Uzbek, and Russian nationals, as well as Tajiks originally from Kulyab, 
Garm, Kurgan Tuppe and other regions. They shared feelings of tolerance vis-a-vis people 
of different national or regional background. Several Ghamkhori members related 
anecdotes of how during the war they maintained contacts with people from all sides -  and 
in a few cases took dangerous steps to assist others (Hoorshed, 01.06.02, Malika, 09.05.02, 
Mavjuda, 30.05.02)
5 During Soviet times it was not uncommon for rural women to have 10-14 living children. Soviet social 
policies rewarded women with large numbers of children (“heroine mothers”) and traditional Tajik cultural 
norms encouraged it (Harris, 2000).
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Though the staff was not bound by pre-existing friendship ties, within Ghamkhori strong 
links rapidly formed. Ghamkhori's management nurtured the development of an 
organizational culture. Staff shared (free) daily lunchtime meals; and met for weekly 
organizational planning, training and development meetings. New employees were paired 
with more experienced Ghamkhori workers to transfer experience and skills. Such steps 
ensured the gradual development of a common organizational approach and identity. Also 
several staff interviewed noted that close collaboration with colleagues was one of the main 
sources of satisfaction in their work.
The majority of those interviewed acknowledged that although the initial motivation for 
working with Ghamkhori was financial, the organization helped them in their own personal 
development. More than half the staff interviewed noted that they had undergone a 
significant change of mentality since joining Ghamkhori -  which made them more aware of 
women’s roles and rights in society, and the importance of community action. The current 
director of the organization, Bahodur (14.06.02), admitted that in 1997, “I did not think that 
women have any rights. Only after I started working here did I start to understand that 
women’s rights are not optional but something that must be exercised.” Several of the 
women staff members gained new confidence and decided to further their education and 
public engagement. Staff was also motivated because the organization provided them with 
new skills. The manager of the Women’s Center, Mavjuda (11.06.02), who previously 
worked in a hospital, explained:
“Work here is quite different from work in the hospital. When a person came to the hospital and 
said that a part of her body hurt, I did not care what was the reason for this pain was. I only cared 
about selecting the proper kind o f medicine for her to take, but I did not listen to her. Here I learned 
how to listen to people -  to understand the problem and help, but in the other way. I learned to be 
patient. I learned how to talk to the people.”
Many staff members, including Ghamkhori's founders, initially knew little or nothing 
about NGOs. Through Ghamkhori they found that NGOs could allow them to work 
independently, creatively and without being impeded by higher authorities and corruption. 
In 2002 most of the staff that has been working with Ghamkhori for several years 
recognized that this new found independence was a key factor that motivated them in their
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day-to-day work. Hoorshed (01.06.02), a Ghamkhori staff member since 1998, described 
how:
“It is different working here. It is work which is close to a person’s soul, where no one dictates how you 
should work. No one is pushing you. You work as you wish to, in a way to make you proud of your 
work. When you do something that you are proud o f -  when you have a good lesson or talk to interesting 
people -  you are happy all day long after that. This is how we do our work. We get tired but in our minds 
we feel satisfaction.”
I.d Ghamkhori’s missions and values:
Ghamkhori’s goal at its inception was to improve the socio-economic conditions of the 
population of Khatlon. In post war Tajikistan the needs in Khatlon, mainly a rural area, 
were diverse. Some of them were directly war-related involving, for example, the 
destruction of homes and infrastructure. Others were linked to the breakdown of the state 
and its capacity to provide basic services and security. International organizations that 
operated in Tajikistan in 1994-1998 focused on meeting emergency needs, distributing 
material aid. When Ghamkhori started its activities it sought to fill a niche in the provision 
of information to rural populations. The initiative group was inspired by the motto “it’s 
better to teach how to fish than to give fish.” From the onset Ghamkhori’s mission was to 
break the population’s dependence on external aid. This signified learning to “help 
yourself’ and engage in prevention. In its statute Ghamkhori’s (1999a) “organizational goal 
is to increase the socio-economic existence level [of the population] by improving the level 
of popular knowledge in the fields of health and the protection of women and children’s 
interests.”
Ghamkhori’s mission was to encourage local communities to take on new responsibilities 
under conditions of declining resources and governmental service provision. After the civil 
war the population of Southern Tajikistan was confronted with a rapid spread of typhoid, 
malaria, and other infectious disease as access to clean drinking water plummeted. To 
tackle these problems, Ghamkhori organized interactive courses on hygiene, reproductive 
health services, and alternative medicine. Dissemination of this information was necessary 
because, according to Bahodur (11.06.02), “people did not know how to survive or to 
protect themselves” after the disintegration of the Soviet era social safety net. The 
organization sought to change individuals’ basic expectation that health care and disease
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prevention are the business of the government - to a general acceptance that they are first 
and foremost a personal responsibility. Lessons on health served as an entry point to 
address a broader range of community problems. Ghamkhori adopted a gradual approach 
which “took into account the mentality of our people,” and in order to do so according to 
Mikhail (24.05.02), “we made a program that could slowly move from health problems to 
family problems, that way changing the mentality towards independent decision making.”
Ghamkhori’s second target was to improve conditions for women and children. The first 
project that the group implemented was entitled the “Health of Bokhtar Women,” and 
thereafter all of its projects have had a similar focus. Women were identified as 
Ghamkhori’s main target group because of the substantial decrease in their rights since the 
early 1990s. A WHO study (2000), found that 35% of women experienced sexual violence 
in their families and 44% psychological violence. Yet like in Bosnia-Herzegovina, women 
also made subtle gains during the war, adopting more active public roles and engaging 
more openly in economic activity (Chatteijee, 2002: 118-119; Falkingham 2000a; 
Kuvatova, 2002). As Mikhail (14.06.02) described, war in Tajikistan affected men and 
women differently because:
“During the war men were afraid to go out of the house, so the women were going to the bazaar to buy 
and sell. Before the war you never saw so many women in the bazaar. [...] The shift has happened. So 
now is the right time to use this situation and start giving lessons to those women.”
Ghamkhori did not explicitly define itself as a woman’s organization as Zhene Zhenama 
did. Though women’s organizations functioned during the Soviet era there was no 
indigenous women’s movement comparable to the one that existed in the former 
Yugoslavia in the 1980s and 1990s. Ghamkhori did not benefit from the contacts and 
support from global women networks. In Tajikistan targeting women and excluding men in 
program activities may have caused men to prohibit their wives or sisters from 
participating. Nevertheless as Bahodur (11.06.02) described, Ghamkhori’s goal was clearly 
to promote women’s rights. He considered that it had succeeded in meeting its objective 
“when after our lessons a woman’s psychological vision of being a slave is broken. She 
understands that she has rights and that she can also express her opinions. She realizes that 
men and women are equal.”
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Ghamkhori initially choose not to work directly on inter-ethnic reconciliation. In 1996 the 
security situation had improved substantially though conflicts were still breaking out 
between returnees and people who had not been displaced during the war, and between 
people of different regional origins (mainly Garmis and Kulyabis).6 At this time 
Ghamkhori’s projects did not address the conflict issue because, according to Bohadur
(11.06.02), “the wounds were still aching, and people had not forgiven each other. [...] We 
did not have much experience in reconciliation and in working on peace building.” 
However the organization was committed to working with all victims and persons in need. 
The situation in 1996-1998 was described by Bahodur (30.05.2002) in the following way:
“When we started working with one ethnic group -  Garmis for instance -  they did not want to work or sit 
together in the same room with Kulyabi people. Or vice versa. They did not want to be in the same room 
-  even kids. There were conflicts, there was fighting sometimes actually. [...] So how did we work with 
them? We started our lessons with lessons on peace and friendship. We let everyone think about how 
wars start, why they start, what the consequences are, etc. Then, step by step, people started realizing 
that, for example, this woman is not guilty that the husband o f the other woman was killed.”
Ghamkhori also countered tensions caused by providing a space for people of different 
backgrounds to interact, by maintaining a multi-ethnic staff, and working with all regional 
or ethnic groups present in the region, in their preferred language. Organization staff was 
not immune from ethnic based discrimination and violence. In one instance, in 1999, when 
Bahodur had recently become the director of Ghamkhori (1999b):
“Immediately the government authorities o f the oblast started to pressure him to get him to resign 
because they considered that only a Tajik should be the head o f such an organization, despite the fact that 
the town where the project’s office has been established is 30-40% Uzbek. Things went so far that two 
KGB [Ministry o f Internal Affairs] officials came around to the office with the expressed intention of 
‘teaching the director a lesson,’ which they made clear would be by means o f taking him to their office 
and beating him up in order to get him to resign.”
The harassment ended when another staff member intervened through his own connections 
with local government. Ghamkhori’s management defended a non-ethnic and non-national 
approach when much was being decided in the region based on people’s ethnic and national 
identities. By treating staff and beneficiaries the same regardless of origin, Bahodur
6 According to Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Watch (1995:12) there were “at least fourteen returnees and 
internally displaced persons who were killed in the Khatlon oblast in 1994. Harassment and beatings, often 
resulting in serious injuries were disturbingly common.”
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(11.06.02) argued that Ghamkhori, “brings people together, makes them closer. National 
boundaries disappear during our lessons and people forget that they have different origins. 
[...] They forget who are the winners and who are the losers. Everybody is together, 
everyone is equal and everyone has the same rights and opportunities.”
I.e Contrasts and similarities between Zhene Zhenama’s and Ghamkhori’s origins and 
missions:
As theories on liberal civil society predict, Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori's were 
grounded in a system of normative values that emphasized mutual respect and tolerance. 
The leaders of both organizations were adept at articulating normatively progressive 
visions -  in support of women’s rights, civic participation, self-reliance -  which fortified 
the organization’s culture and inspired staff. Theorists of the not-for-profit sector (Paton, 
1996; Paton, 1999; Brown, 1998: 230) have characterized NGOs as “value driven.” 
Organizational values motivate staff and volunteers, secure members, and amass external 
support and resources. Arguably values reinforce staffs commitment to organizational 
goals, and to a sense of shared identity, in NGOs where economic interests are less of a 
motivation (Jeavons, 136). Zhene Zhenama was established by a group of women, driven 
by a commitment to shared values and political engagement which had matured with their 
war time activism in the anti-war women’s network. Ghamkhori’s case demonstrates how 
even though values may not initially attract staff, gradually they can strengthen their 
commitment. Ghamkhori’s leaders came to a more progressive understanding of their 
mission and shared beliefs. Ultimately values, but also the opportunity of personal 
development and financial gain, motivated the people engaged in both groups.
The literature on civil society emphasizes the role that liberal civil society can play in the 
political project of strengthening participatory and democratic forms of governance. Zhene 
Zhenama and Ghamkhori shared this mission, but acting indirectly, considering that they 
could best contribute through awareness building and information dissemination. The post­
conflict environment also directed them to other needs, as economic survival was a 
pressing challenge in post-war Tajikistan, while in Bosnia-Herzegovina the continuation of 
a multi-national way of life was in doubt. While Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori both 
aimed to re-establish a “civil” society, the former focused on the reconciliation aspects of
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this project and the latter the economic. Much more than Zena Zenama, Ghamkhori was 
committed to promoting the liberal notion that citizens’ should take responsibility for their 
individual welfare, as the NGO’s leadership perceived government’s involvement in the 
private sphere as being in inevitable decline.
As foreseen in previous studies on NGOs (Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002: 178; 
Cockbum, 2001; Whaites, 2000: 129) Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori were staffed mainly 
by middle-class professionals, in many cases ethnic or national minorities, whose status 
was being challenged in the post-war era. The NGOs served as defense mechanisms and 
self-help groups, offering skills development, psycho-social assistance and financial 
resources to their staff. The leaders of the post-war NGOs were from a different social 
category than those who belonged to Tajik and Bosnian pre-war civic movements: 
intellectuals with clearly defined political agendas. Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori’s 
directors generally participated in, rather than condemned, Soviet and Titoist era social 
activities. They also had weak links with political parties, and especially in Ghamkhori’s 
case,with activists who belonged to pre-war forms of liberal civil society.
Observers (Roy, 2003: 142-43) have argued that NGO staffs middle class, urban, and 
professional backgrounds may weaken its links with the rural and poor populations its 
claims to serve. In the design of projects, staff may be guided by its own perceptions of 
needs rather than grass-roots exigencies. As Howell and Pearce (2001: 201) noted in the 
case of Central Asia, urban, middle class NGOs “risk being perceived as elitist, 
unrepresentative and ineffectual.” The problem is exacerbated by international donors who 
“encourage the creation of LNGOs in their own professional, middle class image, thereby 
maintaining influence over them (Pugh, 1998: 20).” In the Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori 
cases staff seemed capable of nurturing and maintaining links with rural and dis- 
empowered groups as will be described in more detail below.
Liberal civil society has been heralded as autonomous from the state and family, immune to 
the “tyranny of the cousins” (Gellner, 1995: 33). Zhene Zhenama’s case demonstrates how 
liberal civil society may on the other hand become highly dependent on friendship 
networks. Zhene Zhenama followed a practice common amongst NGOs to rely heavily on
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friendship ties to gather staff, members and beneficiaries (Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 
2002: 178). In her study of eight women’s organizations, Cockbum (Cockbum, Stakic- 
Domuz and Hubic, 2001: 177) found that in Bosnia-Herzegovina “women’s NGOs were 
sometimes criticized as ‘mere friendship cliques,’ [...] But friendship is a political 
resource.” She added (2001: 177) that friendship based groups “can become exclusive, so 
that others feel always on the margins, cut out of information flows [...] and discouraged 
from taking responsibilities.” Thus friendship based organizations may begin to take on 
some of the negative characteristics of kinship based ones. Unconsciously heeding Gellner 
and Cockbum’s warnings, Ghamkhori’s management hired staff based on professional 
skills and gradually developed an organizational culture and identity through “team 
building” activities.
Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori both fit into Varshney’s definition (2002: 3) of inter­
community organizations, which promote “associational” and “everyday” forms of inter­
ethnic civic engagement. Addressing inter-ethnic and inter-national tensions was one of 
Zhene Zhenama’s primary goals. It aimed to facilitate a progressing bridging of social 
relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina’s populations. As we will see subsequently, many of 
its projects aimed to increase inter-ethnic cooperation in daily life and to create multi­
ethnic associations. Ghamkhori chose to confront the issue less directly, promoting 
tolerance by having a multi-ethnic and multi-national staff, and speaking about it in village 
lessons, but not explicitly implementing conflict resolution programs in the first five years 
after the war. Neither Zhene Zhenama nor Ghamkhori, however, explicitly defined 
themselves as peace/conflict resolution organizations as those that Gidron, Katz and 
Hasenfeld (2002) described in their volume on mobilizing for peace did.
Where pre-war forms of liberal civil society in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina may 
have lacked an over-arching ideology to bind them with international forms of civil society, 
Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori clearly identified themselves as women’s rights 
organizations. They adopted a gender sensitive analysis of needs, considering that in war 
and its aftermath “women suffer in a way specific to women” (Cockbum, 1998: 156; 
Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2000). In both Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina rape was used as a 
weapon of war against women (Allen, 1996; Cockbum, 1998; Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2000;
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Harris, 2000: 193; Richters, 2001). The trajectory of change away from communism also 
put an end to increases in women’s rights; which occurred during socialism/communism as 
systematic efforts were made to eradicate patriarchal power relations and modes of 
behavior (Ramet, 1996; Ramet, 1999; Harris, 2000). In the post war period women lost 
ground in political and economic spheres.7 In Tajikistan independence was accompanied by 
a  revival of Islamic practices and a return to traditional norms limiting women’s freedoms 
to play active roles in public life.8 Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori organized to address the 
negative affects on gender relations and women’s position in society caused by the post­
war and the post-communist transitions. Zhene Zhenama in particular was able to benefit 
from contacts within the broader Yugoslav and global women’s network, providing them 
with skills, information, and funds critical to organizational development.
n . NGO programs and tactics
Past NGO analyses have attempted to define typologies of groups engaged in post-war 
related challenges based on their programs and activities (Aall, 2000b: 167-180; Aall, 
2000a: 125-132; Goodhand and Hulme, 1997:11; Kumar, 1997: 324; The Carnegie 
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997). Prendergast and Plumb propose a list 
of “important, innovative projects to address issues of long term peacebuilding,” which 
NGOs may engage in.9 Like Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002), Aall (2000a: 129) argues 
that a particular category of resolution organizations exists within the NGO sector. 
However as the Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori cases reveal, NGOs in post-conflict 
environments often defy such classifications. The programs that Zhene Zhenama and 
Ghamkhori implemented from 1996-2002 both concentrated on women’s rights protection
7 For instance in the 1997 municipal elections women obtained 5% o f the elected positions, in the 1996 
national elections they gained 2% o f the seats (OSCE, 1998). See also Pavlovic (2001).
8 Citing one sign o f women’s decreasing status o f society Alla Kuvatova writes: “Today polygamy has 
become an every day occurrence, due to the low economic status o f women (absence of permanent work, low 
earnings) [...]. From the period 1991-2000 the number of officially registered marriages decreased 2.5 times. 
More than 60% of today’s families are created without any registration in civilian registrar's/registry offices. 
(Khegai M. Research o f phenomena as polygamy in Tajikistan.- Dushanbe, 2002). Marriages are concluded 
in religious ceremonies called “nikoh” with the agreement of the parents o f fiancle (bride). In these cases 2d, 
3d wives are allowed. They don’t have any juridical rights on joint property or inheritance in cases of divorce 
or husband’s death.” (Kuvatova, 2002).
9 Such activities include addressing trauma, organizing problem-solving workshops, training for conflict 
management, creating peace media, assembling peace committees, resurrecting indigenous mechanisms for 
conflict management, encouraging collaborative community activities and supporting democracy and human 
rights (Prendergast and Plumb, 2002: 334).
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and community-level civil society development, but implicitly aimed to influence conflict 
resolution or reconciliation.
II. a Zhene Zhenama programs:
From 1996 to 2002 Zhene Zhenama engaged in programs that spanned between service 
provision and advocacy, and centered on women, NGO development and supporting inter­
ethnic reconciliation.10 At first Zhene Zhenama developed programs based on its founders 
and staff’s skills. Nuna (14.11.01) remembered how “from the beginning [...] We focused 
on what we knew.” Subsequently the organization developed more complex and multi­
faceted programs. The four main programs that Zhene Zhenama implemented from 1996- 
2002, which will be described in more detail below, are: the Sarajevo Women’s Center, 
NGO development and support, psycho-social assistance and community level conflict 
resolution.
II.a. 1 Zhene Zhenama’s Women Center:
The foremost goal of Zhene Zhenama's founders in 1997 was to establish a Women’s 
Center in Sarajevo, which would be open to all women but initially focused on returnees. 
In 1997 returnees to Sarajevo faced significant economic, psychological and emotional 
challenges -  including feelings of isolation, guilt and discrimination. The entire system of 
government and public service provision had changed during the war, and women did not 
know whom to address with their needs concerning employment, health, property, etc. 
(Zhene Zhenama, 1996). Services that the Center offered included: individual and group 
counseling, information on employment and property rights, education, and income 
generation support (Zhene Zhenama, 1996).
As women’s needs and the environment in Bosnia-Herzegovina changed, the Women’s 
Center’s activities shifted to more educational and advocacy oriented ones. By 2000 many 
of women’s post-war emotional and psychological problems were becoming less acute,
10 According to the organization’s registration document, Zhene Zhenama’s (1997a) spheres o f activity 
included: integrating women returnees; providing information on health and legal questions; working on the 
education and awareness-building of women; promoting women’s rights; advocating for non violent conflict 
resolution and communications; and supporting the establishment o f a Bosnia-Herzegovina wide NGO 
network.
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while educational and health services remained ineffectual, rule of law and the 
administration of justice were poor, women were confronted with various forms of 
discrimination, and domestic violence was growing (Zhene Zhenama, 2000a). In response 
to these needs Zhene Zhenama sought to increase the role of women in politics, shifting its 
focus from providing services to supporting women’s empowerment. In the 2002 proposal 
for the Women's Center project, goals included increasing the number of women in 
decision-making positions and in NGOs, advocating for the passage of a law on gender 
equality, and supporting the institutionalization of gender mainstreaming through 
cooperation with governmental bodies (Zhene Zhenama, 2001b).
Starting in 1997 the Women's Center offered weekly or bi-monthly consciousness raising 
workshops to heighten awareness about issues related to women’s rights and tolerance, 
initiate debate and change popular opinions. Between 1997-2001, 144 workshops were 
organized with some 1500 participants (Zhene Zhenama, 2001c). Even in 1997 Jadranka
(14.11.01) remembered how at that time “we wanted to change women’s minds. After the 
war, typically we needed to work with women to change their minds and show them that it 
is not every Serb or Croat or Muslim who is guilty.” Almost all beneficiaries interviewed 
spoke about how activities at the Center, particularly the workshops, raised their political 
consciousness and their desire to work together to fight for women’s rights.11
Zhene Zhenama's political activism extended beyond the Women's Center. In 1998 Zhene 
Zhenama was one of the leading organizations in a Bosnia-Herzegovina coalition of 14 
women’s groups called “We are more (Nas je Vise)” which increased women’s 
participation in elections, as voters and candidates.12 The coalition succeeded in lobbying 
for the establishment of a quota in the election’s regulations that required all political 
parties to have a minimum of three women amongst the top ten persons on their electoral 
lists. The same year Zhene Zhenama organized a demonstration on International Women’s 
Day to express Bosnian solidarity with women in Afghanistan; in subsequent years it set up 
similar public events (Zhene Zhenama, 1999). In 1999-2000 Zhene Zhenama participated
11 Topics covered in 2002 workshops included: violence towards women, women and armed conflicts, 
women and elections, women’s human rights, and women in the media. (Zhene Zhenama, 2001b)
12 Through the coalition an estimated 14,000 women took part in voter education training sessions, run by 58 
NGO trainers including 5 from Zhene Zhenama.
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in a program organized by the OSCE entitled “Women Can Do It” in which its staff trained 
women candidates for the 2000 elections (Zhene Zhenama, 2000b). The programs had 
immediate practical affects as by 2001 four of Zhene Zhenama1s members and staff sat on 
the main board of the Social Democratic Party (at the time the governing party of the 
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina). Other women had gained political positions in 
municipal levels of government — such as in Brcko where eight women who had 
participated in Zhene Zhenama training sessions were in the city government in 2001. 
Working with women in government, Zene Zename encouraged them to think about 
women’s issues and to work co-operatively across party lines, to challenge male dominated 
political agendas and discourse.
II.a.2 Zhene Zhenama psycho-social assistance:
The provision of psycho-social support was the second main axis of Zhene Zhenama’s 
work. It fit within the organization’s overall mission of assisting women overcome the 
consequences of war. In 1997, when international NGOs who had offered psycho-social 
support during the war were largely pulling out of these programs, and few locally led 
psycho-social initiatives existed, establishing a multi-national team of Bosnian 
professionals capable of addressing trauma filled an important gap.
Initially the psycho-social team encountered a series of difficulties due to the general lack 
of Bosnian familiarity with the notions of trauma and counseling. It was a major challenge 
for the Zhene Zhenama team to identify beneficiaries and to encourage women to attend 
counseling. As the Psycho-Social Team manager, Snezana (19.11.01) explained, “there is 
no general knowledge about the issues and problems of mental health. So there is a fear of 
stigmatization -  that someone from the community will say, “oh you see she is crazy.” The 
problems were compounded in cases where violence had occurred since for many women 
“talking about violence meant talking about shame (Zhene Zhenama, 200Id).” These 
difficulties showed the limitations of applying counseling methodologies that were 
externally developed and rarely used previously in the former Yugoslavia. They also reveal 
NGOs’ propensity to serve as innovators. Through psycho-social programs like Zhene 
Zhenama’s, new methods came to the attention of governmental providers. As Snezana
(19.11.01) described, “lately in our [governmental] clinic we are seeing some
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improvements for example with the treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder. [...] It is 
my feeling that NGOs in this sector contributed a lot.”
Like the Women’s Center project, the psycho-social assistance’s goals evolved in tandem 
with Zhene Zhenama’s mission and overall women’s needs. Initially the project focused on 
helping women adapt to the life conditions they faced as displaced or returnees, as well as 
overcoming the feelings of helplessness, grief, and loss, which are characteristic of post- 
traumatic stress. However by 2000, the project was less centered on responding to wartime 
traumas and sought to prevent future sources of violence. The psycho-social assistance 
project included an advocacy component as of 2001. The Psycho-Social Team, together 
with the rest of the Zhene Zhenama staff, became more engaged in working with 
governmental institutions - health and educational bodies, police - to increase their 
awareness about domestic violence. Zhene Zhenama helped form a domestic violence 
network of Bosnian and international NGOs in 2000. Within the network, Zhene Zhenama 
worked on the identification and prevention of violence in the field, while legal aid groups 
advocated for changes in law and legal practice. In Republika Srpska, a lobbying effort lead 
by the Banja Luka Women’s Association, one of Zhene Zhenama’s partner NGOs, 
succeeded in criminalizing domestic violence in 2001.
II.a.3 Zhene Zhenama NGO Development and Support:
Starting in 1997, Zhene Zhenama made it a priority to cooperate with CBOs in rural and 
strongly nationalistic parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina to facilitate the development of 
communal civil society. Through the NGO Development and Support program its goals 
included: supporting the revival of civic institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the growth 
of the Bosnia-Herzegovina NGO sector’s legitimacy; networking among activists dedicated 
to peace and the development of civil society; the transformation of cultural mentalities; the 
establishment of a multi-ethnic society; awareness building of women’s issues; and the 
development of women’s leadership (Zhene Zhenama, 1997b).
The project was highly ambitious, promoting values that were far from the post-war reality 
of 1996-1997. Nationalist political parties were still in power, few war criminals had been 
arrested, and displaced persons’ attempts to return to their homes were met with hostility
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and violence. Relations between people belonging to different national groups were frozen 
and communications broken. Almost no multi-ethnic NGOs or CBOs were present outside 
the main Federation cities. Whatever initiatives operated worked in isolation. Eastern RS 
particularly suffered from a deep information blockade. Yet it was precisely in this region -  
Brcko, Visegrad, Foca/Srbinje, Zvomik -  that Zhene Zhenama implemented its project
The NGO Development and Support project was essentially educational, consisting of a 
series of workshops targeting potential activists interested in learning more about NGO 
development. From April 1997 to October 2001, sixteen 2-3 day seminars were organized 
in various parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The workshops addressed three main themes: the 
role of NGOs and civil society; peace building and non-violent conflict resolution, and how 
to organize as women. The methodology employed was highly interactive. Workshops 
were led by Zhene Zhenama staff, often with the assistance of expert trainers from 
women’s organizations based in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia or Serbia. From 1999 
onwards Zhene Zhenama used the workshops to encourage a group of twelve women from 
local NGOs to develop their skills as trainers and facilitators. In each workshop one or 
several of these “trainees” would lead a session to perfect her skills. Whenever possible, 
workshops assembled participants belonging to different national groups.
Five years after the start of the program approximately thirty-six new local NGOs and 
CBOs were registered by former participants of the NGO Development and Support 
workshops. For Zhene Zhenama, the development of the civil society groups in new 
regions simplified the organization’s own tasks. Relationships between governmental 
officials and NGO representatives improved in many “closed” communities. Part of this 
was due to a gradual diminishing of the powers of criminal nationalist elements. But it was 
also because of an increased awareness among government officials about the role of civil 
society; as government authorities attended NGO Development and Support workshops 
they gradually understood the potential for NGOs to serve as partners and not uniquely as 
rivals.
135
Chapter four
II.a.4 Zhene Zhenama’s Community Level Conflict Resolution programs:
In Spring, 2001, Zhene Zhenama in cooperation with the Dutch Relief and Rehabilitation 
Agency (DRA: 2000) began implementation of a community level conflict resolution 
project. The project (DRA: 2000) had the aim of “rebuilding a multi-ethnic society [...] to 
encourage dialogue between different stakeholders in the target areas. This project 
emphasizes the understanding of reconciliation as a form of community building.” The 
merging between Zhene Zhenama and DRA was effective as the latter had experience in 
physical reconstruction, while the former had skills in social reconciliation. DRA was able 
to provide large scale funding for the project -  over 1.5 million DM -  but it did not have 
the staff, expertise or contacts to carry out the project on its own. DRA selected Zhene 
Zhenama for its institutional strengths, and because of its “excellent psychosocial 
knowledge and experience in order to conduct conflict resolution workshops and group 
work in a sensitive and sensible way (Zhene Zhenama, 200 le).”
The community level conflict resolution program was perhaps Zhene Zhenama’s most 
explicit attempt to affect peace consolidation. As in its other programs, Zhene Zhenama 
held workshops - with groups including, returnees, displaced persons, demobilized soldiers, 
police, women, and youth. The gatherings opened a space for dialogue about past 
grievances, for acknowledgement of suffering and for discussion about ways to improve 
future relations. In these sessions Zhene Zhenama staff played an essential role as 
moderators and promoters of a sense of “communality” for:
“Reconciliation is difficult without all parties concerned recognizing a shared basis o f communality, 
something on which they agree. Points o f view and bases for communality should be produced which so 
far had not been perceived consciously by the parties involved in the conflict. It is especially the task of  
the outsider to identify, visualize, and exploit the hidden potential bases for communality (DRA 2000).”
Zhene Zhenama’s moderators aimed to encourage workshop participants to talk about 
common needs, and devise ways to meet them as a community. In its reports, it is clear that 
Zhene Zhenama was rarely able to reach this point. After a workshop in Foca, the Zhene 
Zhenama team concluded (200If):
“The participants o f the workshop [...] understand changes but they still don’t know how to define their 
personal roles and wishes. They are squeezed between the traditional pressures of patriarchy, nationalism
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and transition. There is not enough willingness to talk openly. People are not prepared to work on their 
feelings.”
Yet in instances where Zhene Zhenama came into contact with groups of people belonging 
to different national groups who had already identified common problems and were 
cooperating with each other, the NGO was able to play a greater role. Zhene Zhenama’s 
contribution consisted of encouraging them, providing an understanding of civil society, 
facilitating contacts with international donors and government officials, and teaching 
tactics to influence local decision-making. At the end of one workshop, participants from 
different national communities all signed a petition requesting the re-opening of a bus line 
to re-connect their villages, which was sent to local and international authorities (Zhene 
Zhenama 200If). The most significant case in which Zhene Zhenama helped 
institutionalize the long-term sustainability of reconciliation occurred when, after a series 
of workshops, a Serb and a Bosniak village decided to form a mixed MZ to improve 
conditions in their environment (Miriana, 21.11.01).
ILb Ghamkhori programs:
Ghamkhori began its activities mainly as a service providing organization -  directly 
assisting primary beneficiaries living in rural areas. It offered access to information on 
hygiene, health, family rights, women’s rights and community participation. In 1995-1996 
when it started its activities, Bahodur (11.06.02) recalled how “one international 
organization came and provided roofs for houses, another came and gave some flour to the 
people, another provided medicines, another vaccinations... But no one was educating 
people. People did not know how to survive or protect themselves.” Ghamkhori carried out 
tasks that were previously undertaken by state health and education institutions, filling in 
gaps where Soviet-era state service provision had collapsed. It also addressed serious new 
health and social problems which were the consequence of the conflict and the post­
communist transition. From 1996-2002 Ghamkhori engaged in four main projects that will 
be described below: the Khatlon Women’s Health Program, community development 
support, the Women’s Center, and a project on Violence Against Women.
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Il.b. 1 The Khatlon Women’s Health Program:
Ghamkhori started implementing the Khatlon Women’s Health Program (KWHP) in 1997 
bringing information on health and women’s rights to villages in three districts in the 
Khatlon region and to urban neighborhoods in Kurgan Tuppe. Significantly, though 
different donors funded KWHP, Ghamkhori implemented the same program with few 
modifications for over five years. Teams of four teachers (for boys, girls, men, and women) 
and a midwife weekly visited communities for 6-8 months providing educational sessions 
in hygiene, reproductive health, family relations and rights, as well as basic medical 
services and training. KWHP precisely fit the organization’s goal, as defined in the statute, 
of improving the socio-economic existence of the population by increasing levels of 
popular knowledge (Ghamkhori, 1999a). KWHP’s secondary objective was to provide 
local teachers and midwives with interactive teaching and consultation skills.
KWHP was designed to meet needs that had developed in the post-war period in rural 
areas, due to the extreme decrease in all economic indicators since 1991, destruction of 
infrastructure, the breakdown of state sponsored social service provision, and a sudden rise 
in infectious disease. It is useful to describe in detail the conditions of rural populations 
before the project started:
“Before the start o f the project the people in the village did not think much at all about how they lived, 
about family and interpersonal relationships. On the whole they took for granted the idea that only 
medical specialists understood matters o f health and that it was necessary to use bio-medicine, especially 
antibiotics and injections to cure most illnesses. The idea o f their taking steps to prevent illnesses was 
also absent. Their knowledge of local traditional medical practices had been largely lost during Soviet 
times, so that few even knew how to use local herbs and other domestic substances for treating minor 
problems, such as heartburn or colds. They accepted the idea that younger women and children did not 
have an independent social existence, that mothers-in-law and husbands had the right both verbally and 
physically to chastise young wives in order to force them to behave as their marital family dictated. 
Women put a very low value on themselves, believing themselves to be great sinners and their own needs 
to be of low importance. There was relatively little discussion between spouses about their relationship or 
interpersonal relationships between family members as a whole. Male heads o f household took it for 
granted that their own needs should be met before those o f the rest o f the family and that their opinion 
was the only one that counted. Even adult sons were rarely consulted.” (Ghamkhori, 1999b)
Though the project sought to initiate a debate on citizens’ rights and responsibilities, it 
began by addressing less controversial concerns in the fields of health. In choosing this 
approach the organization focused on building trust, taking into account local mentalities 
and beliefs. Their positions as professionals and teachers provided Ghamkhori staff with
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respect when they entered villages. However as several staff members explained during the 
interviews, they were accepted amongst villagers because they “know the psychology of 
people in rural areas [...] If you don’t know life in rural areas -  you can’t work here 
(Dilorom, 30.05.02).” Once trust between Ghamkhori staff and village beneficiaries 
solidified, greater emphasis was put on social questions, and “it is found that such questions 
are in many ways of greater interest to the villagers, and discussions around them brings 
even more improvements to village life (Ghamkhori 2000).”
The second objective of KWHP was to train village medical and educational professionals 
in alternative treatments and practices. Ghamkhori sought to assist doctors in making the 
transition from Soviet times during which a strong reliance on antibiotics and other 
synthetic treatments had developed. Ghamkhori originally encountered resistance from 
medical professionals, as the provision of medicines had become doctors’ main source of 
income. The practice of selling medicines -  which under communism were free -  created 
significant resentment amongst the population and a decrease in trust in medical 
professionals. Ghamkhori midwives who accompanied the teacher teams provided training 
to the formal and informal village medical professionals, gynecological examinations, 
consultations and contraceptives. After several years of working with medical staff, 
Ghamkhori (2000) found that “the project has significantly improved their prescribing and 
treatment practices [...] Medical staff finds that the loss of income incurred now that they 
rarely provide injections is more than compensated for by the higher number of clients 
coming to them.” In addition, in 2002, with the approval of the Regional Department of 
Education, KWHP began training groups of teachers in the village in which they worked 
“in order to have continuity,” and to assist teachers in increasing their knowledge and 
enhance experience sharing (Ghamkhori, 2002b).
KWHP did not directly seek to promote reconciliation between former warring sides, yet 
staff was frequently confronted with ethnic divisions in the villages in which it operated. 
According to a 1999 project report:
If a small group o f villagers from another regional group lives in a village then these people are not made 
welcome in the houses o f the majority group and we try to provide separate lessons for them when 
necessary. At the same time the teaching staff brings up the problem o f the ‘ethnic’ divides and tries to
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work with the population to resolve these. One way of doing this is to organize focus group discussions. 
Another way is to arrange joint activities, such as football matches among the young men.” (Ghamkhori 
1999b)
In 2002 ethnic tensions remained. As one Ghamkhori staff described (Dilorom, 30.05.02), 
“I worked in villages where Garmis and Kulyabis lived on different sides. Before the war 
we were not different. But the war made us different.”
II.b.2 Community development support:
In order to ensure the sustainability of the KWHP, Ghamkhori began in 1999 to support the
strengthening of communal civil society organizations - especially mahalla committees.
This activity fit within the organization’s overall mission of assisting people find ways to
help themselves. By facilitating the development of strong village organizations,
Ghamkhori staff encouraged citizens to come together and to address their common
problems. Ghamkhori found that in the vast majority of villages citizens were passive and
waiting for the government authorities to take steps to improve community life, to organize
garbage collection, cleaning of irrigation channels, light repairs of schools and medical
points, etc. However as governmental capacities were reduced due to war and transition
from socialism, these works were no longer being carried out. Furthermore village level
committees could fill a critical gap in local self-governance as according to the Constitution
11the lowest level of governmental authority was the i(jam oar  made up of 5-15 villages. As 
Roy has demonstrated, previously the kolkhoz was largely responsible for local-self 
governance, but once the kolkhoz disintegrated no village level structures existed to 
formally represent grass-roots interests (Roy, 2002: 131-145). Ghamkhori staff thus 
encouraged communities to set up institutions that would be capable of identifying 
development priorities and organizing voluntary community work on the foundation of the 
traditional mahallas (Sharbatali, 1.06.02).
The strengthening of mahalla committees could also help nurture community cohesion, 
tolerance and volunteerism. For example in 2002 when Ghamkhori began working in the 
village of Chapaev (pop. 4000, Bohktar district) it first organized a meeting in the village
13 According to the TajikConstitution, a jamoat is defined as an institution o f self-government in towns and 
villages. The framework for their authority is set forth in the 1994 Law on Local Self-government in Towns 
and Villages (Freizer, 2004a)
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mosque with villagers and local government officials to identify local problems and needs. 
Ghamkhori suggested that villagers establish a committee to elect representatives who 
could work on these problems. The villagers agreed and a committee was set up with 
fourteen members -  including four women. In the first four months of its activities, 
February-June 2002, the organization cleaned ditches and channels, resolved domestic 
quarrels and conflicts between families, taught about family planning, and encouraged 
people to reduce the costs of marriage and funeral ceremonies. It made a list of the 19 most 
pressing problems and looked for ways to address them with few financial means and 
active community participation employing hashar, a traditional mechanism of volunteer 
work. In June 2002, to commemorate the 11th anniversary of Tajik independence, the 
village committee composed of people of Kulyabi and Gharmis regional background, 
organized a “Street Day.” According to those present it was the first time in 70 years that 
the village held an event where Kulybis and Garmis -  who live in different parts of the 
village, attend different mosques, and work in different groups -  shared traditions. For 
Ghamkhori (2002c) staff it was highly successful to see that “people realized that after the 
war, and all the problems, they could come together and respect each other.”14
Initially Ghamkhori (Ghamkhori, 1999) management admitted that staff found it difficult 
“to bring the villagers in as stakeholders in the project rather than as mere participants.” By 
2001-2002 Ghamkhori had taken on a facilitator role and placed community development 
at the center of the KWHP. It introduced the concept of community activism as soon as it 
started planning for KWHP in a village. If villagers expressed an interest in setting up a 
community group that could represent them, Ghamkhori staff facilitated the organization of 
elections. Thereafter Ghamkhori staff worked on a weekly basis with the elected 
community to increase their management and organizing skills and collect their inputs for 
better KWHP implementation.
Ghamkhori facilitators preserved a careful balance between encouraging the village to take 
responsibility and influencing the process to guarantee female and minority representation 
in the CBOs. As described in Chapter 2 mahallas in Tajikistan are traditionally run by older
14 Also based on interview with Ghamkhori staff on 31 July 2002, field visit to Chapaev, and viewing of 
video o f Chapaev Street Day.
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men -  Aksakals -  who tend to favor traditional ways of life and patriarchal systems. 
Initially it was difficult to ensure female representation in the mahllas, but gradually 
through dialogue with men and women Ghamkhori convinced both sides (Sharbatali,
I .06.02). The NGO requested that when villagers voted for their mahallas committees “half 
o f their members will be women,” selected amongst “informal women leaders who will 
help to solve conflict situations connected with the infringement of women’s rights.” As 
Ghamkhori’s main donor for this project noted (Chris Buckley, 21.05.03), “a key strategy 
to promote greater representation and influence of marginalized groups, such as women 
and ethnic groups, is providing formal representation for these groups within a legitimate 
decision-making structure such as the mahalla committee.
Ultimately, through its community development program Ghamkhori hoped to contribute 
to the institutionalization of decision making at the village level. The NGO organized in 
2002 a conference of mahallas committee leaders with higher level authorities. This 
opened a forum for mahalla representatives to bring to the government’s attention their 
problems and solutions. In 2003 Ghamkhori planned to continue with these types of 
meetings twice a year. The aim was to open an important channel for communities to lobby 
their concerns with the appropriate authorities, increasing district and regional 
government’s accountability to village constituencies.
II.b.3 Project for the Reduction of Violence Against Women (PROVAW):
While carrying out KWHP Ghamkhori staff became acutely aware of the widespread 
incidence of violence against women and the often linked cases of female self- 
immolation.15 Studies (Falkingham, 2000; WHO 2000; Harris 2000) have identified several 
causes for the high rate of violence against women including: the country’s traditional 
patriarchal system, Soviet era perpetuation of stereotypes about male leadership, post-war 
reversal of roles in the family, male post-war trauma, and women’s lack of knowledge of 
their rights. The problem of violence against women in Tajikistan was compounded by the
15 According to a World Health Organization (2000) women in Khatlon reported more experiences o f  
violence compared to women living in other parts of Tajikistan. 42% of those questioned in Khatlon reported 
having been beaten by their father, mother or relatives in girlhood; 59% were the victim o f violence 
perpetuated by family members in adulthood; and 64% reported experiencing sexual violence by their 
husbands.
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lack of services to assist victims and governmental institutions’ unwillingness to address 
the issue. Rather than switching the focus of KWHP, Ghamkhori’s management chose in 
2001 to create a new program -  the Project for the Reduction of Violence Against Women 
(PROVAW). The program consisted of disseminating in village knowledge about Tajik 
legislation, the shariat, international women’s rights standards, gender relations and the 
prevention of violence.
PROWAV aimed to increase women’s awareness about their rights. According to the 
Medical Director, Mikhail (14.06.02):
“There is a big difference between situations when there is domestic violence and women think that 
it is something natural, so they don’t even talk about it, and when a woman knows that she has a 
choice between staying in the family and continuing to suffer, or leaving it. [Through our courses]
A woman will know that she can leave, sue her husband or do something else. So she will be able to 
protect her rights.”
As with KWHP, Ghamkhori believed that it is not enough to work with women but that it is 
necessary to teach all segments of society, men and women, young and old, about women’s 
rights. Through PROVAW Ghamkhori worked with religious leaders, school teachers and 
medical staff. The NGO made an agreement with regional religious authorities to organize 
weekly lessons with local mullahs to study how the Koran addresses women’s rights. 
Ultimately by cooperating with opinion formers such as religious authorities Ghamkhori 
sought to change popular notions about violence, making it unacceptable in local 
communities.
As in the KWHP project, Ghamkhori used lessons and discussions on health to gain trust 
and find an entry point in villages. This tactic seemed the most strategic, for as Dilorom 
(30.05.02), a supervisor in the project, noted:
“The psychology o f people is structured in a way that means you should not push them immediately. You 
cannot build trust immediately. [...] In the beginning we address medical themes because health is 
always a current concern for people. [...] Health is related to violence and will make people interested in 
our discussions.”
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The Ghamkhori approach was not to openly condemn men perpetuating violence as 
criminals, but to work with them and gradually teach them that what they are doing is 
wrong. As Mikhail (14.06.02) explained:
“If a man who beats his wife attends our lessons, then he will begin to think o f topics such as gender, 
equality, women’s rights etc. But o f course we will never tell the guy: “Hey, you, Petrov or 
Abdullayev, stand up! Shame on you -  you beat your wife! Let us all discuss it and blame him!” We 
would not do it in the Soviet style. [...] This would be dangerous.”
Ghamkhori’s intention was not to reduce the incidence of domestic violence in 2-3 years, 
or even ten, but to begin a lengthy process of mentality change among men and women 
concerning the place of violence in the family.
II.b.4 The Women’s Center:
In May 2000, together with four other local women’s organizations based in Kurgan 
Tuppe, Ghamkhori set up a center to provide medical, psychological and legal assistance to 
women.16 Ghamkhori identified the need for a women’s center when in the context of 
KWHP women came forward with accounts of psychological and physical trauma (Malika,
09.05.02). For many women it was the first time they had spoken about these issues. 
Women had nowhere to go to for support. They did not trust governmental institutions, the 
militia, lawyers, medical professionals or the judiciary. When they did seek these bodies’ 
assistance they often found them un-responsive. Like the founders of Zhene Zhenama’s 
Center, Ghamkhori aimed to create a place where all women regardless of background 
would feel welcome. Women who visited the center explained that this was one of the 
positive contributions that the Center made: “here we are all equal. You don’t divide us into 
rich and poor, or rural and urban, educated or illiterate, Uzbek or Tajik. From you we feel 
that we are all simply women and we have even learned to change our attitudes to ourselves 
(Ghamkhori 2001).”
Compared with Zhene Zhenama’s Women’s Center, Ghamkhori’s was more specifically 
designed to assist women with legal aid, psycho-social, and medical counseling. However,
16 By 2002 only one other organization in addition to Ghamkhori was involved in the project Mehrangez 
established several micro-credit groups at the center, providing counseling and advice to women on how to 
start small businesses.
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like in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ghamkhori’s staff had to overcome traditional and social 
stereotypes critical of publicly speaking about violence. Ghamkhori benefited from the fact 
that its staff was already present in local communities through the KWHP and PROVAW. 
To further build trust, the Center offered a range of services. As the Center’s manager 
(Mavjuda 11.06.02) justified, “If a woman will say that she is going to an obstetrician, her 
husband will let her go. But if she tells him that she is going to a lawyer or to a 
psychologist, her husband will tell her to stay at home. It is hard for us to get a woman out 
of her house. For that we need obstetricians.” On average seventy women visited the center 
daily in 2002. Generally the women who came started by seeking help from gynecologists, 
and only later approached the Center’s psychologists or lawyers.17
The Center offered free legal assistance and representation; the largest percentage of cases 
concerned divorce, child support and/or property separation. Many of the cases brought to 
the Center’s lawyers involved women who were unofficial second or third wives. The 
Center’s lawyers succeeded in increasing awareness about women’s rights and in making 
judicial authorities more sensitive to the protection of women’s rights in divorce cases. In 
2001 the Center’s lawyers won six cases, in the first six months of 2002 seventeen cases 
were won. This was significant in an environment in which the legal system was under- 
resourced, members of the judiciary were frequently subject to threats and bribery; and in 
practice violence against women perpetuated at home was not penalized. According to 
Ghamkhori staff, “Before it never happened. In order to win a divorce case a woman had to 
have a lot of money or an important position. [...] Women even didn’t know where to 
apply, or how to apply. They did not know that they could actually win a case” (Women's 
Center staff, 30.05.02).
Starting in 2001, Ghamkhori began to cooperate with governmental officials, offering 
workshops to staff from the ministry of internal affairs, fire brigades, the National Security 
Committee on gender relations and domestic violence. When Ghamkhori staff learned of 
serious violations of women’s rights it also cooperated with local authorities to address the 
problem. Bahodur (30.05.02) depicted how,
17 Amongst 147 women who took part in psycho-social counseling from May-December 2001 forty two 
spoke about violence inflicted upon them by their husbands. Another 21 spoke about violence carried out by
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“If there is violence against a woman in this village and this woman comes to the women’s center, 
then we contact the governmental sector. We contact the Jamaot, the Aksakals, women leaders from 
this village who can protect this woman, and we contact the community police officer. If a husband 
every day [...] gets drunk and comes back home and beats his wife, then we contact the community 
police officer to deal with this problem, and he starts working on it together with the police.”
In its strategy to diminish violence against women, Ghamkhori thus not only tried to 
increase awareness of the problem, but also to change government policies and practices -  
encouraging them to more readily react against violations of women’s rights. As of 2000 
Ghamkhori also actively disseminated information on the Women’s Center, gender issues, 
and violence against women through mass media (Malika, 09.05.02).
Ghamkhori’s Women Center did not initially hold the kind of consciousness raising 
workshops that Zhene Zhenama did to increase female participation in political life. 
Partially this is because the needs in Kurgan Tuppe were different. In Sarajevo, by 2002, 
there were several NGOs supporting women victims of violence; the first Bosnian women’s 
shelter was established in 2001 whereas no such institution existed in Tajikistan. 
Ghamkhori in 2002 could not rely on a womens’ rights network of support to engage in 
more targeted advocacy or training of women. However Ghamkhori (2002d) gradually 
became engaged in new forms of awareness raising -  for example organizing a 
commemoration of the International Day Against AIDS in 2002 with local authorities, 
school teachers, NGO representatives and media coverage, and a roundtable on violence 
with similar participants.
II. c Contrasts and similarities between Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori’s programs:
As theorists of liberal civil society would predict Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori engaged 
in service provision to carry out activities that were either provided by the government in 
previously, or to meet new post war needs. They concentrated on providing non-material 
assistance, particularly information, education, community-mobilizing facilitation, psycho­
social and legal counseling. At times the methods they employed -  based on Western 
European practices -  were rejected by potential beneficiaries. Deacon, Hulse and Stubbs 
(1997: 185) have argued with reference to Bosnia-Herzegovina that this is because the new
their female in-laws -  a culturally acceptable form of domestic violence in Tajikistan (Ghamkhori, 2001).
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methods had more to do with fashion than actual needs. Yet in other instances new 
methodologies were welcomed as innovative. The three positive characteristics, which the 
NGOs possessed to carry out these activities effectively, were professional skills, 
knowledge of local culture and behavior, and commitment of staff. Most importantly 
perhaps they succeeded in gaining the trust of their beneficiaries -  which argues against the 
notion that when an NGO staff is middle class its ability to interact with rural beneficiaries 
will necessarily be limited. Ghamkhori’s staff subtly encouraged women’s rights protection 
in highly patriarchal environments, as Zhene Zhenama taught tolerance in extremely 
nationalistic villages.
Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori did not meet the full expectations of liberal civil society 
where civil society is described as well placed to check “potential abuses of power” 
(Diamond, Plattner, Chu and Tien, 1997: xxxi) or to “counterbalance the state” (Gellner, 
1994: 5). When they interacted with government officials it was to offer them training and 
information, rather than to lobby for specific interests. Only rarely did Zhene Zhenama and 
Ghamkhori engage in the form of advocacy, defined “as the pursuit of change in policy and 
practice for the benefit of specific individuals or groups of people (Roche, 1999: 192).” 
Rather their interventions fit within another understanding of advocacy, which emphasizes 
Ihe “civil society dimension.” According to this definition (Covey 1998 cited in Roche, 
1999: 199) advocacy should strengthen the institutional base for citizen political action; 
nurture informed grassroots participation; and contribute to an inclusive political culture 
aid public resolution of conflict through peaceful means. Through their community 
development programs Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama fulfilled these tasks, working in 
dose cooperation with communal civil society, to close the gap between liberal and 
communal civil society, and bringing ordinary citizens closer to the political process. They 
dso crucially increased the institutional base for female participation in public life by 
fecilitating greater women’s’ representation in communal decision-making structures -  at 
tie mahalla level in Tajikistan and at the municipal/republic level government in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina.
Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori’s engaged in a variety of programs and employed different 
tactics. Gidron, Katz, Hasenfeld (2002: 181) similarly find that in their post conflict case
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studies “most of the P/CROs adopted an eclectic tactical approach, utilizing more than one 
strategy.” The authors described six tactics that P/CRO employed most frequently: public 
education, service, bridging, lobbying, protests and research. Zhene Zhenama pursued all 
six tactics to various degrees; while Ghamkhori focused on the first four, undertaking 
minimal research, and no protests. As Gidron, Katz, Hasenfeld discovered in their cases, 
the two NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan “preferred a specific mix of tactics 
based upon the unique interests, skills, beliefs of the P/CRO leaders and members, and the 
tactics that were known and available within each region” (2002: 181). Protest was an 
example of such a tactic, legally and politically acceptable in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but 
more harshly repressed in Tajikistan in 2002.
Korten (1990) provides a generational model of organizational development to explain why 
some forms of liberal civil society engage in social services while others focus on 
advocacy. As predicted by Korten, Ghamkhori began its work focussing on relief and 
welfare. By 2001 it had started to more forcefully engage in community development. In 
2002 it was beginning to think about its potential to affect changes in the institutional and 
policy context, in the field of domestic violence prevention for example, thus entering the 
“third generation” of its development. Ultimately Korten speaks about a “fourth generation 
strategy” where NGOs join wider alliances and networks to engage in global developments. 
Arguably Zhene Zhenama began its activities at this level as its three founders were 
integrated in an extensive women and antiwar transnational network during the war and 
thereafter. Nuna, Jadranka and Selma continued this level of engagement through Zhene 
Zhenama advocating for an improvement of women’s plight in Afghanistan and Kosovo. 
When Zene Zernama began its activities it was committed to service provision, as well as 
facilitating changes in the institutional and policy context, which would have placed the 
NGO in Korten’s first and third “generations.” Zhene Zhenama’s case thus demonstrate the 
limitations of this linear model to explain what tactics liberal civil society groups employ. 
It indicates the importance of taking into account the experiences and ideology of 
individual NGO leaders and staff when predicting an organization’s strategic evolution. 
From its inception Zhene Zhenama had the characteristics of a “first,” “third” and “fourth 
generation” organization.
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III. NGO linkages
Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori operated in close symbiosis with their environment and the 
linkages they had contributed significantly to their effectiveness. In general one of the key 
advantages that NGOs are believed to have over other actors is their relationships with the 
communities in which they operate (Ball with Halevy, 1996: 90). Aall (2000: 134) finds 
that in conflict and post-conflict situations, “because of their long-standing relationships 
with the local community, NGOs possess valuable information [...]. They see their long­
term success as dependent on good and open relationships.” According to Prendergast and 
Plumb (2002:329) these linkages provide local NGOs with a “deep contextual 
understanding of barriers and opportunities to making peace at the local level. [...] They 
are also likely to be better equipped to understand the needs of the community and more 
sensitive to cultural norms.” Described below are the multiple linkages which Zhene 
Zhenama and Ghamkhori managed with local communities, international organizations, 
government and the media.
III. a Zhene Zhenama’s Iinkages:
In 2001 Zhene Zhenama had an extensive web of linkages of various intensity and 
importance represented below in a Venn diagram (Roche, 1999: 178). The diameter of the 
circle indicates the significance of the relationship and the overlap the intensity.
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Building linkages across the former Yugoslavia was one of Zhene Zhenama’s key 
contributions to the political project of breaking down barriers based on nationalism and 
exclusion. In 1997 freedom of movement within the country did not exist, and people living 
in the Federation and the RS were not in contact. Women activists were one of the first 
groups to meet across front lines -  in 1996 two large scale women’s conferences were 
organized in Sarajevo and Zenica with the specific goal of reuniting women. Zhene 
Zhenama focused first on bringing women from different ethnic groups together in 
Sarajevo. Subsequently the organization sought access to communities -  in Eastern RS and 
Western Herzegovina especially -  that continued to be isolated in the post-war period.
Zhene Zhenama’s tactic to gain entry within isolated closed off communities was to build 
links around small issues and personal favors. Initially much of the organization’s work in 
Eastern RS and Herzegovina consisted of little more than small informal gatherings. Nuna
(23.11.01) remembered how her first trips to Foca or Zvomik “opened personal contacts. 
Someone always asked, can you help me with this, or that?” Three years later “my 
organization is now benefiting from what I did for these women individually.” Ultimately 
these “cross-cutting ties based on trust and reciprocity between organized individuals” 
(Lewis, 2001: 147) contributed to breaking down barriers set up by exclusionary nationalist 
politics. They also provided a means for a representation of liberal civil society, which 
Zhene Zhenama was, to engage with communal civil society.
Zhene Zhenama staff provided mainly emotional and personal support as friendship ties 
developed and trust was built. The NGO also taught communications and relationship- 
building skills. Mirzeta (26.03.01), one of the activists with whom Zhene Zhenama worked 
from 1998 onwards in Brcko, recalls how Nuna offered essential support when:
“At one point there was a situation when women from a very radical party tried to undermine what we 
were doing. They were trying to divide women o f different nationalities who had established good 
contacts. At that time it was necessary to react. I immediately called Nuna and told her ‘I am afraid that 
our organization is going to split up. It’s the aim o f some people in Brcko.’ Nuna very quickly reacted, 
and after that came here every month. Her trainings are not only about skill development [...] Thanks to 
Nuna, and to ourselves of course, we are today what we are [...] I am an explosive woman, but with 
Nuna I learned for the first time to be a real listener. Through the seminars I learned first how to listen,
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and then all the things concerning declarations, conventions, human rights, how to establish partnerships, 
to resolve conflicts, to identify common problems...”
Two and a half years after Zhene Zhenama began to meet women activists in Brcko, they 
registered their own group called the Women’s Association “Roundtable Brcko.” In the 
deeply divided town, the new NGO’s goals were to understand the 1992-1995 war, 
strengthen women in politics, engage in conflict resolution, and support women in rural 
areas.18
Due to its extensive linkages across Bosnia-Herzegovina Zhene Zhenama could serve as an 
information bridge. In “closed regions” of the country, Zhene Zhenama’s Sarajevo based 
staff provided news and objective testimonies to persons who for years had been living 
under an information blockade. Zhene Zhenama collected information on parts of Eastern 
RS to share with displaced persons from those regions currently living in Sarajevo and 
considering return. Through its contacts with SFOR, Zhene Zhenama insured that some of 
the communities in which it worked obtained basic infrastructure rehabilitation. The 
Federal Ministry of Social Issues and Displaced Persons accompanied Zhene Zhenama staff 
to carry out needs assessments of returnees in Eastern RS, and on several occasions the 
NGO successfully turned to the Ministry for help. Information “from the field” was of great 
value when Zhene Zhenama sought to lobby authorities based in Sarajevo — it also helped 
the organization increase its legitimacy and status of “experts.”
Within Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia, Zhene Zhenama contributed to a 
deepening of women’s rights and peace networks that existed before and during the 1992- 
2000 wars. Zhene Zhenama's engagement spanned three distinct geographic areas: 
Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia. The networking strategy 
gradually evolved from 1996. As Nuna (23.11.01) recollected:
“In 1996 networking meant [finding a way] to bring the experiences o f women from Croatia and Serbia, 
in other words Yugoslavia, to Bosnia and Herzegovina. [It meant finding the mechanisms] to mobilize 
organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for then there were only individual groups and no one network at 
the Bosnia-Herzegovina level existed. In Serbia and Croatia those networks existed and we wanted to 
bring that model here [...] We tried to bring models o f women working in partnership to Bosnia and
18 Interview with members o f the Brcko Roundtable, Mara Kokanovic and Almiija Petrovic, in Brcko on 
26.03.2001.
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Herzegovina, and then include Bosnia and Herzegovina in East-Central European networks, European 
integration or [contacts with] women from the rest o f the world.”
Nuna, Jadranka, and Selma’s engagement in global networks continued to expand through 
cooperation on women’s rights, inter-national/ethnic dialogue, and trafficking issues. When 
in 1998 refugees from Kosovo started to arrive in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Zhene Zhenama 
responded with humanitarian aid and psycho-social assistance. In 2000-2001 when tensions 
were boiling in Macedonia, Zhene Zhenama trained local activists there in conflict 
resolution and civil society development. After 1996 women networking in the former 
Yugoslavia became more formalized with the establishment of Living Waters/ Zive Vode 
(since 1996); the STAR Economic Network for Bosnia-Herzegovina (1999); the RING 
anti-trafficking network (2000); and the organization of high profile events such as the 
2002 Women’s Peace Caravan. As assumed in the literature on international liberal civil 
society, these networks facilitated the promotion of women’s rights and provided a voice to 
women throughout the former Yugoslavia. However the extension and 
“professionalization” of these linkages created their own tensions. Zhene Zhenama's 
management argued that the networks were all too often “captured” by the international 
organizations that funded them to meet their own needs and goals.
Furthermore the networks did not increase Zhene Zhenama's effectiveness in holding 
international multilateral institutions accountable as the literature predicts. In Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, governed by an international “semi-protectorate,” managing linkages with 
bodies such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations was of key importance to affect 
political change. Zhene Zhenama attempted to build linkages with these international 
organizations, employing its habitual strategy of forging personal contacts. Though this 
tactic succeeded in some instances, and Zhene Zhenama cooperated extensively with OHR, 
OSCE and the UN, the ties proved fragile. One possible explanation is related to the IOs’ 
own short institutional memory and high staff turnover. Yet the causes of the weak ties 
between Zhene Zhenama and international organizations were also political. As other 
analysts have found, key international agencies failed initially to include gender, women’s 
rights or cooperation with women peace activists in their peace consolidation strategy 
(Cockbum, Stakic-Domuz, Hubic, 2001: 155). They also did not consider NGOs and civil
152
Chapter four
society activists as serious partners in policy making, preferring to dialogue with 
governmental officials, generally nationalists who had gained influence during the war 
(Pugh 1998; Duffield 1999). Only after 1999 did the OHR and the OSCE shift their 
strategy -  including women and women’s issues in the Stability Pact for Southeastern 
Europe process, and supporting their pre 2000 election activities for example (Chinkin and 
Paradine, 2001: 170-172).
Zhene Zhenama did not have the direct contacts with Bosnia-Herzegovina governmental 
authorities that have been understood as being essential to liberal civil society activism. 
Over time connections between Zhene Zhenama and the state improved but they tended to 
be of a personal nature, rather than institutionalized. From 1992-2000, when nationalist 
politicians controlled virtually all levels of government, multi-national NGOs had little 
interest in cooperating with them. As in other former socialist countries, suspicion between 
NGOs and government was strong, and NGOs lacked legitimacy and credibility in the eyes 
of governmental officials (Cockbum, Stakic-Domuz, and Hubic, 2001: 171-173; Brown, 
1998: 232). Ultimately, political factors influenced state attitudes to NGOs as they have 
elsewhere (Lewis, 2001: 150). Zhene Zhenama’s relations with the state improved after the 
election of the non-nationalist Alliance for Change in 2000, as did overall contacts between 
NGOs and government. In 2000 one prominent municipal official (Kuslugic, 20.03.01) 
noted that “what we need now is for the new government and the activists to turn from a 
supplementary role to a complementary role: public/private partnership.” Zhene Zhenama’s 
contacts were best with Sarajevo canton and municipal authorities that it lobbied over 
issues such as domestic violence, trafficking and minority return. As Selma (15.11.01) 
related, “ we cannot always influence their decision, but we can give them another insight 
based on our information.”
Like with governmental authorities, Zhene Zhenama’s relations with local media gradually 
improved -  especially after the 2000 elections. As one staff member (Danijela, 14.11.01) 
described
“Whenever we do something we try to ensure that its covered by the media [...] if  you tell them that 
it is something concerning feminism they don’t want to cover it because they think its anti-men. But
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now we are trying to explain feminism as something new, like civil society, and step by step place 
that word and the theory in people’s minds.”
Thus, according to Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002: 205), Zhene Zhenama could 
measure its impact on social change by analyzing the extent to which it was “gaining the 
status of a regular media source whose interpretations are directly quoted.”
III. b Ghamkhori’s linkages:
Ghamkhori's relationships with local communities significantly contributed to its success 
in carrying out effective programs. Unlike most NGOs who first attempt to cement their 
position in cities and then branch out to regions, Ghamkhori started its activities in the rural 
districts, only four years later establishing its women’s center in Kurgan Tuppe. However 
its linkages with more distant partners based in Dushanbe or outside Tadjikistan were much 
weaker. Ghamkhori’s web of contacts could be depicted as follows, with the smaller circles 
representing stronger and more intensive contacts:
International NGOs and IOs outside Tajikistan
Dushanbe governmental authorities, IOs, NGOs
KT civil/religious authorities, IOs/NGOs, media
Local communities
Ghamkhori’s relations with local communities were significant due to their breadth, 
intensity, depth and duration. It was committed to developing a deep and long lasting 
relationship with communal forms of civil society. Staff worked with all members of the 
community -  young and older, men and women -  rather than specific target groups. 
Management firmly believed that though one of its main goals was to improve the status of 
rural women, it could not be accomplished unless the entire community -  including men - 
was involved. The director (Bahodur, 29.05.02), explained the necessity of including men 
as follows:
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“For example if Mavjuda works with Malika, and Malika is beaten by me, her husband, if you will 
continue working only with Malika, but not with me, then I will continue beating her. That is why 
Ghamkhori starts working with boys and girls from the age o f 7. [...]After our lessons with boys 
their opinion changes. Both men and boys change their opinions.”
Through KWHP and PROVAW staff met with community members weekly for eight 
months. Subsequently Ghamkhori maintained informal contacts.
Past studies of NGOs have warned that when organizations are too deeply embedded in the 
communities in which they operate they risk being co-opted by local elites (Goodhand and 
Chamberlain, 2000: 91, 98; Roy, 2002: 142). Yet Ghamkhori understood local power 
structures and appeared able to draw on this authority without being co-opted by it. The 
NGO gained community trust by operating non-confrontationally, respecting traditional 
cultural and social norms. Ghamkhori staff appropriated rural accents and modes of dress to 
appear less threatening. One of the main functions of the mid-wife in Ghamkhori’s rural 
teams was to build confidence: while husbands may not have understood why they should 
allow their wives out of the house to attend a teachers’ “class,” they would have difficulty 
denying his wife access to a female medical professional. Ghamkhori understood the 
importance of cooperating with traditional and de-facto community leaders that were part 
of communal civil society. This could be interpreted as cowing to patriarchal and 
inequitable power structures. Yet the NGO found that explaining their work to local 
religious leaders, collective farm presidents, mahalla heads, and other informal community 
leaders significantly facilitated their tasks. In some instances local leaders themselves chose 
to participate in Ghamkhori activities.
Initially like Zhene Zhenama, Ghamkhori failed to develop effective contacts with 
government. As Howell and Pearce have argued, “for most new social organizations in 
Central Asia the key challenge has been survival in a context where [...] national and local 
government officials are suspicious of their purposes and activities (2001: 199).” 
Ghamkhori was not immune to this problem. Ghamkhori sought to work without 
governmental support and found that:
155
Chapter four
“It was very difficult. Many people did not understand us. District heads were saying things like: 
‘What are you doing on my land? Why don’t you provide humanitarian aid? What are you 
bringing?... You are teaching girls about sex!’ Yes they were saying that. They were also saying 
that we try to convince people to believe in Christianity, not Islam (Mikhail, 25.05.02)”
Initially the organization benefited from the ties of the Manager of the Medical Program, 
Mikhail, who had worked in the governmental sector and had links with city and regional 
authorities. Closer cooperation with the Kurgan Tuppe Hukumat (government) began at the 
end of 1998, when Ghamkhori developed a strategy to increase awareness of its activities. 
When starting a new project it informed all levels of government up to the regional 
Hukumat of its intentions, obtaining written confirmation of governmental support at each 
stage (Bahodur and Mikhail, 14.06.02, Malika, 09.05.02). By applying this strategy 
scrupulously, the NGO attained effective working relations with The Ministry of Health, 
the Hukumat of the Khatlon region, hospitals, The Ministry of Education, district 
Hukumats, and rural Jamoats. Ghamkhori staff had little interaction with Republican level 
authorities, though Colette maintained communication with health authorities in Dushanbe 
until her departure in 2000 (Harris, 28.06.03).
As in other instances there was a shift in NGO-State relations. The state began to “see the 
potential for NGOs to broaden the development services under an overall guiding hand 
from government” and to understand that “the government may benefit from resulting 
public gratitude and approval (Lewis, 2001).” Filling gaps in state health and educational 
service provision, engaging in selective collaboration with Educational and Health 
Departments, Ghamkhori gradually was perceived by governmental authorities as an ally. 
Ghamkhori made little attempt from 1997-2002 to become directly involved in policy 
formulation. However it maintained contacts with specialized governmental institutions -  
assisting them with the provision of data. In 2001-2002 Ghamkhori began to carry out 
public actions with the support of the local government on topics such as violence against 
women, AIDS, and drug abuse.
Ghamkhori also worked with religious authorities to develop common approaches, to 
address some of the sensitive issues it was raising, which would be in accordance with the 
Koran. Some observers may argue that integrating religious and spiritual values is 
antithetical to a NGOs modernizing project, yet it also provided an opportunity to form
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alliances with an influential social actor. Starting from 1998 Ghamkhori cooperated with 
several mullahs (religious leaders) and the regional Religious Committee. After 2000, the 
regional Religious Committee invited Ghamkhori to provide lectures in Kuran Tuppe’s 
medressa on family relations, marriage, rights within the family, etc. As community 
members generally have confidence in religious leaders, Ghamkhori occasionally invited 
them to participate in their village sessions.
Ghamkhori's ties with NGOs, and international organizations, based in other parts of 
Tajikistan and abroad, were its weakest link; and it did not use it as a source of political or 
advocacy support. Until 2000 Colette Harris had regular contacts with international 
organizations present in Dushanbe and abroad. After she left, the organization’s links 
became informal and ad-hoc. Ghamkhori partnered with international organizations for 
funding purposes but did not look at them as sources of political support as the literature on 
liberal civil society would assume. Staff rarely participated in international conferences in 
Dushanbe or outside Tajikistan. Within the NGO sector, Ghamkhori tended to work as an 
independent unit, rarely developing alliances with other groups. Ghamkhori's management 
had little sense of the organization’s position within a larger NGO sector. Partly the weak 
links could be explained by Ghamkhori’s lack of technical abilities (email, internet, good 
phone lines). Ghamkhori did not have sufficient personnel with English language skills, 
comfortable and confident in networking, to do so internationally. Nevertheless the 
management of Ghamkhori considered that it was important to increase contacts with other 
organizations to gain information on new methodology and approaches in the fields of 
health, education, psychology, law, etc.
III. c Comparing Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama’s linkages:
The findings above appear to confirm the widespread assumption that the greatest 
comparative advantage that local NGOs have over other organizations operating in post­
war environments is their contacts with local communities, understanding of grassroots 
level needs and sensitivity to cultural norms. However, writing about NGOs in Tajikistan, 
Roy (2002: 142) argues that staff trying to affect change in popular norms, values and 
public engagement are faced with a difficult “predicament.” He argues that “they can have 
an impact on the traditional social context only if they play by its rules -  which puts them
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at odds with the values and agenda of their employing institutions.” Ghamkhori and Zhene 
Zhenama staff appear to have overcome this challenge not by overtly rivaling local norms 
and beliefs, but gradually through dialogue and information dissemination transforming 
them. The staff of the two organizations engaged communal civil society with calculated 
sensitivity, and not with the persuasive power of material assistance provision.
Even though liberal civil society is expected to open a dialogue with government, as past 
studies on NGOs in post-conflict and post-communist contexts have found (Prendergast 
and Plumb, 2002: 329), Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama initially faced large-scale 
challenges in establishing their legitimacy with government. This condition was 
exacerbated by international organizations’ tendency in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan 
to present NGOs as an alternative to governmental authority, and to favor the most vocal 
and critical groups (Howell and Pearce, 2001: 202; Duffield 1999: 139-141). Nevertheless, 
over time Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama’s improved NGO-govemment cooperation 
through “gap filling” and “selective collaboration” (Lewis, 2001: 150). Offering effective 
services was important to gain credibility, as was networking between and among different 
government services. After five years of building linkages, Ghamkhori and Zhene 
Zhenama’s relationship with government was transformed. As predicted by Smith (1998: 
222), “by acting as important gap-fillers and troubleshooters, NPOs shore up social 
stability, head off potential unrest, and sometimes pave the way for governments to learn 
better techniques of reaching isolated regions or marginalized groups.” Ghamkhori and 
Zhene Zhenama’s experience supports the argument that NGOs “may represent an 
important bridge between the people and the state by communicating local needs to the 
government and reducing the prince’s monopoly over the flow of information (Goodhand 
with Chamberlain, 2000: 101).”
Though international organizations often took the place of government structures as the 
designers and implementers of policy in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, neither Zhene 
Zhenama nor Ghamkhori actively lobbied them to affect policy change. In Ghamkhori’s 
case this could be explained by its weak links with international civil society. However in 
Zena Zenama’s situation it demonstrated the difficulty of lobbying international 
organizations when these actors do not perceive NGOs as being serious partners.
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As Kaldor (2003: 11) predicted Zhene Zhenama had the advantage of extensive linkages 
with international civil society, which provided the necessary space to break out of the 
exclusionary environment that existed in war and post-war time Yugoslavia. The civil 
society networks that Zhene Zhenama participated in, through their contacts with advocacy 
networks and international media, campaigns for women’s rights and a multi-national 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, contributed to keeping global attention on these issues. However 
problems of “ownership” of the networks and questions concerning its effectiveness at 
transforming the policies of multilateral institutions based in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
remained. Ghamkhori did not benefit from the same links partly because globalization’s 
impact -  and its basic communication and transportation tools - did not extend sufficiently 
to Tajikistan.
IV. NGO structures and funding
During their first five years Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori faced a host of challenges in 
developing their organizational structures and funding base as the literature on not-for- 
profit and NGO management predicts. Groups that develop in war or post war periods face 
additional challenges according to several observers. Ball (1996: 91) argues that in post­
war contexts “many local NGOs do not have the managerial or substantive capacity to play 
a major role in designing or implementing programs.” Fundraising in post-war 
environments tends to be a key problem for local NGOs (Aall 2000; Minear and Weiss, 
1995: 195). Groups are largely dependent on foreign support, which is based on erratic 
criteria and geographic priorities (Valderrama in Pearce, 2000: 27).
IV. a Zhene Zhenama’s organizational structures:
When Zhene Zhenama was founded it had a small staff; its organizational structure was 
informal and non-hierarchical. The office and the Women’s Center were located in the 
same three-bedroom downtown flat. Decisions were more likely to be made around the 
kitchen table than at staffs desks. Zhene Zhenama’s budget in early 1998 was under 
$35,000 and its activities were mainly confined to Sarajevo. Korten (1987: 155) argues that 
this is a common starting point for groups like Zhene Zhenamawhose formation was based 
on the efforts of a small number of women who “have relied upon high moral purpose,
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good will, hard work and common sense to make them successful [...]. [In these cases] the 
application of effective professional management techniques [....] has not been seen as 
relevant.” By 1999-2000 the organization had begun to change and formalize. An 
organizational structure dividing staff into different teams -  management, administrative- 
financial, and project teams -  was put into place. Nuna, Jadranka and Selma became the 
members of the management team, with responsibilities for personnel and financial 
management, fundraising, communications with partners and donors, program 
development, and strategic planning. Working contracts and official office hours were 
established (Zhene Zhenama, 1999b). In 2001 the office moved to a modem new building 
(where there was no longer an office kitchen) which it shared with other rights-based 
NGOs.
Though formalization has often been seen as the natural outcome of organizational 
development (Korten, 1990), it could also be considered as being in conflict with Zhene 
Zhenama’s identity as a feminist organization. The establishment of formal structures was a 
difficult process, full of questioning and self-doubt. The leadership and staff disagreed over 
the advantages of maintaining the loose informal character of Zhene Zhenama as an activist 
group, and establishing a more vertital organizational structure. It was generally assumed 
that structure and management style was undistinguishable from the NGO’s mission and 
vision. As a conflict resolution organization, decision making should be based on 
consensus and reflection. Describing how she envisioned her organization’s development 
Nuna (27.11.01) explained, “I did not want specialized women and specialized domains of 
work [...] I chose to build an organizational model that would show that different women 
could work together with a common mission.” Zhene Zhenama’s founders tried to establish 
a consensus-based egalitarian structure, in which decision-making was transparent. It aimed 
to function employing what Alter (1998: 259) terms the “distinctive characteristic of 
feminist organizations.”19
19 Alter (1998: 259) adds that feminist organizations “are non hierarchical and function by means of 
processes that attempt to serve nondifferentiation, collaboration amongst all members, and equal attention to 
means and ends.”
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However three factors opposed themselves to Zhene Zhenama's feminist organizational 
project: the NGO’s strong leadership; members’ and staff lack of commitment; and the 
increased complexity of tasks carried out by the group.
In theory it has been argued that “given their rejection of hierarchy and holistic orientation, 
feminist organizations operate ideally without leadership,” based on membership or staff 
consensus (Alter, 1998: 265). However, as Cockbum notes in her study of eight Bosnian 
women’s organizations, they “often found difficulty in activating this principle (Cockbum, 
Stakic-Domuz, Hubic 2001: 133).” Nuna, Jadranka and Selma attempted to distance 
themselves from positions of authority but failed. Decisions concerning programs were 
made in weekly meetings between the management and project teams -  but the 
management team most often represented the organization in public, was responsible for 
resource management, and was looked upon as the source of authority by staff. Going 
against feminist theory, Zhene Zhenama was in fact led by three charismatic leaders. Zhene 
Zhenama thus fit Carroll’s model of effective service delivery and participatory 
organizations headed by strong, charismatic managers with “extraordinary vision and 
personal commitment [...] where strong central leadership has been essential to the survival 
and strength of these organizations (Carroll, 1992: 92).”
Initially Zhene Zhenama's founders hoped to create an organization in which staff would 
be free to determine their level of engagement in the organization. They estimated that the 
staffs level of “commitment” (Alter 1998: 261) and dedication to the NGOs mission would 
provide sufficient impetus to fulfil all organizational tasks. However, as described in the 
first section of this chapter, many of Zhene Zhenama's staff members joined for self-help 
or to accompany their friends. Their commitment to the NGOs values was not explicit. 
Zilha (15.11.01) expressed the majority of the staffs attitude stating, “the management 
team takes care of everything, space, finances, organization. I have my working hours and I 
just have to come and work them.”20 Under these conditions management was burdened 
with ever more tasks and responsibilities. Exhausted, and having given up on the ideal of 
staff self-motivation, Zhene Zhenama in 2001 transformed: clear job descriptions were 
drafted and people began to be hired based on merit. Previously Nuna (27.11.01) loathed
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adopting a professional hiring procedure “because to me applications are very 
discriminatory to women. I don’t like it when twenty women apply and I know that I can 
only hire two and the other eighteen will suffer. Applications are professional but they are 
not good for women.” In 2001 a highly active but poorly organized administrative secretary 
was fired, and replaced by a woman recruited through a newspaper advertisement with little 
or no activist experience. For Nuna (27.11.01) especially, it represented a shift to note that 
previously “it was my failure not to separate the professional from the private...”
The country’s political transformation and the gradual consolidation of peace also affected 
the organization’s formalization. As the country moved into the post-war development 
stage popular modes of thinking shifted from the search for ad-hoc solutions to long term 
sustainable change. The organization’s leaders’ initial enthusiasm, ambition and ability to 
work extreme hours had begun to wane. Zhene Zhenamafollowed the trend that Gidron, 
Katz and Hasenfeld (2002: 185) identified in their study where in post-conflict settings 
NGOs “have a tendency to formalize their structures over time [...] to develop legitimacy, 
mobilize resources, and survive.” Formalization also accompanied the expansion of the 
group’s programs. By 2001 Zhene Zhenama*s yearly budget was approximately $150,000. 
It had 13 paid staff members, compared with 5 in 1998. Projects were being implemented 
throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and some staff also participated in activities in other parts 
of former Yugoslavia.
One of the fundamental challenges for Zhene Zhenama was the establishment of an 
effective structure of governance and oversight. The 1995 Law on Associations of Citizens 
under which Zhene Zhenama registered required it to have an Association Assembly. The 
law stipulated that NGOs should organize annual Assembly gatherings, but as Jadranka
(27.11.01) admitted “we didn’t have time.” The Assembly was composed in 2001 of a little 
over 100 members, who as general supporters, “develop ideas, talk publicly and mobilize 
new women to come” to the NGO (Nuna, 14.11.01). Meeting each other at best once every 
12 months the members were insufficiently in touch with each other, or with Zhene 
Zhenama, to form a responsible governing body. Consequently, in 2001 no actual division
20 Interview with Zilha Carkadzic.
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between the organization’s decision-making and implementing structure existed -  an 
overall supervision and oversight body was missing.
IV. b Zhene Zhenama’s funding:
To fund its activities Zhene Zhenama was some 90% dependent on international donors 
between 1998-2001. This situation was common in the Bosnian NGO sector. Reliance on 
foreign funding could be linked to both “supply and demand.” On one hand Western 
governments contributed significant resources to the provision of humanitarian assistance 
and subsequent post-war reconstruction and development. Indigenous circumstances also 
explained Bosnian NGOs dependence on foreign funding. No favorable tax legislation for 
charitable contributions existed. Zhene Zhenama’s tolerant and feminist values made it an 
unlikely recipient of governmental support as long as nationalists were in power. After the 
social-democratic led Alliance for Change won the 2001 elections, the situation improved 
slightly with the Sarajevo municipality providing free space for the organization’s activities 
and a small grant. By 2001 Zhene Zhenamcrwas increasingly looking to procure 
government assistance, anticipating that foreign funders would shortly exit Bosnia- 
Herzegovina.
The war situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina galvanized women’s rights and peace activists
throughout Europe and Northern America, who purposively sought to provide funding for
multi-ethnic Bosnian initiatives. Zhene Zhenama was able to take advantage of their
particular context, and through its connections to international women’s rights networks,
garnered support from groups who shared many of its values. The first 10,000 DM Zhene
Zhenama received in 1996 were from a small group of Swiss women who had befriended
Jadranka during her time with Women in Black. The second grant arrived through a US
based women’s rights activist who lobbied the US Government to fund a large-scale multi
country women’s rights project under the name Delphi STAR. Starting in 1998 Zhene
Zhenama relied on the Swedish based Kvinna till Kvinna to provide a yearly grant for
0 1“Basic activities and outward work with supporting [sic] other organizations” and the
21 It covered the costs o f the Women’s Center, office rent, overhead expenditures, as well as the holding o f  
workshops outside Sarajevo within the context the NGO Development and Support program. Kvinna till 
Kvinna grants ref: BOH/8150/SIDA/l998 (for 09/1998-12/1998 & 01/1999-08/1999); 1999/BOH8160/ZZ 
(for 09/1999-12/1999); 2000/BOH8165/ZZ (for 1/2000-12/2000); 2001/BOH8166/ZZ (for 1/2001-12/2001).
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activities of the psycho-social team.22 When Zhene Zhenama developed ad hoc projects to 
meet pressing needs, Kvinna till Kvinna offered support at short notice. Kvinna till 
Kvinna’s readiness to aid Zhene Zhenama was linked to its own mission and goals. Kvinna 
till Kvinna was founded in 1993 in Stockholm in reaction to reports about violence against 
women in the Yugoslav wars, to support women as important forces for change.23 Rather 
than being a long established development NGO, Kvinna till Kvinna was a small solidarity 
group who formed to lobby for foreign funds and political attention for former Yugoslav 
women’s groups. By 2000 Kvinna till Kvinna’s funding in Bosnia-Herzegovina extended to 
eleven smaller women’s groups which Zhene Zhenama had helped develop. For all its 
positive characteristics Kvinna till Kvinna was nevertheless itself dependent on the funds of 
SIDA -  the Swedish government’s development agency - and thus could not guarantee 
Zhene Zhenama long-term assistance. Two of Zhene Zhenama’s other donors -  the Global 
Fund for Women and MaMa Cash -  private funds run by successful female philanthropists 
in the US, were in a better position in this regard.
While it is generally assumed that NGOs can benefit from international funding, Zhene 
Zhenama is one of the most well-respected NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, yet did not seek 
out support from any of the larger donors operating in the country such as, the European 
Commission, USAID, or the Soros Foundation. In part this was because Zhene Zhenama's 
leaders were conscious of the importance of not reaching a funding level that exceeded its 
organizational capacities.24 However Zhene Zhenama was also weary of the way in which 
the “majority of donors think that we are their subjects. They expect from us that we will 
do their work” as Nuna (14.11.01) explained, “without having our own thoughts, attitudes 
and ideas.” Selma (15.11.01) took one step further in justifying her refusal to cooperate 
with governmental donors, deriding not only their practical forms of “partnership” but also 
their political motivations. She considered that behind governmental funds “there is always
22 Kvinna till Kvinna grants ref: 96-97/BOH/13560 (for 12/97-8/98); BOH8120/ZZ-98 (for 09/1998-12/1998); 
1999/BOH817/ZZ (for 1/1999-12/1999); 2000/BOH8125/ZZ (for 1/2000-12/2000); 2001/BOH8126/ZZ (for 
1/2001 - 12/2001)
23 Information from http://web.tiscali.it/no-redirect-tiscali/WIN/095.html and http://www.ilctk.se (retrieved 
May, 2003)
24 In this regards Nuna explained, “I know that when you have lots o f funds you have few activities. Because 
when you have lots o f money then everyone wants to get big salaries. If you have less funds -  we are a poor 
organization -  we do double the amount of activities we have funds for.”
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a hidden agenda.” Rather than engage in an indiscriminate funding relationship, Zhene 
Zhenama carefully chose to partner with “like-minded” groups.
TV. c Ghamkhori’s organizational structures:
From its inception Ghamkhori was different from traditional local NGOs because it was not 
self-initiated but developed by Dr.Colette Harris (28.06.03), who considered her role to be 
that of a “facilitator.” She brought together the first five people who started the 
organization, and with them selected the 12 organization founders who signed the 
registration forms. She trained staff in inter-active methodology, established the 
organizational management and administrative system, facilitated contacts with 
international organizations and donors, and most significantly emphasized the importance 
of upholding at all times the organizational mission. Colette served as an inspiration and 
guidance to Ghamkhori, and all the staff who cooperated with her underlined her crucial 
impact on the organization’s structure, methodology and personnel.
When Colette left Tajikistan in 2000, and Ghamkhori lost a key source of leadership, it 
would have seemed likely that the organization would weaken due to sudden vacuum in 
directorship. However, in Ghamkhori’s case several staff members -  especially Bahodur 
and Mikhail - stepped in to fill the void. By 2001 they were responsible for personnel and 
financial management, communication with partners and donors, and leading program 
development and strategic planning. However this posed a challenge to Ghamkhori's 
identity as a women’s organization for according to feminist practice, “we all prefer to 
encourage women in leadership positions” as Colette herself noted (21.05.03). Bahodur and 
Mikhail (14.06.02) recognized that Colette’s departure negatively affected their 
relationships with donors, and other international organizations, because she had 
maintained these links but did not adequately hand them over. Characteristics which made 
it simple for Colette to relate and interact with international donors and policy makers -  
including language, the shared experience of being a foreigner, recognizable experience 
and skills -  could not be easily transferred to Ghamkhori staff.
Like Zhene Zhenama, Ghamkhori struggled to maintain a transparent and participatory 
decision-making structure, which would reflect its ideological commitments. For the Tajik
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NGO the main obstacles were social habits and beliefs. In 2001 an organizational structure 
was established with Bahodur as Director, and four program directors or managers assigned 
for each of the organizations main activities (medical, Women’s Center, KWHP and 
PROVAW). These managers/directors had significant independence in organizing their 
staff, preparing activities, drafting project proposals, and building linkages with national or 
international partners relevant to the project. Once a week the director and all the managers 
met. Though consensus was supposed to govern decision-making, the Director was 
considered by most staff to have the final word. Bahodur (14.06.02) expressed this as a 
source of frustration:
“[When asked to take a decision] people who work in our organization sometimes answer something 
like: “I’ll go and consult Bahodur first”. So outsiders conclude that Bahodur is a dictator and decides 
everything here. But [...] I am not here to say what is right and what is wrong. Staff may consult me 
when they need my help. And in the end [program] manager will come and tell me what they plan to do 
so that I have this information. But I must emphasize again that no one should come to me and ask: “Can 
I do this, Bahodur?”
Mikhail (11.06.02) considered that the reluctance of staff to take decisions independently 
was the consequence of traditional Tajik culture, which places high regard on male 
leadership, and the heritage of Communist-era vertical decision making. Another negative 
influence is the practice of international donors who often insist on speaking with the 
director, instead of other staff members.
Ghamkhori had problems similar to Zhene Zhenama to establish en effective oversight 
mechanism and board. In 1998-2000 the NGO experimented with setting up a board of 
experts -  made up of influential and respected community members. Ghamkhori 
management found that these persons lacked free time and were uninterested in serving 
with little or no financial compensation. After 2000, Ghamkhori management established a 
board made up of dynamic and committed female staff members, with the Director of the 
Women’s Center elected as the head. Board meetings were held on average twice a month 
where staffing, programming, and financing issues were discussed among the seven 
members. In this structure the line between Ghamkhori's management, implementing 
bodies and governing bodies was faint. Bahodur and Mikhail (11.06.02) recognized that 
establishing an effective board is “the weakest and most difficult part for our organization.” 
In the long term they hoped to have a board “with people with authority who could lobby
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for our interests at the ministerial and government level [...] made up of enthusiasts, people 
who really want to fight for their society (11.06.02).”
Ghamkhori considered community activists who assisted in project implementation at the 
local level as its volunteers. They were responsible for determining where the NGOs 
classes could be held, for gathering people, and for ensuring that people understood 
GhamkhorVs project. In 2002 there were 19 active volunteers, many of whom were 
teachers. Bahodur (11.06.02) described a volunteer as:
“firstly a person with initiative. He has the desire to do a part o f our work. [...] He alone starts 
organizing some events. He continues our work in the villages. He implements things that the 
teacher cannot, because our teachers are new persons, strangers, for the people o f the community.
But this volunteer lives together with these people. He knows them, and the people o f the village 
will understand him better. After the end o f our classes the volunteer usually comes to our office 
several times. We provide him with the necessary books. We work with him.”
Thus the volunteers provided an essential link between Ghamkhori and the local 
community, and the NGO looked to its volunteers as a way to ensure the sustainability of 
its projects.
IV. d Ghamkhori funding:
Ghamkhori was similar to Zhene Zhenama in its dependence on international donor support 
to carry out its projects. From 1997-2002 it received funding from the European Union 
(TACIS LIEN), ACT-Central Asia, CARE and the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation (SDC). Ghamkhori did not collect any membership dues, or receive financial 
support from the government. In this Ghamkhori was no different from the vast majority of 
Tajik NGOs. The NGO “demand” for international donor funding in post-war, post­
communist Tajikistan, was created by the same factors that explain Bosnian NGOs’ 
reliance on foreign aid. Nevertheless the “offer” of funding was much less. As predicted by 
Valderrama (in Pearce, 2000: 27) the amount of foreign support earmarked for Tajikistan 
was limited by geographic priorities, as well as a lack of political/security interest in the 
region pre-2001. From this it could be assumed that Tajik NGOs were forced to identify 
alternative sources of funding. Yet instead a number of registered groups (1,241 according 
to ICNL in 2002) equal to the number of groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1,300 according
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to USAID in 2001) competed more intensively to divide a smaller donor pie.25 Project costs 
were budgeted significantly lower in Tajikistan than in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ghamkhori 
benefited from a grant of $13,000 from the Swiss Cooperation Office to finance the costs of 
the Women Center from March 2002 to March 2003 (SCOT, 2002). In comparison Zhene 
Zhenama obtained $47,604 (71,406 DM) to finance its Women Center in 2001 (Kvinna till 
Kvinna, 2001).
Ghamkhori’s founders and staff could not rely on the sort of connections with international 
women’s rights networks that Zhene Zhenama had to secure its first grants, yet it benefited 
from Colette’s technical expertise and networking skills to obtain funding. In 1997 
Ghamkhori obtained its first 5,000 USD grant from Christian Aid whom Colette had 
developed a relationship of trust with (28.06.03). The KWHP was funded through a 
TACIS LIEN grant from December 1998 to December 2000 (Ghamkhori 1998). But due to 
LIEN program guidelines, EU funds had to be channeled through an international 
organization. Thus in EU documents CARE was named as the “lead NGO” and Ghamkhori 
the “partner NGO.” This relationship where CARE acted as a banking intermediary for the 
EU and Ghamkhori (who did not have a bank account), provided limited monitoring, and 
training, eventually proved disadvantageous to Ghamkhori. However the TACIS LIEN 
project gave Ghamkhori the resources to expand KWHP into two new regions and hire 20 
new staff members 26
Ghamkhori found that partnership with international donors -  and in particular CARE 
International -  could challenge their mission, programs and sense of self-worth. The 
NGO’s predicament was not uncommon, for as Howell and Pearce have found:
“Many nongovernmental organizations in Central Asia respond to the priorities and interests o f donor 
agencies rather than defining their own institutional identity [...] In the absence of significant alternative
25 A study by ACT (2003) Central Asia categorizes Tajik NGOs according to the level and continuity of 
funding they have been able to secure. It finds that the first group o f NGOs made up of those who have been 
able to secure long-term funding partnerships with international donor organizations is made up o f no more 
than 25 NGOs. The second group, comprising less than a hundred NGOs, is composed o f organizations which 
have been able to secure funding for different projects relatively consistently. The remaining, vast majority of 
NGOs, has either never been able to secure a grant or follow up financing after an initial seed-grant.
26 In 2000 Ghamkhori was unable to obtain a second grant from the EC when TACIS temporarily terminated 
its activities in Tajikistan after its representative was killed in Dushanbe.
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sources o f funding, external donor agencies wield considerable influence over local NGOs in shaping 
their organizational structures, accounting practices, and priorities (2001: 199-200).”
In January 2002 Ghamkhori signed a grant agreement with CARE (2002) for $38,636 to 
implement PROVAW. While earlier co-operation with Care had been excellent, 
disagreements between the donor and grantee concerning project implementation 
methodologies surfaced in early 2002. As the funder CARE has ultimate decision-making 
power; according to the Grant Agreement, CARE could suspend or terminate the grant at 
any time.27 Six months into the project, Bahodur and Mikhail (11.06.2002) stated, “we 
thought that the more projects we have, the better. But when we started working with 
CARE it really weakened our organisation; we are weaker now then we were a year ago.” 
In September 2002 Ghamkhori chose to pull out of its agreement with CARE. In refusing 
to continue, Ghamkhori expressed a readiness to “just say no” to funding opportunities 
which conflicted with its mission; it chose to respect its own priorities over those of the 
donor. As Hudock (1999: 110) argues, in shifting the power paradigm to give beneficiaries 
of development interventions a stronger voice it effectively made a meaningful contribution 
to civil society development.
Ghamkhori1 s funding relationship with Christian Aid, which in 2002 took the name Act- 
Central Asia, was entirely different. Partly it was because it was not solely project based. 
Christian Aid was part of a well-established church-based organization whose mission is 
“to support local organisations, which are best placed to understand local needs [...] and 
believes in strengthening people to find their own solutions to the problems they face.” It 
thus shared Ghamkhori's values and goals. Since 1997 Ghamkhori was able to rely on a 
yearly grant from ACT Central Asia. It proved to be flexible donor who could rapidly 
provide funds to meet unexpected needs. After TACIS Lien funding for KWHP ended in 
winter 2000, ACT Central Asia was able to fill the gap, thus ensuring that the NGO did not 
have to lay off 20 staff members. ACT Central Asia agreed to not only cover costs directly 
related to project implementation but also office rent and other overhead expenditures.
27 The Swiss Government budgeted $563,900 (750,000 CHF) for PROVAW (09/2000 -  02/2002) o f which 
$518,796 (690,000 CHF) were to be provided to CARE International. In this program budget 130,000 CHF 
were budgeted for “support to service providers and NGOs,” while the rest went to finance CARE’s 
operations, training and consultants. Swiss “Direktion fur Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit, Abteilung fur 
die Zusammenarbeit mit Osteuropa und der GUS,”(2000).
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With funding from various church sources, the financial commitment of ACT Central Asia 
was significantly more secure than that of many other international donors dependent on 
governmental monies.
IV. e Comparing Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori’s structures and resources:
Past NGO studies have emphasized how programming and budgetary increases tend to lead 
to a formalization of NGO structures. Our cases demonstrate that the overall socio-political 
context, in post-war environments moving towards peace consolidation, also pushes 
formalization as society moves out of an emergency, short-term mind-frame, to a more 
confident mindset about the future. The five factors driving Zhene Zhenama and 
GhamkhorVs formalization were thus the overall socio-political post-war context, more 
complex programming, increased economic resources, larger staff and more extensive 
contacts with external partners -  especially international donors. Yet three forces resisting 
formalization were founders’ and members’ ideological preferences; the organization’s 
overall mission and goals; and the dominant social cultural norms. As made most clear in 
Zhene Zhenama's case, Nuna (27.11.01) resisted rapid formalization because as a strong 
advocate of women’s rights she considered that “at the heart of feminist ideology is the 
belief that people can work together for common purposes without resorting to highly 
structured, pyramidal hierarchy to control internal processes (Alter, 1998: 265).”
Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori were characteristic of groups with charismatic leaders who 
struggled to establish effective oversight structures. International donors encouraged the 
two to set up volunteer boards or governing bodies. Though both made attempts to comply, 
they found that what was explained to them did not function in practice. Board members 
sought payment, resisted responsibility, lacked self-initiative, and did not meet. The leaders 
of Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori claimed that the difficulty of creating boards was 
largely due to the unfamiliarity with the structure and the concept of volunteerism. The two 
organization’s experiences support the findings of other studies of NGOs in Southern and 
Eastern contexts that have found that the volunteer governing body model is not necessarily 
universal or appropriate in all contexts (Fowler 1997; Hailey and Smillie 2000 in Lewis 
2001: 172).
28 Statement retrieved from http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/aboutca/index.htm in May 2003.
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According to the liberal conceptualization of civil society, external funding can strengthen 
local NGOs. Zhene Zhenama operated in an environment in which there was substantially 
more international funding available than in post-war Tajikistan, yet Ghamkhori was just as 
dependent on foreign donors as the Bosnian NGO was. Both groups’ financial resources 
came almost entirely from international organizations. Consequently the two organizations 
suffered from similar problems which previous studies (Duffield, 1996; Smillie, 1996, 
1998; Stubbs, 1997; Belloni, 2001; Howell and Pearce, 2001) have found in heavily donor 
dependant organizations. They were forced into short-term projects, which on average had 
a one-year implementation cycle, and were impeded from defining longer-term strategies. 
Fundraising and reporting commitments took time away from project implementation or 
organizational development. There was little job security for staff -  which had neither 
health insurance nor pensions. When the NGOs had innovative or daring project ideas it 
was a challenge to find international funds to support them -  as donors preferred to support 
time tested activities with minimal risks. Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori risked becoming 
victims of “upwards accountability” (Hulme and Edwards, 1997), leading to a decrease in 
their legitimacy within local communities.
The cases of Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori reveal how different funding arrangements 
impact NGOs. Though Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori obtained over 90% of their 
resources from foreign donors they appeared to have successfully avoided the more 
negative consequences of donor dependency. Both groups expressed a clear preference to 
cooperate with international organizations that shared their values and ideological 
commitment such as ACT Central Asia and Kvinna till Kvinna. These two donors measured 
success in terms of their partners’ organization development more than their quantitative 
project outputs. The greatest difficulties for Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori occurred when 
they worked with international NGOs, subcontracted by other donors to implement projects 
in partnership with local groups. This finding reinforces previous arguments warning of the 
limited benefits of international NGO/ local NGO partnerships when they are not based on 
common values and agreement about long-term objectives (Beddington and Riddell, 1997; 
Hudock, 1999: 109-112). Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama benefited most when funding 
was accompanied by “continual dialogue about objectives and strategies rather than simply
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a specification of outputs and targets (Carroll, 1002: 164).” Donors who expressed a 
commitment to organizational development -  providing funds to cover office costs, salaries 
and other overheads, as well as training, and access to information and external networks 
were crucial to Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama.. Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama’s 
experience demonstrates the importance for local NGOs to choose their donors strategically 
and to have the strength to turn away from them when they feel that their mission is being 
compromised.
Conclusions:
The aim of this chapter was to analyze in detail how the NGOs Zhene Zhenama in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, and Ghamkhori in Tajikistan, operated in their respective post-war contexts, 
and determine why they acted as they did. The cases provided us with lessons on the nature 
of liberal civil society in post-conflict, post-communist environments. Zhene Zhenama and 
Ghamkhori were selected as comparable case studies because both focused on women’s 
issues, were urban based, had been operational for at least five years, and were recognized 
in their respective countries as highly successful groups. Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori 
represent “best case scenarios” of organizations that have developed in the post-war period, 
implemented a growing and ever more comprehensive set of programs, obtained increasing 
amounts of external funding, enlarged their networks and deepened their linkages with 
governmental and non-governmental partners. Five years after their founding both groups 
continued, nevertheless, to face challenges in regards to their internal management 
structures: especially in relation to governance, leadership, and staffing.
Strong and charismatic leadership, clear mission, ability to build trust amongst their 
beneficiaries, understanding of donor relations, and extensive linkages helped ensure Zhene 
Zhenama and Ghamkhori’s success in a post-war post communist environment. Even 
though middle class professionals managed them, both organizations made conscious 
efforts to bridge gaps existing between communal and liberal civil society. They engaged 
with communal civil society, presenting their values in ways that would be accepted in 
more traditional and isolated environments. The quantity of funds available in post-war 
Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina for NGO support did not affect NGOs’ dependency on 
external donors which in both countries was at least 80%. Foreign funding was essential to
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the survival of Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori, but by cooperating with donors that shared 
their values the two NGOs avoided some of the more negative consequences of donor 
accountability. Writing about NGOs in Central Asia, Howell and Pearce (2001: 225) find 
that few groups have capacities similar to Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori’s because:
“The new civil society groups are tenuously linked to local societies, especially to rural communities.
The norms and values they expressed have not emerged out o f deep local experiences. Their lack of
rootedness and donor dependence raises crucial issues about their financial sustainability and long-term
viability.”
Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori’s experiences demonstrate the importance for liberal forms 
of civil society of cooperating with communal civil society to insure that the information 
they gather, the needs assessments they make, the programs they implement, and the long 
term change they facilitate are endorsed by communal, rural, groups. Cooperation helps 
guarantee increased effectiveness of the organizations and its interventions.
We find that civil society of a liberal type existed in post-war Tajikistan and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, but with few or weak ties with pre-war liberal civil society organizations and 
activists. The assumptions made concerning liberal forms of civil society’s ability to serve 
as “checks on potential abuses of power” (Diamond and Plattner, 1997: xxxi) were not 
entirely validated in Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori’s cases. Both groups started with poor 
linkages to government, which they only strengthened through engagement and progressive 
confidence building. In Zhene Zhenama’s case co-operation with government only really 
began after the 2000 elections and the transformation of the dominant political discourse 
from an exclusionary nationalist one, to a more moderate inclusionary one. The NGO’ ties 
tended to be with municipal or regional, rather than central, authorities. Only in a few 
instances did they openly affect policy formulation and political decision-making. They 
then aimed to transform popular perceptions about the role of women in society, domestic 
violence and inter-ethnic/national tolerance.
In their efforts to promote peace and women’s rights, both groups targeted women as their 
primary beneficiary group. Regardless of country context, war and post-war developments 
were understood as affecting women differently from men, and women were seen as 
powerful locomotives of change. Yet the political culture in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the
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pre-war existence of a women’s rights movement made it acceptable to speak about 
feminism in the country’s urban areas, while the more traditional heritage in Tajikistan 
meant that this discourse would be alien to even urban dwellers. However Zhene Zhenama 
and Ghamkhori both designed programs to reduce violence against women, and to increase 
women’s feelings of self-worth and public engagement. They both considered working 
with women as effective in the promotion of peace consolidation, public participation and 
economic development.
Both NGOs nurtured the development of liberal and communal forms of civil sociey 
characterized by mutual respect and tolerance. They fit within Varshney’s (2003: 3) 
definition of “inter-communal groups,” and promoted “bridging social capital” (Coletta and 
Cullen, 2000), the creation of daily interaction or formal groups that link individuals across 
major cleavages based on location, gender or nationality/ethnicity. As an advocacy 
strategy, rather than exerting pressure on the state Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori 
provided information and skills to CBOs and village leaders, increasing their capacities to 
interact with government officials. Smith (1998: 217) has termed groups behaving similarly 
“intermediary NGOs.” They “sometimes carry out projects but more frequently act as 
brokers between local groups at the grassroots level.” Brown (1998: 228) takes the concept 
of “intermediary organization” one step further arguing that such “NGOs can play critical 
roles in fostering cooperation among unequal powerful partners when the aim is to solve 
social problems.” Before proceeding to a deeper analysis of NGOs’ affect on peace, in the 
following chapter we will analyze the characteristics of two CBOs, which are generally 
referred to as belonging to the communal civil society ideal type.
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C h a p t e r  f i v e :
Vi l l a g e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a n d  m j e s n e  z a j e d n i c e : t h e  p o s t - w a r  r e -  
e m e r g e n c e  OF COMMUNAL CIVIL SOCIETY IN BO SNIA -H ER ZEG O V IN A  AND  
T a j i k i s t a n
Introduction:
In the preceding chapter the development of two NGOs which fit the liberal definition of 
civil society was described; herewith we turn to two examples of community-based 
organizations (CBOs), the Sevarlije Mjesna Zajednica (MZ) and the Karategin Valley 
Village Organizations (VOs), which represent communal civil society. By this definition 
civil society is a space for collective and public activity -  made up of formal organizations 
as well as highly informal modes of interaction -  where people come together in solidarity 
to meet their self-prescribed goals and defend their common interests. As described in 
Chapter 1, when civil society is conceptualized as a liberal construct it arguably has no 
antecedents in the communist/socialist systems of Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union. 
However when civil society is interpreted as communal it may be seen as having an 
extensive historical experience in both Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Though 
organized differently, the Sevarlije MZ and the Karategin Valley VOs existed before, 
during and after the war, evolving to respond to the changing environment, opportunities 
and needs. The two CBOs are thus interesting to analyze comparatively as institutions that 
functioned during the communist era and were forced to confront similar challenges in 
postwar, transitory, environments.
Inherently this chapter is also a study of the concept of local self-governance and an 
analysis of its relevance in post-war post-communist Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
In the Soviet Union, soviets, factory councils, and collective farms were the main 
instruments of self-management. In Yugoslavia self-management and self-governance
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became the guiding principles of the socialist system and were highly institutionalized.1 
Today local self-government has become a popular notion in development fields. We can 
consider institutions of local self-governance as fitting with the communal definition of 
civil society elaborated upon in Chapter 1. Yet since the early 1990s, new constitutions, 
legal systems, and reforms of local government have put into question the future of 
institutions of local self government in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as in other 
states of the former communist system (Pickvance, 1997; Rogan, 2000, De Martino, 2004). 
Through the two case studies in this chapter I will thus also consider how local self- 
governance functioned in practice five years after the end of war in both countries.
I. Origins and history of local self governance and community development in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan.
The Sevarlije Mjesna Zajednica and the Karategin Valley Village Organizations were 
officially established in 2000 and 2001 respectively -  several years after the signing of the 
peace agreements in the two countries. However both the Tajik and Bosnian organizations 
had lengthy histories. Based on proximity ties, their development was closely linked to 
their geographic location, and thus to understand the history of the CBOs it is necessary to 
also describe briefly the evolution of the rural communities in which they were embedded.
I. a. Brief history o f Sevarlije displacement and return:
Five years after the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Spring 2001 when I first 
visited Sevarlije, a village nestled in hills above the city of Doboj (Republika Srpska), the 
sound of hammering filled the air as Bosniak returnees affixed roof tiles and window 
frames to homes that still bore the scars of wartime vandalism and destruction. By 2001, 
215 families, or 638 people, had returned to Sevarlije (Hamdija 22.10.01). Yet for over six 
years until 1998, Sevarlije had been left empty, its 490 Bosniak families expelled by Serb 
forces on 18 June 1992. That day 34 civilians were killed, along with another 27 in two 
neighboring villages (Potocani, Pridjel). According to accounts of Sevarlije citizens, during
1 Zukin (1975: 48-50). makes a clear distinction between self-management, referring to the political system 
existing in work units, and self-government, which existed in residential spheres, but both fit within the 
Serbo-Croatian term samoupravljanje. See also Seroka and Smiljkovic, 1986.
176
Chapter five
the 1992-1995 conflict another 300 soldiers and civilians from the villages of Sevarlije, 
Potocani and Pridjel died of war-related causes.2
When the GFAP was signed in 1995, the Doboj municipality and the village of Sevarlije 
were included in the Serb Entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina (RS). For the Bosniak pre-war 
residents of Sevarlije a stark reality set in -  either they would live in a Serb majority 
republic or they would not return to their village. In Summer 1998, throughout Bosnia- 
Herzegovina most returnees were moving back to areas where they were part of the 
majority - reinforcing war-time trends of consolidating ethnicity rather than diversifying it 
(Cousens, 2001: 74). Yet at that time the citizens of Sevarlije were one of the first large 
groups of Bosniaks to take the step of peacefully regaining the RS. The Sevarlije Board for 
Return, an informal structure that registered in the Doboj municipality as the Sevarlije 
Mjesna Zajednica (MZ) in November 2000, prepared the return. The Sevarlije MZ existed 
prior to 1992 as part of the Yugoslav structure of local self-government. However, due to 
war-time displacement the Sevarlije MZ ceased to function in 1992, and from 1993-1997 
Sevarlije’s citizens were united in various formal and informal structures (see Figure 1). 
The Sevarlije MZ thus frequently mutated to meet changing needs and opportunities in the 
war and post-war period.4 The following chapter traces the evolution of the Sevarlije MZ 
through wartime displacement to return, with the aim of determining how and why this 
particular representation of communal civil society acted as it did.
2 On war-time atrocities in the Doboj municipality see Human Rights Watch/ Helsinki (1996).
3 The municipality of Doboj is located in Northeastern Bosnia-Herzegovina between Banja Luka and Tuzla. 
According to the 1991 census the pre-war population o f the Doboj municipality was 102, 546 o f which the 
Bosniaks comprised 40.2%, the Bosnian Serbs 39%, Bosnian Croats 13%, Yugoslavs 5.5% and “others” 2.3% 
(Human Rights Watch/ Helsinki, 1996).
4 When writing about the Sevarlije organizations in general in the post-war period I will herewith use the term 
“Sevarlije MZ" for simplicity.
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Evolution of the Sevarlije MZ from 1974-2002:
President: Husein Hadzic; Deputy: Aziz Ibrakovic
1974-1992:
Folk Dance 
Association
4:...
Mjesna Zajednica Sevarlije
(within the M unicipality o f  Doboj)
c Football club 
And other committees, clubs, e tc ...
1992-1996:
W ater works 
committee
Mjesna Zajednica in Exile of Sevarlije, 
Pridjel and Potocani
(within the M unicipality in Exile o f Doboj in 
Tesanj)
Regional Association o f  DPs and 
Refugees in Zenica
\  President: Zahid Kremic -  created 03.93
President: Aziz Ibrakovic
1998-2000:
2000 - 2002:
Association o f  Families o f Fallen 
Soldiers o f  Doboj/ Tesanj region
Citizens Association o f Doboj 
Municipality in Zenica
\  /  Pres: Ramiz Fetic -  created 08.93
Pres: Husein Hadzic -  created 31.10.96
Sevarlije Village Board for Return
1st President: Husein Hadzic 
2nd President: Aziz Ibrakovic
President: Aziz Ibrakovic
Mesna Zajednica of Sevarlije
(within the Doboj Municipality)
Organization renamed or 
transformed
Subsidiary organization 
joined or created 
 >
Coalition for Return
created summer 97
^ ^ W o m e n ’s group
C Farmers’ Association
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I. b. Brief history o f the evolution o f the concept o f local self-government and the role o f 
the Mjesna zajednica in Yugoslavia:
As described in Chapter 1 mjesne zajednice were organizations of local self-government 
established as the most basic level of the organized neighborhood in rural and urban areas. 
Seroka and Smiljkovic (1986: 252-253) argue that the mjesna zajednica played an 
important role in local policy making, and that devolution of decision making to the local 
level was instrumental to the reduction of conflict and factionalism in local communities in 
the 1980s. Yet in the pre-war and war period, MZs’ appear to have done little to support 
inter-communal links. In the run up to the war, many MZs became the site of intensive 
conflicts between members, especially between those belonging to different ethnic groups.5 
Thereafter as populations were forcefully divided or expelled, “split MZs” and “MZ-in- 
exile” were established. This mirrored at the local levels the wartime ethnic and spatial 
fragmentation of formal Bosnian institutions and public services.6 After the signing of the 
GFAP, new laws on local self-governance were passed in the Federation (Jan, 1996) and 
the RS (Nov, 1999). Many MZs lost their legal personality, including the right to own 
buildings, hold bank accounts, initiate infrastructure projects and finance them through 
compulsory financial contributions. In the RS law on local self-government, the MZ was no 
longer described as a mechanism of government, but as a possible form of direct 
democracy similar to citizens’ initiatives and local referenda (WB, 2002: 70).7
However a World Bank study of Local Level Institutions and Social Capital found in 2002 
that in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens generally trusted MZs more than liberal 
forms of civil society -  particularly NGOs. WB survey data revealed that many Bosnian 
citizens continued to participate in MZ boards. Though some respondents expressed 
negative views about the MZs (17.76 of those sampled stated that the MZ did not exist at
5 In Bosnia-Herzegovina there were 2,217 MZs in 1992, covering on average 1860 inhabitants (but the largest 
MZ had close to 10,000 inhabitants and the smallest 300) in Milicevic, Pasic, Zlokapa, Stitic (1999:111). No 
census has verified the number of MZs existing after the war but it is likely to have increased significantly. In 
Brcko for example the number o f MZs jumped from 24 in 1991 to 83 in 1996 (WB 2002: 41).
6 “MZ-in-exile” and “municipality-in-exile” were set up “ex-territorially” by groups of displaced persons 
from the same locality unable to return to their pre-war homes. In the post-war period many of these MZs and 
municipalities continued to function though with no legal status. They were officially abolished during the 
first municipal elections in September 1997.
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all in their community), 15.6% of rural inhabitants (9.5% urban) had attended a MZ 
gathering (zbor gradjana) in the year preceding the survey. Inhabitants of Bosniac majority 
areas were most likely to be satisfied with the work of their MZ board (15%).8 They 
identified MZ leaders as the main initiators of collective action (14%) -  ahead of members 
of voluntary associations (1.88%) and representatives of the municipality (1.25%).9 The 
study found that amongst civil society institutions, people were more likely to provide 
funds and assistance to MZs (after their local parish) -  than to humanitarian or citizens 
associations, NGOs or trade unions.10
In 2000 among the different organizational forms available to them, the leaders of the 
Sevarlije community selected to register their CBO as an MZ even though its legal status 
was much less important than before the war. According to the Sevarlije M Z’s statute, 
approved at a citizens’ assembly meeting on 5 November 2000, in the “MZ citizens make 
decisions on issues related to joint concerns and needs, related to spatial planning, to 
housing, to community activities, culture, sports, environment and other areas of life and 
work” (Article 5). In the Doboj municipality Sevarlije was the first Bosniak returnee 
community to register as an MZ. The following sections seek to explain this choice and the 
community’s success in organizing return.
I. c. Brief history o f war-time and post war developments in the Karategin Valley:
Over five years had elapsed since the signing of the Tajik General Agreement on Peace and 
National Accord when I traveled in 2002 up a steep pass to the village of Shulmak hidden 
in a picturesque mountain valley. Yet the passage of time had not dulled the words one
7 In the Federation the detailed working mechanisms o f the MZs were regulated at the Cantonal level -  in 
each Canton there is a law on local self-government -  while in the RS the statutes o f municipalities 
determined the establishment, rights and obligations of MZs (Art. 77, RS Law on Local Self-Government).
8 Only 5.47% persons living in Croat majority areas and 5.26% persons in Serb majority areas concurred.
9 In Croat majority areas the figures were 0.78% for MZ representatives, 3.91% for voluntary associations, 
and 0.78% for municipal authorities and in Serb majority areas, the numbers were respectively 7.02%,
2.19%, and 0.88%. Why the figures are so different in the three parts o f B-H could be the subject of an 
entirely different study on the decline in associational life and trust in civil society organizations.
10 In Bosniac areas 29.8% are ready to help their local parish in any case, 28.2% the MZ, 23.5% an NGO or 
humanitarian organization, 22.3% a citizens’ association, 20.1% a trade. In Serb majority areas 27.6% are 
ready to help their local parish in any case, 14% the MZ, 13.2% an NGO or humanitarian organization, 13.6% 
a citizens’ association, 12.7% a trade union. In Croat majority areas 30.5% are ready to help their local parish 
in any case, 8.5% the MZ, 7% an NGO or humanitarian organization, 6.3% a citizens’ association, 6.3% a 
trade union.
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university age woman found to describe the killing of eighteen men from the hamlet on 8 
April 1993. Their pictures -  young men in uniform, elders weathered with wisdom and the 
English teacher who was my guide’s father - had been arranged in homage in the local 
school’s entranceway. Shulmak was the site of fighting in 1993 that caused the 
displacement of some 400 people (out of 1300), the destruction of the school and six 
homes. It was one of the six villages that I studied in the Karategin Valley.11 I selected the 
Valley as a region of interest because it was there that the opposition had the greatest 
influence during and after the war, and where the consolidation of peace was facing the 
greatest obstacles. A community-based organization that functioned in the region was the 
village organization whose establishment had been facilitated by the Mountain Societies 
Development Programme (MSDSP) a project of the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) starting 
in 2000. Six village organizations, including the one in Shulmak, were the focus of my 
studies.12
I. d. Brief history o f the evolution o f the concept o f local self-government, the role o f the
mahalla and the sovkhoz in Tajikistan:
In Tajikistan local self-governance evolved through the establishment of collective farm 
decision-making structures.13 These had linkages with pre-Soviet forms of self-governance, 
especially the mahalla. As argued in Chapter 1, it can be considered that mahallas are a 
historical example of effective Tajik communal civil society and local self-governance.14 
Kolkhozes' influence diminished swiftly in the post-war period as the state-controlled 
collective farm system was dismantled.15 This weakened the Soviet-era institutions of local 
self-governance but also provided an opportunity to establish new ones. The Mountain
11 The Karategin Valley, more recently renamed the Rasht Valley, is composed of the districts o f Rasht 
(Garm), Tojikobod, Darband, Tavildara, Jirgatol, Faizobod, and Roghun. My case studies were located in the 
first three districts.
12 The other five were: Loyova (Rasht district, pop. 730), Khuja Ainee (Darban district, pop. 280), Tojikobod 
(Tojikobod district center, pop. 500 approximately), Karashahr (Todjikobod district, pop. 350), Kalai Surh 
(Rasht district, pop. 440).
13 Kholkhozes and sovkhozes both existed in Tajikistan -  the later generally was larger than the former. In this 
text I am applying the more generic Kholkhoz term (as has Roy, 2000) to signify all collective farms, unless 
specified otherwise.
14 Mahalla is a term used to describe communal forms o f civil society in various countries from the Balkans 
to Central Asia. See further in text about mahale in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
15 As o f October 2001,15.710 private farms were created out of the former kolkhoz and sovkhoz. In October 
2002 a new Presidential decree was passed calling for the remaining state farms to be privatized by 2005 
(Abdullaev and Freizer, 2003: 31).
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Societies Development and Support Programme (MSDSP) thus assessed the situation at the 
time and considered that:
“The dismantling o f die kolkhoz, which was a key social as well as agricultural institution, has 
contributed towards the creation o f a vacuum in local governance. [...] The removal o f the 
kolkhoz and the failure of the farmer’s association has created the opportunity for more 
democratic and reform orientated entities to grow in their place.” (MSDSP, 2002a: 11)
I described in the previous chapter how the local NGO Ghamkhori worked with local 
communities and mahallas though its “community development support” activities. 
Ghamkhori also sought to help fill the gap left by the closing down of the kolkhoz. MSDSP 
engaged in a similar effort starting in July 1998 in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous 
Oblast, and in April 2000 in the Karategin Valley through the creation of village 
organizations. MSDSP’s approach was based on the assumption that “rural economic 
development is best catalyzed and sustained through village level institutions that are 
autonomous and transparent, and that contribute to democratic norms of behavior and to the 
growth of civil society.”16 In this chapter I seek to verify this assumption and provide a 
glimpse into the village organization development focusing on how local communities 
adapted the village organization concept to their own social and historical reality.
II. Missions and values of the case study CBOs.
II  a. Characteristics and motivations o f Sevarlije MZ leaders:
The most distinctive characteristic of the Sevarlije Board for Return/ MZ was its leadership, 
which was shared by the same group of 4-5 men from the pre-war period, during the war, 
and until 2001. The leaders of the post-war Sevarlije MZ were linked by friendship and
i n
kinship ties, and had been active in their community since their youth. Four out of the six 
persons who formed the Board for Return to Sevarlije in 1998 had been part of the pre-war 
Sevarlije MZ, three were also related through marriage. The men were all bom during or 
immediately after World War II -  belonging to an era that Zukin considers to have been
16 AKF Activities in Tajikistan 2002, retrieved at http://www.akdn.org/akFtajikrep_02.pdf on 28/07/03
17 In the late 1980s -  early 1990s, Aziz Ibrakovic Sevarlije MZ President in 2001 was the head o f the MZ 
water board; Sabrija Mujkic the Sevarlije MZ’s  first secretary had been the head o f the pre-war MZ’s 
telephone board and o f the Sevarlije Communist Party Chapter; Husein Hadzic the Sevarlije Boardfor 
Return’s first leader was the pre-war MZ’s President.
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1 ftuniquely committed to Yugoslav socialist values. They were part of Sevarlije’s first 
generation of high school and university educated youth; had been employed in Doboj 
businesses or services; belonged to the Communist Party or the Socialist Alliance and in 
the late 1980s-early 1990s all supported the SDP, except for one who joined the SDA. 
Queried on why the persons who led the Board for Return to Sevalije were trusted, 
Sevarlije MZ community members explained that it was because they have been activists in 
the pre-war MZ, and continued organizing during the war.
During the war the leaders of the pre-war Sevarlije MZ built on their skills and experience 
within the MZ, and developed substantial knowledge on how to organize as displaced 
persons. In March 1993, after having been forcibly displaced from Sevarlije in 1992, Aziz 
Ibragovic was asked by the Doboj Municipality in Exile and the Army of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina (203 Brigade) to establish a “MZ-in-exile” for the village of Sevarlije and its 
neighbors Pridjel and Potocani.19 The tasks of the Sevarlije, Pridjel and Potocani MZ in 
Exile were to maintain data on the location of inhabitants of the three villages, collect funds 
to support soldiers and DPs from the three villages, distribute humanitarian aid, and assist 
with the financing and organizing of funerals (Hamdija 22.10.01). In addition the MZ’s 
mission was to assist in preparing a forcible return if the opportunity was to arise (Aziz
22.10.01).20 In August 1996 Husein Hadzic, the president of the pre-war Sevarlije MZ, 
founded an alternative independent association, the Citizens’ Association o f Doboj 
Municipality in Zenica.
The Sevarlije MZ leaders’ political engagement fit within a broader refugee return 
movement that existed during and after the war throughout the former Yugoslavia and can 
be considered as belonging to international civil society. The movement was divided into
18 Zukin identifies a Yugoslav League o f Communist Youth (SKOJ) “ethic” which “prevailed in popular 
consciousness during and immediately after world War II [and] presented and inculcated several behavioral 
norms which were later transferred into the ideals of self-management: comradship, self-sacrifice, discipline, 
modesty, industriousness. (1975: 238)” Zukin also finds that this ethic was no longer present in young 
Yugoslavs in the mid-1970s.
19 According to Aziz (22.10.01) he considered this to be a war time duty similar to a military function, and 
after the war he obtained compensation for his work as though it was an official government employment.
20 Aziz (22.10.02) explained, “we were the first to organize because we could see our village [from territory 
controlled by the Army o f Bosnia-Herzegovina] across the River Bosna. We did not think that the war would 
end as it did. We thought that we were going to return home in a different way. That is why we organized and
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different factions -  most significantly between those who advocated for return at all costs, 
including through the use of violence, and on the Bosniak side tended to be associated with 
the SDA; and those who sought to guarantee return through peaceful compromise and
*71dialogue. Interestingly members of the Sevarlije MZ leadership initially belonged to both 
factions. After 1997 they overcame these differences when it became evident that a form 
of return based on dialogue with the international community and Serb authorities was 
most likely to succeed.
The leaders of the Sevarlije MZ were motivated by the common goal of returning to their 
pre-war homes. As Aziz expressed it “for me it was my life priority to return” 
(22.10.2001). Like the founders of Zene Zenama, the leaders of the Sevarlije MZ felt an 
intellectual and an emotional need to continue with their activism; through their efforts they 
aimed to help themselves and a broader community of beneficiaries. They were willing to 
make tremendous sacrifices to ensure that return was successful.23 When asked what 
distinguished Sevarlije from other villages, a USAID program officer (Ankica, 07.11.02) 
who worked with them in 1998 responded, “from the beginning they had the calm and 
patience and will to rebuild. They did not start by telling us that it was too complicated and 
someone else should do it. So they really had a will and you could see that.” Like the 
individuals described in the previous chapter, several of the leaders of the Sevarlije MZ also 
expressed a firm commitment to tolerance and inter-ethnic dialogue. Husein Hadzic
prepared ourselves. I had everything prepared and then Dayton told us, ‘no you are not going to return that 
way.’ And then we had to change our strategy.”
21 The main dividing factor between associations o f displaced persons and refugees was their attitude towards 
property restitution and the return process. While some associations insisted that their members had the right 
to remain where they were displaced to, others encouraged return and property restitution. Some o f those in 
support of return accepted that DPs from other ethnic groups remain in their place of displacement, others 
insisted that they leave and return to their own homes (WB 2002a: 91).
22 The Sevarlije Boardfor Return and its predecessor the Citizens Association of Doboj Municipality in 
Zenica had close contacts with the SDP; while the Sevarlije, Pridjel and Potocani MZ in Exile’s links were 
stronger with the SDA. Aziz the head of the Sevarlije, Pridjel and Potocani MZ in Exile ran on the SDA list 
for the 1997 municipal elections and won a seat in the Doboj municipal council.
23 In 1999 one o f the main initiators and leaders of the Sevarlije return process, the pre-war head o f the 
Sevarlije MZ, Husein Hadiz passed away due to cancer. But in the words o f his brother, sitting on the veranda 
of his Sevarlije home: “I feel that he burned and died for this return.” (Uzeir, 21.10.2001) -  this thesis is 
dedicated to Husein Hadzic whom I never met in person, but whose civic initiative is the object of my greatest 
admiration.
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remained in Serb-dominated Doboj until 1995;24 as a DP in Maglaj Sabrija Mukic resided 
with a Serb national for five years; and Hamdija Mehinovic the second secretary of the 
Sevarlije MZ was one of the first persons in Sevarlije to apply for an RS identity card.26
II. b The Sevarlije MZ members ’ motivations and goals:
Defining the membership of the Sevarlije MZ poses some difficulty as legislation postulates 
that MZ are made up of all citizens “from the part of one or several villages, or the part of 
several villages which form a territorial or economic unit” (Doboj Municipal Statute, 
Section 6, Art 37). Thus membership was not based on kinship or on voluntary self­
selection - but on proximity. When asked whom he considered to be the members of the 
MZ, Aziz responded, “members of the MZ are all inhabitants of the village. Some are 
active, some are occasionally active and some are not active at all in the work of the MZ. 
But even those who are not active in the work of the MZ are members” (08.09.02). 
However in practice inhabitants were free to choose whether or not they wanted to 
participate in MZ meetings and activities voluntarily. Thus one way to measure actual 
participants in the MZ is to consider the number of persons attending MZ meetings or 
elections. In November 2000 when the first official elections of the registered MZ were 
held some 130-140 people participated.27 At a community meeting or zbor organized by the 
MZ in early summer 2002 approximately 100 persons attended (Aziz, 08.09.02). As some 
240 families had returned by 2002 it could be argued that approximately one in every two 
families was actively engaged in the work of the MZ in 2002. As all inhabitants of 
Sevarlije were Bosniak, the MZ was a uni-national group.
24 In September 1995 after NATO air-strikes and an offensive by the Army o f Bosnia-Herzegovina 
approximately 1,500 Bosniak and Bosnian Croats who had remained in Doboj during the war were forcibly 
expelled. (Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1996: 10) Husein Hadzic’s wartime experiences in Doboj included 
several periods of forced detention (Uzeir, 4.08.03)
25 Sabrija Mujkic (21.10.2001) related how “for five years when I was displaced in Maglaj I lived with a man 
of Serb nationality. I understood then that among intelligent and mature people, common life is still possible 
[...] when we had something to eat, we ate from the same plate. [...] I cannot even compare him with my 
brother. He is more than a brother to me.”
26 When I sat in Hamdija’s office the postman came with his 350 DM pension from the RS government. He 
joked (22.10.2001) “if  I was still a resident of the Federation I would have to wait another five years for my 
pension because the laws are different and you can receive your pension as o f 60 in the RS, while its 65 in the 
Federation. So tell me, where is life better?”
27 At that time Hamdija (22.10.01) estimates that some 170 families had returned.
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During the entire return process, according to an unwritten agreement, the community 
allowed the representatives of the Sevarlije Board for Return to represent them, trusting 
them to carry out most decision-making. Outside the circle of persons involved in the 
Sevarlije Board for Return few if any Sevarlije citizens made attempts to return before July
1998, alone or collectively. A rival leadership did not form, and much of the community 
adopted a passive position as talks with international organizations and local authorities 
continued. As one Sevarlije inhabitant noted in July 1998 “we just heard that return was 
possible [...] without the Board we would probably not be here” (Ramiza 22.10.2001). 
Another community member explained that they did not return until 2000 because their 
house had not been rebuilt and “we waited and then it happened. We just waited our turn” 
(Nevzeta 23.10.2001).
Once return was underway Sevarlije community members activated rapidly, motivated to 
work on their land, rebuild their homes, and re-establish a pre-war way of life. In July 1998 
during the first ten days of the return process 113 persons had been to Sevarlije. The 
Sevarlije Board for Return organized returnees into committees - responsible for various 
tasks including clearing the village of debris, overseeing construction materials, and 
running a public kitchen - and people carried out their tasks voluntarily. Every night a small 
group of persons remained in the village to protect it against vandalism. By winter 1998-
1999, twenty-three families had returned on a permanent basis and Aziz recollected with 
fondness that “when the first snow fell that winter, the next morning the road was cleared 
[....] Immediately life started in the village.” (Aziz, 1.12.2001) A representative of USAID 
noted that the Sevarlije community’s activism was not to be taken for granted for it did not 
occur in all return villages (Ankica, 07.11.2001). A Mercy Corps Europe/ Scottish 
European Aid officer interviewed noted (Marko Nisandzic, 7.11.01) “Sevarlije was the first 
to return to Doboj and started the process. I think that it was mainly because they were well 
organized, and because of their leaders who went from agency to agency.”
I.c Sevarlije values: the strength o f pre-war community bonds and commitment to local 
self-governance
Residents of Sevarlije interviewed explained the ability of the Sevarlije MZ to come 
together and organize return in the face of strong nationalist resistance by Serbian
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authorities and neighbors as being the consequence of the cohesiveness and leadership of 
the pre-war MZ. As Sabrija recalled in the 1980s (21.10.2001):
“The leadership of the MZ had a tremendous vision for the village which was accepted and supported by 
the rest o f the community. We also had a very good football club. We have a folk dance association that 
was among the four best in the Doboj region. We had a monthly information bulletin for the village.”
A one page newspaper article from that time (Glas Komuna, 1987) depicted how the 
Sevarlije MZ built asphalt roads and telephone lines though volunteer work and self­
contributions (samodoprinos), stating: “the identity card of Sevarlije MZ, at the edge of 
Doboj, speaks of its industrious inhabitants, about their commitment and self-sacrifice for a 
better common future, of their work and results, which can be an example to many.”25 In 
the 1980s the MZ engaged in various capital improvement projects with funds from 
voluntary contributions, that covered over 80% of the costs according to Aziz (1.12.2001). 
The infrastructure and objects built were the MZ’s property, and it collected income for the 
provision of services to finance infrastructure maintenance.
The pre-war Sevarlije community seemed to have more readily embraced socialist era 
concepts and practices than other villages described by Lockwood (1975) and Bringa 
(1995). As Lockwood (1975) showed village solidarity in Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
frequently expressed through labor exchange among villagers, the joint ownership of 
property (the mosque, village commons), the organization of common actions based on 
consensus and the celebration of common ceremonies. In Dolina, the village Bringa (1995) 
studied, it was common for voluntary work to be carried out by neighbors for individual 
households -  such as assisting in the construction of a private house. However “communal 
work,” efforts initiated by the MZ, was not undertaken as willingly. In Dolina “the village 
committee’s mandate was limited to being a bureaucratic link between the village and the 
local council, and its influence on the village was very limited” (1995: 74). This was not 
the case in Sevarlije where, during the 1980s, traditional forms of village solidarity were 
promoted further through the concepts, and instruments, of self-governance and self­
management.
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The pre-war Sevarlije village community was cohesive and homogenous, and as a result of 
economic developments in the 1960s and 1970s, prosperous. Sevarlije, like many villages 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Lockwood, 1975; Donia and Fine, 1994), was mono-ethnic before
901992. Uncharacteristically the hamlet was not built around a mosque -  instead it was 
located on the edge of the habitation and was shared with neighboring Potocani. According 
to the former imam of Sevarlije, the region had not been the site of any large atrocities 
during the Second World War because it was a transit point through which all armies 
passed (24.10.2001). It shared characteristics found in other Bosnian villages (Lockwood, 
1975; Byrnes 1976; Bringa, 1995) such as a weak zadruga institution -  extended family 
households -  and the breakdown of the village into smaller neighborhood groupings or 
mahallas. As Lockwood (1975) found in another Northern Bosnian village (Planinica), the 
organizing principle in Sevarlije was residence and not kinship. However Sevarlije was an 
untypical village because it was located some six kilometers away from Doboj, a major 
regional center, and by the 1960s the majority of the population worked either in the city, 
or in the whitewash quarry at the foot of the village. Excellent public transportation (bus 
and train) linked the village to the urban center.31 By the 1970s agriculture in Sevarlije was 
a hobby rather than an occupation. The village benefited uniformly from the rapid 
economic development of the 1960s and 1970s (Uzeir, 20.10.01; Hamdija 22.10.01). In this 
sense Sevarlije could be considered a “suburbanized” village, one that had its origins in 
traditional village life but gained from Yugoslav industrialization and urban development.32 
Sevarlije’s readiness to adopt the concept of local self governance -  to a degree rarely 
found in other Bosnian villages -  may in part be explained by the fact that it belonged to a
28 “Licna karta Mjesne zajednice Sevarlije kraj Doboja govori o njenim vrijednim ziteljima, o samoprijegoru i 
njihovu upornom odricanju za bolje zajednicko sutra, o radnim i razvojnim rezultatima koji mogu biti 
mnogima primjer. ” Glas Komuna, 7 July, 1987, p.9
29 The Central Bosnian village described by Bringa (1995) under the Active name Dolina was mixed Bosnian 
Muslim/Croat.
30 Some o f the main households in Sevarlije were the Alibasic, Canic, Hadzic, Jupic, Ibrakovic, Fetic, Mujkic 
and Mehinovic families.
31 In most cases in the 1970s “the village presents a common front to all outsiders” (Lockwood, 1975: 67) but 
in Sevarlije’s case easy transportation links, economic ties, jobs and education, opened the village to Doboj 
and institutions o f the Yugoslav communist state usually more present in urban areas (Bringa, 1995).
32 Sevarlije in this case was different from many other villages, which were left behind during the 1960s and 
1970s economic boom, saw their living standards decreasing and their way o f life diverging increasingly from 
urban areas’ (Bringa, 1995).
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small group of rural communities that clearly benefited from 1960s-1970s economic 
development.
The ability of the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ to organize effectively can be explained 
by the strength of the village’s community ties -  what Colletta and Cullen (2000) term 
“bonding social capital” - its experienced leadership, and commitment to the concept of 
local self-governance. The wartime displacement of Sevarlije’s entire Bosniak population 
initially annihilated the community links and MZ structures of the Sevarlije community. 
The physical capital that the community had constructed -  including a new drinking water 
system, electricity supply, telephone lines, a community/medical center, a school and 
mosque -  was burned and looted. Close to 100% of the housing stock was destroyed. Yet 
during the years of exile the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ succeeded in maintaining a 
degree of social cohesion amongst Sevarlije’s displaced persons.
II. d  Characteristics and motivations o f Karategin VO leaders and members:
Like the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ leadership those who led the Karategin Valley 
village organizations under the MSDSP program were deeply embedded in their 
communities, and had distinguished themselves previously by their skills and activism. In 
the VOs leadership was shared between the president, deputy, bookkeeper, and head of the 
women’s group. Those interviewed were all full-time residents of the community, middle- 
aged, and educated (as engineers, veterinarians, accountants, and teachers). In one of the 
villages observed (Loyova), the current VO President was the sovkhoz director before 
privatization; he had now become the largest private landowner in the village. In the other 
five VOs the Presidents were formerly part of the kolkhoz technical staff. Three of them had 
been active in socialist era institutions such as the Communist Party, trade unions and the 
Komsomol. None of the VO Presidents interviewed admitted to having had any ties to the 
opposition (IRP or UTO) during the war. In five out of the six cases, the person elected to 
be deputy VO head had moral status and authority either as the village mullah or aksakal. 
Family ties often bound members of the VO leadership and in two instances the head of the 
women’s group was the wife of the VO President. The leaders of the women’s groups 
rarely had any experience of working on women’s issues before, though three of them had
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participated during the past few years in OSCE organized training programs on women’s 
rights.
VO leaders tended to humbly explain their elevation to their new positions as community- 
driven and not as the outcome of their own efforts and ambitions. As the head of the VO 
Kalai-Surh explained “I was not interested in becoming the President but people nominated 
me and I had to think of the village and accept. Nobody would want this job because it’s a 
lot of work for no pay [...] It is not a formal job, people force you to do it” (Hokimov,
29.07.02). The VO leaders thus seemed primarily motivated by community pressures, and 
the desire to appear effective vis-a-vis their peers, rather than by the emotional drive that 
galvanized the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ leaders. As Mahmadali Saidov, the Director 
of MSDP in the Karategin Valley explained leaders “are not those that want it themselves, 
they are given this responsibility by the community” (31.07.02). Five out of six Karategin 
Valley VOs elections for the position of VO head were contested by only one candidate. In 
two cases the VO heads claimed that they did not want the position. Only one of the VO 
Presidents interviewed expressed his engagement as based on personal ambition “I enjoy 
incorporating all the people of the village and assisting them construct for the future. If I 
feel that I am not contributing I will leave the position.” (Eshanov, 22.07.02)
It is very difficult to determine to what extent greed and the opportunity to gain personally 
from their engagement in the VO also motivated the VO leadership. In four out of the six 
VOs studied, where I visited VO Presidents’ homes, it appeared that they lived well, in 
large fully equipped houses (with TVs, stereos, and cars), where guests were frequently 
welcomed with food and lodging.33 However it was unclear whether they were chosen to 
fill the VO position because the community felt that they had the resources to work 
voluntarily, or because they fit within a class of “rural notables” (Roy, 2000: 93) which had 
controlled much of village life during the Soviet Union and continued to do so post­
independence. Allegations that VO leaders were gaining personal benefit from their 
community work were heard in two villages. MSDSP staff also report a small turnover rate 
among VO Presidents (Whitton 13.07.02). However, in the Garm district amongst the 16
33 According to Roy (2000: 93) in rural Tajikistan the main symbol of social status is one’s house -  how large 
it is and whether it is able to provide hospitality to guests.
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existing VOs, two held a second round of elections to replace their VO President, when they 
considered that he was ineffective (Bobokhojaev, 24.07.02). It is important to note that 
personal gain in rural Tajikistan did not usually transit only upwards. As leaders were 
deeply imbedded in local communities and largely reliant on them for support, they were 
also bound to them through a host of patron and parochial relations (Roy, 2000, Collins, 
2002). It thus seemed unlikely that VO Presidents could gain personally without having any 
sense of accountability.
While membership in the VOs was voluntary, MSDSP requested that a minimum of 80% of 
all households belong to the VO before formally accepting it into its program. According to 
MSDSP figures between 89% and 100% of all households had at least one member who 
had joined the VO.34 MSDSP regulations stated that VO members should be residents of 
the village, heads of households (who have decision-making authority), and not less than 
17 years old (MSDSP VO Charter 2001). Thus membership in the VO was primarily based 
on residency, as membership in the mahalla and the Bosnian mjesna zajednica was. The 
figures that the VO leadership provided to MSDSP may not have been entirely accurate as 
VO leaders had an interest in inflating them to ensure that they were included in the 
MSDSP program. In three villages, the VO leaders explained that the number of members 
in their organizations was growing because people saw membership as a way to gain 
benefits, especially materials and credits from MSDSP. Those who did not participate were 
either the elderly and ill, or those for whom “life is good as it is” (Sharipov, 25.07.02).
II.e Missions and values o f Karategin VOs:
The VO leadership and members interviewed explained that they considered the VO to be a 
continuation of past forms of village organizing, which enabled them to continue with their 
Soviet era activism. “Everything that we are doing now [through the VO] existed before, 
but was not as well documented,” explained Kokimov the VO head of Kalai-Surh 
(Hokimov, 29.07.02). For the head of the Khuja Ainee VO it was necessary to create a 
village organization structure because, “we could no longer get anything as a sovkhoz, so 
we had to change” (Gazoev, 23.07.02). As the VO leadership and members depicted their
34 MSDSP Information about members o f the VOs of Rasht Valley, 30.06.02
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villages under the Soviet system, they were extremely cohesive and active, but this 
activism diminished with war and independence, as resources dried up.
Somewhat similarly to the Sevarlije MZ, the villages of the Karategin Valley organized a 
host of capital improvement works in the mid 1980s. The head of the Shulmak VO recalled 
how their chaihanalmosque was constructed in 1980-198335. At that time according to 
Rakhimov the work was carried out and financed by local inhabitants, with the assistance 
of the kolkhoz who provided heavy equipment and materials. It was a costly endeavor and 
the roof alone cost 3300 somoni (3 somoni = $1) (Rakhimov, 30.07.02). In Kalai-Surh, as 
in Shulmak, through the donation of funds, labor and materials, the community built a local 
school in addition to the chaihana/mosquQ. The Kalai-Surh VO head Hokimov explained 
that in the 1980s “we renovated roads, repaired damage caused by floods, enclosed the 
cemetery [....] during the Soviet Union it was much easier to organize people because they 
had funds, now they are unemployed.” (Hokimov, 29.07.2)
The ability of the Karategin Valley villages’ to carry out activities for the common good 
was in large part linked to a subtle merging of Soviet era institutions and traditional forms 
of communal civil society during the Soviet period. Many traditional religious practices, 
social norms, and modes of local decision-making continued to be relevant in Soviet 
Tajikistan. Through traditional self-help practices and solidarity mechanisms, villages and 
their leaders organized voluntary forms of service provision and resolved community 
disputes. My interviewees in the Karategin Valley supported Roy (2000, 2002) and 
Humphrey’s (1998, 2002) findings that the kolkhoz structures worked in symbiosis with 
traditional institutions. In Kalai Surh, the VO head remembered for example that “there 
was a village rohbar who was in charge of the village and carried out work on a voluntary 
basis, and brigadier linked with the sovkoz. People who did not work on the sovkoz but in 
the district would make their contributions to the rohbar, other contributions were 
generally collected by the b r ig a d ie r (Hokimov, 29.07.02)
35 The chaihana (tea-house) serves as a mosque but also as a community center, and inn for travelers. Social 
activities are organized in the chaihana, and there may be a TV for those who don’t have access to one at 
home.
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Villages in the Karategin Valley tended to be sparsely populated,36 isolated from each 
other, homogenous, and largely dependent on agriculture. All the hamlets studied were 
mono-ethnic. As explained in Chapter 1, in the Karategin Valley as in the rest Tajikistan, 
the basis of traditional village level solidarity remained the extended family structure or the 
avlod. As several avlods may have lived and intermarried in one mahalla or kolkhoz the 
links between families often spanned territory and kin (Chvyr, 1993: 256).
II.f Comparisons between the Sevarlije MZ and Karategin VOs
The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ and Karategin Valley VOs were intra-communal civil 
society organizations made up of individuals who shared the same ethnicity, regional basis 
and religion, and were bound together by proximity ties. In the two communities kinship 
was socio-politically relevant. Past anthropological studies have argued that clans and 
kinship networks play a significant role in Tajikistan, but were weaker in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. In Tajikistan kinship as expressed through the avlod, and solidarity networks 
based on place of origin, have been characterized as central to social, political and 
economic life (Collins 2002; Chvyr, 1993; Roy, 2000). In the Bosnian village Lockwood 
observed that “the evidence of organization, collective activities or group functions that 
characterize the clan” did not exist. He argues further that “bonds of kinship are relatively 
weakly developed among Bosnian Muslims. Kinship roles do not usually carry specific and 
distinct rights and obligations (1975: 74-75).” Nevertheless in Sevarlije three members of 
the same extended family were leaders of the Board for Return/MZ and kinship seems to 
have played a role in at least insuring that these men stayed in contact while in exile during 
the war.
The experience of the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ and Karategin Valley VOs supports 
arguments made in Chapter 1 concerning the different levels of cooperation and co-optation 
that existed between communal civil society and state institutions in Yugoslavia and Soviet 
Tajikistan. While the MZ provided a means for Sevarlije to integrate into the Yugoslav 
system of self-government, the Karategin Valley mahallas remained largely insular and
36 The largest village that I studied, Shulmak, had a population o f 1300 (208 households). Compared with 
other VOs this was a large village. The biggest village in the MSDSP VO program in the Karategin Valley 
Shul had 497 households.
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isolated. In the Karategin Valley, pre-Soviet forms of communal civil society were 
strengthened though their reincarnation in the kolkhoz; mahallas ’ integration into a broader 
Tajik or Soviet value system was weak. Akhmedov (1998: 173) and Roy (2000: 94-98) 
lhave underlined how, particularly in villages populated by people from Garm/Karategin 
Valley, pre-Soviet forms of communal civil society largely usurped Soviet institutions, 
molding them to fit into traditional systems of patronage and mutual aid. On the other hand, 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Sevarlije MZ appears to have been largely assimilated into the 
Yugoslav system of local self-governance, which at least in theory was inclusionary and 
sought to promote an equitable use of resources regardless of ethnicity/nationality. 
Employing Varshney’s (2003: 3) terminology, its seems valid to describe the Sevarlije MZ 
as an “intra-communal” group, which participated in a larger “inter-communal 
associational form of civil engagement.” Karategin Valley mahallas were purely “intra- 
communal.” It can be supposed that the Sevarlije M Z’s willingness to engage with 
Yugoslav era modes of self-management was due to its location on the edge of a major 
urban communications center, and the economic gains it made in the 1960s and 70s from 
its surroundings’ rapid industrialization. Many MZs in Bosnia-Herzegovina which did not 
benefit from this burst of economic growth (such as Bringa’s Dolina) evolved in ways 
similar to the Karategin Valley mahallas. These were often the first communities to adopt 
nationalism in the early 1990s.
Like in the NGO case studies, strong leadership was crucial to the success of the Sevarlije 
MZ and the Karategin Valley VOs’ success. Leaders provided vision, skills, past 
experience and contacts. In the Karategin Valley, as predicted by Gellner (1995: 33), the 
VOs’ leadership appeared to be closely dependent on pre-existing social roles and 
obligations. Individuals accepted leadership positions as their duty to ensure community 
solidarity. In the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ, leaders built on their pre-war skills and 
experience, and through self-selection and ambition drove the return process. Asked why 
Sevarlije was so successful, a USAID officer explained, “it must have been the 
determination of the population and then their leaders. Aziz was so dedicated” (Ankica,
07.11.03). Sevarlije’s case supports the conclusions of a broader study of ten MZs carried 
out by the World Bank which finds that “the functions and achievements [of MZs] depends 
largely on the personality of the President and his closest associates” and “local leadership
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is clearly linked with associational experience.” (WB 2002a: 73) Charisma and experience, 
as much as pre-existing standing within kinship and community networks, explain the 
Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ leaders’ success.
Much like in the NGO cases described in the previous chapter, those who managed the 
Karategin Valley V Os and Board for Return/MZ could generally be considered to be 
“professionals:” skilled, educated, and in the rural context, in which they lived, 
economically “middle class.” In several cases they had lost their employment during the 
war, often victims of a shrinking public sector. They were thus interested in finding ways to 
maintain their pre-war status within the community. As one informant explained in the 
Bosnian case “throughout history it has stayed with our people that clergymen, teachers, 
doctors are the most prominent citizens. In the villages they were always the people who 
led others. [...] It is not important that today teachers are in a very difficult economic 
situation with low wages -  they are still the center for gathering people” (WB, 2002a: 109). 
A similar situation could be observed in 2002 in the Karategin Valley where former 
kolkhoz technicians, teachers and medical professionals were held in high esteem even 
though their economic position had decreased substantially. Thus CBOs, like the NGOs, 
provided a crucial forum for village “professionals” to retain and develop their skills, and 
maintain their popular status. In the postwar environment where cultures of lawlessness 
tended to domain, and those gaining economic and social prestige were often engaged in 
illicit activities, the VOs and Board for Return/MZ helped keep more traditionally respected 
citizens in the public eye.
Addressing inter-ethnic and inter-national tensions was not an explicit aim of the two 
CBOs, however maintaining community security and stability was. The leaders of the 
Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ and of the Karategin Valley VOs shared a commitment to 
restoring to their local communities the material, physical and economic conditions they 
had in the pre-war period. They based their aims on the experiences of the 1980s when the 
village organizations carried out capital gains projects through citizens’ self-contributions 
in labor and funds, with the support of state institutions. In the post-war period, the 
Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ and Karategin Valley VOs relied on their past experience
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with direct participation, community self-help, and mutual aid in an attempt to promote 
community development.
III. Activities, tasks and tactics of the case study CBOs.
I l l  a Sevarlije MZ activities and tactics
Ill.a. 1 Preparing the return process to Sevarlije
The activities and tasks of the Sevarlije community evolved in tandem with the 
opportunities and challenges of the wartime and post-war political process. After the 
signing of the GFAP, the Sevarlije Board for Return organized to insure that Sevarlije 
residents benefited from the right to return. Those involved in the process admitted “we 
came back to Sevarlije in an un-expected way” (Sabrija, 21.10.2001) because during the 
war return was seen as possible only after a military victory. Not until after the GFAP was 
return understood to be an administrative and bureaucratic process linked to the fulfillment 
of a human right and towards which the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ could significantly 
contribute.
From 1996-1998 Sevarlije leaders carried out administrative tasks, lobbied, and advocated 
to ensure the return of their community. Through the Sevarlije, Pridjel and Potocani MZ in 
Exile, the Citizens Association o f Doboj Municipality in Zenica, and later the Sevarlije 
Board for Return, Sevarlije’s leadership organized to represent Sevarlije inhabitants vis-a- 
vis Bosniak authorities, Serb officials, and representatives of international organizations. 
The Sevarlije organizations collected, aggregated and disseminated information on return. 
One of the first tasks of the post-war period carried out by the Sevarlije, Pridjel and 
Potocani MZ in Exile and the Citizens Association o f Doboj Municipality in Zenica was the 
distribution and collection of UNHCR Housing Forms. The Sevarlije associations also 
maintained ties between former Sevarlije residents displaced in different regions of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, and strengthened links between Sevarlije DPs and DPs from other parts of the 
RS.37 The Sevarlije associations, together with the broader DP and refugee network, kept 
the issue of return within the public sphere, in the media, and alive in the dreams of the 
displaced themselves. They continuously lobbied for the fulfillment of the right to return
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with representatives of the UNHCR, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the 
Ministry of Work, Social Policy, Refugees and DPs of Zenica/Doboj Canton and the Doboj 
Municipality.
As a provider of news the Sevarlije associations broke nationalist politicians’ monopoly on 
information. Eade (1997: 183) argues that especially for displaced populations “the lack of 
access to reliable information concerning one’s current situation or future options is 
profoundly dissempowering. At best, it undermines people’s capacity to determine their 
own interests; at worst it leaves them prey to rumors or to the deliberate manipulation of 
information for political or military purposes.” In Bosnia-Herzegovina Croat-displaced 
persons from Central Bosnia for example were encouraged by the HDZ not to return to 
their homes by misleading accounts of ongoing violence against minorities in their pre-war 
villages. Through the provision of reliable information, the Sevarlije, Pridjel and Potocani 
MZ in Exile and the Citizens Association o f Doboj Municipality in Zenica thus helped limit 
the Sevarlije displaced persons’ disempowerment and increased their capacity for action.
III.a.2 Facilitating reconciliation
The greatest obstacle to return which the Sevarlije Boardfor Return successfully overcame 
was the intense distrust that existed between Bosniak DP and Serb communities. The 
attitude of municipal and higher level authorities towards minority return was not 
categorically negative. According to the UNHCR Program Assistant, authorities suggested 
at the time that “if you can settle it at the grassroots level we don’t mind” (08.11.2001). 
Nevertheless when Sevarlije returnees first visited their homes they still risked being 
attacked by “organized mobs” as other minority convoys had been from 1996-1998 and 
continued to be in 2000 and 2001 (Cousens, 2001; Vandiver, 2001; ICG, 2001). The 
possibility also existed that Bosniak returnees would turn against Serbs living in the 
surrounding areas to exert revenge for crimes committed during the war. However on 1st
37 The Citizens Association o f  Doboj Municipality in Zenica for example was made up of 6 sub-bodies which became 
Boards for Return (such as the Sevarlije Boardfor Return), representing DPs of 6 different communities in the Doboj 
region (Zahid, 25.10.2001)
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July 1998 the first day that Sevarlije residents visited their pre-war homes, there was no
- lO
violence, and no violence occurred thereafter.
Peaceful return and reconciliation was possible thanks to the Sevarlije Board for Return’s 
willingness to engage in a lengthy and time-consuming process of dialogue with 
representatives of the Serb displaced persons community in Pridjel and Potocani.39 
Dialogue was mainly facilitated by the UNHCR Doboj branch office and lasted from mid- 
1997 to mid-1998. It is worth quoting directly from Aziz (22.10.2001) who participated in 
the entire process and has a vivid memory of a radical transformation visible only to a few:
“We had direct contacts with representatives from the MZs of people o f Serb nationality who live in 
our surrounding. Most o f the meetings took place in the SFOR base outside Doboj. At first the 
meetings were very difficult. They were very short. And RS representatives were very hostile. They 
tried to persuade us that Serbs were peaceful people and that the war had been imposed on them.
And etc. [...] Though at the beginning the meetings were very short, meeting after meeting they 
became longer, and changes became evident. Firstly in the breaks during those meetings we were 
left alone with the Serb representatives. So through those cigarette pauses, those coffee breaks, we 
came closer to each other. We started to talk openly as ordinary people. And I think that gave 
results. In the end we attended 77 official meetings.”
Through gradual confidence-building Serb and Bosniak MZ representatives reached 
agreement on the return issue. The Serb MZ representatives pledged that return would 
happen without violence. Bosniak representatives understood the need for a gradual return 
process that would not pose a security threat to the Serbs, and Serb representatives accepted 
that return was not a direct menace to their interests. Sevarlije DPs were returning to a part 
of the village which had been left uninhabited, and they were not demanding that Serb DPs 
move (Rado, 08.11.01).
At the start of the return process, the Sevarlije Board for Return took the important step of 
including their Serb neighbors whenever possible in their activities. The bus hired to
38 This is significant considering that between March 2000 and July 2001,316 incidents involving threats to 
or attacks on the ‘minority’ population in the RS were reported to the IPTF. UN statistics for the April -  
September 2001 season are o f 208 incidents against minorities in the RS (ICG 2001b: 38).
39 Pridjel and Potocani had been majority Bosniak villages before the war. Their original inhabitants had been 
forcibly displaced like those o f Sevarlije in June 1992. During the war Serbs, mainly from villages in the 
Maglaj municipality, were also forced to leave their homes and they settled in Pridjel and Potocani 
(destruction of the housing stock in Sevarlije was greater). They eventually formed their own MZ under the 
leadership o f Zarko Ilicic. Zarko, and the MZ of Pridjel and Potocani he presided over, became the main 
Sevarlije interlocutors.
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transport Sevarlije DPs from the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) to Sevarlije was from a 
Serb firm based in Doboj. The Sevarlije Board for Return employed Serb DPs residing in 
Potocani and Pridjel immediately to assist them in house reconstruction. Cooperation in 
house building, in part replicating traditional Bosnian mutual aid habits, was also made 
possible because the Bosniaks offered a small salary to the Serbs to carry out the works. 
According to Aziz (22.10.01) at that time when the Serbs could have resisted cooperation 
with their war time enemies, “the Serb response was massive and every day we got more 
requests for work from them. I think that it was a key moment, when we put security 
concerns back in their proper place.”
The Sevarlije Board for Return/  MZ leadership was also conscientious of the necessity of 
carefully undertaking activities that could be interpreted as an affront to Serb values and 
ideas. Three years after return began in the fall of 2001 reconstruction of the Sevarlije 
mosque was incomplete.40 Even though exhuming and re-burying persons killed in 
Sevarlije at the start of the war, or later when they were displaced, was laden with meaning 
and value for the community, the Sevarlije Boardfor Return did not organize the ceremony 
until May 2000.41
The Sevarlije experience also gave an impetus to Serb DPs in Priidjel and Potocani to begin 
returning to their homes in the Maglaj municipality (Federation).42 By 2000, when the Serb 
DPs began this process, spatial proximity had significantly decreased any remaining 
cleavages between the two groups. Bosniak and Serb MZ members were now linked by a 
mutual interest in return. The Sevarlije MZ facilitated contacts between the Serb MZ and 
Maglaj authorities. When Serb DPs started their own reconstruction effort, Sevarlije MZ 
representatives assisted them in developing relationships with IOs and obtaining building 
materials. As will be analyzed in more detail in the next chapter on impact, the intra-
40 As new mosques were appearing throughout the Federation after the war it was somewhat surprising to see 
that in 2001 the Sevarlije mosque was not rebuilt. The Sevarlije imam (24.10.01) explained that he had been 
unable to obtain donations from international Islamic aid agencies -  who feared that their “investments may 
not be secure in the RS.” The imam added that he agreed with the Sevarlije MZ’s decision to prioritize other 
forms o f reconstruction in the village.
41 At the time some 5000 people attended the ceremony and according to Aziz “the police in Doboj were up to 
the task, they engaged almost a whole police station for us” (22.10.2001).
42 UNHCR estimated that by 2001 more than half of the Serb DPs had left Pridjel and Potocani for their 
homes in Maglaj municipality (Rado Durdevic, 08.11.2001)
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communal bonding social capital that existed in Sevarlije and Pridjel, within the Bosniak 
and Serb DP communities, helped create new bridging social capital and networks of 
reciprocal social relations.
III.a.3 Providing reconstruction aid and social services
While the greatest goal for minority returnees in Bosnia-Herzegovina was regaining access 
to homes and land, a host of subsequent challenges confronted them, as succinctly 
described in a statement by the Human Rights Coordination Center (2000:2):43
“From the repossession of property, to registering one’s residence and receiving an ED card, 
enrolling one’s children in school, becoming gainfully employed, securing access to pensions, 
to reconnecting to electricity, water, or telephone networks -  in each o f these elements of daily 
life Bosnians are confronted by abuses emanating from the law or from the conduct of their 
officials. This is particularly so for returnees.”
Due to its knowledge of local needs, the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ adopted the role of 
intermediary between international donors, local authorities and local citizens. Cooperating 
with international donors, the MZ developed criteria to determine which houses in the 
village should be reconstructed. The Sevarlije MZ also served as a mediator, tempering 
conflicts that arose over the allocation of aid. Representatives of international organizations 
interviewed appreciated this contribution. As Marko Nisandzic (7.11.01), Director of 
Operations of Mercy Corps Europe/ Scottish European Aid explained, “we trusted each 
other. We agreed on criteria, and they never tried to put someone on the list who did not 
need help.”
As security for minority returnees gradually improved throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
uneven access to social services for returnees became a more pressing problem (HRCC, 
2000; ICG 2002). The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ lobbied for funding from 
international organizations to reconstruct social and physical infrastructure. It advocated 
with the Doboj municipal and the RS Entity level governments to obtain the social services 
it had been provided with before 1992. The Sevarlije Board for Return/ MZ submitted a 
proposal to USAID in 1998 for the reconstruction of the village elementary school so that
43 The Human Rights Coordination Center was a co-operative effort o f the OHR, OSCE, OHCHR, UNMiBH, 
the Council o f Europe and UNHCR within the OHR.
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children could stop commuting to a school in the Federation. It obtained permission from 
the Ministry of Education in Banja Luka to restart the school and provide teaching staff in 
2000 (Hamdija, 22.10.01). As the school functioned within the RS educational system, the 
parents and teachers agreed to have lessons in Cyrillic as well as Latin scripts (school 
teacher, 24.10.01). The community center/ clinic’s rehabilitation was completed in early 
2002. The Sevarlije MZ encouraged citizens to register for RS ID cards and to take 
advantage of social services provided by the Doboj municipality, helping to ensure the 
social protection of the community. According to the HRCC in 2000 “discrimination in 
access to pension entitlements remains [...] a tangible obstacle for many Bosnians”. Yet 
that year in Sevarlije returnees were obtaining RS pensions.
Gaining access to employment was another challenge for most minority returnees that the 
Sevarlije MZ attempted to address.44 Poor employment prospects in the Doboj area were 
linked to the depressed economy as well as employment discrimination. The whitewash 
quarry outside Sevarlije lost its economic utility with the breakup of Yugoslavia; many of 
the jobs in Doboj that Sevarlije inhabitants had filled during the 1970s and 1980s were 
either made redundant or filled by Serb nationals.45 In an attempt to address this problem, 
the Sevarlije MZ cooperated with international organizations to initiate income generation 
projects in the village.
The MZ also has the competency to intervene in local level conflicts through the MZ peace 
council (Mirovno vijece). Peace Councils traditionally act to resolve disputes related to the 
rights of citizens - especially in the areas of property disputes, trespassing, disputes related 
to borders between properties, inheritance, division of the common property of married 
couples - as well as in criminal or misdemeanor affairs, or in cases against another’s honor 
and reputation (Milisevic, Pasic, Zlokapa, Stitic, 1999: 113-114). However, according to 
Aziz (08.09.2002), people rarely addressed the Sevarlije Peace Council, because there were 
few local level conflicts.
44 In a study o f minority returns conducted in early 2000, the UNHCR found that only 5.5% of the minority 
returnees it had interviewed had found employment in their home regions (USCR, 2001: 7).
45 During my interviews I did not meet any Sevarlije returnee with employment in Doboj.
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The MZ propagated community mobilization and action. Like in the pre-war period when 
MZs held large-scale volunteer community actions (radne akcije) the Sevarlije MZ in 
Spring 2002 called upon community members to clean the village roads. Even though “it is 
very difficult to organize these kinds of things because people believe that someone should 
do this work for them,” some 100 persons participated (Aziz, 08.09.02). The Sevarlije MZ 
also encouraged the creation of new associations to represent the interests, and satisfy the 
needs, of particular groups in the community. In 2001 a farmer’s association and a 
women’s group were registered in the RS as local NGOs (Abdullah, 23.10.01; Alma, 
24.10.01).46
IILb Karategin VO activities and tactics
In 2000 needs and priorities in Tajikistan were very different from what they were in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina as they were linked to challenges caused by the breakup of the Soviet 
Union. Consequently the activities of the Karategin VOs were less focused on refugee 
return and reconciliation, but more on infrastructure rehabilitation, income generation, and 
social service provision. The Karategin Valley VOs, with the support of MSDSP, thus 
began with activities to meet these pressing needs, first of all to ensure that people had 
sufficient food and access to water.
IILb. 1 Helping secure food sustainability, employment and infrastructure development:
To a much more significant degree than in Bosnia-Herzegovina, access to food and 
employment were urgent problems in the Karategin Valley. In its quest to reduce poverty in 
Tajikistan, MSDSP and AKF began their operations by providing humanitarian assistance47 
but the overall program purpose was to enhance the “capability of communities to increase 
incomes, manage communal resources and attain food security” (MSDSP 2002a: 4). In the 
Karategin Valley over 80% of the population worked in agriculture (MSDSP 2002a: 10) 
and close to 100% of households relied on the food they grew to meet at least part of their
46 The farmer association aimed to address the problem o f local unemployment by encouraging people to live 
by working in agriculture. The women’s association Stublicanka established a kindergarten, and in Fall 2002 
started art, dance, theater classes for children on weekends. It had its own office in the newly rebuilt 
community center.
47 In 1993 when AKF began working in the Gomo-Badakshan region o f Tajikistan its objective was to ensure 
the availability o f enough food for the survival o f the population, and in the longer term to work towards food 
self-sufficiency (MSDSP 2002a: 5)
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dietary requirements. The VOs’ activities were closely tied to MSDSP’s, and in 2001 the 
VOs assisted in the distribution of vegetable seeds, tree seedlings, chickens and goats 
Amongst the six VOs studied, on average six projects were implemented during the first six 
months of 2002. A significant addition to the VOs ' program was a micro-credit program for 
women to promote small income generation activities. The credit ranged between 300-360 
somoni ($1 = 3 somoni) per person and benefited between 4-10 women in three out of the 
six VOs.48 The credits were generally for 2-3 months and to be repaid into a revolving fund. 
The size of the credits, and time frame, enabled beneficiaries to engage in trade but not in 
production.
The breakup of the Soviet Union and the subsequent war in Tajikistan caused a virtual 
decimation of physical infrastructure in the country and the government no longer had the 
resources and capacities to maintain the massive rural infrastructure (WB, 2002b: 5). 
Consequently, since the start of the conflict in Tajikistan, villages in the Karategin Valley 
rarely had access to clean water, proper irrigation and sanitation, regular electricity, and 
good roads.49 In order to tackle this problem MSDSP supported the development of 
community based physical infrastructure through the VOs rather than the rehabilitation of 
massive Soviet era systems. Its rationale was that “small infrastructure projects not only 
meet the short-term priorities of most communities but [...] are also good mechanisms for 
mobilizing community involvement and for providing opportunities for building the social 
and human capacity of village level organizations” (MSDSP 2002a: 27).
III.b.2 Building community cohesion:
Extending their MSDSP technical tasks, the VO leadership tended to play a broader role in 
the community similar to that of traditional aksakal and mahalla leaders. VO Presidents 
helped maintain community cohesion and resolve local conflicts. Though not considered to 
be a religious authority, the VO President often played a key role in religious activities and 
discussions. Each village tended to have its own mullah who was different from the VO
48 MSDSP, Projects o f VOs of Rasht Valley, approved for 2002,05.07.2002
49 Some 40-50% o f the land equipped with irrigation facilities are not irrigated or drained due to breakdown 
of pumps and related machinery and neglect o f cleaning o f irrigation canals (UN, 2001: 23), most o f the rural 
population has never had access to piped water (UN, 2001: 26) and in rural areas access to safe drinking 
water is less than 20% (UNICEF, 2001).
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President, but the two men generally worked closely together. As most VO meetings were 
held in the village chaihana/mosque, there was overlap and proximity in the VO and 
mosque’s work. In four out of the six VOs visited, the Presidents explained that the people 
usually approached them when planning marriages or funerals, to assist them in the 
organization, and sometimes to raise funds. In Tajik social life, weddings and funerals are 
the most significant events to occur in the community and are laden with symbols, rites, 
obligations, and expenses.
The VO leadership was often called upon to mediate in family crises and disputes between 
neighbors. When faced with problems many citizens preferred to approach the VO 
President, or his staff, in the first instance and only as a last resort to turn to higher level 
authorities, the police or the courts. In Shulmak, the head of the women’s groups explained 
that in six or seven instances women had come to her to ask for advice because their 
husbands had taken a second wife. In one case a woman came to ask how she could obtain 
alimony from her ex-husband (Rukhshona, 30.07.02).
Like the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ, Karategin Valley VOs called for large-scale 
volunteer community actions (hasharj. In the Karategin Valley villagers traditionally 
engaged in voluntary community work -  such as clearing irrigation channels, contributing 
to building the chaihana/mosquQ - as willingly as they assisted neighbors, or individual 
households -  for example to construct a house. In the post-communist, post-conflict period 
studies have nevertheless found that the hashar tradition has begun to wane.50 It can be 
argued that in the villages where VOs were set up hashar was more effectively maintained 
due to the MSDSP requirement that communities contribute funds and labor to all projects 
that they supported. It could also be explained by a general increase in community cohesion 
caused by the development of the VO. According to the Karashahr VO President, the VO 
encouraged the village to “organize hashar every day [...] now we are all working together, 
to collect wheat in the fields for example” (Piramavdov, 26.07.02). In Kalai-Surh, the VO 
head described how he frequently organized hashar to maintain the water channel.
50 According to a survey carried out the NGO ASTI in Soghd Oblast, a large majority of mahallas did not 
organize a hashar between 2000-2002 (Interview with Farrukh Tyuryaev, General Director, Association of 
Scientific and Technical Intelligentsia, on 27 June, 2002 in Khojand )
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The Karategin Valley VOs appeared to carry out little advocacy. According to MSDSP’s 
vision “in the future as new opportunities arise and local capacities are built up, MSDSP 
will want the VOs to take on more service delivery roles” (VO Charter 2001: 19). Yet 
MSDSP was less certain about how VOs could engage in lobbying. According to MSDSP, 
the VOs' advocacy potential was limited by their poor leadership -  since during the Soviet 
Union “lack of elections procedures [in the Soviet village level institutions] led to the 
selection of poorly qualified people,” who had low levels of skills or experience. This 
argument goes against Roy (2000, 2002) and Humphrey’s (1998) findings, which suggest 
that village level leaders had a large amount of autonomy and were generally successful in 
transferring substantial services, resources, and attention to their communities. What is 
possible is that Karategin Valley VOs in fact advocated for their community through 
traditional solidarity networks, using informal means, which were difficult to quantify by 
MSDSP or in the policy sphere.
7 //.C  Comparison between Sevarlije MZ and Karategin VO activities and tactics 
The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ and the Karategin Valley VOs are examples of 
communal civil society organizations whose main aim was to ensure that all members of 
the community had the necessary means for survival. Through their activities they 
successfully provided “self help” in the absence of state provision of public goods including 
social services, infrastructure, personal and social security. As predicted by Roy (2002: 
124) the immediate post-war challenge for the two CBOs was to compensate for the 
weakness of the post-communist state. Once return was accomplished, the Sevarlije Board 
for Return/MZ reverted back to many of its pre-war tactics, attempting to mobilize the 
community to participate in decision-making, and project implementation. In 2000 the 
Karategin Valley VOs continued with activities that the mahalla and aksakals had carried 
out in the past. Rather than starting new innovative projects, similar to the ones 
implemented by the NGOs and described in the last chapter, the CBOs tended to focus on 
what they knew best, especially community infrastructure development and maintenance. 
However the environment in which they were working had changed dramatically since 
1992, and the resources that had been provided through the kolkhoz or state structures were 
no longer available.
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To a degree not assumed in the literature on communal civil society, the Sevarlije Boardfor 
Return/MZ was engaged in advocacy in addition to its service provision tasks. With regards 
to minority return it took a strong role in agenda setting, policy development, and policy 
implementation. In the last chapter we employed Roche’s (1999: 192) definition of 
advocacy as “the pursuit of change in policy and practice for the benefit of specific 
individuals or groups of people.” While we found that our NGO case studies were more 
likely to be engaged in a form of advocacy that “strengthened the basis for citizens’ 
potential action” (Covey 1998), in the Sevarlije Boardfor Return/MZ case advocacy clearly 
signified both strengthening popular participation and influencing policy change. Thus the 
Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ could be defined as a “policy entrepreneur” (Najam, 1999). 
The extent to which the Karategin Valley VOs engaged in policy-related advocacy appeared 
to be much lower. Thus, based on the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ and Karategin Valley 
VO cases, we can agree with Roy’s (2002: 131) statement that communal civil society 
“offers a shield against state coercion [...and also] against the economic ravages stemming 
from the collapse of the Soviet social security nets.” However the Sevarlije Board for  
Return/MZ example demonstrates that Roy’s argument that “what this type of society does 
not do is provide political actors” is inapplicable to Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Sevarlije Boardfor Return/MZ and Karategin Valley VOs both fit into Carroll’s (1992: 
11) definition of “primary grass-roots organizations” or “the smallest aggregation of 
individual or households that regularly engage in some joint development action as an 
expression of collective interest.” Carroll predicted that the scope, level, complexity and 
function of the two groups would be relatively limited. For example where Gidron, Katz 
and Hasenfeld (2002) find that most peace/ conflict resolution groups utilize more than one 
strategy or tactic in their work, the Karategin Valley VOs were almost uniquely involved in 
service provision. The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ, however was engaged in service 
provision, bridging and lobbying. Korten’s generational model (1990) is also inadequate in 
predicting the two CBOs’ capacities to further expand the scope and depth of their 
activities. It can be argued that by 1996-1997 the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ had 
reached the “fourth generation” in Korten’s model (1990) when it was cooperating with 
groups of displaced from throughout the former Yugoslavia, and advocating for the right of
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minority return for all. After return was successfully implemented however it refocused on 
“first generation tasks:” the provision of relief and welfare.
IV. Linkages of the case study CBOs
IV. a Sevarlije MZ linkages:
The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ was deeply embedded in the Sevarlije community, but 
its success in sustaining the return process was also a consequence of the extensive web of 
linkages it developed with local and international authorities. Its relations were more 
intensive with partners in the Doboj area, and its contacts with more distant actors -  
international organizations and NGOs based in Sarajevo or outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Federation or RS governmental authorities -  were much weaker. As in the NGO cases 
described in the previous chapter, the majority of the contacts that the Sevarlije Board for  
Return/ MZ leadership had with governmental authorities and representatives of 
international organizations were based on personal relations rather than institutional or legal 
commitments.
During the war the head of the Sevarlije MZ in exile had strong connections with the Doboj 
Municipality in Exile, Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and SDA but these did not 
provide the foundations for strong cooperation during or after the return process. In 
interviews Aziz, Sabrija, Hamdija and Uzeir strongly denied having obtaining political 
assistance from Bosniak governmental authorities to facilitate return. Instead Sabrija
(21.10.2001) claimed, “our conclusion was that we had to work for ourselves, and in the 
end that was the proper decision. I think that if at that time we had waited for our leaders 
we would still not be back.” What linkages existed between the Sevarlije Board for Return 
and Federation authorities were less a function of politics than personal contacts based on 
kin and place of origin. In Sevarlije’s case kinship may have influenced decisions on the 
allocation of aid from Federation authorities. For example the Federation official who 
allocated grants to the Sevarlije MZ in 1998 and 2000 had a daughter who married into a 
Sevarlije family.51
51 The Ministry of Work, Social Policy, Refugees and Displaced Persons o f the Doboj-Zenica Canton 
(Federation) provided Sevarlije returnees in 1998 with 20,000 DM and in 2001 with 200,000 DM. Miralem 
Galijasevic, who was the head o f the Ministry in 1998 and Deputy Minister in 2000 and granted this aid had a 
daughter who married into a family from Sevarlije.
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Ideology rather than institutional arrangements determined the nature of Sevarlije Board for 
Return/ MZ relations with the Doboj municipal authorities. Until Fall 1997, when the first 
post-war municipal elections were held in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Doboj municipal 
government was dominated by nationalist members of the SDS with whom Sevarlije 
representatives had no ties.52 After the Fall 1997 elections when the SDS’s monopoly on 
power was broken in the municipal assembly and 21 seats out of 69 went to Federation 
based parties, the relationship began to improve. Aziz, the President of the Sevarlije MZ, 
served as a municipal counselor in Doboj at this time (Aziz, 1.12.01). After the 2000 
municipal elections, when the SDS won over 44% of the vote, the political environment 
shifted again.53 Aziz lost his seat in municipal government and had difficulties even to 
arrange a meeting with the Doboj Mayor to discuss village infrastructure (Aziz, 08.09.02). 
It can thus be argued that the connections that existed between the Sevarlije MZ and the 
Doboj municipality were dependent on the political composition of government, rather than 
institutionalized within a broader structure of local self-government. This was also possible 
because legislation on local self-governance was vague on municipal authorities’ 
responsibilities to MZs.54
In past studies (OSCE 2002) MZs have been found to have close contacts with political 
parties and provide political elites with a channel to manipulate the community for political 
gain. For example, it was found that in many cases, “Boards are not elected in accordance 
with local statutes but appointed by political parties. This ‘cronyism’ involves the potential 
for MZ Boards to become the tools of municipal parties rather than a vehicle for 
representing the needs and interests of ordinary citizens” (OSCE, RC Tuzla, 2002: 2). The 
World Bank survey on local level institutions (2002: 75) also noted that informants 
complained that political parties controlled MZs. They also believed that MZ boards’
52 Leaders o f the SDS in Doboj has been accused o f being personally involved in the ethnic cleansing o f non- 
Serbs from the Doboj area and other acts of extreme violence (Human Rights Watch/ Helsinki, December, 
1996).
53 “OSCE Releases Preliminary Results for 37 Municipalities” elections results published by OSCE Mission 
to Bosnia-Herzegovina, on 12 April 2000 (15:00 CET).
54 For example nothing in the legislation on local self government indicated that Municipalities were under 
the obligation to consult MZs, share information with them on municipal budgets or plans, include them in 
hearings or committee meetings, or offer them training or technical help.
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achievements depended largely on the MZ President’s political affiliations. In Sevarlije 
persons interviewed stated that political parties played no role in the MZ elections process 
or in MZ decision-making. Yet especially before 2000, the Sevarlije MZ/ Board for Return 
had links with political parties. Aziz was elected on a SDA ticket. In 1998 members of the 
Citizens ’ Association o f Doboj Municipality in Zenica founded their own political party: 
The Party for the Return o f Displaced and Refugees to the Doboj Municipality. They joined 
the SDP list for the 1998 Elections; and the Citizens’ Association nominated twenty-eight 
out of the 39 SDP candidates for the RS House of People (Ramiz, 24.10.01). Nevertheless 
when it came to return, Board for Return/MZ members (Samir, 23.10.01, Uzeir, 4.08.01) 
underlined that the process was made possible because the CBO relied on its own resources 
rather than waiting for political parties to come to an agreement amongst each other. In 
2001 Sabrija (22.10.01) exclaimed “if at that time we had waited for the SDA party leaders, 
we would still not be back to Sevarlije now.”
Especially before the return process began, the Sevarlije Board for Return and the Citizens ’ 
Association o f Doboj Municipality in Zenica that preceded it, had extensive contacts within 
a Yugoslav-wide network of refugee and displaced persons associations. Through its’ 
contacts with the Coalition for Return and Let’s Live Together, the Citizens’ Association o f 
Doboj Municipality in Zenica entered a dialogue with representatives of the international 
community, with Doboj-based Serb NGOs, and with governmental authorities in Zenica 
and Doboj. The intra-communal Sevarlije MZ/Board for Return thus demonstrated a 
capacity to bridge differences based on nationality and ethnicity, and to cooperate with 
liberal forms of civil society.
Several large international organizations working on return related issues in the Doboj area, 
including the UNHCR, USAID, and Mercy Corps, worked closely with the Sevarlije Board 
for Return/MZ even before it was registered. These partnerships were partially based on the 
personalities of those involved. For example, in 1997-1998 the Sevarlije Board for Return 
cooperated closely with the UNHCR Doboj Branch Office. The Sevarlije representatives 
interviewed all underlined the significance of the contribution of the head of office at the 
time. He was personally committed to assisting the return process, and considered the 
representatives of the Sevarlije Board for Return, as well as those of the Serb Pridjel and
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Potocani MZ, as serious partners. The head of office’s assistant in 1997-1998 remembered 
that “we were not supposed to negotiate return -  but we did not want people’s lives to be 
threatened so we decided to go through this painful process of negotiating at the grass roots 
level” (Rado, 08.11.01). The UNHCR head of office was thus not following a programming 
directive from his superiors. The Sevarlije Board for Return personally trusted their 
UNHCR counterpart and as Sabrija (22.10) described “we did not make any protests or 
moves without his approval.” The ad hoc and innovative relationship between UNHCR and 
the local community groups was a determining factor in the success of the return process.
Though the Sevarlije Board for Return did not have any contacts with Serb or international 
security forces before the return to Sevarlije, the UNHCR, with whom it was closely linked, 
did. As has been pointed out by others, successful minority return depended greatly on 
coordination amongst the major international organizations (Cousens, 2002: 549). UNHCR 
cooperated with the International Police Task Force (IPTF) to encourage Doboj municipal 
police to provide necessary and adequate security. As Rado (08.11.01) recalled, this 
cooperation between Sevarlije Board for Return, UNHCR, IPTF and the Doboj police was 
particularly effective, because “the pressure on the local police to comply and perform their 
duties was in a way stronger and harder than it was on civil authorities.” In this case 
inclusion of law enforcement forces was essential. A large SFOR base was also located at 
the foot of Sevarlije, and soldiers could intervene to secure peace should confrontations 
develop. Rather than relying on SFOR, UNHCR felt that the military should maintain a low 
profile, and that confidence building should be the outcome of reconciliation and dialogue, 
with security guaranteed by police rather than military forces. In 2001 Doboj police 
continued to visit Sevarlije occasionally and to check with the MZ that no security problems 
existed.
IV  b Karategin VO linkages:
The Karategin Valley VOs were deeply embedded in the communities in which they were 
located but it was difficult to ascertain what types of linkages they had beyond the village 
borders. Contacts with groups outside Tajikistan and with bodies based in Dushanbe 
seemed weak. However to state that the village organizations had no outside linkages 
would be to argue that they did not fit within Tajikistan’s dense system of social networks
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based on kin and regional/village origin. As described above the VOs were clearly 
integrated into these links of solidarity.
The VOs were part of a homogenous tight knit social network based in the Karategin 
Valley. In some parts of Tajikistan (Kurgan Tuppe, Dushanbe) the war became a conflict 
between people from different regions, in which for example people were killed because 
they were from the Karategin Valley, but with little regard to whether or not they supported 
the opposition. However the Karategin Valley was considered largely homogenous and no 
such “regional” based violence occurred there. The harassment and killings that happened 
did not follow any obvious ethnic, religious, parochial, family or political lines. In the 
Karategin Valley a UTO field commander may have had a brother working in the 
government administration. In the post-war period, a former field commander, now heading 
an MSDSP district office, noted (25.07.02) that if there were problems in and around 
Kurgan Tuppe that did not exist in the Karategin Valley this was because “here we live 
alone. There are no Kulyabis or any other groups. And alone we have to continue to live 
and make our future.”
As we saw in Chapter 2, field commanders continued to exert substantial influence in the 
region in 2002. Yet all six VO Presidents interviewed claimed that they had no contacts 
with them. According to the head of the Shulmak VO, by 2002 most field commanders had 
either migrated (generally to Russia for employment) or been re-integrated into civilian 
life. However other statements suggested that the field commanders continued to play an 
influential role due to the power they had gained during the conflict. A young woman 
interviewed in Shulmak, described how UTO fighters have been very strong in the village. 
Until Fall 2001 they banned any singing or dancing at weddings. They did not allow girls 
to attend school after the 9th grade, and insisted that women stay inside their homes. Even 
in 2002 this informant considered that former field commanders had more influence than 
the VO President because they had the ability to physically threaten him (interview in 
Shulmak on 30.07.02). The VO’s ability to influence field commanders’ behavior will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter. But here we can note that though the VO stated 
that it had no ties with former fighters and opposition this was highly unlikely in the 
cohesive environments in which they co-habited.
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Official contacts between the VOs and the government were even less frequent than they 
were in the Sevarlije Boardfor Return/MZ case. Semi-official links existed between the VO 
and the Jamoat (the lowest level of government) which in general provided a one-way 
information flow from the VO to the Jamoat. All six Karategin Valley VO leaders 
interviewed explained that their main reason for contacting the jamoat was to “obtain 
authorization” to start new projects. This was done in particular when projects involved 
areas outside the VO’s territory. Jamoat representatives also chose on occasion to attend the 
VO meetings -  especially when they needed the village’s help.55 The district and the jamoat 
were not a-priori concerned with reacting to village level problems. The VOs did not 
appear to lobby government structures through official institutionalized channels, though it 
is highly likely that solidarity networks based on kin and territory made possible “informal” 
advocacy. For inhabitants of the Karategin Valley in 2002 the ability to lobby in this 
manner with higher level government officials was nevertheless limited by the small 
presence of Karategin-natives in central government.56
The main linkages that the VOs had were with MSDSP staff. In addition to funding (see 
next section), MSDSP provided them with material support, training and moral guidance. 
According to the VO Charter (2001: 16), MSDSP also sought to facilitate the development 
of links between VOs, the state, market institutions and other civil society actors. In 2002 in 
the Karategin Valley this process had not yet begun. VO leaders did not lobby or advocate 
with MSDSP staff as the Sevarlije Boardfor Return/ MZ did. Yet a fundamental difference 
existed in the nature of the relationship between community-based organizations in 
Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. While in Bosnia-Herzegovina most decision-makers in 
IOs were expatriates, MSDSPs’ policy was to put Tajiks in leadership roles. MSDPS staff 
in the district offices was originally from the Karategin Valley and included former
55 In one village organization meeting observed a (female) member of the district (hukumat) government 
participated (when no other women were present) and came to request that VO members prepare their village 
for the visit o f the President Rakhmonov.
56 The Karategin Valley was also dis-empowered by its position within the overall Tajik governmental 
structure. The Republic o f Tajikistan consists o f the Gomo-Badakshan Autonomous Region (GBAR), the 
regions o f Sogd (former Leninabad) and Khatlon, the capital city of Dushanbe and thirteen districts directly 
subordinate to the central government. The districts o f the Karategin Valley were thus all directly subordinate 
to the central government in Dushanbe. They were not united administratively and did not have their own 
authorities above the district level. (Abdullaev, 2002b)
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governmental officials, scientists, technical experts, field commanders, and other 
community leaders. Thus they tended to be highly respected in the VOs with whom they 
worked not only because they represented a large organization with funds and resources, 
but also because they had a status that pre-dated their engagement with MSDSP. MSDSP’s 
staff positions in the complex kin and territorial networks also undoubtedly affected how 
VO leaders collaborated with them.
IV  c Comparing Sevarlije MZ and Karategin VO linkages:
It could be assumed that the history of close cooperation between communal civil society 
and the state in Yugoslavia and Soviet Tajikistan would guarantee that the MZs’ and VOs’ 
linkages with local government would be better than those described in Chapter 4 between 
the state and NGOs. Yet the two CBO cases had few contacts with local government. 
During the communist era in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, relations between 
governmental authorities and local self-government institutions were carefully regulated, 
and provided the latter with resources, information and clear responsibilities. In the post 
war period in both countries legislation on local self-governance had changed: while the 
Sevarlije MZ could still consider itself to be a formal institution of local self-governance, in 
Tajikistan there was a void below the jamoat and no structures carried out local self- 
governance at the village level. Thus the VO had no official relationship with governmental 
authorities, and the Sevarlije MZ had only a weak one. In both cases whatever ties existed 
were based largely on personal relationships rather than being formally institutionalized.
While the Karategin Valley VOs had few or no contacts with Tajik liberal civil society 
organizations, the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ cooperated with various communal and 
liberal forms of civil society, especially before the return process began. Though an intra- 
communal organization, the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ had ties with Serb and Croat 
groups involved in the Coalition for Return and other Yugoslav-wide refugee/ displaced 
persons’ initiatives. Regardless of their ethnic or ideological background, these groups 
shared the interest of insuring that the right to return was guaranteed. Significantly though 
the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ had contacts with political parties, ultimately they did 
depend on them to assure return, deciding to advocate independently. Once Sevarlije’s 
inhabitants began to regain their pre-war homes, the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ's
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contacts with other civil society groups waned, with the possible exception of the Serb 
displaced persons community in Pridjel and Potocani.
Both the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ and the Karategin Valley village organizations had 
linkages that were deeply grounded in the local community, but they did not consider these 
bonds as significant sources of political influence to be employed cooperatively with other 
CBOs. The Karategin Valley VOs seemed to operate with few contacts outside the district 
and with few contacts with neighboring VOs. The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ 
developed close ties with the Pridjel and Potocani MZ because of the years they spent 
dialoguing about return, but a-priori they did not cooperate to obtain better services, or 
lobby more effectively with the government. Aziz had occasional contacts with other MZs 
at municipal meetings. But in general his feeling after meeting MZ representatives was that 
“when I heard how they were complaining then I decided that it was not necessary for me 
to say anything. We organized our lives in the way that we thought was best for us”
(08.09.02). Similarly in the Karategin Valley, when queried about cooperation with other 
VOs the head of Shulmak’s group replied, only partly in jest, that “between different VOs 
we are competing to see who can accomplish more” (Rakhimov, 30.07.03). VOs tended to 
meet in MSDSP organised training sessions, but did not have an understanding of how to 
employ limited resources co-operatively. In the longer term MSDSP hoped to develop 
interactions between “clusters of VOs” (MSDSP 2002a: 20) but in 2002 this had not yet 
commenced. The VOs like the MZs could thus be considered as having little consciousness 
of the common interests that could bind them with their neighbors, and of their ability to 
have a greater impact on change through cooperation, and “strength in numbers.”
Previous studies of international organizations’ civil society development programs (Pugh, 
1998; Duffield, 1999; Roy, 2003) have criticized external actors for bypassing communal 
civil society and partnering predominantly with NGOs. Yet the Sevarlije Board for  
Return/MZ and the Karategin Valley VOs benefited from significant levels of cooperation 
with international organizations. This may reveal a shifting of donor priorities and strategy, 
and a new openness to working with communal civil society. In the Sevarlije case in 
particular, the CBO was considered not only as being an aid recipient but also a partner in 
decision-making. Compared to the NGOs described in the last chapter, the Sevarlije Board
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for Return/MZ was also more deeply involved in directly lobbying international 
organizations to affect change.
IV. Structures and funding of the case study CBOs
I. V.a Structure o f the Sevarlije MZ:
The structure of the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ was formal from its inception because 
the existence of legal provisions governing MZ’s creation, responsibilities and working 
mechanisms. In the Sevarlije case, the MZ structures and tasks were regulated by the Doboj 
Municipal Statute, Section 6: Participation of Citizens in Local Self-Government, “On 
Creation of MZs and Elections to MZ Councils” (Art. 33- 47), the RS Law on Local Self- 
Government, and the attached “Instruction on Forming MZs”. The MZ competencies 
defined by legislation at the Entity and Municipal level were vast, sometimes contradictory 
and unclear (OSCE, RC Tuzla, 2002: l).57
The registration of the Sevarlije M Z’s in November 2000 was not only an administrative 
but also a highly political step in the context of post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. When the 
Sevarlije Board for Return tried to register in 1999, the Doboj authorities refused to 
consider the request. They argued that Sevarlije residents had to procure RS ID cards in 
order to be considered as RS citizens with the right to register an organization. 
Subsequently some 70-80 Sevarlije residents obtained RS ID cards, and in March 2000, 
after much lobbying by Sevarlije representatives, Doboj Municipal authorities accepted the 
re-activation of the Sevarlije MZ. By registering in the RS, the Sevarlije MZ sent a clear 
political message that it accepted the rule of governing authorities in Doboj and Banja 
Luka, and its position within the RS. It was a significant shift for the Sevarlije Board for 
Return/ M Z’s leadership, especially when compared with its war time position which 
considered regaining control of Sevarlije to be a military task.
Sevarlije’s leadership’s main mission in registering their organization as an MZ was to gain 
an official status within the Doboj municipal system of government, which they considered 
would provide them with greater leverage than they had as a Boardfor Return or an NGO. 
“As an instrument of local government, MZs have extra powers, to participate in the work
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of the Municipality,” noted Uzeir (20.10.2001). The Sevarlije Board for Return/ MZ/s  
commitment to re-activating the pre-war MZ was also linked to an emotional desire to 
return to a pre-war way of life. As seen above, the MZ status did not in fact provide 
Sevarlije with better access to services, or a greater say in government affairs. The MZ 
registration points to the strength of historical and cultural modes of action; even when 
MZs were devoid of many of their official powers, the institutional value remained fixed in 
the psyche of local citizens.
The MZ Board is elected at a citizen assembly (zbor gradjana) meeting, with elections to 
be held every two years (Doboj Municipal Statute, Art. 45). The MZ was thus a form of 
representative democracy in which the 9 member Board had executive authority and 
represented local citizens. MZ Boards could however be elected with little more than 1/10th 
of the MZ citizens present. Hypothetically a situation could develop in which MZ Board 
members were not approved by a majority of MZ inhabitants, or even families. This posed 
particular problems in ethnically “mixed” villages -  and led to the creation of “double” or 
“parallel” MZs and the further fragmentation of institutional structures at the local level 
(OSCE, RC Tuzla, 2002).58 In Sevarlije, in November 2000 one woman and eight men 
were elected to the Board out of 13 candidates. Some 130-140 people (70% men, 30% 
women) participated (Aziz 08.09.02).
As described above, a committed, experienced and educated leadership was essential to the 
successful return of the Sevarlije community. Centralized leadership was a key 
characteristic of MZ structures, and legislation provided for the election of a President with 
the power to “represent the MZ in all relations and affairs with third parties” (Sevarlije 
Statute, Art. 4). With such influence the MZ President risked falling prey to relationships of 
patronage, and being pressurized to favor certain groups over others. As has been found in 
other studies (Eade, 1997: 178-179), especially with the advent of significant resources, 
existing biases in favoring families from a particular political faction, clan or ethnic group
57 And Canton level in the Federation
58 The OSCE argued that “the composition of MZ Boards does not always reflect the ethnic composition of  
the MZ. In addition the composition needs to ‘anticipate’ potential future returns (taking trends into account). 
The Law on Local Self Governance should state that quotas are used in these MZs, which would prevent the 
bitter conflicts that this issue may raise in mixed MZs.” (OSCE, 2002: 2)
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were at risk of intensifying. Though difficult to verify, this may have been the case in 
Sevarlije. Presidential accountability to MZ members was dependent on the organization of 
bi-annual elections and regular MZ board meetings. However elections were not required 
to be multi-candidate, and during the 2000 Sevarlije MZ elections only one person ran for 
the MZ President position. Aziz’s experience, knowledge and contacts may have made him 
a logical MZ President in 2000. However two years later when the next round of elections 
were due to be held according to the Doboj Municipal Statute (Art. 45), Aziz’s readiness to 
possibly hand over power would be tested. In addition to guarantee more equitable power 
sharing, Aziz explained that he generally organized a meeting of the MZ Board once a 
month (08.09.2001). To increase accountability, once a year he presented a report and work 
plan of the MZ activities that was discussed at a general citizens’ assembly meeting.
Local self-government legally aims to facilitate the active participation of citizens in local 
decision-making. As the Sevarlije MZ charter states, “citizens in the MZ give initiatives, 
suggestions, opinions, participate and decide...” (Art. 6). To ensure accountability and 
transparency MZ Councils are required to organize citizens’ assembly meetings or 
referenda when deciding on issues relating to the MZ’s functioning. The Sevarlije MZ did 
not organize any referendum in 2000 or 2001. However it did call for citizen’s assembly 
meetings. According to Aziz (08.09.2002), “every time we initiate a significant activity in 
the village, when we have an issue to discuss with the people, we gather all of them to hear 
their opinion, pass on the information and make decisions concerning the action.” Issues 
addressed in 2002 included: de-mining, the organization of municipal elections, and power 
distribution.
Nevertheless, as the reconstruction process advanced, MZ members’ trust in their 
leadership began to decrease, active participation waned, and divisions within the MZ 
became more apparent. Husein Hadzic, the head of the pre-war Sevarlije MZ and one of the 
leaders of the Sevarlije Board for Return, passed away. From 1998 to 2002 three different 
MZ secretaries were appointed: Sabrija, Hamdija and Edin Hodzic. Even though Sabrija 
and Hamdija were actively involved in the return process and in the pre-war MZ, trust in 
them diminished after 1998 and Aziz felt compelled to dismiss them (08.09.2002). Aziz 
himself resigned in 2001 (but shortly afterwards was reinstated). As will be described
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below, much of the community’s disappointment in the MZ leadership was linked to its 
inability to amass sufficient resources to finance the reconstruction of all homes.
In ways similar to the NGO case studies in the last chapter, over time the Sevarlije Board 
for Return/  MZ progressively formalized its organizational practices and structures. The 
Sevarlije M Z’s leaders’ enthusiasm, ambition and ability to work long hours began to 
decrease in 2001 as their immediate goal to return to Sevarlije was fulfilled. Like in the 
Zene Zenama case, the gradual consolidation of peace affected the Sevarlije MZ as popular 
modes of thinking shifted to longer-term concerns. Another example of the Sevarlije M Z’s 
steps towards formalization was a shift in 2002 in its hiring practices. The first two MZ 
Secretaries were appointed by the MZ President without any formal selection process, 
based on friendship ties and their past experience. When the third Secretary in two years 
had to be chosen, the MZ organized a formal application procedure. Aziz (08.09.02) 
explained that “this time we advertised the post because we thought that it would be more 
democratic to give everyone who was interested in supporting the MZ the opportunity to 
apply.” Clear qualifications were sought out -  including a technical degree, and the ability 
to be highly communicative and innovative. Five persons applied and the MZ Board 
selected a person who met the criteria and was relatively young.
I. Vb Sevarlije MZ resources andfinancing:
The pre-war Sevarlije MZ financed most of its community capital improvements through 
self-contribution, but in the post-war period came to rely on international organizations for 
the donation of materials and other inputs. Between 1999-2002 the Sevarlije Board for  
Return/  MZ carried out fundraising with international organizations to finance additional 
expenditures related to community rehabilitation and reconstruction.
Some 90% dependent on international donors in 1998-2000, the Sevarlije Board for  
Return/MZ took advantage of international policy makers’ decision to prioritize support to 
minority communities when 1998 was declared the “Year of Return.” Through the use of 
targeted aid -  making assistance conditional on the return of minorities -  the international 
community tried to encourage local authorities to enforce the right to minority return 
(Vandiver, 2002, Cousens, 2002). Projects implemented to meet this goal included the
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“Open Cities” program (UNHCR), the Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF, by 
UNHCR and OHR), and bilateral assistance such as $22 million provided by the Dutch and 
$58 million by the US Governments in 2000-2001 (ICG, 2000: 17). Within this broader aid 
context, the Sevarlije MZ received its first funding from the UNHCR who provided in-kind 
assistance, as well a funds for the reconstruction of sixty four houses in support of the 
Summer 1998 return.59 In 1999 the Sevarlije MZ reconstructed another 17 UNHCR houses, 
and 40 houses through Mercy Corps Europe/ Scottish European Aid.60 In 1999-2000 the 
Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ also benefited from $1,248,950 from USAID for 
infrastructure rehabilitation, including the reconstruction of the primary school, the health 
facility/ community center, the water supply system and the electrical supply system.61 The 
Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ lobbied to obtain this support, and as Hamdija (22.10.01) 
recalled, “we did not want to wait, so we went around and begged and asked. We knew one 
or two persons in each of the international organizations that worked here before. So we 
regularly would call them up.”
The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ*s reliance on foreign funding made it highly sensitive 
to changing international priorities. In 2000 international organizations faced a large-scale 
funding gap due to the rapid rise in minority returns throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina62 
(ICG, 2000). One of the largest shortfalls was in the housing sector 63 Though the Sevarlije 
MZ continued to approach international organizations in 2000 and 2001 to fund the 
reconstruction of the approximately 300 destroyed houses remaining in the village it was 
largely unsuccessful.64 In 2000 according to Rado (08.11.01) it was evident that while there
59 Letter from UNHCR Doboj Head o f Office Mr. Oliver Burch to the Mayor of Doboj, Mr. Mirko 
Stojcinovic, dated 7 September, 1998.
60 Funds for this project were given by the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO). Mercy 
Corps Europe/ Scottish European Aid, Narrative Report, “Rehabilitation o f 40 houses in the Village o f  
Sevarlije, Municipality o f Doboj,” contract ref: ECHO/BIH/214/1998/03005.
61 USAID, Municipal Infrastructure Services Management Information System, Progress Sheet w/status by 
Municipality. 21 November, 2001.
62 The 67,447 registered minority returns (refugees and displaced persons) in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2000 
represented a 64% increase from 1999 (USCR 2001: 4).
63 In 2000 the UNHCR estimated that 23,000 houses needed to be rebuilt but that 4,700 were financed and 
planned with 3,000 being reconstructed at the time. (UNHCR 2001: 191)
64 Based on the monthly RRTF Information Sheets (created by OHR RRTF Doboj) from July 2000 to October 
2001, no donors financed reconstruction o f properties in Sevarlije until May 2001 when World Vision 
proposed to offer loans for the reconstruction o f 7 or 8 houses.
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were many new returns to Sevarlije, international agencies wished to “invest in new 
areas.”65
Though the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ could no longer depend on large voluntary 
contributions, it sought to obtain some financial support from citizens’ in particular to pay 
for community services. Local inhabitants’ revenues had significantly decreased in the 
post-war era. For example the local whitewash quarry which had provided a significant 
percentage of the “self-contributions” in the 1980s by collecting them from workers’ 
salaries, no longer functioned after 1992. From 2000 onwards, the Sevarlije Board for 
Return/MZ attempted to collect 2 DM ($1.2) per month as MZ membership fees to finance 
a small stipend for the MZ Secretary, MZ phone and electricity charges. In 2000 part of the 
members’ contributions financed the salary of a second elementary school teacher. 
According to Aziz (1.12.2001) the Sevarlije MZ was often successful in collecting the fees: 
“we try to ensure that people pay. We use the fact that people sometimes need the services 
provided by the MZ and we use those opportunities to remind them that they should pay. If 
someone is unable to we can bend the rules but that is the exception.” The MZ also 
gathered revenue through water user charges for maintenance of the water supply system. 
The Sevarlije M Z’s ability to gamer funds when citizens had no legal obligation to pay was 
impressive even if insufficient to finance capital improvement.66
When the Sevarlije MZ was unable to provide assistance for additional housing 
reconstruction it began to lose trust and respect within the Sevarlije community. A rumor 
spread in Sevarlije that the international community had placed an “embargo” on the
65 The ICG (2000: 9) also took note of the funding shortage in Sevarlije. It stated that “In the Doboj region, 
RRTF officials estimate that as o f 12 May 2000, international assistance to returnees meets about 10% of 
requirements. [...] Although 123 homes have been reconstructed in the village o f Sevarlije, 300 more families 
await funding, while an additional 50 families live under plastic sheeting or in the rubble o f their homes.”
66 In a detailed study carried out by the European Stability Initiative (ESI, 2002: 10) on the municipality of 
Kalesija another example o f how an MZ raised funds is provided. In the case of MZ Tijsici the municipality 
of Kalesija had transferred the right to rent certain buildings. The MZ amassed an annual income of 
approximately DM 100,000 that it spent on maintaining the local football club and in contributions to local 
road and water projects. In another example three MZs in Kalesija collected money ffom their citizens, hired 
a construction company and rebuilt and extended their local telephone network in 1997. Of the total cost o f 
DM 601,200, an ordinary family paid DM 590 for connection, together with a tax o f DM 154 to the PTT. The 
success of this project attracted the interest o f other local communities and the municipality. In the second 
phase, another 1,377 new connections and 888 reconnections were completed, at a total cost o f DM 878,340. 
(ESI, 2002: 13)
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village. Signs of the decrease in legitimacy of the Sevarlije MZ leadership were noted by 
Aziz, and visible to his closest international counterparts. For the first time since the return 
process began, in 2001 a group of Sevarlije returnees approached Mercy Corps Europe/ 
Scottish European Aid independently of the Sevarlije MZ seeking housing reconstruction 
and complaining that the MZ leadership was not doing enough (interview with Marko 
Nisandzic, 7.11.2001). The MZs’ reliance on international assistance, and diminishing 
citizens’ financial participation in MZ work, thus contributed to the de-legitimization of the 
MZ and its leadership.
The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ also sought resources from governmental authorities. In 
the pre-war system when MZs were considered to be a part of government, they could rely 
on governmental support to cover their administrative costs. In 1998-2002 the Sevarlije 
Board for Return/ MZ was unable to obtain more than 500 DM from the Doboj municipal 
government. Queried on why support from the Doboj municipality was so limited, Aziz
(08.09.2002) answered “I don’t know why. Maybe it’s because of the current weakness of 
the municipality, or because we are a Bosniak MZ. It could be either.” However, the 
Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ was considerably more successful in obtaining funds from 
Federation authorities. Some 20,000 DM was provided by the Zenica-Doboj Canton in 
1998,67 and in 2001 thirteen returnee families in Sevarlije received materials worth 200,000 
DM to winterize their homes. A study (ESI, 2002) carried out on the Kalesija 
Municipality (Federation) concluded that “to overcome the chronic underdevelopment 
typical of rural regions in Bosnia, municipalities must learn to use their resources to 
generate capital investment in the infrastructure and local services” in close cooperation 
with MZs. The cases described in the ESI study show positive potential, but due to its weak 
linkages with the Doboj Municipality the Sevarlije MZ was unable to obtain a sufficient 
collaboration with municipal authorities to follow such examples.
67 Requests for assistance from Citizens Association of Doboj Municipality in Zenica to the Zenica-Doboj 
Canton, Ministry o f Labor, Social Policy, Refugees and Displaced persons (2.07.1998); letter o f support from 
the Zenica-Doboj Canton, Ministry of Labor, Social Policy, Refugees and Displaced persons (15.09.98); 
receipts from the Citizens Association of Doboj Municipality in Zenica to the Zenica-Doboj Canton, Ministry 
of Labor, Social Policy, Refugees and Displaced persons (16.09.98 and 23.10.98).
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IV.c Karategin Valley VO structures:
Karategin Valley VO structures were institutionalized in a way that the community based 
organizations that preceded them had never been in Soviet times. Unlike in the Sevarlije 
MZ case, it was not the State but MSDSP which defined the governing of village 
organizations. Provisions governing the VO’s creation, responsibilities, working 
mechanisms and external linkages were elaborated in the VO Charter, which was 
developed in 2001. The Charter was based on discussions with MSDSP management and 
VO leaders. The Charter aimed to serve as a “generalized framework” (MSDSP 2001: 
Introduction) but in practice it was followed virtually to the letter by the Karategin Valley 
VO leaders interviewed. According to it VOs are representative bodies of households living 
in a given geographic locality who voluntarily come together to make decisions and 
undertake activities to advance common interests and improve the livelihoods of 
community members (MSDSP 2001, Art. 1).
Arguably the VO Charter helped fill a gap in Tajik legislation, as by 2002 no official text 
comprehensively regulated the work of local self-government bodies at the village level. 
Partly this was due to the slow pace of reform in Tajikistan. The Constitution of the 
Republic, passed in November 1994 and a series of subsequent laws lay the foundations for 
the country’s higher state bodies. A Law on Local Self-government in Towns and Villages 
existed since 1994, according to which local self-governance is described as “the system of 
organizing public activities to address issues of local importance autonomously and at their 
own discretion.” (Preamble) However while providing jamoats with duties, the law did not 
elaborate on the competencies or working mechanisms of village level bodies (Ilolov and 
Khudoiyev, 2002: 610; also UNDP 2000: 57, Freizer 2004a).69 The Presidential Office 
established a committee to work on new legislation on institutions of local self-governance
n nin 2002 to fill this void. Thus Karategin Valley VOs operated in a legal vacuum.
68 “Sevarlije returnees receive aid in construction material,” 21 November 2001, ONASA report. Yet as we 
mentioned previously this donation was just as likely to reflect the importance o f kinship as other forms of 
solidarity.
69 In 2002 356jamoats functioned on the territory o f Tajikistan. On average jamoats tended to represent some 
6-12,000 inhabitants.
70 According Rahmatillo Zoir, Legal Advisor to the President o f the RT (until July 2003), the draft would 
include several significant changes, amongst them mahallas would be for the first time included as 
institutional forms o f local self-government (interview with Zoir, 15.07. 02).
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Karategin Valley VOs were unsatisfied with their status and sought the means by which 
they could regulate it more officially. Consequently in 2002 several VO leaders planned to 
register with the Ministry of Justice according to the 1998 Law on Public Associations.71 
Registration according to this law did not provide groups with a status within the system of 
government; but rather clearly identified them as wow-governmental. VO leaders 
considering this option were therefore moving in the opposite direction from the Sevarlije 
MZ leaders’. In interviews however it seemed evident that Karategin Valley VO leaders 
were muddled in their understanding of the differences between non-governmental and 
self-government groups, for-profit and not-for-profit bodies. They did not understand their 
registration as a means of joining a broader Tajik non-governmental sector.72
Karategin Valley VOs understood registration as a way to formalize their status, broaden 
their contacts with international organizations, and obtain more funds. As the VO leader 
from Kalai-Sur explained, “When we are registered we will be able to cooperate with other 
donors and NGOs. We hope that 3-4 people from our organization will be able to get 
salaries. Our main concern now is to increase our funds, to be able to accomplish more” 
(Hokimov, 29.07.02). For the VOs registration was also a means to assert their 
independence. “Registration will allow us to be independent of the hukumat and the jamoat 
and to accomplish more,” according to VO leader Ibrohimov (25.07.02). Unlike the 
leadership of the Sevarlije MZ, the Karategin Valley VO Presidents did not aim to register 
to increase their political leverage on government.
The election of the VO leadership, as stipulated by the VO Charter exposed the Karategin 
Valley villages to a process of participatory democracy, though often without women’s 
participation. As defined in the VO Charter, the VO leadership - usually including a chair, 
deputy, bookkeeper and the head of the women’s organization - was selected through 
elections, with the participation of at least 80% of households living on the village’s
71 According to this law (Art. 5-6) “a public association is a voluntary, self-governing, non-commercial 
formation, created at the initiative o f citizens [...] to fulfil and protect the civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights and freedoms o f citizens (ICNL 1998).”
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territory. His/her mandate was for two years. Candidates for VO leadership positions were 
obliged to work as volunteers (MSDSP 2001, VO Charter, 4.1.1-4.1.6).73 The VO Charter
(4.1.2) indicated characteristics that VO leaders should have, including: the ability to put 
the interest of the village before self-interest, the belief in volunteerism, trustworthiness, 
honesty, inter-personal skills, and the trust of the people and village elders (MSDSP 2001). 
In the six Karategin Valley VOs studied the elections were held soon after the decision to 
create a VO was taken. They took place in the chaihana/ mosque, the main village 
community gathering point. However, holding the elections in this location meant that in 
three out of the six Karategin Valley VOs no women participated. In these cases separate 
women’s meetings occurred during which the head of the women’s organization was 
selected. There appear to have been few conflicts concerning the selection of leadership. 
According to the VO Charter (4.1.3) “the purpose of the elections is not to cause divisions 
in the village. The purpose of the election is to have good leadership” (MSDSP 2001). The 
only fragmentation that occurred at the village level was thus between men and women, 
included and excluded in the process, rather than between families.
The VO structure aimed to reduce opportunities for private gain by VO leaders, and 
increase public accountability of elected officials through the organization of regular 
village meetings. The leadership of the VO was not authorized to execute decisions without 
consulting the village organization as a whole. As stated in the VO Charter (4.1.8), “it is 
this holding of leaders accountable that is the essence of a participatory organization, where 
the leaders know that they are accountable not to outsiders but to insiders” (MSDSP 2001). 
By mentioning the role of “outsiders” the VO Charter inherently recognized that where 
there are donor funds a shifting of accountability from beneficiaries to donors may occur.
The holding of regular VO meetings could potentially serve as an exercise in participatory 
and deliberative democracy. At the monthly general gatherings 80% of households were
72 In summer 2002 no VOs in the Karategin Valley had officially registered though several were in the 
process of preparing the necessary documents. In GBAO* however* 6 or 7 had registered according to 
MSDSP Program Officer Mark Whitton (interview 13.07.02)
73 Significantly Tajikistan has no tradition of elections of local governmental authorities. There is a clear 
vertical chain of command in the Tajik governmental system. The President (whose last election in 2000 was 
not considered free or fair by the OSCE) appoints the heads o f the provincial and district governments, in turn 
district authorities nominate the head of Jamoats. The VO leadership thus has a unique elected mandate.
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required to be present. Such participatory decision-making and direct forms of democracy 
were possible because village organizations represented between 500 and 50 households 
living in a relatively small territory. The general gathering was considered to be the 
legitimate entity representing the community, through which citizens carried out self­
management.74 In the Karategin Valley VO meetings were held monthly with between 70- 
200 participants (depending on size of village and time of year). At the meeting local 
needs, and projects to satisfy them, were discussed and agreed upon. The extent to which 
decision-making was the product of actual debate was unclear. The VO leadership could 
also make decisions prior to the meeting and have them rubber stamped at the monthly 
gathering. At one VO meeting I observed75 there was an active discussion on the need to 
refurbish the local school, on members’ insufficient membership fee contributions, and the 
VO head was openly accused of misusing funds. The debate was lively but largely 
monopolized by a handful of VO members and ultimately inconclusive. It showed that for 
community meetings to be truly participatory necessitates more than the establishment of 
formal structures, but a mentality change based on a greater understanding of individual 
rights and responsibilities. It requires the initiation of new forms of dialogue, based on 
active listening and consensus building.
Ensuring the participation of women, youth and the poorest was a problem in the VO 
structure. According to the VO Charter (Art. 2) “from each household at least one woman 
should be a member of the Women’s Group of the VO,” but interviews revealed that this 
did not occur. In three out of the six Katategin VOs observed women and men held separate 
monthly meetings. Inevitably women discussed “women’s problems,” or the projects that 
benefited them directly such as micro-credit for women. Less frequently they talked about 
community issues such as infrastructure development or social service provision. Even 
when they did, no mechanism to feed their discussions and conclusions into the (male) 
village meeting existed. Participation by persons under 17 was not authorized and the level 
of active involvement of young males -  many who spent several months a year working in 
Russia -  appeared low.
74 “In principle, MSDSP only recognizes the general body o f the VO as a legitimate entity, and its 
development partner at the village level.” (MSDPS 2001, VO Charter 4.1.8)
75 Shul monthly VO meeting (24.07.02)
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IV. d  Karategin Valley VO resources andfinancing:
Village level organizations financed the construction of community social and physical 
infrastructure in the 1980s through the voluntary contribution of funds, materials and labor, 
obtaining some additional support from the kolkhoz. However, after Tajik independence 
and the ensuing civil war, this system collapsed and many village level organizations 
became dormant. As the Loyova VO head (Eshanov, 22.07.02) explained “when there is no 
money you don’t feel like doing anything, even talking.” VOs were often set up in reaction 
to this. “Because many people were poor in the village, we saw the creation of the VO as a 
way to get assistance from MSDSP. We had observed how MSDSP worked in other 
villages so we decided to go to them to ask for help (Piramavdov, 26.07.02).” Though 
village level organizations had existed for centuries, their re-activation and transformation 
into VOs was thus largely dependent on the availability of foreign funding. When I asked 
interviewees to explain to me the difference between the VO and the mahalla the vast 
majority responded that there was little distinction between the two but that the former had 
funds while the latter did not.
Like the Sevarlije MZ, the Karategin Valley VOs were heavily dependent on international 
donor funding, and took advantage of an aid context which privileged community 
development in the Karategin Valley. By 2001-2002, when most of the Karategin Valley 
VOs were formed, the international donor community in Tajikistan had clearly shifted their 
focus from relief to development (Abdullaev and Freizer, 2003). Amongst the main 
multilateral donors and international organizations operating in Tajikistan a new interest in 
supporting community based organizations had surfaced. The World Bank (2002b) 
argued that the strengthening of community based organizations (community-driven 
development), “is an approach that can bring a sense of empowerment and real 
opportunities back into the communities, especially the poor.” Until 2001 international 
agencies had been wary of engaging in the Karategin Valley because of security concerns.
76 International programs that had a community development approach included: the UNDP Tajikistan 
Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Development Program (RRDP) which set up Jamoat Development 
Committees (JDC), the USAID funded “Peaceful Communities Initiative” implemented by Mercy Corps 
International, the USAID “Community Action Investment Program,” the Counterpart Consortium
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However large-scale donors including USAID, GTZ and European Commission earmarked 
greater funds for the region in 2002.77 The funding available to Karetegin Valley VOs was
<70
nevertheless a fraction of what the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ benefited from.
The Karategin Valley VOs essentially relied on a single donor: MSDSP. Only the Loyova 
VO President lobbied other international organizations for funding in the same way that the 
Sevarlije MZ leadership did. The others either claimed that they needed to register 
beforehand, or seemed to be concerned that MSDSP may misconstrue their cooperation 
with other donors as disloyalty. As the Karashahr VO leader (Piramavdov, 26.07.02) 
pointed out “all international organizations want to work with their own people.” There was 
no guarantee that other international organizations would recognize the VO authority. This 
was a problem that MSDPS staff was conscious of and according to Mark Whitton
(13.07.02), “one of the key capabilities we want to judge ourselves on is the capacity and 
ability of the village organizations to access resources from other parties. We want them to 
go out to other people and get resources.” But this also engaged MSDSP and signified that 
they had to coordinate and cooperate with other international organizations/donors to 
ensure that they understood the VO concept.
Heavy reliance on MSDSP risked making Karategin Valley VOs ’ initiatives donor driven. 
Most activities and projects carried out by the Kara tegin Valley VO focused on food 
production, physical infrastructure development, and income generation. The overriding 
strategy of MSDSP’s program to support the development of VOs was to “build the 
capacity of the community to analyze village resources, plan together as a group, access 
resources, implement planned activities, assess the success of implemented activities” 
(2002a: 17). This implied that VOs should determine community needs and how to meet 
them. Nevertheless, as the Shulmak VO head (Rakhimov, 30.07.02) explained, “when we 
have a VO meeting people decide what they want. But MSDSP and other IOs have their
“Community Outreach Program” and the Swiss-funded Peace “Promotion Program for northern Tajikistan 
and southern Kyrgyzstan.”
77 In June 2002 USAID allocated $4 million to the Community Action Investment Program (CAIP) for 
Tajikistan, but focusing on the Karategin Valley. (Abdurahim Muhodiv, 14.10.02).
78 While the Sevarlije Boardfor Return/MZ obtained infrastructure rehabilitation support worth $1.248.950 in 
1998-1999 (for six projects, USAID, Municipal Infrastructure Services Management Information System,
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own criteria which it was necessary to meet.” Thus the projects that the VO proposed 
tended to be ones that they knew MSDSP was interested in funding. Two of the VO leaders 
(Kalai-Surh and Shulmak) interviewed talked about how young people requested to obtain 
VO assistance. But this had not been discussed at the VO meeting and the projects were not 
shared with MSDSP because the VO Presidents considered that they were not within 
MSDSP’s field of interest. Women in several VOs stated that, though they were pleased 
with the micro-credit they were obtaining through MSDSP, they were eager to obtain 
medical equipment or kindergartens (Kobilova and Jobirova, 31.07.02; Ismoilova, 
25.07.02, Mamadjonova, 26.07.02). Thus even though MSDSP was conscious that “VOs 
should be careful that they do not become just the ‘delivery mechanism’ for other agencies; 
that they do not turn themselves into ‘clients’” (VO 2001), this was exactly what VOs 
tended to do in practice.
MSDSP prioritized food production, infrastructure and income generation projects when 
the VO may have had a different concept of local needs. Karategin Valley VOs did not 
obtain funding for medical projects, information dissemination (access to newspapers, 
media sources, books), legal assistance, conflict resolution, educational, sports or cultural 
activities. One MSDSP staff member related his reaction during an initial village meeting, 
when a VO requested funding to re-stock its library. As he explained, “The fact is that they 
were starving, or they would be starving without humanitarian assistance [...] They wanted 
to have a library. What library? Don’t you think that it’s a problem that your village 
receives 5 to 10 tons of humanitarian assistance?” (Whitton, 13.07.02).79 MSDSP did not 
always trust or agree with the VOs’ identification of needs. In addition the donors funding 
MSDSP often earmarked their funding. For example USAID funding to MSDSP was for
fininfrastructure development. Thus even though the Kalai-Sur and Karashahr VOs clearly 
identified school renovation as their priority need in 2001, MSDSP had no donor to finance 
the work at the time (Piramavdov, 26.07.03; Hokimov, 29.07.02). Inevitably with so many
Progress Sheet w/status by Municipality, 21 November, 2001), the entire USAID grant to MSDSP for its 
operations in the Karategin Valley (i.e. in 72 villages) was $562,800 in 2002.
79 Meshcheryakov found the same phenomenon in Siberia (Tunka Valley) where he observed that “villagers 
are buying luxuries (prestige goods, things for pleasure), even though they lack basic household utensils and 
means o f transport. He attributes this to the ‘habitude produced by the Soviet regime that the population 
would be supplied with the means of production from above, while the task o f people themselves is the 
organization o f leisure according to their own ideas.’” (Meshcheryakov 1996 in Humphrey 1998: 460)
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organizations involved, the donors’ priorities often preempted those of MSDSP and of the 
VO.
Even though the Karategin Valley VOs could not depend on voluntary contributions as they 
had in the past, they continued to collect membership fees and to organize community work 
activities according to the hashar principle. Membership fees tended to range between 20 
diram -  1 somoni per person ($1=3 somoni). The poorest contributed in kind. However in 
all Karategin Valley VOs wealthy VO members or persons working abroad contributed 
more, especially during community celebrations, hashar, or to finance the purchase of 
specific public goods (a carpet for the chaihana/mosque for example). The Loyova VO 
leader (Eshanov, 22.07.02) claimed to have written to those persons originally from 
Loyova now living in Russia to inform them of the creation of a “serious organization” in 
the village and to request their support. According to MSDSP statistics the six VOs under 
study had collected 4493.6 somoni (3 somoni = $1) since the day of their foundation in
O |
membership dues. It is possible however that the VO’s collected more for village 
activities but did not include this in the “official” statistics presented to MSDPS.82
The Karategin Valley VOs were encouraged by MSDSP to increase private contributions to 
the VO in the form of cash and labor. MSDSP aimed to break with communist era practices 
whereby the state was generous in the allocation of benefits and financial support. Its 
strategy fits the liberal project of rolling back the state described in Chapter 1. Though 
MSDSP generally financed infrastructure renewal through grants, the majority of the other 
projects were supported in the form of credits to be paid back in cash or kind. The rationale 
behind the credit system was, “We do not give anything to anyone for free. We want people 
to learn how to work, to earn money for the bread themselves. Now farmers start 
understanding that in order to have something they have to work” (Saidov, 31.07.02). The 
contributions of VO members to project implementation generally ranged from 30-70% of 
total project costs. While MSDSP’s financial injection to the six Karategin Valley village
80 MSDSP Rasht Program Budget for 2002.
81 Qalai Surkh had 1205.4; Loyova: 327; Shulmak: 834; Khuja Ainee: 1459; Tagikobod: 291.2 and 
Qarashahr: 377 somoni. MSDSP, Information about the Saving of VOs of the Rasht Valley, 30.06.02.
82 As indicated above VO Presidents often helped with the organization o f weddings and funerals. The funds 
that he raised for this endeavor may not have been included in the MSDSP statistics for example.
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organizations under study was of 10,419 somoni in the first seven month of 2002, the VO’s 
contribution exceeded it by more than double, totaling 24,639 somoni.83
The Karategin Valley VOs were even less likely to turn to the government for financial 
support than the Sevarlije MZ was. None of the Karategin Valley VOs claimed to have 
obtained any state financial support since their formation. This could not be linked to a 
deliberate decision by the government to withhold funds to the VOs, as may be the case 
with the Sevarlije MZs. Rather it was more likely to be due to the weakness of local 
government and its own funding deficits.84
IV. e Comparison between MZ and VO structures andfinancing:
Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina shared similarities as post-communist states that faced 
the challenge of establishing mechanisms to ensure good governance, decentralization and 
increased accountability of governmental authorities. In 2003 though legislation has been 
passed on institutions of local government in both countries (Law on Local Self- 
Government in Towns and Villages in Tajikistan, the Law on Self-Government in the RS) 
many uncertainties remained regarding the responsibilities, structures and financing of 
institutions of local self-government. In Tajikistan local self-government was understood as 
existing at the jamoat level and not the village or mahalla one. Thus a gap below the 
jamoat existed In Bosnia-Herzegovina mjesne zajednice continued to function but with 
much less financial or legal authority than previously. Roy (2000: 89) argues that during 
Soviet times communal civil society in the kolkhoz was strong because the countryside was 
under-administered by the state. A similar governmental under-administration of local 
communities appears to have developed in post-war Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The Sevarlije MZ and the Karategin Valley VOs ’ experiences demonstrate how this void in 
governance could provide communal civil society with an opportunity for increased 
innovation, decision making, and independent initiative. However in this context the
83 Qalai Surkh: 4156; Loyova: 3324.4; Shulmak: 3679.5; Khuja Ainee: 982; Tagikobad: 8482; Qarashahr: 
4016. (MSDSP, Projects o f VOs o f Rasht Valley approved in 2002, 05.07.02).
84 State budgeting is a complex issue in Tajikistan though according to Dolov and Khudoiyev, “all statistics 
confirm the reduction o f real opportunities for local governments to invest in social, cultural, and economic 
development.” (2002: 625).
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development of effective synergies between higher authorities and community based 
groups was also limited.
The cases of the Sevarlije MZ and the Karategin Valley VOs reveal the difficulty of clearly 
conceptualizing community-based organizations in post-communist environments as 
governmental, non-governmental, or self-governing. This points to the challenge of 
standardizing institutions and concepts of self-government across country contexts. While 
the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ chose to register as a means to link more closely with 
government, the Karategin Valley VOs wished to gain more independence from local 
authorities and sought to register as “public associations”. In practice the legal status of the 
organization may even be somewhat irrelevant to any discussions on the links between civil 
society and the state. Due to the political culture in Tajikistan the government was likely to 
exercise more control over “public associations” than the state did over MZs in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina.
The Sevarlije MZ and the Karategin Valley VOs had less flexibility in defining their 
structures than did the NGOs described in the last chapter because the VOs were bound by 
MSDSP regulations, and the Sevarlije MZ by the Doboj municipal statute. Participation, 
accountability and oversight mechanisms were more clearly defined than they were for the 
NGOs. The CBOs’ representatives were elected, and citizens called upon to actively 
participate in all decision making. The VO and the MZ leadership was held accountable to 
the organizations’ membership at regular village organization meetings. However like in 
the NGO cases, strong, charismatic and trusted leadership was crucial to the success of the 
CBOs.
Community participation in decision making could be considered to be more effectively 
guaranteed in the CBOs than in the NGOs studied, yet in both the Sevarlije MZ and the 
Karategin Valley VOs full and equal participation of women was not achieved. In the Tajik 
case VO leaders evoked “shyness” and tradition to explain why women did not join mixed 
public meetings. Studies in other contexts (Eade, 1997: 112, 177-178) have found that 
tradition is frequently invoked as a form of resistance to external forces which are seen as 
morally decadent or culturally threatening by those in position of power, including male
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traditional leaders. In several instances the head of the women’s groups in the VOs 
explained that women were encouraged to be active in the Soviet era, and that they 
participated more at that time (Ms. Hokimov, 29.07.02; Ismoilova, 25.07.02). Even in the 
case of the Sevarlije Board for Return/ MZ, which was much less patriarchical than the 
Karategin Valley VOs, women played a small part in the organization’s leadership. Men 
were valued more highly as social leaders. War time harassment and violence may also 
have undermined women’s self-confidence and self-respect (Kaufman, 1997: 155-157). 
Under these conditions several of the Karategin Valley VOs choose to have women-only 
meetings, in Sevarlije women created their NGO Stublicanka as a sort of parallel women’s 
organization.
The CBOs were as highly dependent on foreign funds as the NGOs Zene Zenama and 
Ghamkhori. To a large degree international funds replaced pre-war citizens’ self­
contributions and state subsidies. When citizens provided private funds to the CBOs it was 
usually to pay for a specific service, such as the provision of water, or the salary of a 
teacher. While it might be assumed that international funding of CBOs would be inferior to 
funding of NGOs, the resources that Sevarlije Board for Return/ MZ ob tained for its 
beneficiaries and members dwarfed Zene Zenama’s budget. While the Karategin Valley 
VOs operated in an environment in which there was substantially less external funding 
available than in the Doboj municipality, the VOs relied extensively on international 
patrons. Most notably perhaps, even though the Karategin Valley VOs were receiving 
insignificant foreign funding in comparison with the other cases, they appeared to be even 
more susceptible to “donor driven projects” and “upwards accountability.”
Conclusions:
This chapter described how the Sevarlije Board for Return/ MZ and the Karategin Valley 
VOs organized in their respective post-war environments, and explained why the 
inhabitants in the two localities formed CBOs, which fit within a communal definition of 
civil society. In both the Bosnian and Tajik cases local communities reverted back to 
organizational types that existed before the war when they chose to formalize their modes 
of interaction. They set up mjesne zajednice, and village organizations that had a great deal
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in common with the former mahallas. This points to the virulence of traditional forms of 
organizing.
This chapter provided some understanding of the challenges that post-communist states 
face in their definition of new structures and practices to fill the void left by the 
disintegration of communist era forms of local self-governance. In both countries 
comprehensive and complex systems of local self-governance existed previously. Our 
findings from the Karategin Valley seem to support Roy’s (1999, 2000, 2002) argument 
concerning the “recasting of former solidarity groups into a ‘socialist’ system (2002: 127).” 
In this sense the values and power relations of traditional communal groups largely defined 
Soviet village level institutions. In the post-war era there is nothing to suggest that the same 
will not occur with the VO structures. In the Bosnian case, at least in Sevarlije, the reverse 
seems to have happened, as traditional forms of community solidarity adopted Yugoslav 
ideals and integrated into the official local self-government structure. Paradoxically, though 
Sevarlije had been more dependent upon and integrated into the state, its leadership 
remained self-motivated and organized during the war. Karategin Valley village leaders 
were apparently more passive. This may have less to do with the nature of former 
government-civil society relations than with the level of economic development, access to 
communication links and infrastructure, and closeness to urban centers, which also affected 
sentiments of greed and grievance in the community. It is likely that pre-war grievances 
were much higher in Karategin Valley communities than in rapidly industrializing villages 
around Doboj.
As with the NGO cases described in the last chapter, the success of the Karategin Valley 
VOs and the Sevarlije MZ was highly dependant on their experienced and charismatic 
leadership, system of values, ability to build trust within the community, understanding of 
donor relations, and linkages. For the CBOs, as for the NGOs, foreign funding was 
essential for survival. As we saw in the last chapter organizations benefit most from foreign 
funding when the alliance is based on common values and agreement about long-term 
objectives. Arguably the Sevarlije MZ initially had a good funding relationship with 
international partners because it developed out of a joint effort to promote minority return. 
Nevertheless, the Sevarlije MZ case also demonstrates the negative impact of large-scale
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reliance on foreign donors. Once their priorities began to shift away from Sevarlije, funding 
shortfalls caused MZ members to question its leadership’s effectiveness and to seek 
alternative modes of organizing.
Several of the findings in this chapter contradict assumptions on communal civil society 
presented in Chapter 1. In several instances, the Sevarlije MZ and Karategin Valley VOs 
behaved in ways, which theoretically seem more suited to liberal forms of civil society. 
Through its’ lobbying and advocacy efforts to make return to Sevarlije possible, the Board 
for Return openly affected policy formulation and political decision-making. The electoral 
system set up to elect MZ and VO heads promoted public participation in decision-making 
and the accountability of local leadership. Perhaps more than the NGOs in the last chapter, 
the CBOs contributed to a privatisation of state welfare provision. This was the case in 
Sevarlije where funds were collected from citizens for the use of a range of services and 
reinvested directly into the community with little or not intervention from municipal 
authorities. Similarly, in the Karategin Valley, VOs private resources were put into MSDSP 
funded projects. Like the NGOs described previously, the CBOs were highly dependent on 
foreign funds, and perhaps even more prone to upwards accountability. Somewhat 
surprisingly, considering their Soviet era linkages with government, we find no evidence 
that the CBOs benefited from greater co-operation with government officials than our case 
study NGOs did.
A key finding of this chapter is that homogeneity facilitates community organization, the 
provision of social welfare and services, and the development of communal civil society. 
The Bosnian and Tajik communities studied were characterized by ethnic, religious, and 
political homogeneity, as well as relative economic equity. They were “intra-communal” 
(Varshney, 2003: 3), and “bonding social capital” (Coletta and Cullen, 2000) insured 
cohesion. Leaders of the CBOs were tied to their communities by strong loyalties and 
interests including those based on family, neighborhood, village, ethnicity, religion, and 
political preference. A World Bank study (2002b: 6) on community development in Central 
Asia argues, “in addition to socio-economic differences, ethnic heterogeneity has shown to 
make participatory engagement very difficult and can have an adverse affect on project 
effectiveness.” The homogeneity of the Sevarlije MZ and Karategin Valley VOs may thus
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in part explain their strength. One important difference to note between the Sevarlije MZ 
and Karategin Valley VOs is that the former cooperated with “other” communal CBOs, 
mainly Serb displaced communities, while the later did not, and functioned largely 
autonomously. It was when return had been accomplished, and the Sevarlije MZ had less 
reason to cooperate with Serb groups along inter-communal lines, that tensions and 
divisions began to appear within its own structure.
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C h a p t e r  S i x :
C i v i l  s o c i e t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ’ a f f e c t  o n  p e a c e  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  i n  
T a j i k i s t a n  a n d  B o s n i a - H e r z e g o v i n a
Introduction:
Having considered civil society organizations’ characteristics in postwar post communist 
contexts through four case studies I now return to the original question posed at the start of 
this dissertation, “what type o f civil society is most likely to affect peace?” More 
specifically, I will try to determine, whether communal or liberal forms of civil society 
have made positive contributions to peace consolidation. As described in Chapter 2 four of 
the main approaches to peace consolidation present different theoretical answers to this 
question. Institution building approaches to peace building consider that NGOs can support 
the strengthening of democratic institutions, economic liberalization, and the privatization 
of social service delivery. Conflict resolution proponents argue that both CBOs and NGOs 
can improve contacts and trust between former warring sides; modify values and modes of 
dialogue; and increase group cohesion and the initiation of common action. Political 
economists are less convinced about the impact that civil society organizations can have on 
the juxtaposition of greed and grievance that makes the use of armed violence more likely. 
They tend to favor CBOs as the agent most likely to reduce grievances. The human rights 
based approach contends that a specific form of liberal civil society - tolerant, activist and 
committed to the protection of human rights -  can contribute to peace. In the following 
chapter we will determine to what extent these assumptions about civil society 
organizations’ ability to positively affect peace consolidation are verifiable in the Tajik and 
Bosnian context, where five years after the end of war peace was being consolidated, albeit 
to different degrees depending on which approach to peace is favored.
I. Civil society organizations’ affect on institution building.
As we saw in Chapter 2, Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina continued to face institutional 
peace consolidation challenges five years after the end of war. Peace agreements in both
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countries laid the framework for new democratic governments. A series of elections, which 
partly met international standards, had been held. For the first time since independence, a 
coalition of non-nationalist parties had won majorities in the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Parliamentary Assembly and the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as 
well as in several lower level races in 2000. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the challenge of 
establishing a functioning “unified” government remained nevertheless largely unfulfilled 
as many of the institutions of a centralized state -  an army, supreme court, common 
ministries -  were weak or non-existent. In Tajikistan the government and the opposition 
had agreed upon and implemented a power-sharing agreement, and the president had 
effectively centralized many state powers. As the executive was increasingly dominating 
the political system, institutions and mechanisms for public participation remained weak 
(ICG, 2003: 10-11). In both countries the extent to which the state should be centralized or 
decentralized remained a point of contention. Efficient revenue collection and delivery of 
public services were problematic. Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina were publicly 
committed to liberalizing their economies, yet little sustainable macro-economic 
development had occurred.
I.a Civil society organizations ’ contribution to democratic institution building 
Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina emerged from war as new states challenged by the task 
of establishing effective democratic political institutions. At first glance the CBOs and 
NGOs we observed appear to have had little impact on this process. In Bosnia-Herzegovina 
the responsibilities and relationships of state bodies were defined in the Constitution 
(Annex 4 of the GFAP), drafted in the US to which few Bosnian elites or citizens, let alone 
civil society contributed (Cox, 2003: 253). In Tajikistan a parallel Inter-Tajik Dialogue 
with civil society activists to some degree contributed to the official negotiation process 
leading to the 1997 General Agreement. Four Dialogue participants became part of the 
Commission on National Reconciliation in charge of the agreement’s implementation and 
drafting new legislation. Nevertheless the number of civil society actors engaged was 
limited, and the extent and nature of their influence on political decision making during and 
after the war difficult to determine (Saunders, 1999: 147-170; Slim and Saunders, 2001: 
46-47).
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Though the organizations we studied did not bring about changes within regional or 
national level institutions or decision-making, it can be argued that they affected local level 
governance, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Amongst the four organizations observed, 
only Zhene Zhenama had contacts with federal state officials, and these were of a personal 
nature rather than institutionalized. However, all four had a degree of contact with 
municipal level authorities. At the municipal level, the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ, had 
a particularly important impact, by contributing directly to the (re)unification of municipal 
governmental structures. Aziz served simultaneously at one time as the MZ President and 
as a delegate in the Doboj Municipality Assembly. Rather than boycotting or obstructing a 
municipal body, which was part of the Serb Republic system of government, the head of 
the MZ, and the Bosniak community he represented, chose to actively participate in policy 
making. When it registered as an MZ in the RS, the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ 
countered fragmentation of lower government along national lines. The Sevarlije Board for 
Return MZ also strengthened its members’ citizenship ties to the RS by encouraging them 
to take RS ID cards, register as RS residents, and receive RS pensions. Thus the Sevarlije 
Board for Return/MZ defied the fragmentation of formal Bosnian institutions, and 
contributed to the building of more effective municipal level bodies. The leadership of 
Zhene Zhenama was not directly involved in local government but several persons who 
benefited from its programs were elected to local office. This was particularly noteworthy 
in Brcko where the election of eight women of different national/ethnic background, who 
had previously participated in Zhene Zhenama training sessions, strengthened the multi­
national character of the town authority.
We find even more evidence to argue that CBOs, such as those studied in Tajikistan and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, can facilitate decentralization and the strengthening of local self- 
government. The Karategin Valley VOs and Sevarlije MZ were influenced by their past 
experiences as institutions of local self-government in Soviet/Yugoslav times, and sought 
to regain capacities to fill voids in local level governance after the war. An institutional 
interpretation of the Tajik and Bosnian wars - where the conflict was largely seen as the 
outcome of a competition for control over state institutions/resources after the 
disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia - underlines the importance of decentralization. 
While the system of government in Bosnia-Herzegovina was highly decentralized -  at least
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until the cantonal level -  in Tajikistan it was the opposite. Whether centralization or 
decentralization is more likely to positively affect peace remains an issue of debate. As has 
been shown in other cases (Kaufman, 1997: 13) decentralization’s positive aspects are 
often reduced when the state is unable to balance demands among competing groups; local 
government resources are weak; and political, ethnic, regional and gender polarization 
threatens community cohesion. In Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina tensions existed in 
the post-war period between the need for decentralization to promote more responsive 
government and greater popular participation in public affairs, and the equally critical need 
to ensure that the state remained unified with functioning institutions.
The case study CBOs were critical not only in promoting decentralization per se, but also 
in increasing the democratic foundation of local self-government. As Bojicic-Dzelilovic 
(2003: 300) demonstrates in her study of decentralization in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
comparing the situation in Mostar with that of Tuzla, “decentralization by itself is not 
sufficient in fostering democratic processes conducive to conflict management.” She argues 
that institutions of local self-governance must be shepherded by democratic values, and be 
politically and socially inclusive, for them to positively affect peace. All my case study 
organizations promoted the institutionalization of elections as a mode of selecting 
community leaders. Due to the nature of communism in the Soviet Union, in Tajikistan, 
citizens’ experience with direct democracy and multi-candidate electoral politics was 
weaker than in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yet the Karategin Valley VOs implemented a system 
by which village organization officials were selected through open suffrage rather than by 
appointment by higher state bodies. Ghamkhori also encouraged mahalla committees to 
elect their officials rather than acquiesce to their top down appointment. As will be 
described subsequently, however, a lack of women’s full inclusion in the Karategin Valley 
VOs was a significant problem which arguably limited the positive benefit of 
decentralization.
As institutions of local self-government the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ and the 
Karategin Valley VOs also promoted greater participation in local decision-making. 
Regular meetings of MZ and VO members and staff were accompanied by debates on the 
prioritization of needs and the means to address them. The two CBOs were in a position to
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provide information on local needs and to represent the interests of their communities vis- 
a-vis domestic authorities and international agencies. The OSCE Mission to Bosnia- 
Herzegovina (2003: 2) thus contended that institutions of local self-government “can be 
utilized as interest groups, providing a forum for particular community interests at higher 
levels of government [....] In addition, given the population size of most municipalities, 
particularly in rural areas, the MZs are an effective method of incorporating greater citizens 
participation.” The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ and the Karategin Valley VOs appears to 
corroborate these assumptions by contributing to increasing citizens’ participation in local 
affairs.
Beyond the local and municipal level, the civil society organizations we studied enhanced 
formerly disenfranchised citizens’ public participation in electoral politics. The Sevarlije 
Board for Return/MZ encouraged Bosniaks to take part in RS level elections in 2000. By 
providing confidence and support to women, as well as skill development and training, 
Zhene Zhenama increased women’s participation as candidates, voters and members of 
government at the national and local level. The NGOs’ affect on elections was 
institutionalized in 1998 when Bosnian electoral rules and regulations were modified to 
increase the number o f women on candidate lists. Zhene Zhenama also helped produce new 
leaders at the local level, for example in Brcko where women who had previously 
participated in Zhene Zhenama training sessions obtained positions in the city government 
in 2001. The Tajik case studies were not similarly active in the 1999-2000 election process. 
In 2002 it was early to tell what their influence might be on the scheduled February 2005 
parliamentary suffrage. Karategin Valley VO leaders denied having any interest in party 
politics; yet in 2002 Ghamkhori was beginning to consider what role it could play to 
increase participation in the elections, especially for women. Amongst my four case 
studies, I did not observe any formal relations between civil society organizations and 
political parties, linkages between activists in the two types of groups were weak. The 
organizations had little or no influence on candidates, political party platforms or party 
decision-making.
Three out of four o»f the civil society organizations influenced policy formulation and 
implementation witlh regard to issues of direct relevance to post-conflict peace
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consolidation through their educational and information dissemination activities. Zhene 
Zhenama affected government agenda setting, policy development and policy 
implementation with regards to women’s rights protection, increasing the number of 
women in public office, trafficking and domestic violence prevention. The Sevarlije Board 
for Return/ MZ and the refugee/DP organizations with which it networked were highly 
effective in maintaining minority return as a pressing political issue among domestic and 
international political bodies. By 2002 Ghamkhori had also initiated a dialogue with 
municipal authorities on issues related to women’s health and rights. It had begun to 
contribute to policy formulation on domestic violence and primary health care.
I.b Civil society organizations ’ support o f economic liberalization and the privatization 
o f social service provision 
I find no evidence that the civil society organizations observed in Tajikistan and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina had any influence on macro-economic trends in the post-war period. They 
played little or no role in transforming wartime economies to market orientated ones or in 
the privatization process. However it can be argued that they had an affect on community 
level physical and social infrastructure maintenance and development. In post-war 
Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where social institutions and social policy were 
weakened by the substantial economic, social and political transformations that 
accompanied the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, civil society organizations 
stepped in to help fill the void.
During the war and in the immediate post war period, international humanitarian and 
development agencies encouraged a privatization of welfare assistance by working mainly 
with local NGOs to implement a host of programs in food sustainability, health and 
education. The groups with which they cooperated became known as “service delivery 
NGOs” (Stubbs, 2000). They were financed to provide a range of services to vulnerable 
groups which otherwise may not have been offered, or would have been provided by the 
state sector in pre-war times. Some critics (Smillie 1996; Stubbs 2000, 2001) who analyzed 
the Bosnian situation have argued that in doing so international agencies promoted a 
Westem-style liberal model of social service provision, which incidentally also fit within 
their liberal peace building project. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Stubbs (2001: 132)
240
Chapter six
argues that in the post-war period there was not only a “liberalization” of social policy but 
also an “ethnicization.” This was due to post-Dayton structures of government and the 
ethnic allegiances of many civil society organizations where “separate ethnicized claims 
and loyalties are legitimized, leading to three separate welfare regimes underpinned by a 
social vision which limits reciprocal relations.”
Evidence from my case studies rejects the strongest criticisms of civil society involvement 
in social service provision. Rather than serving as an alternative to the state, the NGOs and 
CBOs complemented governmental initiatives, filling crucial gaps. As one Bosnian activist 
(Mevlida Kunosic, 19.03.01) explained government officials were learning that there are 
“some programmes that they can implement better with NGOs than alone.” For example 
Ghamkhori provided training to nurses on home birthing methods, as some 80% of rural 
women no longer went to state clinics to give birth; and hygiene courses in villages where 
water sources had become contaminated. The Sevarlije MZ re-started the local school, 
collected money to pay for a teacher’s salary, and through its women’s group, ran a 
kindergarten. The NGOs and CBOs we observed targeted populations that tended to remain 
excluded from state assistance schemes, and engaged in activities which the state often 
deemed non essential. They supported hard to reach mountain inhabitants -  as existed in 
Tajikistan -  as well as other disenfranchised groups including women, minorities, former 
combatants and youth. As we saw in the Sevarlije MZ and Karategin VO cases, community 
based organizations also mobilized to meet social needs which carry highly symbolic and 
personal meanings -  such as marriages or funerals -  but would otherwise not be considered 
as high priorities for community survival. NGOs in particular could address un-popular, 
sensitive problems, such as post-trauma stress disorder, domestic violence and trafficking 
which for mainly political reasons governmental bodies tended to discount as nonexistent 
or unimportant.
Civil society organizations further contributed to service provision by diminishing tensions 
between citizens and the state with regard to the allocation of services. Of relevance to 
Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina it has been found that “the Communist system left a 
double legacy: individuals are likely to have a high degree of trust in their immediate social 
network, and a high degree of distrust in the formal institutions of the state (WB 2002a:
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133).” In Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens’ trust in the effectiveness, honesty 
and neutrality of state institutions decreased in the 1990s (UNDP 2001, WB 2002a). The 
state was caught in a vicious circle where government collected low levels of tax-based 
revenue, which provided little to finance social services, which created greater public 
discontent as well as incentives for corruption and a decreased willingness to pay taxes.
In this environment the civil society organizations I studied served as mediators to improve 
trust. Thus Ghamkhori’s lawyers working with victims of domestic violence succeeded in 
encouraging women to address local courts with their grievances. Due to its privileged 
access to rural women, and its knowledge about their needs, the NGO also served as a 
useful information source for state authorities, increasing their awareness, and influencing 
them to change their response mechanisms. In the RS, the Sevarlije MZ was an 
intermediary between the returnee Bosniak community, international organizations and 
local Serb authorities, building trust on all sides. This was essential as “municipal leaders 
had significant decision-making power over the distribution of social benefits and 
community services, from access to humanitarian assistance to medical care, education and 
pensions (Cousens, 2001: 81).” The Sevarlije MZ liaised directly with municipal 
authorities, provided them with information on needs, advocated for assistance and to some 
decree succeeded in re-establishing trust vis-a-vis the state within its community. Working 
closely with international organizations and MZ members, it also contributed to reducing 
some of the tensions that tend to arise within communities over the distribution of external 
aid. Based on their knowledge of needs civil society organizations were in a position to 
establish fairer and more transparent criteria concerning aid allocation. Thus our case study 
organizations provided select services while also encouraging the communities they 
worked with to rely on coping mechanisms that supported state legitimacy and capacity. 
They played a unique role as “bridging organizations” (Brown, 1998: 230) and “brokers” 
(Smith, 1998: 217).
Rather than exacerbating an “ethnicization” of social service provision (Stubbs, 2001: 132) 
three of the case study organizations counteracted the fragmentation of state assistance. The 
Sevarlije MZ was the most clear in this regard when it accepted in its Bosniak community 
RS provided services such as the RS school curriculum, policing by Doboj law
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enforcement officers, and a RS based medical professional in its village clinic. To gain 
access to these services the MZ lobbied authorities in Doboj and Banja Luka. NGOs like 
Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori were one of the few institutions in the post-war period 
who provided service regardless of ethnicity/regional background and purposely sought out 
persons who had been excluded based on their identity. They also encouraged their 
beneficiaries to have recourse to official institutions regardless of their ethnicity: thus for 
example Ghamkhori bolstered Garmi women’s confidence to visit medical and legal 
professionals regardless of whether they were Garmi or not.
Our case studies show the potential for civil society organizations to contribute to more 
effective service provision by recommending new methodologies and tailoring them to 
local realities. Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori thus piloted innovative approaches to 
address new problems, providing amongst other services, psychosocial assistance in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and free legal aid in Tajikistan. The Karategin Valley VOs managed 
revolving funds -  a credit concept that had never been formalized in the country 
previously. Faced with sharply rising cases of typhoid and malaria, and a breakdown in 
state health care provision, Ghamkhori taught alternative medicine and traditional disease 
prevention rather than employing treatments highly reliant on costly imported medication. 
They claimed (Bahodur and Mikhail, 14.06.02) that their methods “saved lives and 
welfare” and that the Department of Health credited them with reducing by 2-3 times the 
number of typhoid cases in the villages in which they worked (Mikhail, 24.05.02). 
Ghamkhori staff used previously unknown interactive teaching methods, and trained rural 
teachers in similar methodologies. Ultimately the leaders of the case study organizations 
hoped that their innovative methods would be adopted amongst state bodies and 
professionals working in the public sector.
Studies of social developments in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union describe how 
community based organizations played a role in physical infrastructure development 
(Lockwood 1975; Roy 2000). In the 1980s, in both countries, community based groups 
facilitated capital gains projects by mobilizing community resources and implementing 
works. My case study CBOs continued to organize community actions to contribute to the 
rehabilitation of destroyed social and physical infrastructure. They could no longer rely on
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state bodies to assist them with finance or machinery, and community members no longer 
possessed the same financial resources as they did before the war. Yet even in a context of 
declining wealth, the CBOs succeeded in collecting rare community resources which were 
supplemented by foreign aid. Where government had assisted previously in the post-war 
post communist context, foreign financing was providing the necessary structures through 
which to mobilize community self-help and mutual aid. The CBOs provided capacity to 
build and maintain village infrastructure; they also collected user fees.
Lastly the cases demonstrate how civil society groups can positively affect economic 
development in the “employment marketplace” by providing jobs to middle class 
professionals and minorities whose skills would often otherwise remain dormant, or who 
would choose the immigration route. Positively Goodhand and Chamberlain (2000: 1000) 
note that in this way the organizations “may also be producing an important resource: a 
cadre of ‘organic intellectuals’ with community-mobilizing skills.” Other observers (Roy 
2002: 143; Stubbs, 2000) have argued that this trend creates distortions in the local labor 
market as the non-governmental sector supported by outside funding diverts scarce human 
resources from the public sector. However Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori in particular 
hired medical, legal and educational professionals who were part of national minorities and 
who were likely to remain unemployed or under-employed in governmental jobs generally 
controlled by nationalist elites. They also operated in a high-unemployment environment 
where the lack of human capital was not (yet) a problem.
My evidence suggests that civil society organizations can have a positive affect on the 
consolidation of institution building but in less explicit ways than suggested in the 
literature. I find that civil society organizations have a role to play in strengthening linkages 
between citizens and local government, thus inherently increasing state legitimacy and 
capacity; by supporting decentralization, increased public participation, and the definition 
of policies that responded to minority concerns, in particular those of women. One of my 
key findings is that in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan CBOs are just as likely, if not 
more, than NGOs to positively affect institution building. In particular CBOs demonstrate 
an ability to support improvements in public participation in community decision-making, 
public service delivery, infrastructure maintenance and development. The Karategin Valley
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VOs failed nevertheless to ensure full inclusion in decision-making for women. Our 
findings tend to support conclusions drawn by Kaufman and Alfonso (1997: 12-13) based 
on a six country comparative study of community-based organizations. They argue that 
CBOs have the potential of serving as guarantors of popular participation at the community 
level and in relation to national politics and decision-making; of harnessing untapped 
economic and human resources; of assisting in the provision of social services; and of 
providing community self-defense. In Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina I also found 
CBOs making an impact in all these areas -  except in the crucial task of influencing 
national politics and decision-making, where the case study NGOs were equally weak.
II. Civil society organizations’ affect on conflict resolution.
Conflict resolution proponents argue that peace is fundamentally dependent on changes in 
human relationships. “Until relationships are changed, deep-rooted human conflicts are not 
likely to be resolved (Saunders, 1999: 30).” Analyzing relationships for an external 
observer is a particularly difficult exercise. Recalling some of the discussion in Chapter III 
on the problems of conducting research in post-conflict environments, it is important to 
note that long term engagement in a war-torn country can provide a better framework for 
analysis. Thus for this writer -  with experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina dating back to 1993 
-  by 2000 it was evident that personal relationships between Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks 
had altered since the war years. In addition physical changes were visible: citizens traveled 
from one part of the country to the other regardless of what “ethnic” territory they crossed; 
the media no longer spewed viscous hate messages; cross-entity initiatives in a host of 
fields were commencing; “minority” religious institutions were being re-built in both 
entities...
In Tajikistan in 2002 on the surface there was little or no public expression of hate or anger 
among people from different regions. The peace building project appeared to have 
overcome the desire for revenge. Yet in 2002 government and administration continued to 
be dominated by officials from the President’s Kuliob region and dissatisfaction remained 
amongst regional elites who felt excluded from power. Poor transport links insured a lack 
of contacts between people from different regions. Especially in areas where people from 
one regional group were perceived to have committed atrocities against others during the
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war, animosities remained. In a village outside Kurgan Tuppe visited in 2002, mothers 
described how they would not let their (Garmi/Karategin Valley) daughters go to school 
because on the way they had to pass a section of the hamlet where people originally from 
Kuliob lived. There “they may be attacked by Kuliobi boys” the women claimed (2.06.02).
Throughout this study one crosscutting question that has repeatedly arisen is “to what 
extent does civil society have to be inter-communal to positively affect peace 
consolidation? ” Findings from past studies come to conflicting conclusions. Coletta and 
Cullen argue that reconstruction efforts should build on existing forms of bonding social 
capital, while seeking opportunities to strengthen nascent bridging social capital to spur 
social cohesion and peace. They hypothesize (2000: 122) that bonding and bridging social 
capital are complementary as “resilient communities rely on all forms of responsibility and 
social capital: bonding primary ties for protection and survival in times of crisis; bridging 
links for action and development in times of hope.” In Ethnic Conflict and Civil Life 
Varshney comes to the opposite conclusion stating (2002: 46) “Intercommunal engagement 
leads to the formation of what might be called institutionalized peace systems. 
Engagement, if only intracommunal, is often associated with what Paul Brass calls 
institutionalized riot systems.” Varshney’s argument is thus that intra-communal 
organizations and bonding social capital’s affect on peace should be the reverse of inter­
communal groups’ and bridging social capital’s contribution.
This debate is particularly relevant to this study because the case studies can be considered 
as representing forms of bonding and bridging social capital. The NGOs that we studied 
were multi-ethnic, committed to values of tolerance, and to working with citizens across 
national, educational, and gender, divides. On the other hand, ethnic, religious, political 
homogeneity, as well as relative economic equity characterized the CBOs we observed.
II. a Civil society organizations and the strengthening o f contacts and trust between
former warring parties.
All four of the case study organizations played a direct role in promoting contacts within 
local communities, and building inter-group trust. The Sevarlije MZJ Board for Return 
maintained high levels of community confidence in the MZ leadership, and cohesion
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amongst the displaced, successfully rallying them around a common vision of return to 
their pre-war homes. Similarly Zhene Zhenama offered a forum for women of different 
backgrounds to come together, treat each other with mutual respect and confidence. The 
Ghamkhori Women’s Center was another example of a “space” that provided interaction, 
and the opportunity for dialogue, in a “civil” environment. According to Ghamkhori staff, 
traditionally women were discouraged from relating their problems openly to others within 
their rural communities (staff, 24.05.02). Thus the environments that the Tajik and Bosnian 
NGO created were unique spaces within highly polarized, intolerant, and closed post-war 
environments. Through its community development support activities, the Tajik NGO also 
re-unified mahalla communities that had largely remained dormant since the breakup of the 
Soviet kolkhoz system. The Karategin Valley VOs provided an opportunity to 
institutionalize what were previously informal relations and interactions at the village level.
Yet within these “unique spaces” it was mainly the NGOs that provided their members, 
staff and beneficiaries with sufficient self-confidence and skills to engage in public life and 
openly formulate their interests. After the disintegration of the socialist systems of 
governance in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and years of internal war, citizens in 
both countries tended to be publicly passive, and less ready to engage in political debate. 
Zhene Zhenama and Ghamkhori both provided workplaces for multi-national staff to gain 
confidence. The NGOs nurtured a cadre of new leaders. They also gave confidence to new 
community activists -  among previously disenfranchised groups such as women, displaced 
persons, and poor rural citizens - who over time could potentially lead local political 
processes or exert pressure from below on higher level authorities.
Three out of four of the organizations that we observed contributed to opening 
communication channels between members of former warring parties -  thus beginning a 
process of transformation of their antagonistic relationship. The Sevarlije MZ/ Board for 
Return built contacts with Serb displaced persons and the Doboj municipality -  before 
return was achieved it participated in 77 meetings with Serb representatives and members 
of international organizations. Overtime the tone of the meetings changed from one of open 
hostility to one of cooperation. As one observer remembers “the process of negotiation in a 
way crystallized the pattern of how return should be done (Rado, 08.11.01).” This supports
247
Chapter six
Saunders hypothesis that “sustained dialogue is the instrument that citizens outside 
government use for addressing the human dimension of conflict to change their 
relationships (Saunders, 1999: xxiii).” Such dialogue is likely to produce “shared problem 
definitions” which in turn are powerful incentives for further contact (Brown, 1998: 234). 
Similarly Zhene Zhenama organized a host of activities bringing together women from 
different national groups throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. One example of this was the 
Brcko roundtable described in Chapter 4 where, after two and a half years of regular 
meetings, Bosniak, Serb, and Croat women developed sufficient trust to establish a 
common women’s group. Though Ghamkhori was less focused on promoting inter­
national/ethnic ties than were the two case studies from Bosnia-Herzegovina, it also 
worked with antagonistic Garmi and Kuliobi groups. As described in Chapter 4, through its 
community development efforts in mixed villages such as Chapaev, Ghamkhori bred 
cooperation and trust between Garmis and Kuliobis.
II. b Transforming values and modes o f dialogue:
Conflict resolution theorists emphasize the cultural and psychological aspects of peace 
consolidation. The conflict resolution project thus seeks in-depth transformations in society 
-  paraphrasing Vaclav Havel, Saunders argues that “’We should fundamentally change 
how we behave’ [...] That different way of relating is the foundation for a peaceful society 
(Saunders 1999: 243).” Changing behavior inherently signifies forgiving and accepting the 
“other”. Ways to change behavior include transforming the language, images, and modes of 
dialogue employed by post-war societies. Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002: 214-215) 
found that civil society organizations contributed significantly to this process in three post­
conflict settings. Civil society groups were successful through “their ability to create 
cultural images and symbols that provided new and novel frames for the definition and 
resolution of the conflicts. Once these new frames were accepted more broadly into public 
discourse, they provided powerful alternative models on how to think about, respond to, 
and resolve the conflict.”
Three of the organizations studied dared to take the first step towards reconciliation; 
legitimizing contact and dialogue between different national groups; undermining wartime 
fears, prejudices, and hatreds; and creating a momentum that other citizens could follow.
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Zhene Zhenama’s leaders were part of the first activists to travel to the RS and Herzegovina 
to meet with women “from the other side.” When they did so in 1995 they broke a 
paralyzing taboo created by a nationalist media. They were part of a broader movement in 
which, according to one analyst (Lejla Somun, 24.03.01), “NGOs’ main peace-building 
role was forming ties between people [...] NGOs were channels for information which 
created conditions for reconciliation.” Dialoging with Serb authorities, and increasingly 
cooperating with them, the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ similarly showed that Bosniak 
return to the RS was a real option. The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ steps gave impetus 
to other Bosniak returnee groups to organize similarly. UNHCR officers recognized the 
significance of disseminating the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ’s experience to other 
groups of displaced persons. In several instances UNHCR facilitated meetings between the 
Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ and the leaders of other displaced communities so that they 
could describe how the negotiation process had succeeded. Working in mixed villages 
Ghamkhori also encouraged people of different regional backgrounds to meet for the first 
time since the end of the war.
In the post-war period changing the language, images and symbols popularly used to think 
about the conflict was of particular importance. Ignatieff (1997: 70-71) argued that even the 
most virulent nationalist in the Bosnian war could be transformed into “something decent 
and human, if only he could read a newspaper or listen to a television broadcast that didn’t 
poison him with hate and lies [...] that addressed him as a rational human being.” From its 
creation Zhene Zhenama’s leadership was committed to helping its beneficiaries see the 
“source of creativity as being in the diversity of relationships among human beings (Nuna,
14.11.01).” A multinational Bosnia-Herzegovina was promoted as the foundation of peace 
and stability rather than as a threat. While ultra-nationalists controlled the media, the NGOs 
could do little to change the public discourse. However, when traveling to Eastern RS in 
1996-1998, Zhene Zhenama staff brought newspapers from the Federation to give their 
Serb beneficiaries an alternative discourse on the war and its aftermath. Gradually Zhene 
Zhenama succeeded in insuring that the media adopted some of its language, by going on 
the air to broadcast stories on women’s issues and inter-ethnic reconciliation, thus 
increasing the likelihood that its ideas would gain currency in the wider public. On the 
other hand for several months the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ refused to allow its
249
Chapter six
members to speak with journalists fearful that they would publicly distort the image of 
return before it was firmly secured. Only after return was well underway did the Sevarlije 
Boardfor Return/MZ's invite the media to publicize its message that for Bosniaks to live in 
the RS was possible. In its strategy to diminish violence against women, Ghamkhori also 
actively disseminated through the media information on gender issues. Like the 
organizations studied by Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002: 205), our cases were able to 
transform modes of dialogue, and define new frames to describe the conflict and its 
solutions, through judicious cooperation with the media. Or as one Bosnian activist (Bulic,
21.03.01) explained, our cases played a significant role, because in post war situations 
“when normal values are discredited, civil society is the one which should bring normal 
values back.”
The NGOs also contributed to the conflict resolution process of forgiveness “transforming 
certain emotions (moving from anger to affinity) and transcending certain beliefs about 
oneself and the other that open the possibility of new beneficial relations (Long and 
Brecke, 2003:23).” To transform negative images of “the other” Zhene Zhenama advanced 
novel methods to talk about guilt, pain, and trust, based on its experience with Western 
psycho-social and conflict resolution approaches. It taught its staff and members to be 
critical and think independently firstly about themselves, than about their self-perceived 
enemies.
II. c Civil society organizations' affect on building group cohesion and the initiation o f
common actions.
In Tajikistan, building group cohesion towards peace consolidation signified encouraging 
community members to take control over their own lives and to agree on a common vision 
about what they wanted their community to look like.1 The Tajik case studies thus assisted 
different groups within single communities to come together, publicly discuss interests, 
make decisions on the allocation of scarce resources, and divide tasks to carry out common 
actions. In monthly VO meetings the Karategin Valley VOs facilitated the development of a
1 Participants in the Inter-Tajik Dialogue process which began in 1993 and continued in 2002 found in 1996 
that “one o f the main obstacles to peace is lack o f common vision about what kind o f country the Tajikistani 
people want. . ..A common vision shared by the citizens of the country is the necessary foundation for a 
negotiated peace agreement” (quoted in Saunders 1999: 165).
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unified discourse on community interests -  which at least in the public forum of the VO 
appeared to transcend personal interests, though not gender divides. Community members 
who contributed their own financial and in-kind resources to projects (funded by MSDSP) 
appeared to feel greater ownership, responsibility and pride over project outcomes. 
Ghamkhori’s mission was to help communities help themselves and through the 
establishment of mahalla committees it encouraged citizens to take responsibility with 
regard to the collection and allocation of scarce resources. Through its community 
development activities Ghamkhori assisted communities carry out essential work such as 
physical infrastructure maintenance, and implement new efforts such as Street Day in 
Chapaev, which promoted the image of a unified, proud and productive village.
The Sevarlije case provides a good example of how a CBO’s efforts could gradually build 
trust between two hostile communities, leading to the definition of common interests and 
the implementation of collective actions. Within their ethnically homogenous communities, 
the Bosniak and Serb MZ leaders first gained their MZ members’ trust, based on their 
national affiliation, wartime experiences, and political positions. After months of regular 
negotiations, the confidence they benefited from improved the CBO leaders’ abilities to 
persuade their communities to accept difficult compromises. Serb and Bosniak MZ 
representatives reached agreement on the return issue when, through sustained dialogue, 
return no longer presented itself as a threat to Serb interests. Instead after the first Bosniak 
returns to Sevarlije in 1998, Serb DPs began to assist them in house reconstruction. When 
Serb DPs began to return to their own villages in the Federation, the Bosniak and Serb MZ 
members were further bonded by a mutual interest in return. Sevarlije MZ representatives 
assisted them in developing relationships with IOs and obtaining building materials. 
Ultimately in May 2000 the Sevarlije Board for Return organized the exhumation and re­
burying of persons killed in Sevarlije at the start of the war, or later when they were 
displaced. At the time some 5000 people attended the ceremony, including law 
enforcement from Doboj who assured security. The Bosniak and Serb communities had
2 For example speaking about the Serb head o f the Pridjel MZ community who came to agreements with the 
Sevarlije Boardfor Return in 1998, the UNHCR program officer explained, “he was very exposed and 
blamed by the radicals. It was maybe only because he was a radical as well that he passed relatively safely 
through all that. He always publicly appeared to be a radical person, but privately we achieved things with 
him.” (Rado, November, 2001).
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reached what Ignatieff (1997: 190) terms “the last dimension of reconciliation -  the 
mourning of the dead,” when the desire for revenge had been replaced by “rituals in which 
communities once at war learn to mourn their dead together.”
It is useful to return to the issue of decentralization of local governance and decision­
making to assess whether it can affect reconciliation. As noted in previous chapters, Seroka 
and Smiljkovic (1986: 252-253) have argued that devolution of decision-making to the 
local level was instrumental to the reduction of conflict and factionalism within local 
communities in the former Yugoslavia in the 1980s. On one hand devolution provides 
groups with the opportunity to organize along national lines. On the other hand it makes it 
easier for intra or inter-communal associations to cooperate to resolve common problems. 
In the Sevarlije case devolution made direct discussions between the Sevarlije MZV Board 
fo r Return, Serb displaced persons and municipal authorities possible. None of the partners 
had to wait for agreements to be made at higher levels of government. International 
organizations could negotiate with the MZs without any intermediaries. Decisions taken 
between the Sevarlije MZJ Board for Return, Serb displaced persons and international 
authorities could be immediately implemented. When decision making is devolved the 
chance for opposition groups to identity and act upon common interests is greater.
The case studies confirm conflict resolution literature hypotheses concerning civil society 
organizations’ ability to transform hostile relationships. Overall in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Tajikistan the NGO case studies appear to have advanced conflict resolution as much, if not 
more, than the CBOs. Compared with the Bosnian cases, the two Tajik groups were less 
effective at transcending divisions based on region, ideology or gender. The Karategin 
Valley VOs’ did not appear to have any affect on reconciliation between different 
communities, in particular between antagonists from different Tajik regions. The Karategin 
Valley VOs ’ limited impact could be due to the weakness of their formal linkages outside 
their village, their lack of common interests and shared wartime experience with other 
regional communities, more than their intra-communal nature. The VOs ’ main contribution 
appeared to be the strengthening of intra-community cohesion. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
where reconciliation was clearly progressing five years after the end of the war, civil
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society organizations were affecting the process more than in Tajikistan, where the degree 
of reconciliation achieved was ambiguous.
Our findings also support Colletta and Cullen’s arguments concerning the ability of 
communities where there is strong bonding social capital to positively affect bridging social 
capital and peace. The Sevarlije MZ/Board for Return case is an example of a tightly 
bonded intra-communal organization that maintained community cohesion amongst the 
displaced, sought to assure the protection of its members (even with military force), and 
was ethnically homogenous. Through its contacts with governmental authorities in Doboj 
and the Federation, international organizations, and Serb DPs, the Sevarlije MZ helped 
breed new forms of bridging capital and inter-ethnic links. The Sevarlije case is an example 
of how bonding social capital can gradually promote the creation of bridging social capital. 
It was able to positively contribute to reconciliation because it shared with its Serb 
neighbors a common experience with wartime displacement, interest in return, and a 
willingness to trust. A WB study on Bosnia-Herzegovina (2002: 29) describes a similar 
case in Klanac, a suburb of Brcko, where a Serb and Bosniak MZ met regularly and signed 
an agreement to facilitate minority return.
III. Civil society organizations’ affect on greed and grievance:
In Bosnia-Herzegovina as in Tajikistan, monopoly on violence and control of informal 
economic activity had guaranteed political and military leaders from all warring sides an 
effective means to satisfy economic and political greed. Five years after the war, in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina nationalists attempted to maintain war-like conditions -  ethnic separation, 
popular fear, breakdown in rule of law - on which their ability to satisfy their greed 
depended (ESI, 1999: 2). However, arrests of war criminals, and undermining of some of 
their economic levers of power, had begun to weaken their position. Similarly in Tajikistan, 
while warlords had maintained an insecure environment in the Karategin Valley until 2001, 
by 2002 the central government had regained a degree of control, with roads open to free 
movement and local government bodies carrying out their legal duties. In Tajikistan as in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, five years after the signing of peace agreements, many former war 
profiteers had turned from war fighting to smuggling drugs, weapons, fuel, and people to 
satisfy their greed.
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Less progress had been made in addressing the causes of grievance. In Tajikistan 
macroeconomic figures demonstrated that “extreme poverty” was a substantial threat to the 
country’s development, while a tiny minority of the population lived in opulence. The 
country’s geographic location on the border of Afghanistan and along the ancient Silk 
Road, which had become one of the main drug routes to Europe, offered large-scale 
opportunities to satisfy greed, and grievance, through illicit and sometimes violent 
activities. Throughout the country “a growing number benefit[ed] from drug money and 
other aspects of a shadow economy (ICG, 2003: l).”3 The official level of unemployment 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2001 was 40% (UNDP 2001: 35), and though there was no 
“extreme” poverty as in Tajikistan (UNDP 2002b: 50), disparities between the wealthy and 
the poor seemed to be growing, as the middle class was contracting. In Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, as in Tajikistan, youth was especially vulnerable to feelings of grievance as 
economic standards declined, access to social activities decreased, and opportunities for 
employment appeared increasingly elusive. They were the main actors in 2000 when 
Bosnian Serb high school students in the Brcko district engaged in a week long protest in 
support of Karadzic and Mladic, and against sharing school buildings with Bosniak 
students and the concept of a multi-ethnic district (ICG, 2000b: 8).
Those who apply a political economy approach consider that systematic transformations 
that focus on the economic dimension of conflict are necessary to consolidate peace. Peace 
implies eliminating opportunities for satisfying greed and reducing grievance. Diminishing 
greed signifies decreasing the economic benefits of employing violence and the legal/moral 
impunity that warmongers act under. Reducing grievance includes effecting “employment, 
recognition, security, belonging and a sense of control (Skelt quoted in Keene 2000: 40).” 
As argued by de Waal “the power relations that exist in any society, and particularly so 
during wartime, present a huge obstacle to any sort of civic mobilisation for peace” (2000: 
1). Political economists claim that if the institutions set up by peace building efforts 
solidify the unequal power relations that developed during and before the conflict, rather
3 According to a survey conducted in 2000 by the Open Society Institute in Tajikistan, 98% of respondents 
answered that the desire to make money was either the primary reason or a main reason why people trafficked 
drugs; 96.8% answered that unemployment was the greatest cause or a significant one; 94.4% pointed to 
difficult material circumstances. OSI, Women and Drugs, Dushanbe, 2000: 12.
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than countering them, then peace will likewise be unstable. Peace consolidation is thus 
most effectively seen as “a realignment of political interests and a readjustment of 
economic strategies rather than a clean break from violence to consent, from theft to 
production, or from repression to democracy (Keen, 2000: 38-39).
Practitioners implementing civil society development programs in Tajikistan have argued 
that such projects can provide livelihoods and infrastructure to help guarantee 
normalization and reduce the attractiveness of participation in illicit activities such as 
trafficking, drug smuggling, and terrorism (Muhidov, 13.10.02). The UN (2001: 7) 
requested priority funding for reintegration of former combatants because “rendering 
assistance to those groups of the population would have a stabilizing affect and would 
prevent jobless, dissatisfied and socially un-protected ex-combatants from engaging in 
criminal activities and joining armed gangs and irregular paramilitary formations.” 
According to this argument civil society’s role would consist of reducing the economic 
benefits of violence. Yet as demonstrated above I find no evidence that civil society 
organizations could impact macro-economic trends to reduce poverty, increase employment 
or reduce economic incentives to take part in illicit activities.
However civil society organizations had a role to play in effecting community level 
developments. The Sevarlije MZ/ Board for Return and the Karategin Valley VOs 
attempted to decrease feelings of grievance through the implementation of small income 
generation programs to increase employment. The Sevarlije MZ/ Board for Return 
benefited from a 45000 DM grant to start a credit fund to support local farmers in 1999, 
which by 2001 had increased in value to 74000 DM. In 2001 out of the 215 families that 
had returned to Sevarlije, some 60 took out micro-credits (Hamdija, 22.10.01). The MZ 
facilitated contacts with a local food processing plant that provided seeds to Sevarlije in 
exchange for a percentage of the harvest. Similarly the Karategin Valley VOs were heavily 
engaged in providing agricultural inputs, targeting average and small farmers, rather than 
those who controlled the largest plots of land (Saidov, 31.07.02). In Tadjikabad the 
MSDSP district manager estimated that some 40% of the beneficiaries of the agriculture 
support programs were former combatants; most of the other former fighters who did not 
benefit were either integrated into the government army or had migrated to Russia
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(Sharipov, 25.07.02). He himself a former opposition commander, Sharipov (25.07.02) 
emphasized the importance of including demobilized solders, quoting a Tajik idiom, “a 
hungry person will even go and fight with lions.” Thus the CBOs’ projects began to meet 
political economists’ calls for job creation and micro-economic development to curtail 
political entrepreneurs’ ability to enlist disenfranchised men into violent activities.
The Tajik and Bosnian civil society case studies played a role in increasing local 
communities’ sense of economic and social security. As described above they provided 
select social services, improving the effectiveness and equity of state provision. The two 
CBOs strengthened local coping mechanisms. Based on ties of kinship and territorial 
proximity, they sustained mutual support networks through which the most severely 
disenfranchised could make claims on fellow community members for aid. Throughout 
Central Asia existed a tradition for private transfers to reflect good neighborliness and in 
particular the ties of kinship (Coudouel, et all, 1997: 119; Falkingham 2000b: iv). Similarly 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina persons in need tended to turn first to their family, then to their 
neighbors for assistance (WB 2002a, UNDP 2001). With their links to international donor 
agencies the Sevarlije MZ/ Board for Return and the Karategin Valley VOs contributed 
additional financial and in-kind resources to strengthen these traditional communal coping 
mechanisms.
The Bosnian and Tajik cases study organizations strengthened previously disenfranchised 
groups’ sense of belonging, recognition and control. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the Sevarlije 
MZ/ Board for Return gave former displaced control again over their place of residence in 
the RS, Federation or abroad. In doing so it reduced Sevarlije inhabitants’ grievances vis-a- 
vis their Serb neighbors which may have led to a resumption of armed conflict. Back in 
their homes, the formally displaced felt a sense of belonging which explained their 
eagerness to rehabilitate their village’s physical and social infrastructure. By providing 
them with even limited financial resources to engage in capital improvement projects, the 
Karategin Valley VOs also rekindled villagers’ sense of control, thus explaining their 
willingness to contribute to large scale volunteer actions Qiashar). In the immediate post­
war period, communities who had been unable to control the tide of events as fighting 
raged, were often passive, distrustful of their ability to affect change. Yet the successful
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completion of a community project demonstrated to local groups their capacity to succeed 
and served as a powerful motivator for them to plan additional works. Zhene Zhenama and 
Ghamkhori also assisted women in regaining a sense of control over their lives.
As community cohesiveness increased, civil society organizations could place greater 
moral and social pressure on wartime elites to reduce their illicit activities. My case studies 
suggest that the CBOs could serve as a way to reconnect “greedy” entrepreneurs to their 
community. They could strengthen integrative links -  re-uniting warlords to their families 
and neighbors by encouraging their participation in “civil” community activities. However, 
civil society organizations’ programs to reconvert former warlords, and the leaders of 
armed groups, into farming or other legal employment, while able to affect grievance, was 
less likely to transform greed when there were substantially more profits to be gained from 
illicit business and trade.4
Youth was one crucial population of disenfranchised that the Karategin Valley VOs in 
particular, but also the Sevarlije MZ, worked with insufficiently. The VO Charter indicated 
that persons under 17 years of age could not participate. Young people (between 17 and 25) 
did not appear to be well represented in VO meetings, perhaps partly because in the 
Karategin Valley large numbers of young males served as migrant workers in Russia. 
Karategin Valley VO heads who were approached by youth with requests for funds for 
projects, spoke of their inability to obtain MSDSP support. Several (Hokimov, 29.07.02; 
Mirzoev, 25.07.02; Sharipov, 25.07.02) regretted that youth were not more involved in the 
VO’s activities, and that the VO could not do more in the fields of education and sport. The 
NGO cases more successfully targeted young people, in particular providing them access to 
information and awareness on the negative effects of violence.
For civil society organizations to have a positive affect on grievance, it is essential for them 
to reduce, rather than deepen inequalities. Thus the provision of aid should promote
4 The Tajik government seemed well aware o f this and chose to integrate some o f the most “greedy” 
opposition field commanders in its own structures. A former commander from Garm was named the head of  
the Ministry o f Interior Unit Against Organized Crime (in Garm), a commander from Jirgital became head of  
the Jirgital-Kyrgyzstan border forces, and a Tadjikobod commander the head o f a collective farm. These 
positions could give the men sufficient means to satisfy their greed without having to resort to violence 
(Abduallaev and Freizer, 2003: 27).
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equitable provision and access. Some of our CBO cases at times appeared to prioritize 
beneficiaries based on influences/ linkages, rather than need, contributing to deepening 
inequalities. This problem was especially likely to surface when CBO leaders served as 
intermediaries between international donors and community members in deciding how 
more “valuable” goods should be distributed. In two of the Karategin Valley VOs it seemed 
evident that the head of the VO had benefited disproportionately from MSDSP’s aid: one 
constructed a drinking water line to this personal property, another placed a chicken 
incubator meant for the community in his garage. When community based organizations 
are linked to clan and family structures, the potential exists for them to firstly satisfy 
family, then community, needs. This is the possible negative affect when “at the social 
level, clan networks have become increasingly active in the villages, and have largely 
usurped both the interest-aggregation role of parties, and the role of the state in distributing 
resources, jobs and social benefits” (Collins, 2002: 148). It is also more likely to occur 
when a CBO is dominated by one key figure (ex: VO head) whose motivations, position in 
the community, skills and linkages are considered by the rest of the community as essential 
to the “bringing in” of new resources.
In the CBOs, the village meeting or the zhor gradjana offered a mechanism to reconcile 
differences over the distribution of resources, and to guarantee leaders’ accountability to 
members. The public, formalized and participatory nature of these meetings was key to 
breaking the more discreet workings of traditional patronage networks. One difference 
underlined by several (Hokimov, 29.07.02, Sharipov, 25.07.02) as existing between 
traditional mahallas and the VO was formal accounting and reporting on activities. The 
technical aspect of VO decision-making, implementation, reporting and planning had the 
potential of improving transparency, participation, and interest aggregation. Yet the lack of 
full and equal participation of women and youth in the VO meetings also decreased the VO 
leadership’s sense of accountability to all its members.
Land reform was an area that was not affected in our case studies, but in Tajikistan 
especially was essential to alleviate pressures of greed and grievance, to increase food 
production, and reduce poverty. Land ownership was of great significance in a country 
where some 65% of the population was dependent on agriculture for its economic survival
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and was competing for 4% of the land suitable for cultivation. Five years after the end of 
the war, privatization of state farms was well underway (Abdullaev and Freizer, 2003: 31). 
However, much of the private land was going to the chairmen and management staff of the 
former kolkhoz, or in some case to former field commanders (ICG 2003: 3). Re­
organization of state farms tended to increase disparities between land owning and landless 
farmers -  exacerbating grievances rather than reducing them.5 The Tajik case studies did 
not engage in the land privatization process before 2002, though at the time they were 
beginning to consider how they could contribute to ensure a fairer distribution of land 
through the promotion of public awareness on land rights. However, amongst the six VOs 
studied, one VO President was the sovkhoz director before privatization and had become the 
largest private landowner in the village, and the other five VO Presidents were formerly 
part of the kolkhoz technical staff. It was thus unlikely that they would be the leaders to 
push for more equitable land distribution.
Decentralization had the potential of diminishing opportunities for greed and causes for 
grievance in local communities through the efforts of CBOs and NGOs. As argued above 
effective decentralization is premised on the establishment of democratic rules of 
procedure, and respect of values of tolerance and justice. Pickvance notes that “after 
socialism local government becomes in many respects a more active mediating institution 
and control over its functions becomes a highly contested issue in local politics. [...] The 
central questions are how far it gains autonomy from former economic and political centers 
of power, and how far it is subordinate to new sources of economic and political power.” 
(1997: 306) Alfonso (1997: 185) goes further to consider that decentralization’s ultimate 
goal “must be to allow the re-appropriation of power by concrete and diverse individuals 
and their collectivities. A real process of popular empowerment will convert the ordinary 
citizen from a passive political consumer into an active political producer.” Thus 
decentralization is likely to reduce the ability of a small group of power and money hungry 
leaders to monopolize decision-making and influence, and to offer an opportunity for 
persons with grievances to gain a public voice. This was particularly important in 
Tajikistan where five years after the end of war “one clan’s monopoly of political power
5 According to a survey carried out by MSDSP in 2002 in the Karategin Valley, 8.57% of families were 
landowners, 36.7% were renting and 98.86% had kitchen gardens. Land Reform and Land Tenure in the
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and thus of economic prizes has spurred the disaffection of the other clans from the regime 
and has fueled a civil conflict that has persisted despite the 1997 peace agreement.” 
(Collins, 2002: 147)
Political economists are less optimistic than conflict resolution or peace building 
proponents with regards to the positive impact that civil society may have on peace. Our 
findings tend to concur that civil society organizations can offer little to reduce greed. On 
the other hand CBOs appear able to diminish grievance by providing disenfranchised 
populations with a greater sense of economic and social control over their lives. By 
formalizing decision-making procedures, and increasing public participation, CBOs may 
also serve as a check on greedy entrepreneurs’ ability to use community resources for 
personal gain. One area where NGOs were more successful in addressing grievance than 
the CBOs was in working with women and youth.
IV. Civil society organizations’ affect on the rights-based peace project:
Five years after the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan 
decommissioning and disarmament had been fully implemented, though the rule of law 
based on the effective functioning of courts and law enforcement was only partially 
secured. By March 2000, 4,498 UTO fighters had been integrated into the Tajik army or 
security forces, and 6000 ex-combatants were amnestied (UNDP, 2000: 28; ICG 2001: 16). 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina where there had been 430,000 people under arms in 1995, there 
were 22,000 in 2002. Police, who had been manipulated by extremist nationalists since 
1991, were increasingly willing to cooperate across ethnic lines and work on crime 
prevention (Ashdown, 2002b). In both countries the monopoly on the use of violence was 
being consolidated in the hands of the state. However access to justice and the rule of law 
were not guaranteed (Abdullaev and Freizer, 2003: 28, 35-36; Ashdown, 2002a, ICG, 
2003: 11-10). In some post-conflict situations civil society organizations have played a role 
in decommissioning and the rehabilitation of former combatants (Kaldor, 1999b: 136), in 
others they have contributed to truth commissions or international tribunals. The 
organizations in this study did not engage in these tasks. Civil society was rarely called to
Rasht region, MSDSP Internal Document, 2002.
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cooperate with international law enforcement bodies as part of the initial effort to establish 
security and basic human rights protection (Chinkin and Paradine, 2001; 176-177).
War had left Bosnian and Tajik communities fragmented and prone to violence. In 
Tajikistan though fragmentation along regional lines may not have affected most citizens’ 
daily lives, other divisions, such as those between men and women, warlords and citizens, 
different clans or family networks, did. Rights based analyses view society’s capacities to 
manage tensions without violence as the most significant factor for successful peace 
consolidation (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2000). In Tajikistan, as in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, at all levels of society violence and the use of force had become acceptable 
and effective means to defend self-interests during the war. In the post-war period it was 
essential to ensure that conflicts were no longer solved through the use of force but through 
dialogue or formal institutions.
We find that in at least three of our four case studies civil society groups contributed to the 
strengthening of the rule of law, by encouraging citizens to satisfy their grievances through 
state bodies and legal mechanisms rather than “taking justice in their own hands.” The 
Sevarlije MZJ Board for Return cooperated with all law enforcement forces that had 
jurisdiction on its territory, including Doboj municipality police even though trust between 
the police and returnees was extremely low in 1998. Rather than creating its own 
alternative militia, or calling for assistance from Federation security forces, the Sevarlije 
MZJ Board for Return opened a dialogue with the Doboj police, informing them of any 
village problems or needs. The Sevarlije MZJ Board for Return demanded that returnees 
behave lawfully vis-a-vis their Serb neighbors and encouraged them to trust Doboj 
municipal law enforcement officials. As described above Ghamkhori also assisted victims 
gain retribution through the courts -  rather than for example starting family vendettas. In 
some instances Ghamkhori cooperated with community police officers providing them with 
information on crimes to investigate and prosecute them more effectively. Civil society 
organizations thus positively affected peace consolidation by encouraging their members 
and beneficiaries to trust state structures to ensure security and justice.
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At the community level, the civil society organizations helped guarantee peace and stability 
by serving as referees in local disputes. As was the practice in the Yugoslav era, the 
Sevarlije MZJ Board for Return organized a peace council to deal with low level and 
personal conflicts. In the Karategin Valley, VO heads described how community members 
would address them regarding small disputes over land, money, livestock, and other civil 
matters. Most citizens appealed to MZ or VO heads to mediate with regards to inter-family, 
inter-neighbor and non-criminal conflicts. Ghamkhori field staff, and latter the elected 
mahalla leadership they helped set up, also recounted incidents where local inhabitants 
come to them for help and advice with regards to local disputes.
Ghamkhori and Zhene Zhenama furthermore educated citizens about their rights, and 
cooperated with law enforcement bodies to improve their capacities to react to rights 
violations. This was in particular the case with regards to incidents of domestic violence 
which both NGOs identified as a growing problem in the post-war context (Swiss, 2000; 
Zhene Zhenama, 2000a). Ghamkhori recognized a deep lack of knowledge about domestic 
violence among medical, legal, judicial, psychological religious and other professionals. 
Through PROVAW the NGO thus started a multi-faceted awareness-building project on 
violence against women with state and religious institutions (Swiss, 2000). Similarly Zhene 
Zhenama carried out projects to educate potential victims about domestic violence. The 
NGO also trained law enforcement bodies on domestic abuse. Inherently by engaging law 
enforcement officials, and lobbying them to act when violations happened, our NGO case 
studies also pressured the police and courts to fulfil their responsibilities as preservers of 
the rule of law.
In addressing violence between men and women, the CBOs under study were distinctly less 
influential than the NGOs. This was especially the case in Tajikistan where female 
participation in decision-making within the Karetegin Valley VOs was never fully secured. 
Thus in Shulmak five years after the end of the war the community had regained sufficient 
cohesion to commence communal infrastructure development activities. Yet this sense of 
solidarity did not extend to male/female relations. Intense divisions, suspicions and hatred 
remained. During summer 2002 one young woman, who worked as a school teacher, was 
viscously murdered by six other villagers who alleged that she was not behaving properly
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according to Islamic law and custom. The six were never prosecuted. Other women in the 
village spoke of living in fear. Our case studies thus support Eade’s argument that 
“traditional organizations [...] may have the authority and capacity to mobilize along 
village, clan, religious, ethnic, age or gender lines. They may be a powerful force for social 
cohesion and a focus for collective identity. However while conferring privileges on some, 
they may also severely constrain the rights of others (Eade, 1997: 112).” Thus as women’s 
full and equal participation with men was not insured in the VOs, the CBO’s ability to 
positive affect rights-based peace consolidation was significantly constrained.
Three of the case study organizations also played a role in providing alternatives to 
exclusionary politics at a time when part of the political elite was still intent on maintaining 
power on the basis of a particular identity. As explained in the section on civil society’s 
contribution to conflict resolution Zhene Zhenama, Ghamkhori and the Sevarlije MZ/Board 
for Return helped transform values and modes of dialogue. By the composition of their 
staff the two NGOs showed that people belonging to different ethnic, regional, or national 
groups could cooperate to affect change. They helped victims of violence understand that 
individuals and not entire identity groups were responsible for wartime atrocities. In 
Tajikistan Ghamkhori encouraged its beneficiaries to re-think the causes of war through the 
application of a multiple step process, which concluded with the recognition that individual 
members of the “opposite side” did not necessarily bear collective guilt for wartime crimes. 
According to Bahodur “our work brings people together, makes them closer, so the 
boundaries of nationalism disappear during our lessons and people forget that they have 
different origins.” Through its cooperation with Serb displaced persons, the Sevarlije 
MZ/Board for Return showed that not all Serbs were war criminals, but rather, that they 
could also be victims of forced displacement.
The two Bosnian civil society groups, and the Tajik NGO, also contributed to the creation 
of a community of citizens that shared similar worldviews -  or at a minimum understood 
each other sufficiently to forge alliances to engage in debates. Zhene Zhenama was 
particularly successful in constructing and advancing the vision of an alternative social 
order, which emphasized reconciliation, tolerance, equal rights for women, and non­
violence. It found that other civil society groups could relate to this discourse. The Sevarlije
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MZ/Board for Return were able to make cross-ethnic/national alliances based on common 
interests in return that defied national differences. According to Muric Bulic (20.03.01), 
Director o f the Center for Civil Initiatives, civil society organizations in this regard 
accomplished what few other Bosnian institutions could do. “Civil society’s role in peace­
building was to [...] create different citizens alliances [...]. We managed to do something 
that the Presidency is not succeeding in doing... We built political and non-political 
alliances around ideas and not national identity.” Bosnian civil society groups thus 
contributed to a re-launching of political debate by helping citizens conceptualize of their 
interests as more than nationality-based.
As predicted by rights-based analysis of peace consolidation, the Bosnian case studies were 
able to take advantage of contacts within international human rights and women’s rights 
networks to affect change in Bosnia-Herzegovina and beyond. Our Bosnian NGO case thus 
increased awareness about trafficking of women to Bosnia-Herzegovina by working 
through a network of international and non-governmental organizations (RING network). 
In cooperation with women from throughout the former Yugoslavia, Zhene Zhenama 
contributed to ensure greater female participation in the EU sponsored Stability Pact for 
South East Europe (Chinkin and Paradine, 2001: 172). Through its international contacts 
with women activists, Zhene Zhenama engaged in efforts to support women victims of 
violence in Kosovo, Macedonia and Afghanistan. Cooperation with international 
organizations and networks of refugees and displaced, provided moral and political support 
to the Sevarlije MZ/ Board for Return as it advocated for return. With it international 
networks and contacts Zhene Zhenama actively informed and lobbied women’s groups 
around the world about post war developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus contributing to 
an enlargement of the debate and discussion on Bosnia to the global scene. Among our case 
studies Zhene Zhenama was the only civil society organizations with the necessary linkages 
to transform global debates.. Yet as an example it demonstrates civil society groups’ 
capacities to extend dialogue on conflict and reconciliation beyond their own nation-states.
However due to geographic distance, ineffective communication and transportation links, 
our Tajik cases were unable to take advantage of the resources, information, and space for 
dialogue provided by international civil society and take steps comparable to those made by
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our Bosnian cases. We may ask if more fortunate elements of international civil society did 
not have the responsibility to facilitate inclusion of Tajik partners to promote security and 
development?
Proponents of a rights based approach tend to consider that tolerant and activist forms of 
civil society, which fit a liberal definition, are most likely to positively contribute to peace 
consolidation. Amongst our cases, Zhene Zhenama with its clear political mission, multi­
ethnic staff, links to international women’s networks, commitment to non-violence and 
experience in women’s rights advocacy, most closely fits this organizational model. 
Ghamkhori was less likely to consider itself as a potential opposition to the centers of 
political and economic power, though it shared many of Zhene Zhenama's ideological 
preferences. The Sevarlije MZ/Board for Return also did not see its role as “oppositional” 
nor did it emphasize the promotion of tolerance and equality as its key aims. Nevertheless 
as we have seen in this section all three organizations provided alternatives to exclusionary 
politics, assisted in human rights protection, and supported the strengthening of the rule of 
law and trust injustice.
Conclusion:
Beyond the scope of this thesis is the debate on the extent to which the various concepts of 
peace complement and rival each other in theory and in practice. The four approaches to 
peace consolidation introduced define distinct causes for war, and interpret the evolution, 
goals, and instruments of peace consolidation differently. Thus they may come into 
conflict. By positively contributing to economic liberalization, civil society organizations 
may be increasing grievance; by supporting community cohesion at the local level civil 
society may be working against centralized democratic institution building. Other studies 
have begun to compare different peace consolidation theories and approaches (Crocker, 
Hampson and Aall, 2001). However, more analysis is needed to determine how the 
assigning of different peace consolidation strategies affects democratization, economic 
development, social cohesion and equality.
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C o n c l u s io n :
T h eo r etic a l  a n d  po lic y  r e l a t e d  fin d in g s
Introduction:
Five years after the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995) and Tajikistan (1997) 
peace was being consolidated, and civil society organizations were contributing to the 
process. Democratic state institution building and economic liberalization were gradually 
being promoted in the two countries. Similarly the transformation of modes of dialogue, 
building of contacts, and the development of common projects between former warring 
sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina was being accomplished step by step. In Tajikistan 
community cohesion appeared to be strengthening as nation building replaced calls for 
revenge in the public discourse. The attractiveness of addressing grievance through armed 
conflict was reduced, while respect for the rule of law and human rights protection was 
increasing in both countries. Civil society organizations were one of the many actors that 
supported this process making multidimensional contributions to peace.
Theoretical literature on the concept of civil society -- which was reinvented in the mid- 
1980s due to political changes in East and Central Europe, and more broadly redefined in 
the mid-1990s through the influences of globalization — divides civil society groups into 
ideal types to help the observer understand the empirical manifestations of civil society 
appearing in various country contexts, and to appreciate the different roles civil society can 
play in effecting change. At the start of this dissertation I chose to rely on one such 
typology -  where a communal view of civil society is distinguished from a liberal one. 
Based on a historical analysis of the evolution of civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Tajikistan I identified the existence of both types in the two countries under study. At 
times liberal and communal forms of civil society have operated in harmony and at times in 
conflict. When war broke out in 1992 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan, there was a 
sharp divide between liberal and communal forms of civil society, which may partly 
explain why civil society was unable to play a significant conflict prevention role. This
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study has focused on the post-war period and found that civil society contributed to peace 
consolidation. This seems to suggest that the communal/ liberal civil society dichotomy 
was less relevant in the post-war period.
Civil society in post-communist, post-war contexts:
In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan — where based on the literature we could have 
expected significant differences in how and why communal and liberal civil society 
organizations behave as they do -- we on the contrary identified numerous commonalties. 
We found that the groups under study responded in similar ways to many of the constraints 
and opportunities they faced in the post-war post-communist contexts they operated in. In 
all four of our cases, experienced and charismatic leadership, clear missions, ability to build 
trust within local communities, understanding of donor relations, and well-developed 
linkages were essential for success. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, where there was large 
international donor effort to support the peace process, as in Tajikistan, where external 
funds were more limited, the NGOs and CBOs were highly dependent on foreign 
assistance. Contrary to assumptions made in the literature on civil society we find that 
CBOs, which fit a communal understanding of civil society, can be as active in advocacy as 
NGOs representing liberal civil society. In comparison with the NGOs, the CBOs also 
contributed as much, if not more, to the privatization of social service provision. However 
our four civil society case studies’ were overall more engaged in “gap filling” and 
“selective collaboration” (Lewis: 2001: 150) between local communities and the state, than 
in censure or rolling back the state in the political or economic sphere.
Based on the comparative aspect of this study, I would thus like to highlight five findings, 
that apply to the CBOs and NGOs observed. These can help us better understand the 
characteristics and organizational attributes of civil society organizations that have the 
capacity to positively effect peace consolidation in post-communist, post-conflict settings.
The local community is the main source of inspiration and of strength for CBOs, as well as 
for NGOs. While Zhena Zhenama aimed primarily to help women -- an interest community 
-- the other three case studies focused their assistance on geographic communities, 
promoting mutual aid. The NGOs served as self-help groups for their members but also for
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their beneficiaries and the communities they belonged to. The literature on civil society 
argues that communal, rather then liberal, forms of civil society seek to build relations 
within society, to facilitate the development of community expressions of solidarity. Yet 
we find that NGOs as much as CBOs are concerned with connecting individuals, building 
trust, encouraging reciprocity, and facilitating exchanges of view on matters of public 
concern. Liberal representations of civil society were not absorbed by state-society issues 
but rather by society-society problems. The NGOs were embedded in the communities in 
which they operated, and the norms and values they expressed emerged out of a deep 
understanding of local experiences. Even though they may have had a more progressive 
understanding of political and social developments, working at the community level the 
NGOs presented their values in ways that would be accepted in more traditional and 
isolated environments.
Social service provision, rather then advocacy, is the main activity carried out by CBOs and 
NGOs. Between liberal and communal civil society groups, there was thus little difference 
in the nature of their programs and activities. In difficult post-war and post-socialist 
contexts, in the absence of state provision of public goods -- including personal, material 
and social security -  both types of organizations increased citizens’ ability to engage in 
collective action and self-help. Compared with communal civil society, liberal civil society 
was no more successful in undertaking political projects, which promoted public 
participation in decision-making, good governance, and democratization. It was not the 
NGOs’ “lack of maturity,” along a Kortenien (1990) generational model of organizational 
development, which can explain Zhena Zhenama and Ghamkhori’s reluctance to engage 
more forcefully in advocacy or political action. Rather their choice of programs was based 
on the post-war post-communist environment opportunities and needs. The case studies 
rarely succeeded in influencing state-level decision-making due to their lack of linkages 
with governmental officials. When the groups did achieve something through lobbying, 
they did so based on their close ties to their members and beneficiaries. The Sevarlije 
Board for Return/MZ was the most effective policy entrepreneur, advocating for minority 
return, while Zhena Zhenama and Ghamkhori’s had some success lobbying for women’s 
rights protection.
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Geographic location has a greater effect on civil society organizations' ability to build 
linkages, especially with international civil society, than their belonging to a liberal or 
communal ideal type. Due to better access to communication and transportation links, 
groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina could build ties with organizations’ and media with similar 
interests throughout the world. Neither the Tajik NGO nor the CBO had this possibility. All 
our case studies initially faced difficulties making contacts with governmental authorities 
and establishing their credibility beyond the municipal level. Whatever ties existed were 
based largely on personal relations rather than formally institutionalized. They had few 
formal links with political parties.
External funding plays a key role in the development of all groups -  whether they are part 
of communal or liberal civil society. Though the groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina operated in 
environments where there was substantially more international funding available then in 
Tajikistan, the Tajik organizations were as dependent on foreign donors as the Bosnians 
were. Though much has been written about NGOs negative tendency of over-relying on 
international fimds for their survival -  in our cases the CBOs were as reliant on external aid 
as NGOs. Tlie CBOs were able to collect small volunteer contributions and membership 
fees — while the NGOs were not -  but this did not significantly affect their funding base. 
Neither group obtained a budget from the government. Due to their dependency on external 
donors, the CBOs like the NGOs were forced into short-term projects that may not have 
met what they perceived as being their primary needs. Innovative and non-material projects 
- whose outputs could not be measure quantitatively -  were rarely carried out by the CBOs 
for lack of resources. All the groups struggled with the challenge of dual accountability: to 
the donors and to the community. They found that their missions and values were less 
likely to be compromised when the funders they cooperated with shared their values and 
missions -  the promotion of the rights of women, refugees, or rural development. They 
were also more likely to benefit when they were engaged in a regular dialogue with donors 
over projects’ objectives and strategies.
Charismatic leadership is essential for organizations to be effective in affecting change, 
whether they are of a communal or liberal type. In our cases one or two central figures 
provided the impetus behind the definition of the "organizations' goals and the activities.
269
Conclusion
The literature on communal civil society described the existence of communal forms of 
civil society that are not created deliberately, are based on informal communal ties, and 
made up of loose organizational structures. However from their re-appearance in the post­
war period, the CBOs we examined were highly formal organizations, either due to their 
legal character or to their links with an international donor. The NGOs also adopted 
hierarchical and structured decision-making mechanisms with centralized leadership. Even 
though the NGOs tried to establish oversight bodies such as boards, to hold the leadership 
accountable, they found it difficult to mobilize enthusiastic volunteers to participate. CBOs 
were more effective in this regard on the surface, organizing regular village meetings, but it 
is questionable to what extent based on these gatherings the leaders were held accountable 
and decision-making was the product of actual debate. Rather leaders were guaranteed a 
significant amount of authority and autonomy due to their position in the community.
However as the literature on civil society predicted, there were some significant differences 
in the nature of the communal and liberal organizations studied. CBOs served as vehicles 
for rural based political elites, while NGOs empowered middle class professionals in urban 
settings. One may have expected these two groups to represent two rival fractions of the 
political class, yet interestingly this was not the case in post war Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Tajikistan. War and economic transition affected both social groups in similar ways, 
undermining their previously influential and respected positions. Even in rural Tajikistan 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina those who managed the CBOs could generally be considered to be 
“professionals,” economically “middle class;” in the post-war context, they often became 
unemployed, victims of a shrinking public sector which through communism had extended 
to rural areas. In the post-war period the position of former Tajik and Bosnian elites from 
the urban areas, as well as from the rural ones, was often undermined by new strong men — 
warlords, field commanders, extreme nationalists — who gained from the war and acted as 
“spoilers” (Stedman, 1997) resisting peace and normalization at all costs. Thus unlike in 
the pre-war period, the leadership of communal and liberal civil society groups may have 
found common interests in cooperating after the war to overcome these new rivals 
operating in rural and urban settings.
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A more significant variation between our case studies -  especially in Tajikistan -  
concerned the opportunities communal and liberal groups gave to social actors who had 
gained new skills, experiences and strengths during the war, especially women, to take on 
new leadership roles. The NGOs we studied provided an opportunity for women and 
minorities to become politically engaged; while the CBOs tended to strengthen pre-existing 
power relations. They gave leadership position to those middle aged men who already had 
moral status and authority in the pre-war period, based on their skills, activism, or family 
ties. The NGOs were made up of individuals brought together by friendship and 
professional interests; while the CBOs were kinship-based. The NGOs nurtured a new 
cadre of civic leaders where CBOs relied on pre-war elites.
This brings us to an underlying question that has not yet been addressed throughout this 
study: to what extent does civil society have to be normatively based to positively affect 
peace consolidation? This is a particularly challenging query because I am arguing that by 
definition all forms of civil society do not necessarily have to be “good.” In Chapter 1 I 
defined communal civil society and noted that it can be a place where the few pursue their 
own interests, and where associations are organized along national, ethnic or religious 
lines. In the historical account of civil society development in Tajikistan and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina I included exclusionary groups such as Bosnian national humanitarian 
organizations -  Merhamet, Caritas and Dobrotvor -  and Tajik organizations that promoted 
Tajik nationalism such as Rastokhez. Due to the non-normative character of communal 
civil society, arguably many of the groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan that were 
at the forefront of wartime atrocities can be understood as belonging to civil society. If we 
accept this proposition, do we find that exclusionary civil society can affect peace 
positively?
The Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ example suggests that even exclusionary civil society, 
organizations that once considered that their goals could best be met by the use of violence 
and armed force, can transform into effective peace consolidation influences after peace 
agreements are signed. When we compare the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ with the 
Karategin Valley VOs, who did not demonstrate a similar engagement to promoting 
reconciliation or human rights protection, we can distinguish three factors that may
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improve the chances that even formerly violent or intra-communal groups may contribute 
to peace. The first relates to internal structures. Though the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ 
and its Serbian counterpart might have been initially exclusionary vis-a-vis persons 
belonging to other ethnic groups, it seemed that inside their own communities there was 
little exclusion. Decision-making within the MZ was transparent, all members of the 
community were allowed to participate, and there was full and equal representation. 
Secondly when the Sevarlije Board for Return/MZ met with the Serb DP leaders they were 
placed on equal standing, and over time were able to recognize common interests. Lastly 
the two groups functioned in an environment where the GFAP gave both the Bosniak and 
the Bosnian Serb communities equal rights, and where pre-war co-existence provided 
models of inter-communal associational life.
Whereas tensions between communal and liberal forms of civil society are seen as 
considering an important political problem in many countries (Glasius, Lewis and 
Seckinelgin, 2004), we find that in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan 
opportunities for bridging between both types of groups existed. Partly this is due to the 
fact that the CBOs and NGOs were no longer such different creatures - their missions, 
programs, linkages and structures had a great deal in common. Furthermore the NGOs 
understood the importance of cooperating with community-based groups. Zhena Zhenama 
and Ghamkhori for example worked closely with rural grass roots associations, closing the 
gap between communal and liberal civil society, to bring ordinary citizens, women in 
particular, closer to the political process. Thanks to these links the NGOs were able to 
develop close contacts with rural communities, understand grass roots level needs, and 
avoid becoming elitist or ineffectual. Where such bridging between NGOs and CBOs, 
liberal and communal civil society, occurred, civil society organizations’ capacities to 
positively affect peace consolidation appeared to be greatest.
Policy issues:
During the first five years of the peace process, international funding agents and policy­
makers tended to exclude communal civil society from their peace building efforts in 
Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. They often considered them to be intolerant or 
untrustworthy. Consequently “organizations promoting a rather different view of
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democracy rooted in grass-roots realities and local traditions, or which are simply at 
variance with the dominant liberal paradigm (Hearn and Robinson, 2000: 257-258),” were 
often sidelined. This thesis supports the conclusion that for external support to have a 
positive affect, it must clearly understand the social-historical context in which it acts, and 
employ a wide definition of civil society which goes beyond the liberal one and its focus on 
NGOs. Even in post-conflict situations, external actors should not bypass or duplicate 
existing civil society. They should consider how to cooperate with civil society groups that 
do not consistently share their values -  such as tolerance, commitment to democracy, 
gender equality, secularism -  but may be deeply embedded in society and have widespread 
legitimacy. Working with them, adopting a sensitive approach, may offer an opportunity to 
gradually encourage communal forms of civil society to adopt more participatory and 
inclusive modes of decision-making which in turn will improve their ability to contribute to 
peace.
On the eve of the outbreak of conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikstan communal and 
liberal civil society was deeply divided. This may in part explain why extremist forces were 
able to successfully mobilize supporters through communal groups, and why civil society’s 
ability to engage in affect conflict prevention was limited. The cases analyzed in this 
dissertation are examples of bridging between communal and liberal forms of civil society, 
between CBOs and NGOs. Our conclusion is that for civil society actors to affect change 
they must be willing and able to close the gap between communal and liberal forms of civil 
society. A sustainable relationship between the two should be based on shared values, 
missions and strategies; not founded on unequal power relations such as develop when 
NGOs serve uniquely to fund CBOs. It is a bridging process that international organizations 
should support through information dissemination, skills development, the provision of 
communications equipment, and project funding.
In the past ten years lessons have been learned about international policy makers’ and 
donors’ ability to strengthen civil society groups through external funding and capacity 
building (Burnell, 2000; Ottoway and Carothers, 2000; van Rooy, 1998). As we have seen, 
by providing mainly financial assistance, international donors risk negatively affecting 
local civil society groups’ definition of priorities and needs, and ultimately undermining
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their popular credibility. For international intervention to successfully strengthen local 
groups, the partnership should be based on common values and agreement about long-term 
objectives. In addition it should be multi-dimensional: not only financially based but also 
politically orientated. The cases in Bosnia-Herzegovina were adept at using international 
links to disseminate their views and lobby for their interests -  women’s rights protection or 
minority returns. International organizations working in Tajikistan should consider these 
examples to assist Tajik groups extend their ties with international forms of civil society in 
order to have a stronger voice to advocate their concerns.
When Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan were selected as comparative cases, I assumed 
that the different levels of international financial engagement and government 
centralization in the two countries would affect civil society organizations’ contributions to 
peace. The case studies do not support this hypothesis. International funds and the 
weakness of the state in Bosnia-Herzegovina do not provide civil society with a greater role 
in peace consolidation than in Tajikistan. However I find that geography and the countries’ 
level of integration into global networks is significant. Groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina were 
to a much greater extent able to use to their advantage far-reaching links with international 
civil society than their counterparts in Tajikistan were.
Conclusion:
The main finding of this dissertation is that both communal and liberal civil society may 
positively contribute to peace consolidation. Practitioners and scholars have previously 
argued that civil society can support peace, but they have tended to emphasize NGOs as the 
main actor of change. One of the unexpected findings of this study is that CBOs seem 
especially well suited to contribute to institution building and NGOs to reconciliation. In 
both the Bosnian and Tajik cases local NGOs were most successful in affecting trust, 
transformations in modes of dialogue, reconciliation and the initiation of common action 
among former warring sides. CBOs, which were forms of local self-government, appeared 
to have had a greater impact on improving public participation in community decision­
making, public service delivery, infrastructure maintenance and development. If we 
consider CBOs in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina to be organizational representations 
of communal civil society, and NGOs of liberal civil society, this finding challenges
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preliminary hypotheses on civil society’s affect laid out in Chapters 1 and 2. Based on 
existing literature on civil society and peace we expected that communal civil society 
organizations would contribute mainly to conflict resolution and liberal civil society groups 
to institution building.
My conclusions tend to support political economists’ assumptions about NGOs’ limited 
ability to significantly affect greed and grievance. Yet I find that CBOs can make important 
contributions to the reduction of grievances that can induce disenfranchised groups to turn 
to violence. They can provide disenfranchised populations with a greater sense of control 
over their social and economic lives, as well as means for communities to hold greedy 
elites accountable. The cases demonstrate that not only organizational representations of 
liberal civil society, which have an activist and tolerant ideology, can meet rights-based 
peace consolidation challenges. Forms of communal civil society may also help re-launch 
political debate and support the re-establishment of the rule of law.
This dissertation demonstrates how in the post-war post communist contexts of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Tajikistan, amongst the most well-developed and organizationally sound 
representations of civil society, differences between communal and liberal types were 
diminishing rather then growing. Close ties between communal, liberal and international 
forms of civil society were increasing groups' ability to affect change, in particular to have 
an impact on peace consolidation. Thus we found that although at least two ideal types of 
civil society organizations existed, groups' ability to contribute to peace consolidation was 
strengthened when they had extensive links between each other. In post war Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Tajikistan it is too early to consider that the communal/ liberal civil 
society dichotomy has vanished. But we can suggest that ultimately a clearer consolidation 
of the two forms of civil society may bring the two countries closer to peace.
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Rakhimov, Alimordhon. Head, Shulmak VO on 30.07.02.
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Whitton, Mark. MSDSP Program consultant in Khorog on 13.07.02
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Alma Canic, member MZ women’s association Stublicanka on 24.10.01
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Ramiz Fetic, MZ member on 24.10.01
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Uzer Hadzic, MZ member on 4.08.03.
Uzer Hadic, MZ member on 20.10.01
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Zene Zenam (all in Sarajevo):
Danijela Dugandzic, Office Administrator on 14.11.01
Jadranka Milicevic, Management Team on 14.11.01
Jadranka Milicevic, Management Team on 27.11.01
Milica Kajevic, Program Manager, Women Studies on 13.11.01
Miriana Music, Head, Psycho Team and DRA Trainer on 21.11.01
Mirzeta Amautovic, Women’s Association “Roundtable Brcko” on 26.03.01
Nuna Zvizdic, Management Team on 14.11.01
Nuna Zvizdic, Management Team on 23.11.01
Nuna Zvizdic, Management Team on 27.11.01
Radmila Manojlovic-Zarkovic, Project Assistant, Women’s Studies on 13.11
Sefika Krdzalic, Office Administrator on 20.11.01
Selma Hadzihalilovic, Management Team on 15.11.01
Snezana Ler, Supervisor, Psycho Team on 19.11.01
Zilha Carkadzic, Project Officer, Psycho Team on 15.11.01
Other referenced interviews:
- Abdullaev, Kamol. Visiting Professor, on 4.03.02 at Yale University, USA
- Abdushukurova, Tatiana. Program Director. Open Society Institute Tajikistan on 17.05.02 
in Dushanbe.
- Arbitrio, Roberto. Program Coordinator of the UN office for Drug Control and Crime 
Prevention, Regional Office for Central Asia, Tashkent on 11.11.02
- Bulic, Muric Director, Center for Civil Initiatives Tuzla Office, on 20.03.01 in Tuzla
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- Derajic, Svjetlana, Project Manager, European Human Rights Foundation, interviewed on
22.03.01 in Sarajevo.
- Hadzic, Damir. E-mail interview correspondance, on 4.03.02.
- Interviews in Hoit, 25.10.02
- Somun, Lejla. Deputy Director, International Bureau for Humanitarian Issues (IBHI) on
24.03.01 in Sarajevo
- Khegai, Margarita. Sociologist, Slavonic University on 23.03.02 in Dushanbe
- Kunosic, Mevlida. Director, Taldi, on 19.03.01 in Tuzla
- Kuslugic, Mirza. Dean of the Faculty of Electrical Engineering at the University of Tuzla, 
interviewed on 20.03.01, in Tuzla
- Kuvatova, Alla. Sociologist, Slavonic University on 21.10.02 in Dushanbe
- Mamadazimov, Abdughani. Director of the National Association o f Political Scientists, 
on 20.03.02 in Dushanbe
- Muhodiv, Abdurahim. USAID Project Management Specialist, 13.10.02 in Dushanbe
- Rahmonderdiev, Alisher. Director Maniza on 18.09.02 in Dushanbe
- Ryazanova, Ella. Director, Association “Salzburg Seminar Alumni, ” on 13.06.02 in 
Dushanbe.
- Secretary of the Noisiri Khisrav Jamoat on 4.06.02 in Nosiri Khisrav (Shartuz district)
- Suvalija, Gordana. Project officer, Delegation of the European Commission to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, interviewed on 23.03.01 in Sarajevo
- Tyurryaev, Farrukh. General Director, Association o f Scientific and Technical 
Intelligentsia (ASTI) on 27.06.02 in Khojand
- Zoir, Rakhmatillo. Senior Advisor to the President on Legal Issues, on 15.07.02.
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A n n e x  1 :  I n t e r v i e w  q u e s t i o n n a i r e
Name of interviewee: 
Interviewee title: 
Date of interview: 
Place of interview:
Se m i-st r u c t u r e d  in t e r v ie w s  w it h  NGO a n d  CBO s t a f f
I. Or igins  o f  o rg anizatio n  a nd  ea r ly  involvem ent  o f  sta ff:
1.1 Early involvement of the staff:
1. (S)he was part of the organization when it was founded □ yes
□ no
2. Form of earliest involvement □ staff, date  □ beneficiary □ volunteer
3. Why at that time did you come to the organization?
4. What did you think was the goal of the organization when you joined?
5. How were you involved in the initial development of the organization?
1.2 Personal characteristics of interviewee:
1. What is your level of education?
2. What was your pre-war employment
3. Were you active in any communist time social organizations?
4. Do you have children, how many?
5. Where did you live before the war?
6. Where did you live during the war?
7. (For returnees) When did you return? Where you able to move back into your home?
8. (If applicable) What is your nationality?
1.3 NGO employment:
1. Is this your only job?
2. Why did you leave your former job, and take this one instead?
3. What rewards do you get from your job here?
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II. STAFF INVOLVEMENT IN PROGRAMMING:
11.1 Functioning of the programme within the NGO:
1. What programmed) within the organizations are you/ or have you been involved in?
2. What needs did the programme aim to meet?
3. Activities:
4. Number, type, location of beneficiaries:
5. Budget of the programme?
6. Funding sources?
7. Responsibilities of Management Team:
8. Responsibilities of your coordinator and programme:
11.2 Impact of the programme:
1. What were the main issues that women brought up through this programme?
2. What do you consider to have been the greatest 3 successes of the programme?
3. What do you consider to have the greatest failures of the programme?
4. Is the programme still needed? For how long do you think that it will be needed?
5. Are other institutions involved in similar programmes:
Activity  Agency.............Yes, still works
Activity  Agency.............Yes, still works
Activity  Agency.............Yes, still works
11.3 Programme outreach:
1. Is your program active in the regions: Y/N Locations:................................
2. Majority population in each region ...........................................................
3. Reactions there:
4. Reactions here:
III. Relationships and linkages:
III.1 Contacts with governmental officials:
Who: Mahalla Jamoat Rayon Oblast Republic
How often:
More/less:
Why:
III.2 Contacts with political parties:
Who:
How often:
More/less:
Why:
III.3 Contacts with media:
Who: Radio TV Newspaper
How often:
More/less:
Why:
III.4 Contacts with international organizations:
Who:
How often:
More/less:
Why:
IV. 5 Contacts with other local groups:
1. Which organizations?
2. How often:
3. Reasons for contacts:
III.6 Contacts with population at large:
1. Familiarity of people with organization: □ bad □ vague □ good
2. Popular opinion of organization: □ negative □ neutral □ positive
4. Attempts to inform people of organization’s work:
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5. Attempts to include people in the work o f the organization:
IV. Impact of programmes:
IV. 1 Organization’s effect on DP/refugee return:
1. Form o f  assistance to DPs:
□ material aid □ information □ moral support
□ advocacy support □  other services
IV.2 Did your programme have any effect on reconciliation and diminishing local conflicts?
IV.3 Did you programme have any effect on policy? Did it include any form of advocacy?
1. Last policy effected:
2. When:
3. L evel o f  governm ent lobbied:
4. Strategy applied:
5. D i fference with past efforts:
IV.4 Did your programme in any wav address elections related issues?
IV.5 Did your programme have any effect on public participation, and encourage local communities to 
find wavs to resolve their own problems?
V. V iew  o f  so c io -po litic a l  sit u a t io n  in  r e g io n :
1. M ost critical issue resolved since 1995:
□ end o f  fighting □  restoration o f  security □ return o f  DPs
□ re-start o f  the econom y □ em ploym ent
□ punishment o f  war criminals □ o th e r ................
R esolved  by:
Three critical issues for the future.
□ security □ multi-party dem ocracy □ gender equality
□ econom ic developm ent □ end o f  corruption
□ a multi-national state □ refugee return □ o th e r ...................
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Annex 2: g l o s s a r y
Aksakal also aqsaqal (T): 1. chief or elder (literally “white beard” in Tajik); 2.
Administrator of a city or village. 3. Head of a craftsman shop. (Abdullaev and 
Akbarzadeh, 2002: 15)
Apparatchik (R): member of the governmental administration
Avlod (T): Extended family, patriarchichal extended family. Pillar of social structure in 
Tajikistan and institution of traditional authority. (A. and A., 21)
Brigade (R): work unit on a collective farm
Chaihana (T): teahouse, also often served as a mosque, community center and inn for 
travelers.
Dom-Kom (R): housing Committee 
Enaf (S-C): guild, corporation
Hashar (T): communal labor or cooperative work. Collective effort by volunteers to assist a 
person in need in the community. (A. and A., 86)
Hukumat (T): 1. Supremacy; 2. Executive power; 3. Government; 4. Administration of 
cities and nohiyas since 1994.
Imam (T): leader of prayer at a mosque
Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP): Islamic party that held its inaugural conference on 6 
October 1990. Was recognized by the Tajikistan Supreme Soviet in October 
1991. Islam was declared the guiding principle of the party, while its immediate 
task was the “establishment of a legal and democratic state.” Constituted the 
backbone of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in the Tajik 1992-1997 war. 
Banned in 1993, re legalized in 1998. (A. and A., 98-99)
Islamska Zajednica (S-C): Islamic Community
Ishan/pir/murshid (T): A title for elder in Sufism. Is a “holy” person. (A. and A., 149) 
Jadid/jadidist/jadidism (T): Linked with a reformist movement imported to Central Asia by 
Tartar Jadids who promoted educational reformist ideas. Reformist ideas about 
Islam and education penetrated the region through modernist newspapers from 
Egypt, India and Turkey. Especially well developed in the Bukhara Emirate. 
Eradicated in the 1920s by the Soviets. (A. and A., 102)
Jamoat (T): institution of local self-governance in Tajikistan. Chairs are appointed by the 
head of the city or the region.
Kolkhoz (R): collective farm.
Komsiluk (S-C): Daily system of coexistence between different communities 
Komsomol (R): youth committee. Youth aged 14-28 joined following the approval of a 
local Komsomol committee. Was present in schools, army institutions, and 
enterprises. Disbanded in 1991. (A. and A., 121)
Madrasa (T) (medrese, S-C): religious school
Mahalla (T) (mahala; S-C): neighborhoods often run by local elders. All traditional
ceremonies and feasts (weddings, funerals, mutual assistance, etc.) are usually 
organized on the mahalla level under the active leadership of local elders and 
members of the mahalla committee. (A. and A., 129)
Mar aka (T): community gathering usually accompanied by food.
Mjesna Zajednica (S-C): Organization of local self-government established under the 1963 
Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the 1974 Federal Constitution of 
Yugoslavia. Self-managing community of citizens, from the territory of villages
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and cities, in which citizens achieved self-management to carry out those 
activities which directly satisfy their needs and the needs of their families 
(Milicevic, Pasic, Zlokapa, Stitic, 1999: 110).
Millet system: Religious communities that provided a large measure of internal autonomy 
to non-Muslim populations living in the Ottoman Empire. Each religious group 
traditionally provided its own schools, welfare system, courts and other public 
services. (Pinson, 1993: 58)
Mirovni vijece (S-C): peace council
Mullah also mullo (T): 1. A clerical graduate of a madrasa; 2. Clergyman serving in a 
mosque; 3. Teacher or educator. (A. and A., 148)
Murid (T): A disciple of a Sufi murshid/pir/ishan, the murid renounces wordly ties and 
follows the example and the word of his chosen master. (A. and A., 149) 
Nohiyas (T): administrative division (district). Introduced as an official term in the 1994 
Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan to replace the Russian term rayon, 
urban districts in major cities, and administrative subdivisions in veloyats 
(obslast in Russian).
Radne akcije (S-C): voluntary community work 
Rohbar (T): informal village leader 
Raion (R): administrative division (district)
Sadoka also Sadaqa (T): community giving to those in need 
Samodoprinos (S-C): self-contribution
Samoupravna interesna zajednica (S-C): self-management interest community 
Somoni (T): Tajik currency 
Soviet (R): Council
Sovkhoz (R): state farm. Unlike in kolkhoz, sovkhoz property did not belong to the sovkhoz 
members but to the state.
Subotnik (R): Voluntary community work (often carried out on Saturdays -  thus linked to 
the word Subota)
Udruzenja gradjana (S-C): citizens’ associations
United Tajik Opposition (UTO): Formed in 1994 by the main opposition political parties 
banned by President Rakhmonov. Headed by Said Abdullo Nuri, it included the 
IRP, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the Coordination Center of Opposition 
Forces, Lal’li Badakhshton and other groups. IN 1994-1997 the UTO took part 
in the Inter-Tajik Peace Talks and signed the General Agreement on Peace in 
June 1997. Ceased to exist in 2000. (A. and A., 218)
Vakuf(S-C) (vaqf, T): religious endowments, lands and estates donated to religious 
institutions.
Veloyat (T): Tajikistan word meaning territory or province, veloyat replaced the Russian 
word oblast in the 1994 Constitution. Since 1999 three veloyats exist in 
Tajikistan. Heads are appointed by the President.
Zadruga (S-C): extended family household 
Zajednica (S-C): community 
Zbor (S-C): meeting
zbor gradjana (S-C): citizens’ assembly meeting 
Zhensoyuz (R): Women’s Committee
Index key:
S-C: Serbo-Croatian T: Tajik R: Russian
A. and A.: Abduallev and Akbarzadeh, 2002
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